ISRAEL/DOCUMENTS MAY–DECEMBER 1949 COMPANION VOLUME 4

STATE OF ISRAEL

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL May–December 1949

COMPANION VOLUME

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ISRAEL STATE ARCHIVES

DOCUMENTS ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF ISRAEL

VOLUME 4
May–December 1949

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COMPANION VOLUME

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CONTENTS

This volume of the ***Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel*** *is the first to be compiled after the sudden death of Dr Gedalia Yogev (1928–1982), General Editor of the series from its inception.*

The editing and publishing policies for the series were laid down by Dr Yogev following accepted standards in historico-scientific publishing, while taking into account the special problems involved in the case of documents written in Hebrew and in several European languages and intended mainly for the non-Hebrew reader.

Dr Yogev combined rare professional integrity with wide knowledge and trenchant judgement. The whole project had been stamped with his personality and the Editorial Board will endeavour to abide by the principles he established.

FOREWORD

This volume is the fourth in the series relating to the foreign policy of Israel. It covers the period May to December 1949. The editorial policy followed in the present volume is the same as that which governed the preparation of the previous volumes. The documents selected deal primarily with foreign policy, but a number of documents related to other matters closely bound up with the conduct of foreign policy have also been included. Among the subjects which fall under this category are immigration and the relations between Israel and the Jewish diaspora.

The documents have been selected with a view towards providing extensive documentation of deliberations, discussions, the spectrum of opinions and the shaping of foreign policy. A number of documents were chosen with the aim of providing coverage on subjects which, though they cannot be classified with the major themes of foreign policy, were of some importance at the time and must not be entirely ignored. These documents also enable the reader to trace the files which hold further information on the issues in question.

The selection of documents was only marginally affected by considerations as to whether or not deliberations on a particular issue led to concrete results or were of more than transient significance. Nevertheless, this criterion cannot be entirely disregarded and the space devoted to a particular issue must obviously bear some relation to its importance in a historical perspective.

A number of documents recording discussions and consultations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been included, the editors being aware of the importance of documentation relating to policy planning. It should be borne in mind, though, that questions relating to the long-range aims of foreign policy were not necessarily discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but rather at Cabinet level and by the executives of political parties.

The minutes of Cabinet meetings have not been declassified and are not available for research purposes, but information derived from them has been used by the editors in the preparation of the notes and the introduction to the volume.

The documents published in this volume derive mainly from the files of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the files of Israel's missions abroad. All these files are now in the custody of the Israel State Archives. A number of documents derive from other archives, such as the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives and other record groups kept in the Israel State Archives.

Arrangement of the documents. The documents are arranged in chronological order. Documents composed or sent out on more than one date are placed according to the earliest date. The position of telegrams in the chronological sequence is governed by the earliest known date, in the following order: date of drafting, date of dispatch, or – if neither of these is known – date of receipt. Reports of discussions and meetings appear under the date of writing, when known. When the date of writing is not known, the chronological location of the document in question is determined on the basis of the date of the recorded discussion or meeting (the latter date always appears in the main editorial heading).

The text. The text of the printed documents is identical with the original text except for the following editorial changes and corrections:

(a) Addresses of senders and addressees as well as dates in their original form have been deleted. In some of the reports, memoranda and minutes the original headings have also been omitted. The deleted information is incorporated in part in the editorial headings in standard form (see below) or in a note.

(b) A number of passages which have no direct relevance to foreign policy have been omitted, as have a few offensive references to individuals as well as some passages referring to subjects and names which have not been declassified. All omissions are indicated in the body of the text and as a rule are explained in footnotes.

(c) Minor errors have been corrected without comment and without indication in the body of the text.

(d) Common abbreviations and abbreviations whose meaning is not in doubt have been replaced by the full terms without comment and without indication in the body of the text. Abbreviations of proper names and abbreviations employed for reasons of secrecy have been expanded to full form in square brackets. However, abbreviations commonly pronounced as such and acronyms (e.g., U.N., UNO, I.D.F., U.S.A.) have not been altered.

(e) Missing words have in some cases been added, either conjecturally (within square brackets and preceded by a question mark) or on the basis of a corresponding text of the same document (within square brackets and with an explanation in a footnote).

(f) English spelling has been standardized to conform with British usage except in documents originating in American institutions or written by Americans.

(g) Faulty punctuation has been corrected. Punctuation words used in telegrams (e.g. *stop, comma*) have been replaced by punctuation marks, and the words *quote* and *unquote* by quotation marks.

(h) The outgoing text of telegrams has been used when extant.

Names. Israeli personalities who changed their names in the course of the period documented in this volume are referred to by their new Hebrew names in the editorial headings and in the annotation. Names appearing in the text, including signatures, have not been changed.

Signatures. Signatures appended in the writer's own hand are printed in bold type.

Editorial headings. The heading includes, *inter alia*, the file reference of the document and, in the case of telegrams, the file reference of the outgoing text. References to files of the Israel State Archives give only the reference numbers of the record group, the series, the box and the file. References to files of other archival institutions carry the full or abbreviated name of the institution. (See list of archives and abbreviations in references below.)

The destination of a document is noted in the editorial heading except when the document is addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other central government body.

Editorial Notes provide information on important events or developments. They precede the earliest document which contains a reference to the subject or are placed at the date on which the event took place.

Footnotes. The annotation consists mainly of numbered footnotes, explanatory notes and reference notes. The references given are mainly to primary sources (including sources that have been published, mainly documents of the Department of State of the United States published in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States).* The main purpose of the footnotes is to elucidate the text where necessary and to call attention to other relevant documents. There are a few references to documents and files which have not yet been declassified but which will eventually become available to researchers.

Biographical footnotes have been provided where necessary for a proper understanding of the text. Information on most persons mentioned in the documents is included in the index. The index does not provide information on persons mentioned only in the footnotes.

Appendices. There are five appendices in the Main Volume, containing U.N. documents vital for the understanding of the documents in this volume.

Maps. Two maps are appended to the Main Volume, one showing the armistice lines between Israel and her neighbours, the other showing the armistice lines in Jerusalem.

Index and list of documents. A list of the main subjects of the documents and editorial notes can be found at the beginning of the volume; an index of persons and subjects is at the end of the volume.

We would like to thank the following for their assistance: Dr Aba Gefen, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who read the entire manuscript; Dr Zehava Ostfeld, the Deputy Director of the Israel Military and Defence Establishment Archives, for her help in locating important complementary documentation; Mr Joseph Elron, who supervised the copy-editing of the Main and Companion Volumes, translated the major part of the summaries of the Hebrew documents and notes into English and was in charge of the proof-reading of the entire manuscript; Dr Carol Bosworth Kutscher, who translated the Introduction and some summaries of the Hebrew documents and notes into English; Mrs Michal Engel, who prepared the biographical notes and the index, read the entire manuscript of the Main and Companion Volumes and extended much help in general; Mrs Nehama Chalom, Director of the Weizmann Archives in Rehovoth, for style-editing the Companion Volume; Mr Eli Shaltiel, for style-editing the Hebrew Introduction; Professor Yehoshua Porath, for his guidance with regard to the transliteration of Arabic names; Mrs Lou Kaddar, for her assistance in preparing the French documents; Shlomit and Yuval Greenbaum, who prepared the maps; and Mrs Vera Eden, who prepared the typescripts of the documents and the annotations.

We are also indebted to all those who provided us with biographical infomation on themselves or on persons mentioned in the documents.

INTRODUCTION

The Conciliation Conference in Lausanne and the United Nations General Assembly debate on the political future of Jerusalem were the pivotal events in Israeli foreign policy during the period documented in the present volume, for Israel's relations with the Arab states and her relationship with the U.S. were directly affected by the course of events at the Lausanne Conference, while the problem of Jerusalem was the focus of Israeli activity in her relations with the Vatican and the nations of the Christian world. In addition to these central problems, there were other topics on the agenda of Israeli policy, including her relations with the U.S.S.R. and the East European states, Israel's policy at the U.N., and the establishment of a new relationship with Britain.

The political campaign abroad was waged simultaneously with a battle at home by Moshe Sharett to have his political positions and assessments accepted. On two principal issues – the Arab refugees and the status of Jerusalem – Israel's Foreign Minister advocated lines of action different from those adopted by the Prime Minister and some of his fellow ministers. In several instances he failed to persuade his colleagues in the Cabinet and consequently suffered bitter disappointment. At the end of the year, this constant struggle culminated in a personal drama: after months of endeavour to influence the conduct of foreign policy, Sharett tendered his resignation following Israel's severe defeat at the U.N. on the Jerusalem issue.

The U.N. General Assembly resolution of 11 December 1948[1] was the legal basis for international activity on the question of Palestine during 1949. The resolution contained three main clauses: the establishment of a Conciliation Commission which would aid the parties in ending the prevailing state of war; reaffirmation of the resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem and instructions to the Conciliation Commission to propose a detailed draft statute for the establishment of a permanent international regime in the city; and finally, an appeal to Israel to repatriate those Arab refugees desirous of returning to their homes and to compensate those wishing to remain in exile. On the basis of this resolution, the Conciliation Conference was convened in Lausanne, the campaign for the internationalization of Jerusalem was launched at the Fourth Session of the General Assembly of the U.N., and pressure was exerted upon Israel in connection with the refugee issue.

The members of the Conciliation Commission were the U.S. representative, Mark Ethridge, the French representative, Claude de Boisanger, and the Turkish representative, Hüseyin Yalçin. The conciliation talks opened in Lausanne on 27 April 1949. During the first phase, Israel's delegation was headed by Walter Eytan, the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and included two experts on Arab affairs, Reuven Shiloah and Eliahu Sasson, an expert on refugees, Zalman Liff, and Gershon Avner. The Arab delegations included senior officials from the foreign offices of the states

1. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.

concerned: Muhammad Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa headed the Egyptian delegation; Fawzi al-Mulqi led the Jordanian delegation; Fuad Ammun headed the Lebanese and Adnan al-Atassi the Syrian delegations respectively. On the periphery of the Conference, a delegation of refugees was also active under Muhammad Nimr Hawari. Most of the Arab representatives were already known to the Israeli representatives from earlier contacts and from the armistice talks.

The tortuous course and tangles of the Lausanne Conference preoccupied the makers of Israel's foreign policy for four months. During this time, Israel was continuously called upon to react to the developments and problems arising at the Conference, to resist the pressures exerted on her by the American State Department, and to formulate a policy on peace with the Arab countries.

From the first, the Lausanne talks encountered grave difficulties. The gap between the positions of the parties on the format of the discussions and the topics which were to be clarified was so great that only powerful outside pressure or the intense desire to arrive at a settlement at any cost could have bridged it. Israel refused to negotiate with a united Arab representation, and insisted on talks with each Arab delegation individually on the problems common to both parties, rejecting the demand to hold a debate at the Conference on the question of Jerusalem and refusing to hold talks with the Syrian delegation as long as that state did not sign an armistice agreement with Israel.

Israel's stand on the principal topics on the agenda – the question of the Arab refugees and boundary settlements – was clear-cut and decisive. The approach to the refugee problem was based on the assumption that, inasmuch as the Arab states were responsible for its creation, it was their duty to find a solution. Israel determined that permanent relief of the refugees' plight could best be achieved by their resettlement in Arab countries. However, recognizing their present suffering, Israel agreed to aid in the solution of the problem, but only on condition that it should be part of a comprehensive peace settlement with the Arabs. On the eve of the Lausanne Conference, Israel yielded to the importunities of the Conciliation Commission by announcing her willingness to pay compensation to those refugees who had cultivated their land before the war, and also to enable the reunification of families and to participate in the formulation of an international plan for settling the refugees in Arab countries.[2]

Israel's position on the territorial settlement was based on the actual situation: she proposed to recognize the armistice lines as her permanent boundaries but expressed her willingness to discuss border modifications in some sectors. Her attitude to the future of the Arab part of Palestine was by no means fixed, vacillating as it did between acceptance of Jordanian annexation of the area and agreement to the establishment of an independent Arab

2. See Vol. 2, No. 505.

state there. A Cabinet's decision to agree to the incorporation of the Gaza Strip in Israel was taken during the first days of the Conference.

The representatives of the Arab states, on the other hand, refused to hold direct talks with the Israeli delegation, and at the very outset of the Conference announced that all the Arab delegations would appear as a single united delegation. They demanded that the refugee problem be placed at the top of the agenda and adopted a uniform position on the subject, namely, they accused Israel of having expelled the refugees and demanded that these be repatriated to their former homes in Israel. They were particularly insistent in their demand that residents of those areas which the partition plan had recognized as part of the territory of the Arab state (Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba, and western Galilee) should be immediately restored to their homes.

The Arabs rejected the proposal of a permanent territorial settlement based on the armistice lines; each of the Arab delegations demanded far-reaching changes in their country's border with Israel.

The U.S. State Department's position on these two controversial subjects had a decisive effect on the course of the Lausanne Conference and on Israel–U.S. relations during those months. On the refugee question, the Americans adopted the Arab demand for the repatriation of the refugees to Israel. But, moved by realistic considerations, they also accepted the Israeli approach, namely, that some of the refugees must be resettled in Arab states. During this time, the State Department formulated a comprehensive plan for the solution of the refugee problem based on the repatriation of 200,000–250,000 refugees in Israel and the settlement of the remainder in Arab lands.[3] This plan tallied with the simultaneous American effort to penetrate the Middle East in order to safeguard it against Soviet influence. The effects of the global struggle between East and West, which intensified throughout 1949, were felt also in the Middle East and influenced the policy of the U.S. in the region as well as her attitude towards Israel. In this setting we may understand the State Department's position on the territorial issue. Israeli control of the southern Negev drove a wedge between Jordan and Egypt and ran counter to the American strategic conception of Arab territorial continuity. The Jessup formula, granting territorial compensation to the Arabs for territories held by Israel which were not included in the partition plan, was conceived in response to the actual situation in the area.[4] According to this formula, Israel was to cede the southern Negev in exchange for western Galilee. The question as to whether the territory taken from Israel would be granted to Jordan or to Egypt or would be divided up between them was not conclusively settled.

On the eve of the Lausanne Conference, the Department of State acted on the assumption that the key to the solution of the problem lay with Israel and that a certain degree of Israeli flexibility on the refugee and boundary

3. See No. 4, n. 20.
4. See No. 63, n. 1, and *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1430–40.

questions would make a comprehensive settlement possible. The American representative came to the Conference discussions with predetermined conceptions of Israel's role in the negotiation process. He learned the essentials of Israel's views during his preliminary talks with the Prime Ministry and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His impression of Ben-Gurion's views and of his standing in Israeli politics determined his moves during the first weeks of the Conference.[5] As the U.S. representative on the Conciliation Commission, Ethridge was senior to the representatives of the two other countries. In fact, in its initial stage, it was Ethridge who presided over the Conference and determined its character. His reports to Washington on Israel's intransigence and his recommendation, already in the earliest days of the Conference, to put pressure on Israel, particularly in connection with the refugee question, placed her in constant conflict with the White House and the Department of State.

The proximity of the beginning of the talks to the state's admission to the U.N. on May 11 facilitated the exertion of pressure on Israel.[6] Intentional leaks regarding the possibility that the U.S. would not support Israel's admission if she did not change her stand, forced Israel to weigh her every move in the opening days of the Conference. Her reply to the first document of the Commission concerning good-will gestures in the matter of the refugees[7] was, therefore, carefully considered. In the U.N., Eban declared Israel's willingness to contribute to the solution of the refugee problem upon the achievement of a peace settlement, but did not specify the nature of that contribution.[8] At Lausanne, Eytan argued on the meaning of Eban's declaration and attempted to emphasize Israeli gestures which had already been made regarding the refugees. These declarations were directed at policy-makers in Washington to convince them to decide in favour of Israel's admission to the U.N. The episode of the signature of the protocol of the Lausanne Conference[9] reflects the same trend: the Commission submitted the protocol as its solution to the thorny problem of the procedure of the discussions. The Arabs demanded that the discussions open with the refugee issue while Israel insisted that they begin with talks on a comprehensive settlement to serve as the framework for the solution of the refugee problem. By way of compromise, the protocol defined these two problems as questions requiring further clarification, and it was determined that the map of the partition plan should serve as a basis for discussion. Eytan signed this document, despite the obstacle it presented to the Israeli argument on the territorial question, in an effort to deprive the Americans of grounds for accusations against Israel on the eve of the debate on her admission to the U.N. After having signed the protocol, each party interpreted it in its own

5. See No. 1 and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 955–6.
6. See Nos. 14, 17 and *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1003–5.
7. See Appendix B, Main Volume, p. 780.
8. See No. 5 (Appendix).
9. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21.

way. Israel rejected the Arabs' contention that the document included the commitment to recognize the borders of the partition plan. The protocol served the Arab argument long after the Lausanne Conference had ended, and forced Israel repeatedly to contest the validity of the document.

The finalizing of the Conference agenda permitted some progress in the talks. Israel seized the initiative, submitting to the Commission a proposal for a combined solution to the boundary and refugee problems.[10] She proposed annexing the Gaza Strip, with all the refugees residing there, and fixing the other boundaries on the basis of the armistice lines, except for the border with Syria, which had still not signed an armistice agreement with Israel. The Cabinet had decided in favour of annexing the Gaza Strip over Sharett's opposition, the majority siding with the Prime Minister. Sharett presented two principal arguments: he feared that Israel could not cope with the humanitarian problem of absorbing the refugees and that Israel's agreement to assimilate them would be exploited to her detriment. Ben-Gurion pointed out in opposition that the geopolitical advantages of annexing the Gaza Strip would outweigh the problems involved in assimilating the refugees. The Gaza Strip was the first of the issues over which Sharett clashed with his colleagues throughout the period documented in the present volume. He held to his position even after the Cabinet's decision, although he scrupulously instructed the Israeli delegation in accordance with the majority opinion.

The Israeli initiative did not meet with the favourable response hoped for by the Government. In fact, Ethridge and the Commission did not consider it an important turning point. Only after some hesitation, without much enthusiasm or any expectation of changing the course of the Conference, did they decide to submit the Israeli proposal for consideration by the Arab delegations. Ethridge did not approve of Israel's approach; he continued to demand more flexibility on her part on the various controversial subjects. The Department of State and the White House supported his assessments. After the first month, when the Conference reached a hopeless impasse, Ethridge tried to end it with the aid of a strongly worded note from President Truman to Israel's Prime Minister.[11] The American President demanded that Israel repatriate the refugees and make territorial concessions based on the Jessup formula. The note contained the threat that the U.S. would reconsider her policy regarding Israel if the latter did not modify her position.

Ben-Gurion was enraged by this note and in his talk with the American Ambassador in Israel reacted vehemently to its contents. In her official reply to the note, Israel rejected the American dictates and reiterated the main points of her stand on the refugees and boundaries.[12] The Israeli position provoked a great deal of resentment in the Department of State, which reacted with proposals to take severe steps against Israel, including suspension of the

10. See Nos. 32 and 41.
11. See No. 42.
12. See Nos. 64 and 67.

loan authorized through the Import–Export Bank. American pressure contributed nothing to the progress of the Lausanne talks which were practically deadlocked. The atmosphere at Lausanne was gloomy and full of suspicion and a crisis arose in Israel's relations with the American representative.[13] In mid-June, Ethridge proposed that the talks recess for several weeks. The members of the Israeli delegation felt that this step would prove futile, and feared that any break in the negotiations would be to the detriment of the informal ties which they had succeeded in establishing with the members of the Arab delegations. These ties had been fostered simultaneously with the formal talks and had enabled the Israeli representatives to study the Arabs' positions at first hand. From meetings with members of the Lebanese delegation, the Jordanian and Egyptian representatives, and members of the refugees' delegation, it became clear, for example, that Israel's boundaries worried the Arab governments more than the refugee problem. Only the refugees' delegation, which the Arab delegations considered a nuisance, concentrated on the fate of the refugees and attempted to come to some sort of settlement with Israel for the solution of this problem.[14]

The Arab territorial demands were indicative of the numerous difficulties in the way of a settlement. The Egyptians demanded the southern Negev (the Majdal–Dead Sea line) and rejected the idea of Israel's annexing the Gaza Strip. The Jordanians demanded that the West Bank be annexed to their country and that the refugees be resettled in the territories which Israel had taken over beyond the partition boundaries, or, alternatively, that areas such as Lydda and Ramle be transferred to Jordan with the refugees residing there. The talks with the Arabs did not eventuate in an agreement or further the goals of the Conference. The Conciliation Commission did not favour these direct contacts but, rather, accused Israel of attempting to circumvent the Conference debates. Israel rejected this accusation, contending that it was the Commission's misguided policy which was forcing her to establish ties with the Arabs outside the conference rooms at Lausanne.[15]

The delegation's tense relations with the Commission and the disappointment with the Lausanne talks affected the Israeli representatives, especially Eliahu Sasson, who tried to make his Government aware of the graveness of the situation and who proposed a different approach to the talks. On the basis of his conversations with the Arabs, Sasson had come to the conclusion that they would reject any peace agreement which did not include the following clauses: annexation of the Arab Triangle by Jordan, Israel's abandonment of her claim to the Gaza Strip and agreement to Jordanian free access to Gaza, partition of Jerusalem with international supervision of the Holy Places, changes in the border with Syria, and Israeli agreement to repatriate 100,000 refugees. Sasson, sunk in the pessimistic spirit of that period, thought it

13. See No. 74.
14. See Nos. 12, 52 and 56.
15. See Nos. 50, 61 and 62.

might be desirable for Israel to consider a peace settlement under such terms if it would end the struggle with the Arabs.[16] Sharett rejected Sasson's approach although he adopted some of his suggestions. He agreed to Jordan's annexation of the Arab Triangle, relinquishment of Israel's plans for the Gaza Strip, and the partition of Jerusalem, but rejected the idea of Jordanian sovereignty over a corridor to Gaza, opposed any concessions to Syria, and any commitment to repatriate a specific number of refugees. His position on the refugee question changed several days later under pressure of political circumstances. The clarification of positions begun in the exchange of letters between Sharett and Sasson continued in consultations among Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel prior to the second stage of the Lausanne Conference. It was at these consultations that Israel's peace policy became clarified and her line on the continuation of the talks took shape (see below).

In the days preceding the suspension of the Conference, American pressure on Israel increased. In an exchange of communications and notes between the Department of State and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and between the presidents of the two nations, Israel was repeatedly called on to declare her willingness to absorb a certain number of refugees and to endorse the principle of territorial compensation.[17] Israel was indirectly blamed for the failure of the Conference and was pressed to help end the impasse. In the bitter controversy with the Department of State, Israel vigorously denied the American charges, pointing to the inept conduct of the Conference and censuring the Commission's attempts to prevent direct contact between the parties. Israel repeatedly rejected the American assumption that the new order must be founded upon the partition plan, maintaining that the armistice agreements which had been achieved through direct negotiations were more valid than settlements based on the partition plan. These bitter exchanges did nothing to lessen the tension, and growing American pressure gradually convinced the Israeli representatives that they had no alternative but to yield to some at least of these demands. The State Department's efforts to deny the Israeli lobby access to President Truman[18] were successful. The Israeli representatives were convinced that the President's particular interest in the refugee problem and the State Department's successful formation of a united front with the White House threatened Israel's special place in the President's sympathies and consequently dictated a change in the Israeli position.[19]

In the summer of 1949, the political debate in Israel centred on her relations with the U.S. Israel's representatives in America and Lausanne returned home in order to impress upon Ben-Gurion and the Cabinet the gravity of the situation. They dwelt on the damage to Israel's standing in the

16. See No. 81 and exchange of telegrams between Sharett and Sasson, 13 and 15 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5.
17. See Nos. 96, 101, 104 and 105.
18. See No. 92.
19. See Nos. 103 and 105.

White House and stressed the lessening of sympathy for Israel in American public opinion.[20] In anticipation of a debate in the Cabinet on this issue, the Foreign Minister drew up a proposal aiming at easing American pressure on Israel, suggesting that the Government publicly declare Israel's willingness to repatriate 100,000 refugees. This figure would include some 35,000 refugees who had already been absorbed in Israel or who were to be admitted within the framework of family reunification. The Prime Minister and several Cabinet members rejected the Foreign Minister's proposal. Ben-Gurion stood by Israel's declared position against repatriation of the refugees, and dwelt on the shortcomings of Sharett's proposal. He maintained that the suggested figure would not satisfy the Arabs nor the Americans, who were demanding the repatriation of at least 200,000 refugees, would not further the cause of peace, and would merely pose a threat to Israel's security. Only a minority of the ministers were of Ben-Gurion's mind, the majority, although with some reservations, supporting Sharett's proposal. The resolution finally adopted by the Cabinet took into account Ben-Gurion's opposition. Sharett was requested to find out whether such a step on Israel's part would help ease the tension with the U.S., and on the basis of his findings to decide on the most appropriate time to publish the resolution. The Government's decision was communicated to the Americans in late July.[21] The statement dispatched to Secretary of State Dean Acheson declared that implementation of this resolution was contingent on the achievement of a peace settlement with the Arabs and a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem. Israel also stressed that the proposed number of refugees represented the outer limit of the concessions which she was prepared to consider.

When news of this leaked out to the Israeli press, it aroused a storm of public protest. Personalities representing the gamut of political convictions came out against the proposal. In the Mapai party, in the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security, and in the Knesset plenum, the Cabinet resolution aroused rage and fierce opposition. Sharett was forced to argue even with his fellow party members, some of whom did not support the Government during the debate in the Knesset. The public controversy in Israel actually strengthened Israel's cause in the U.S., for in reflecting the extent of domestic dissension it was seen as decisive evidence of the risk the Government had taken in proposing these concessions.

The American reaction to the Israeli move was not uniform. The President, apparently, was favourably impressed by the change in Israel's position, for pressure by the White House abated. The State Department's attitude towards Israel did improve, but disappointment was expressed at the number of refugees which Israel was willing to accept and, after a brief respite, the Department redoubled its pressure.

20. See Ben-Gurion's Diary, 30 June 1949, I.M.D.E.A.
21. See Nos. 144 and 160.

In the meantime, the Conciliation talks had been resumed in Lausanne. The second stage lasted approximately six weeks (18 July – 12 September). Israel was prepared this time, having learned the lessons of the first stage and bearing in mind the approaching session of the U.N. General Assembly in September. Israel's policy-makers assumed that the failure of the Conference might cause the Palestine issue to be raised in the General Assembly, where resolutions unfavourable to Israel might be adopted. It was therefore decided that the momentum of the negotiations must be regained in order to forestall intervention in the talks by the Assembly. Israel assumed that greater flexibility on her part would further this and she planned her course of action at Lausanne accordingly.[22] The decision was that should the Arab delegations declare that they viewed the Lausanne talks as a stage in talks towards a comprehensive peace agreement, Israel would declare her willingness to commence the discussions with of the refugee question. It was also decided that in the course of the negotiations, Israel would announce how many refugees she would be willing to admit if a peace settlement were arrived at.

This time, too, Ben-Gurion disagreed with Sharett's assessments, rejecting his evaluation of the importance of the U.N. General Assembly and the urgency of achieving peace. He was also against informing the Arabs at Lausanne formally of the intention to admit 100,000 refugees, arguing that the resolution had been adopted solely *vis-à-vis* America and must not be published at Lausanne. At Ben-Gurion's intervention, it was decided to adopt the formula intended for the U.S., namely, that Israel must first sound out the Arabs and only afterwards decide when and in what manner to make her declaration. On the question of a territorial settlement, it was resolved that Israel's approach versus Egypt be relatively flexible, the desert area on the Egyptian border to be offered in exchange for the Gaza Strip.

Israel's modified position did not bring about the hoped-for results, and the course of the second phase of the talks resembled that of the first. The American representative on the Commission was replaced, Ethridge being succeeded by Paul Porter, the President's confidant. Like his predecessor, Porter conducted the talks at his own discretion, not infrequently clashing with the French representative. He endeavoured to conclude the talks before the Assembly was convened, and to hammer out an acceptable formula on the refugees and on a territorial settlement, and a declaration of intent on the issue of peace. It was not long before Porter discovered how vast were the differences between the parties and realized the Conference was not achieving its goals.

The Arabs rejected Israel's declaration of willingness to absorb 100,000 refugees and insisted on a larger number. Israel rejected this demand despite pressure by the U.S. and in Lausanne. In informal talks, representatives of Syria and Jordan had agreed to absorb refugees in their own countries, but the official stand of the Arab delegations remained the same and no progress was

22. See No. 146.

made. Having analysed the positions of the parties on the territorial issue, Porter saw that there was no prospect of a compromise and he gradually came to the conclusion that a solution to the controversy would have to be found outside the framework of the Conference. A proposal to refer the debate on the Palestine issue to the General Assembly was categorically rejected by Israel as well as by the French representative on the Commission, and was subsequently dropped.

Discouraged by his stay in Lausanne, Porter returned to Washington for consultations. Israel's representatives averred that they had succeeded in persuading Porter to dissociate himself from the State Department's stand on the refugee and territorial issues and to draw closer to Israel's position.[23] In Washington, Porter tried to relieve the pressure on Israel and forestall a crisis in her relations with the U.S., recommending to his superiors that they adopt a new approach and try to formulate a solution based on economics rather than politics. He also advised that an Economic Survey Commission be appointed under the auspices of the Conciliation Commission, to examine the feasibility of resettling the refugees in Arab countries and in Israel and to recommend a plan for development of the Middle East. Porter's proposal aimed at indicating a way out of the impasse of the Lausanne Conference without creating a sense of failure. The President and the Secretary of State endorsed Porter's recommendation, but the Middle East Division of the Department of State gave it a cold reception. The latter did not abate its pressure on Israel all through the second stage of the Conference. In the second half of August, State Department pressure culminated in the unprecedented step of a political veto on transfer of loan monies to Israel. The veto was rescinded two days later due to the strenuous opposition by the directors of the Export–Import Bank, Israel's strongly worded reaction, and her representatives' agreement to cooperate with the proposed Survey Commission.[24]

The establishment of the Survey Commission gradually led to the termination of the Lausanne Conference. At the end of August, the participants replied to the Commission's questionnaire on their final position on the two controversial questions. When the Commission had evaluated these replies, it announced on 12 September that the talks would be suspended until the Survey Commission had completed its work. Thus ended the Lausanne Conference, although the Conciliation Commission continued its activities. In exchanges of communications with Israel's representatives[25] and the Arabs, the Commission tried unsuccessfully to find a generally acceptable formula on the territorial issue. Israel's firm stand on the issue of the armistice lines was rejected by the Commission. In an exchange of notes, the Commission carried on a trenchant dispute with Israel, accusing her of intransigence and inflexibility. Israel rejected these accusations, claiming that

23. See Nos. 225, 226 and 236.
24. See Nos. 240–244, 247 and 287.
25. See Nos. 255, 288, 272 and 414.

the Commission was overstepping the bounds of its mandate in trying to impose a solution on Israel. The controversy did not end in 1949 and angry exchanges took place at the session of the Commission in Geneva in January 1950.

The four months of talks at Lausanne ended without any great disappointments for Israel. The failure of conciliation only served to reinforce the basic Israeli attitude that direct talks were preferable to any form of mediation. Israel emerged from the talks and from the controversy with the U.S. without having made any concessions on her principal positions, though she also failed to formulate an agreement with her neighbours. Israeli policy on the question of peace and the prospects of a settlement with the Arab states were discussed on several occasions in the course of the Lausanne Conference.[26] In Cabinet meetings and consultations in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the question was clarified of the urgency of peace and the advisability of a settlement with one Arab state rather than another. In mid-July it was decided that it was preferable to reach a settlement with Syria and Egypt rather than hold talks with Jordan. On the basis of indications from Damascus of the willingness of the Syrian ruler, Husni Zaim, to begin peace talks with Israel and to absorb refugees in his own country, Israel put out feelers, but there were no substantial results. Subsequently an army *coup* in Damascus overthrew the Zaim regime and the Israeli feelers were withdrawn. Internal instability in Syria in the months following the *coup* did not favour the development of fruitful contacts with her leaders.

American attempts at mediating talks between Israel and Egypt during the recess in the Lausanne Conference were frustrated by Egypt's refusal. Egypt's position on the question of boundaries as advanced in Abd al-Mun'im's meetings with Sasson and Shiloah at Lausanne, did not create the proper atmosphere for opening direct talks on a peace settlement. On the other hand, preparations in Jordan and Jerusalem following the Lausanne Conference and the debate on the Jerusalem issue in the U.N. General Assembly furthered the initiation of peace negotiations with King Abdallah. The talks with the Jordanian king were the most serious held with any Arab state since the war in 1948. They did not end in 1949, but continued to concern Israeli policy in 1950 and even later.

The line adopted on the question of peace during the period dealt with in Volume 4 held that Israel must not rush, or allow herself to be rushed, into any peace settlement entailing far-reaching territorial or other concessions which would threaten her security. In various debates at home, it was accepted that, for the time being, the armistice agreements represented an effective substitute for a peace agreement, and hence there was no need for haste. The fear that reiterated declarations of Israel's desire for peace would be interpreted as a sign of weakness led to avoidance of anxious statements on the urgent need

26. See No. 137.

for peace, but at the same time, stress had to be laid on the aspiration for peace as a fundamental part of Israel's policy.

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The question of the political fate of Jerusalem occupied Israeli policy-makers all through 1949, although serious treatment of the subject was given real impetus only shortly before the U.N. General Assembly debate in September until the resolution on internationalization in December. The Israeli position on Jerusalem was complex; the difficult international situation revolving around the status of Jerusalem began with the partition resolution determining that the city should be internationalized, and placed an especial burden on Israel by confronting her with a formidable political dilemma: though rejecting the internationalization plan which she had however formally endorsed when she accepted the partition plan of which internationalization was a part, she could not oppose internationalization openly without being accused of brazen violation of a U.N. resolution. Israel sought a solution and seized upon the idea of functional internationalization, that is, the establishment of international supervision of the Holy Places only, or alternatively, of the entire Old City. The idea took shape at the end of 1948 and found supporters in several states in Europe and America. However, the Vatican, the very heart of the Christian world, with its tremendous influence over numerous Catholic states, rejected this proposal.

In the latter half of 1949, Israeli diplomacy ceaselessly strove to defeat the internationalization resolution. With the help of contacts with various states and international elements, Israel tried to influence Vatican policy. At one point it seemed that her efforts had been successful: there were indications of a change in the Vatican's relations with Israel, and a chance of strengthening the hand of those Vatican officials who showed a willingness to support international supervision of the Holy Places. A short time later, this hope was blasted when it became obvious that the Vatican had no interest in direct ties with Israel or in establishing a permanent dialogue with her.

Simultaneously with Israel's diplomatic struggle abroad, there was the internal struggle to make Jerusalem the capital and to take definite steps to transfer government institutions there. The Cabinet's resolution in late 1948 on the transfer of government offices to Jerusalem was implemented slowly and several Cabinet members tried to expedite the creation of accomplished facts before the Assembly convened. By contrast with those who endeavoured to accelerate this process, Sharett felt that creating accomplished facts in Jerusalem would only jeopardize Israel's chances of blocking the expected political offensive against her in the U.N., and hence he urged waiting until the Assembly had completed its sessions. Nor was Sharett in any hurry to declare Jerusalem the capital of Israel.

Further debates in the Cabinet during the summer of 1949 embittered relations between the Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister and other

ministers. Through unremitting struggle and debate with his colleagues, Sharett managed to prevent the adoption of the resolution in principle on the transfer of government institutions to Jerusalem until the convening of the General Assembly,[27] but this decision was not scrupulously observed. Various steps which were evidence of the Government's intention of establishing an administrative centre in Jerusalem had international repercussions and aroused protest around the world.[28] International sensitivity to any change in the *status quo* in Jerusalem forced Israel's representatives into a defensive position. Sharett was troubled and pointed out to his colleagues the damage they were causing to the standing of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and indirectly also to Israel's foreign policy. Sharett managed to resist domestic pressure until the resolution on internationalization was adopted, but in the aftermath he could no longer do so.

Israel's diplomatic effort in the Jerusalem issue on the eve of the U.N. General Assembly session concentrated on foiling the Conciliation Commission's plan to establish an international regime in Jerusalem. The Commission's plan specified that Jerusalem should be demilitarized and partitioned into two zones, Jewish and Arab, which would be accorded broad administrative autonomy. The demographic balance of the city was to be preserved and a U.N. representative appointed to guarantee free access to the Holy Places and provide the means for their protection. Some of the basic assumptions were consistent with Israel's ideas, but the plan also included several clauses which ran counter to Israel's approach and set her irrevocably against it.[29] The Israeli delegation at the U.N. strove to frustrate the plan. While pointing out its disadvantages and basic unimplementability, the delegation presented an alternative proposal which essentially consisted of an agreement between Israel and the U.N. on the supervision and safeguarding of the Holy Places. The delegation worked tirelessly to persuade the representatives of the other nations of the advantages of the Israeli plan while sounding out their positions on the Commission's plan and the idea of internationalization in general. From the addresses of the delegations' heads at the U.N. in the Plenary Session of the General Assembly and from varied diplomatic activity among those attending the Assembly, the Israeli representatives came to the conclusion that the Commission's plan would be defeated in the actual debates and that there was no danger of the internationalization plan coming up again.

In accordance with the Assembly's agenda, the debate on Jerusalem was transferred to the Political Committee, and from there to the Sub-committee. The debates in the Committees began only in November. During the long recess from the end of the Plenary Sessions in September to the opening of the debate in the Committees, the idea gained currency that the advocates of internationalization were not united and would be unable to gain the support

27. See No. 192.
28. See Nos. 277 and 237.
29. See No. 293.

of the required number of representatives in order to reintroduce the internationalization plan. Thus, when on 24 November Australia unexpectedly submitted to the Sub-committee a proposal to internationalize Jerusalem, it caused great consternation among the anti-internationalization forces and represented a dramatic turning point in the campaign on Jerusalem. Domestic developments in Australia had led to this startling move: Evatt, the Prime Minister, had initiated the resolution under pressure of an election campaign which was held at precisely that time, hoping that this step would earn him the Catholic vote.

The fact that it was Australia which submitted the proposal rather than the U.S.S.R., for example, tipped the balance in favour of internationalization. The Israeli representatives who knew of Australia's intentions only shortly before it was taken were aware of the gravity of the step. Their efforts at persuasion of the Australian representatives at the U.N. as well as of the heads of the Australian Ministry for External Affairs were of no avail.[30] In addition to the Australian proposal, the Sub-committee had before it the Conciliation Commission's report and Israel's draft resolution.[31] The debates on the various proposals in the Sub-committee aroused neither great hopes nor utter despair. The U.S. and Britain, who opposed internationalization, encouraged Israel but the U.S.S.R. and with her the entire Communist bloc supported the plan, owing to their belief that an international regime would weaken the position in Jerusalem of the Western powers, and of Britain in particular, and owing to their support in principle of the U.N. partition resolution.

The diplomatic activity headed by the Foreign Minister, who left for New York at a certain stage, aimed as a first step at defeating the plan in the Sub-committee. Approval of the plan in the Sub-committee did not necessarily mean that it would be adopted in other forums. According to various assessments, there was still reason to hope that the plan would not be approved in the Political Committee; the voting in this committee was in effect a general rehearsal for the final decision in the General Assembly.

The adoption of the internationalization proposal in the Political Committee on 5 December was a grave blow to Israel, but her representatives did not yet despair of persuading several U.N. members to vote against it. Last-minute diplomatic activity in New York, New Zealand, the Benelux countries, France, and even the Vatican[32] somewhat improved the outlook on the eve of the voting. This cautious optimism was destroyed in the face of the Catholic-Soviet-Arab front which on 9 December brought about the adoption of the Australian proposal for the internationalization of Jerusalem in the U.N. General Assembly. A subsequent analysis of the voting patterns of the various delegations showed that last-minute pressure by the Vatican had

30. See No. 429.
31. See Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.
32. See Nos. 459, 464, 466, 468 and 475.

changed the declared positions of several delegations (Mexico, Holland, Luxembourg, Panama and Honduras)[33] and tipped the balance in favour of internationalization.

The smarting defeat in the U.N. stirred up a stormy controversy between Sharett and his colleagues over Israel's reactions before and after the adoption of the resolution. On the eve of the voting in the General Assembly, Ben-Gurion proposed a strongly worded statement to be issued by the Knesset explaining to the U.N. members that Israel would not accept a foreign regime in Jerusalem and would resist any attempt to tear the city away from the State of Israel. The text of Ben-Gurion's proposed statement contained the threat that Israel would secede from the U.N. if the resolution on internationalization were adopted. Sharett opposed a drastic reaction which might be interpreted as provocation of the U.N. and evidence of unwarranted agitation in Israel.[34] Sharett's position thus had a moderating effect on the wording of the Government statement in the Knesset on 5 December, which however he did not succeed in blocking altogether. After the adoption of the General Assembly resolution, the controversy broke out with redoubled acrimony. Ben-Gurion demanded a sharp reaction on Israel's part and was prepared to risk taking practical steps in Jerusalem in the face of the U.N. resolution. The internationalization resolution was the signal for action for all those in favour of transferring the government offices to Jerusalem and declaring the city the capital of Israel. They sought to create accomplished facts which would be evidence of Israel's control over the city and would gradually bring about world recognition of the changing state of affairs in Jerusalem. Ben-Gurion stated flatly that the *status quo* in Jerusalem must be changed and the world confronted with the fact of Israel's existence and sovereignty. He viewed the Jerusalem episode as a factor which would accelerate international recognition of Israeli sovereignty.[35] Sharett, who for months had withstood the pressure of the international campaign at the U.N., was extremely worried lest Israel be accused violating the Organization's resolutions. His stand on the transfer of government offices to Jerusalem and declaring it the nation's capital did not change under pressure of events. Thus at this time, the months-long controversy between Sharett and his colleagues flared up again in all its bitterness. Like his fellow ministers, Sharett wished to establish publicly Jerusalem's unquestionable status as the capital of Israel; nor was he afraid to lay the blame upon the U.N. for adopting an unimplementable resolution. The controversy between Sharett and his colleagues centred rather on the question of whether it was necessary to publish official statements on the transfer of the Government to Jerusalem. Sharett felt that the resolution on internationalization would fail of its own accord, and by refraining from provocative statements Israel could forestall accusations of having adopted a

33. See No. 463.
34. See No. 453 and n. 2 *ibid.*
35. See No. 487.

policy which had defeated the internationalization plan. He recommended waiting for the convening of the Trusteeship Council, which was entrusted with the implementation of the plan, and for the American reaction.

In the course of two stormy meetings, the Government debated the nature of Israel's reaction. Ben-Gurion laid before the Cabinet the text of a statement to be submitted to the Knesset containing the declaration that the seat of Government would be transferred to Jerusalem. The Cabinet rejected various proposed extreme wordings, but also rejected Kaplan and Rosen's contention that there should be no declaration on the transfer of the ministries and that the Cabinet should await Sharett's return. At the first meeting, there was criticism of the Foreign Minister for having prevented adoption of the Israeli resolution on Jerusalem for half a year, but this criticism was rejected by the Prime Minister and several Cabinet members. At the second meeting, the Cabinet was apprised of Sharett's opposition to the wording of the declaration, but no meaningful debate on it took place. The Cabinet approved Ben-Gurion's text of the declaration with only minor changes. In reply to one minister's criticism of their having adopted the resolution without discussing Sharett's reply, Ben-Gurion insisted on the Government's right to pass resolutions on foreign policy in opposition to the Foreign Minister's views. He clarified that from the moment the resolution received a majority, the Minister was obligated to implement it. In a Mapai party debate on the Government resolution, Ben-Gurion's position was approved by a much larger majority than anticipated.

In the course of several days then, Sharett was compelled to endure a twofold failure – he felt responsible for the Israeli defeat at the U.N. and also experienced a personal defeat in the Cabinet and in his own party. These circumstances drove him to a drastic and unexpected personal decision – resignation from the Cabinet. He submitted it to Ben-Gurion, only a handful of his friends being aware of his intention.[36] Simultaneously, Sharett requested his friends' help in preventing extreme reactions on Ben-Gurion's part; he urged that they make Ben-Gurion aware of the damage which his statements had done to Israel on the international scene, and that they act to prevent *faits accomplis* of foreign policy in the form of political statements by the Prime Minister.[37]

Ben-Gurion was stunned by Sharett's resignation, which he flatly refused to accept.[38] Nor did he accept Sharett's decision to take personal responsibility for the failure in the U.N., calling upon him to continue, along with his colleagues, with the mission of strengthening Israel and defending her stands. Sharett's friends implored him to change his mind.

One day later, Sharett responded to these pleas by withdrawing his resignation. His step had apparently been intended to express his profound dissatis-

36. See No. 490 and n. 2 *ibid.*
37. See No. 494.
38. See No. 498.

faction with the Government's and the Prime Minister's actions and the damage to his status as Foreign Minister. At the same time, Sharett did not change his views. He stood by his conviction that it was possible for Israel to extricate herself from the mire of internationalization without conflict with the U.N., and he repeatedly criticized Ben-Gurion's public statements on foreign policy questions, which, he felt, undermined Israel's prestige. Ben-Gurion rejected Sharett's views and continued to believe that the resolution on internationalization was a grave one and therefore any response to it had to be equally severe. Before his very eyes, the dream of making Jerusalem the capital of Israel was becoming a reality, and for the sake of this vision he was willing to risk clashes with the U.N. This controversy over the question of Jerusalem did not end here, and it left a residue of bitterness in the relations between Ben-Gurion and Sharett.

The implementation of the resolution on internationalization was entrusted to the U.N. Trusteeship Council which now became the focus of Israel's diplomatic campaign over the status of Jerusalem. The Council's attempt to prevent the transfer of government offices to Jerusalem was strenuously resisted by Israel. The last document in the present volume reiterates Israel's right to establish the seat of Government in Jerusalem. Thus ended the first phase of the struggle for Jerusalem, which had begun in late 1948. This campaign, however, was by no means over, but continued to occupy Israel's policy in coming years.

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The focusing of political attention on the Lausanne Conference and the problem of Jerusalem did not retard the development of Israel's foreign relations and her efforts to integrate in international politics. In the latter half of 1949, Israel continued her effort to expand and consolidate her foreign relations. Special attention was devoted to political activity which would foster Israel's relations with the U.S.S.R. and the East European bloc.

The first signs of strain in Israel's relations with Russia began to appear already in the fall of 1948. Apparently the background to this change was the great awakening of Russian Jewry after the founding of the State of Israel. On the surface, relations continued correct, even cordial, but Israel's expectations of closer ties were frustrated. At the close of this period, there were increasing signs of a substantial change in the Soviet Government's attitude to Russian Jewry which found expression in a marked worsening of their situation.[39] Friendly diplomatic contacts with Israel did not prevent the U.S.S.R. from supporting internationalization of Jerusalem in spite of all Israeli diplomatic efforts. One argument was pointing out to the Russians their ingratitude, seeing that it was only thanks to Israel's sovereignty in Jerusalem that the Soviets recovered their property in the city.

39. See Nos. 324 and 445.

The Soviets' uncompromising stand set Israel thinking about changing her policy of nonalignment *vis-à-vis* the two blocs. Intimations by the Department of State of fears in American military circles lest Israel draw too near the U.S.S.R. also furthered this process.[40] Gradually, other strains became apparent in the political line which dictated the preservation of a balance in Israel's relations with East and West. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the opinion was expressed that a change in attitude towards the U.S.S.R. would improve relations with the U.S. and ease the pressure which America had been exerting on Israel for the past few months. For the time being, other political considerations were more pressing, including Jewish immigration to Israel from Eastern Europe, and Israel continued to maintain the balance in her policy, but the process which had led to change did not last long.

The relations with the East European states focused on the question of *aliyah* [immigration] and commerce. Official policy in most of these states placed difficulties in the way of Jewish emigration to Israel. The Israeli ministers in Rumania and Hungary laboured tirelessly to open the gates to *aliyah*, but with little success. The situation of Rumanian Jewry was especially difficult and reflected the attitude of Rumania towards Israel. In the period covered by the documents in Volume 4, the State of Israel's relations with this country were in crisis. Ben-Gurion's strongly worded address on Rumania's hostile policy on Zionism and the Jews and his remarks regarding Rumania's Foreign Minister, reflected the tension between the two states. The Rumanian government's protest and Israel's reply did not lessen the resentment on both sides.[41] At the end of the year, Israel's minister was recalled in protest. Relations with Rumania gradually improved and *aliyah* from that country resumed in the course of 1950.

Poland represented the only bright spot in East European *aliyah*. At the close of 1949, Jews were permitted to emigrate to Israel under certain conditions. The problem of the absorption of the immigrants troubled Israel's minister in Warsaw. Barzilai feared that Polish *aliyah* might be cut off if the immigrants were not successfully absorbed in Israel. His request to grant preferential status to Polish Jews was not approved by the Cabinet, for the latter was careful not to discriminate in favour of any one national group of immigrants at a time of generally increasing *aliyah*.

Israel's relations with the West European countries developed in stages, whose vicissitudes depended on these nations' attitude towards the main political questions preoccupying Israel at that time. Special importance was attached to the change in Israel's relations with Britain which began in the summer of 1949. The remnants of British hostility towards Israel left over from the Mandate period and the founding of the State of Israel gradually disappeared, to be replaced by an approach characterized by the recognition of the fact of Israel's existence and her place in the Middle East. One sign of

40. See No. 512.
41. See Nos. 393 and 439.

change was Bevin's offer to mediate between Israel and the Arab states and in his moderate statement concerning Israel's retention of the Negev.[42] Other indications confirmed the trend towards change which Foreign Minister Sharett noted with approval. The improvement in political relations was however accompanied by difficulties which became apparent in discussions between the two states over the economic problems still outstanding after the termination of the Mandate. However, the economic controversy did not affect the general positive trend in relations between Israel and Britain.

Israel's complete integration in international politics found tangible expression in her admittance to the U.N. in May 1949. Her membership in the organization made Israel a state with equal rights in the international arena. The democratic process of majority rule practised in the various U.N. bodies gave Israel's vote a weight equal to that of every other state, and her voting on various controversial international issues was decisive. Israel determined her stand on topics debated in the U.N. only after exhaustive deliberation. The problematics lay in the conflict of interests between her aspiration to demonstrate a moral-ethical political standpoint and the need for a sober diplomatic approach. In the period documented in the present volume, Israel was required to decide on several issues (relations with Spain, Indonesian independence, South Africa, etc.), the question of the future of the Italian colonies in Africa, which split opinions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and even in the Cabinet, proving one of the thorniest in Israel's foreign policy. The question was whether to support Somalia's independence or the establishment of an Italian trusteeship there. On the one hand, the liberation of Asian and African states from colonial rule was an issue which occupied a special place in Israel's heart inasmuch as she herself had so recently gained her independence. On the other hand, friendship and fostering of ties with Italy were no less important.

At the Second Part of the Third Session of the Assembly, Israel decided, on the basis of ethical and moral considerations, to abstain from voting on the Italian trusteeship. On the eve of the Fourth Session, a dispute broke out between the two representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were concerned in the affair: Abba Eban, head of the Israeli delegation to the U.N., and Shlomo Ginossar, Israel's minister in Italy. While Eban supported the vote of conscience against Italian trusteeship,[43] Ginossar's defence of Israel's political interests in Italy obliged him to come out in support of the latter.[44] Sharett vacillated between the two positions, finally deciding in favour of Ginossar's, as did the Cabinet.

The present volume marks the end of one stage in Israel's political campaign for independence. After a year of war and the commencement of

42. See Nos. 140 and 183.
43. See Nos. 235 and 254.
44. See Nos. 295, 318, 385 and 400.

Israel's political integration in the international arena, the year 1950 was to usher in a period of consolidation and growth in Israel's foreign policy. Several of the fundamental problems which troubled Israel in 1949, such as the question of the refugees, the status of Jerusalem, and relations with the Arab states, would continue to do so in later years, while new issues, such as relations with Germany, the relations with France and Britain, would arise forming Israeli policy in the 1950s.

Yemima Rosenthal

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125. 6 July **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting of Eban and Rafael with Ross: prospects of talks with Egypt; the embargo on arms to the Middle East.

126. 8 July **G. Avner to P. de Azcárate**
Government of Israel's announcement on reuniting of families.

127. 8 July **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting of Eban and Rafael with Cordier on the possibility of an Israeli announcement on repatriation of one hundred thousand refugees – Cordier's promise to sound out State Department.

128. 8 July **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting with State Department officials: pressure on Israel to state the number of refugees to be admitted; territorial compensation.

129. 8 July **A. Eban to G. McGhee**
Clarifications following their conversation of 7 July.

158. 28 July **A. Eban to R. Shiloah**
Report from New York: the U.S. position on continuation of the Lausanne Conference; Eban's proposals for the policy to be adopted by the Israeli delegation on the territorial issue.

159. 28 July **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Conversation with President Truman: refugees; the embargo; the Southern Negev. Elath's impression regarding possibility of influencing the President.

160. 28 July **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Talk with State Department officials: Israel's proposal to repatriate one hundred thousand refugees; the embargo; improvement in State Department's attitude.

161. 28 July **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Soundings among members of the Security Council in anticipation of the discussion on lifting the embargo.

162. 29 July **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Report from Lausanne: meeting with Porter and Rockwell on referral of the issue to the U.N. Assembly and on the territorial issue; meetings with other members of the Commission.

163. 29 July **E. Sasson to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Meeting with Abd al-Mun'im: American pressure on Egypt; Egyptian satisfaction at Israel's new position on the refugees.

164. 31 July **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Report from Lausanne: growing personal rapport with Porter; instructive conversation in anticipation of Israel's announcement on the number of refugees to be admitted.

165. 31 July **E. Sasson to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Constructive results from meetings with the Commission concerning reunification of families and frozen Arab assets.

166. 31 July **W. Eytan to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Message from the U.S. Government against direct talks during the Lausanne Conference.

167. 1 Aug. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Talks with Abd al-Mun'im: favourable Egyptian reaction to Israel's proposal on the refugee question; report on conversation with King Faruq; tendency in Egypt to reaching a compromise with Israel and Egyptian concern over Israel's favouring Jordan.

168. 1 Aug. **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Talk with Hare of the State Department: refusal of Arab leaders to sign formal peace treaties; American development plans for the Middle East and Britain's reservations about them.

169. 1 Aug. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Report of Muñoz of the Argentinian delegation to the U.N. on states of mind among South American countries concerning Jerusalem.

170. 1 Aug. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting with Tsarapkin of the Soviet delegation to the U.N. on the territorial question.

171. 2 Aug. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Meeting with Porter: Shiloah's protest against U.S. opposition to direct Israeli–Arab contacts.

172. 2 Aug. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Talk with Bunche on the implications of the armistice agreements with regard to the embargo, Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal, direct contacts and Mount Scopus.

173. 2 Aug. **S. Ginossar to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Meeting with Riley: Israel's position on Jerusalem and the Holy Places and an attempt at sounding out the Vatican's position through Riley.

174. 3 Aug. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Meeting with the Conciliation Commission on the refugees.

175. 3 Aug. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Contacts with the Egyptian Court.

176. 3 Aug. **M. Sharett to M. Eliash** (Telegram)
Instructions to inform Strang of the British Foreign Office of Israel's offer to repatriate one hundred thousand refugees and to request that Britain influence the Arab states to accept the offer.

177. 3 Aug. **E. Elath to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Conversation with President Truman: refugees – Israel's offer to admit one hundred thousand refugees; development of the Middle East; the Lausanne Conference; lifting the embargo; the Negev; American assistance in the organization of the army.

178. 4 Aug. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Meeting with Mun'im: both parties' desire for peace and the possibilities it offers for the future of the East; refugees; boundaries.

179. 4 Aug. **M. Sharett to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Conversation with McMahon: his belligerent support of internationalization of Jerusalem. Sharett's conclusions with regard to creating contacts with the Vatican and inviting Proskauer for a visit.

180. 5 Aug. **R. Shiloah to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Meeting of Shiloah and Sasson with the Commission: strong reaction against the Commission's attempt to extract from Israel an undertaking to admit a larger number of refugees.

181. 5 Aug. **E. Sasson to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Meeting of members of the delegation with Yalçin: Turkey's considerations in favour of calling off the Lausanne Conference and referring the issue to the Assembly. Meeting with de Boisanger: his favourable attitude towards continuation of work at Lausanne; Western Galilee; Jerusalem.

182. 5 Aug. **A. Eban to R. Shiloah**
Report from the U.N.: attitude of the Egyptian representative; Bunche's ruling on the Egyptian blockade of the Suez Canal; preparations for the debate on Jerusalem at the Assembly; the future of the Conciliation Commission's activities during the Assembly.

292. 15 Sept. **D. Ben-Gurion to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Guidelines for Israel's foreign policy versus the Eastern and Western blocs.

293. 16 Sept. **Statement Delivered by M. Sharett at a Press Conference**
Vehement criticism of the Conciliation Commission's Jerusalem plan.

294. 19 Sept. **M. Keren to M. Comay** (Telegram)
Meeting at State Department on Jewish refugees from Iraq being turned back by Iran.

295. 19 Sept. **Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Information to Israeli Missions Abroad** (Hebrew)
In anticipation of the forthcoming U.N. Assembly: reservations and comments on the recommendations by Israel's U.N. representatives concerning Israel's position on the Italian colonies, Indonesia, South-west Africa.

296. 19 Sept. **S. Ginossar to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Sounding out Tisserant about prospects of negotiations with the Vatican; the Pope's stand.

297. 20 Sept. **A. Eban to T. Lie**
Reaction to the appointment of a U.N. Representative for Jerusalem.

298. 20 Sept. **S. Eliashiv to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Meeting of Eliashiv and Namir with Gromyko: Israel's opposition to the Jerusalem plan; Gromyko's abstention from taking a position; Israel's request for commercial credit.

299. 21 Sept. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Talk with New Zealand's Representative at the U.N. on his Government's support of a U.N. regime for Jerusalem. Position of Ross on the Jerusalem plan.

300. 21 Sept. **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Conveyance by McGhee of assurances received from the Arab Governments to cooperate with the Survey Mission. Talk with Porter: the Jerusalem plan; the Negev; the Survey Mission.

301. 21 Sept. **M. Keren to M. Comay**
Meeting with Stabler of the State Department: transfer of the Administration to Jerusalem; argument on Israel's stand on the Jerusalem plan.

302. 21 Sept. **J. Tsur to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs** (Hebrew)
Meeting with the Spanish Ambassador in Buenos Aires: Spain–Israel relations; reasons behind Abdallah's visit to Franco.

303. 22 Sept. ***Note Verbale* by the British Government**
Criticism of Israel's policy of neutrality between East and West; the difficulties in the way of securing peace; criticism of the Israeli position in the financial discussion with Britain.

304. 22 Sept. **R. Rubin to M. Sharett** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Annulment of identity cards belonging to natives of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina – their fear of repatriation to the Soviet Union; suggestion for sounding out the Soviets on the possibility of allowing these Jews to emigrate.

344. 15 Oct. **M. Sharett to M. Namir** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Reaction to Namir's survey of the state of Soviet Jewry; future lines of action.

345. 16 Oct. **M. Sharett to E. Elath and A. Eban** (Telegram)
Activity against the Syrian–Iraqi union.

346. 17 Oct. **M. Sharett to E. Elath** (Telegram)
Conversation with McDonald concerning the Syria–Iraq union.

347. 17 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Suggestion for formula for territorial internationalization of Jerusalem.

348. 17 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Talk with Vyshinsky: debates at U.N.; demilitarization of Jerusalem; the Partition Plan; immigration.

349. 18 Oct. **M. Sharett to A. Eban** (Telegram)
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350. 18 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
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351. 18 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
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352. 18 Oct. **M. Fischer to G. Avner**
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353. 18 Oct. **S. Ginossar to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Papal Nuncio's visit to the Israeli legation in Rome: conversation on Jerusalem and the Holy Places.

354. 19 Oct. **J. Herzog to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Possibility of secret talks with the Vatican; McDonald's report of conversations with Spellman and the Pope.

355. 19 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Conversation with Ross of the U.S. delegation at the U.N. on Jerusalem: Eban's protest against U.N. authority in the matter; the Conciliation Commission's Jerusalem plan.

356. 19 Oct. **R. Shiloah to E. Elath** (Telegram)
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357. 19 Oct. **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
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358. 19 Oct. **I. Barzilai to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
On the eve of the first large-scale emigration from Poland: last arrangements; anxiety about absorption in Israel; Barzilai's request for permission to come to Israel.

373. 28 Oct. **G. Rafael to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Vyshinsky's words to Egyptian correspondent: Moscow's intention of granting a loan to Israel on suitable terms guaranteed beforehand; support of Israel provided she does not surrender to Western interests.

374. 28 Oct. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
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375. 30 Oct. **W. Eytan to A. Eban** (Hebrew)
Preparing arguments for action intended to achieve Iran's recognition of Israel: readmittance of Iranian nationals to Israel; release of their property; appropriate attitude towards representative of the Iranian Government in Israel; Turkey's recognition of Israel.

376. 30 Oct. **M. Sharett to A. Eban** (Draft Telegram)
Abdallah's proposal for peace negotiations.

377. 30 Oct. **W. Eytan to Israeli Missions Abroad** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Instructions for diplomatic activity with regard to Jerusalem: presentation of the evacuation of the Old City of its population as an ideal solution.

378. 30 Oct. **I. Barzilai to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Progress of emigration process from Poland; future of the Zionist organization there.

379. 1 Nov. **R. Shiloah to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Directives issued by the British Foreign Office to U.K. delegation at the U.N.: objection to internationalization of Jerusalem; restoration to the Arabs of the southern residential quarters of Jerusalem; free port in Haifa under Western administration; handing over the southern Negev to the Arabs.

380. 1 Nov. **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Meeting at State Department at Hare's invitation: argument on actual situation of Iraq's Jews following an American attempt at investigation.

381. 1 Nov. **M. Eliash to M. Comay**
Interview with Wright of the British Foreign Office: results of British unofficial approaches concerning the situation of Iraq's Jews.

382. 2 Nov. **E. Elath to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Further to the report on the talk with Hare on Iraq's Jews: slackening of persecution; suggestion to wait before submitting the matter to the U.N.

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383. 3 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
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384. 3 Nov. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
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412. 15 Nov. **Meeting: M. Sharett and S. Eliashiv – P. Yershov** (Hebrew)
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413. 15 Nov. **Memorandum by E. Sasson** (Hebrew)
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414. 15 Nov. **H. Yalçin to A. Eban**
Reply to Eban's letter of 27 October: the refugee and territorial questions in reference to the Protocol of 12 May; the Commission's support of direct negotiations as opposed to the Arabs' demand for mediation; the Commission's plan of proceeding from conciliation to mediation including initiating proposals for solution.

415. 17 Nov. **W. Eytan to A. Eban** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Government's decision concerning the debate at the U.N.: endeavour to prevent any resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem, or otherwise – submit proposal for an agreement on the Holy Places, not including any reference to the Old City.

416. 17 Nov. **A. Lourie to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Meeting with the Conciliation Commission: receipt of a written summary record of the Commission's meeting with the Arabs in which the latter urged the Commission to increase its intervention; copy of the Arab declaration on Jerusalem.

417. 17 Nov. **E. Elath and A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
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418. 17 Nov. **E. Elath to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Iranian Ambassador's announcement on unofficial assistance extended to Jewish refugees from Iraq.

419. 18 Nov. **J. Tsur to W. Eytan** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Conversation with Uruguay's Minister of Foreign Affairs: Uruguay's support of supervision of the Holy Places and opposition to internationalization; appointment of a minister to Israel.

420. 20 Nov. **M. Comay to Israeli Delegation to U.N.** (Telegram)
Reply to Eban's telegram regarding Australia's intention to submit a draft resolution for internationalization: contradicting report by Levin from Australia; Evatt's problem in view of the forthcoming elections; request for correct information.

421. 20 Nov. **W. Eytan to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Abdallah's instructions to his delegation at the U.N. against internationalization.

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Preliminary contacts in preparation for Israeli–Jordanian peace talks.

422. 20 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Instructions for talks with Jordan.

423. 21 Nov. **W. Eytan to A. Eban** (Telegram)
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424. 21 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Abdallah's announcement to the U.S. representative regarding his readiness for a separate peace with Israel – his stand and anticipated conditions.

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425. 21 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
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426. 21 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
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427. 21 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
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428. 21 Nov. **M. Sharett to M. Eliash** (Hebrew)
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429. 23 Nov. **M. Comay to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Evatt's explanation of his stand on the Jerusalem issue.

430. 23 Nov. **M. Amir to G. Avner** (Hebrew)
Visit to the Soviet ambassador in Brussels: talk on the Arab refugees – favourable attitude of the ambassador's.

431. 24 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Talk with de Boisanger on the Conciliation Commission's future; lunch with the Commission's members: request for reply to Yalçin's note of 15 November.

432. 24 Nov. **M. Sharett to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Meeting with Austin and Ross: Jerusalem; Transjordan offer of direct contacts.

433. 24 Nov. **E. Elath to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Meeting Niles–Truman: Truman's support of postponement of the decision on Jerusalem; his welcome of the prospect of direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan.

434. 24 Nov. **J. Herzog to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
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435. 26 Nov. **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Crystallizing of groups at the U.N. with regard to the Jerusalem question, deadlock in debates at the Ad Hoc Political Committee.

436. 27 Nov. **W. Eytan to E. Elath** (Telegram)
Expulsion of Iraqi Jewish refugees from Teheran.

437. 27 Nov. **G. Avner to D. Lewin** (Hebrew)
Guiding lines for relations with Austria and Germany.

438. 28 Nov. **M. Sharett to A. Moissis** (Telegram)
Instructions for meeting with the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs on Jerusalem, the Holy Places and the rights of the Christians.

503. 16 Dec. **A. Moissis to G. Avner**
Meeting with the Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: Israel's complaint at Greece's hostile attitude in spite of her recognition of Israel; Greek interest in Jerusalem; Pipinelis's attempt to explain motives.

504. 18 Dec. **D. Ben-Gurion: Diary Note** (Hebrew)
Meeting of Eytan with Anzilotti, the Italian Minister: idea for extraterritorial status for the Holy Places.

505. 18 Dec. **M. Amir to G. Avner** (Hebrew)
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506. 19 Dec. **Meeting: W. Eytan – R. Neuville** (Hebrew)
Neuville's opposition to the internationalization resolution; his proposal to include Jewish Jerusalem in the area under Israeli sovereignty and establish a military unit for safeguarding the Holy Places in the Old City – Mount Zion included – its officers to be of various nationalities.

507. 19 Dec. **Memorandum by J. Tekoah**
Tactical considerations in the Jerusalem situation and the various elements involved.

508. 19 Dec. **G. Rafael to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Reply to Eytan's request to sound out Riley's views on the internationalization resolution: according to report on Riley–Spellman talk, Riley opposed the resolution.

509. 19 Dec. **M. Eliash to M. Comay** (Telegram)
Interview with Strang of the British Foreign Office: application of the Anglo–Jordan treaty; Jerusalem; purchase of arms; oil.

510. 20 Dec. **G. Avner to W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
Meeting with the Dutch Minister in Israel on the Jerusalem question; support of Israel's policy.

511. 20 Dec. **M. Fischer to G. Avner**
Transfer of the government offices to Jerusalem; tactics of France and the Vatican with regard to Jerusalem.

512. 21 Dec. **Note by M. Keren**
Talk with Rockwell of the State Department: criticism of Israel's tactics during the Assembly; the problem of the Negev in contacts with Jordan; Arab fear of Israeli aggression; concern over Israel's relations with the Soviet bloc; American Zionists.

513. 21 Dec. **M. Fischer to G. Avner**
Meeting with de Boisanger: the voting on the Jerusalem issue; the Conciliation Commission; new Arab policy.

514. 22 Dec. **W. Eytan to the Embassy of Israel in Washington** (Telegram)
Message from the State Department on Jerusalem.

Editorial Note
The U.N. Trusteeship Council Resolution on the question of Jerusalem (20 December 1949).

515. 24 Dec. **Memorandum by W. Eytan** (Hebrew)
The problem of Jerusalem: plan for Israel's political campaign.

516. 25 Dec. **M. Fischer to G. Avner**
Meeting with Binoche of the French Foreign Ministry: Israel's complaint at the French attitude in the Trusteeship Council; differences of mind in the French Foreign Ministry on the Jerusalem problem.

517. 25 Dec. **W. Eytan to J. Tsur** (Telegram, Hebrew)
Instructions with regard to the Jerusalem issue in anticipation of a talk with the President and Foreign Minister of Argentina.

518. 28 Dec. **A. Eban to W. Eytan** (Telegram)
Guidelines for a letter from President Weizmann to President Truman on the subject of Jerusalem.

519. 28 Dec. **A. Katznelson to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Talk with Tsarapkin: internationalization of Jerusalem; contacts with Abdallah; laying the blame for the results of the voting in the U.N. on the U.S.S.R.

520. 29 Dec. **M. Sharett to A. Eban** (Telegram)
Report on the progress of the talks with Abdallah: deadlock over the corridor; alternative assumptions regarding Jordanian intentions.

521. 29 Dec. **Memorandum by S. Rosenne** (Hebrew)
The Jerusalem question: suggested line of action in the U.N., the inclination being to postpone decision.

522. 29 Dec. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Suggestion of Garreau, the French representative at the Trusteeship Council, for internationalization of parts of Jerusalem – both the Old and the New – while maintaining sovereignty of Israel and Jordan outside the enclave.

523. 29 Dec. **G. Rafael to M. Sharett** (Hebrew)
Truman's angry reaction to Ben-Gurion's statement; tendency of Australia and the Vatican to withdraw from the internationalization plan; arguments for possible talks with the Vatican and the Russians.

524. 29 Dec. **M. Fischer to G. Avner**
Meeting with Couve de Murville: analysis of the situation created by the internationalization resolution; possibility of returning to the Conciliation Commission's plan; warning to Israel to refrain from extreme reactions.

525. 30 Dec. **A. Eban to M. Sharett** (Telegram)
Suggestion for reply to Garreau's plan for internationalizing parts of Jerusalem.

526. 30 Dec. **A. Eban to R. Garreau**
Reply of the Government of Israel to Garreau's letter of 21 December; defending the authority and acts of the Israeli Government with regard to Jerusalem.

APPENDICES

Appendix A	General Assembly's Resolution of 11 December on the Progress Report of the U.N. Mediator
Appendix B	Memorandum by the Conciliation Commission of 11 April 1949
Appendix C	Australian Draft Resolution of 19 November 1949 for Discussion at the Ad Hoc Political Committee on Proposals for a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and for Protection of the Holy Places
Appendix D	Israeli Draft Resolution of 25 November 1949 for Discussion at the Ad Hoc Political Committee on Proposals for a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and for Protection of the Holy Places
Appendix E	Dutch and Swedish Draft Resolution of 5 December 1949 for Discussion at the Ad Hoc Political Committee on Proposals for a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and for Protection of the Holy Places

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93. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel Missions Abroad*
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    - 93.02 Paris
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    - 93.06 Vienna
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    - 93.26 Brussels

130. *Record Group: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head Office*
    - 130.02 Offices of Minister and Director-General
    - 130.09 Coded telegrams
    - 130.10 West European Division
    - 130.11 East European Division
    - 130.13 British Commonwealth Division
    - 130.16 Armistice Affairs Division
    - 130.20 United States Division

105. *Office of the President of the State*

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A245 *Moshe Sharett — Private Archives*

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Abbreviations in Editorial Headings and References

Inc.	Incoming text
Orig.	Original
Outg.	Outgoing text
Recd	Received
Tel.	Telegram

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(Abbreviated reference: SCOR, Fourth Year)

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(Abbreviated reference: SCOR, Fourth Year, Resolutions)

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(Abbreviated reference: SCOR, Fourth Year, Supplement VIII 1949)

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(Abbreviated reference: TCOR, 2nd Sp. Sess.)

United Nations. *Official Records of the Second Special Session of the Trusteeship Council, 8 December – 20 December 1949, Resolutions, Supplement No. 1*
(Abbreviated reference: TCOR, 2nd Sp. Sess., Resolutions, Supplement No. 1)

Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49, New York 1950

NOTES
AND SUMMARIES OF
HEBREW DOCUMENTS

All summaries of Hebrew documents and all notes are arranged chronologically, i.e. according to the numbers of the documents in the Main Volume. Editorial headings of Hebrew documents are reproduced in full, while headings to translations of notes to documents in English or French are given in a shortened version. Where no notes are appended, the English and French documents are represented by headings alone. Editorial Notes are given in the same order as in the Main Volume, preceding the relevant document.

1. G. Avner[1] (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 1 May 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/6

Summary

Avner informs Sharett of Eytan's arrival at Lausanne and refers to the latter's first report on the talks.[2] Sasson[3] and Avner have decided to report separately on their activities preceding Eytan's arrival, as well as to supplement his report in several particulars.

At the first meeting with the members of the Conciliation Commission[4] Ethridge[5] adopted a firm position with the Israeli delegation, demanding a clear statement of Israel's policy regarding refugees, Jerusalem, and the borders. Sasson and Avner made clear to the Commission that for Israel a general peace settlement, i.e., agreement on the borders, had priority over the refugee problem. Leo Kohn's memorandum[6] on the refugee problem assisted them in presenting their arguments and in their efforts to convince the Commission members that the issue of boundaries should first be taken up with each Arab state separately, and only then could the refugee problem be tackled. Ethridge and Yalçin[7] found these arguments hardly persuasive, but for reasons of their own they provisionally acquiesced in Israel's request to defer discussion on the refugees.

This fleeting success, however, was offset by the pressure of events at Lake Success[8] and by the reports from Tel Aviv[9] on Ethridge's pessimistic appraisal of the outcome of the Lausanne Conference, and its negative effect on the Department of State. Avner and Sasson think that Ethridge's pessimism is rooted in two *idées fixes*: that Ben-Gurion is the *sole arbiter* of Israel's foreign policy, and that he is negatively disposed towards the Lausanne Conference, to Ethridge himself, to any negotiations, and to the various issues which could be settled "only on the basis of good will".

Azcárate[10] confirmed to Sasson Ethridge's pessimism and his conviction that there was a gap between Avner and Sasson's line and Ben-Gurion's negative attitude to any compromise or purposeful negotiations.

Ethridge jumped to this radical conclusion as a result of his talks with Ben-Gurion prior to the Lausanne Conference. Following a difficult session of the Commission with the Prime Minister in Tel Aviv,[11] Comay[12] tried to smooth things over,[13] but at a further meeting, the last before the Lausanne Conference, Ben-Gurion evinced an even more uncompromising attitude.[14]

In addition, Israel had left the Commission's memorandum on a good-will gesture towards the Arabs[15] unanswered, and had failed to explain her position on the Jerusalem issue to the Sub-committee,[16] as requested by the Commission. Ethridge became convinced that Sasson and Avner were the counterparts to Comay in Jerusalem, and that when the moment of truth arrived Israel would be unwilling to compromise. In a conversation with Kimche,[17] Ethridge spoke harshly about the Israelis, claiming they were "arrogant, drunk with success", were uncompromising and "it was open to

doubt whether at this stage they were at all interested in peace''. Ethridge had consequently begun thinking that a setback at the U.N. would soften up Israel at Lausanne and he advised the American delegation at the U.N. accordingly. He repeatedly told the Israeli representatives that only when Israel moderated her stand would he support some of her claims at the U.N.

Avner hopes that Eytan's statement on the refugee issues at the Lausanne press conference[18] will effect a change in Ethridge's opinion. He adds that a statement by Sharett or by Ben-Gurion stressing Israel's desire for peace and for a solution to the refugee problem would help to improve the climate at Lausanne.

Another item discussed with the members of the Commission was the Israeli-Syrian armistice talks. The French and Turkish members were inclined to adopt the Syrian point of view, and Avner is apprehensive that Ethridge will join their ranks.

As for unofficial talks with the Arabs, Avner believes that the Arab delegations are awaiting the outcome of Israel's application to the U.N.; he thinks that indirect talks on the subject of the borders with the Lebanese and direct talks with the Jordanians will eventuate.

Notes

1. Gershon Avner (Hirsch), Director, West European Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of the Israeli delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
2. See Vol. 2, No. 526.
3. Eliahu Sasson, Director, Middle East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of the Israeli delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
4. The Israeli delegation arrived at Lausanne on 27 April 1949. For the first meeting, see Vol. 2, No. 515.
5. Mark Ethridge, U.S. Representative on the Conciliation Commission.
6. Leo Kohn, Political Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For his memorandum, dated 24 April 1949, on the Arab refugees, see 130.02/2447/3.
7. Hüseyin C. Yalçin, Turkish Representative on the Conciliation Commission.
8. The impending vote at the General Assembly on Israel's admission to the U.N.
9. Sharett to Eytan, telegrams LS1, LS2, 28 April 1949, 130.09/2317/8, quoting Eban's report on his conversation with Acheson (see Vol. 2, No. 511). Eban gathered that the State Department was worried over the possible failure of the Lausanne Conference, given Ethridge's gloomy reports citing Israel's intransigence.
10. Pablo de Azcárate, Principal Secretary of the Conciliation Commission.
11. See Vol. 2, No. 479.
12. Michael Comay, Director, British Commonwealth Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
13. For Ethridge's report of the conversation, see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 911–916.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 925–927.
15. See Appendix B, Main Valume, p. 780.
16. The special sub-committee on Jerusalem and the Holy Places, set up by the Conciliation Commission at the beginning of 1949. The request for clarification of the position on Jerusalem was made to Comay at his meeting with Ethridge on 9 April. See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 912.
17. Jon Kimche, British journalist, formerly Editor of the *Tribune*.
18. See Vol. 2, Nos. 517, 523 and 526.

2. President Weizmann [New York] to President Truman (Washington). 1 May 1949

Notes

1. The meeting took place on 25 April. See Vol. 2, No. 509 and Companion Volume to same, Editorial Note, p. 209.
2. Cardinal Francis J. Spellman, Archbishop of New York, President of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association.
3. See No. 3 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. No. 3.
5. See Vol. 2, Nos. 477 and 510.
6. See Vol. 2, No. 510, n. 3.
7. See No. 5 (Appendix).

3. President Weizmann [New York] to Cardinal F. Spellman (New York). 1 May 1949

Notes

1. For details on the conversation see "Bureau of the Minister of Foreign Affairs: Information for Members of the Cabinet" No. 47, 7 June 1949, I.M.D.E.A. 532/73/169; cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1015, n. 3.
2. See Vol. 2, No. 510, n. 3.
3. See *Documents, December 1947 – May 1948*, Appendix A, pp. 815–820.
4. See Vol. I, No. 200 and notes *ibid.*
5. Reference is to the General Assembly Resolution of December 11th, 1948. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
6. No. 2.

Editorial Note

Cabinet decision on the future of the Gaza Strip

On 3 May 1949 the Cabinet discussed Ethridge's proposal for the transfer of the Gaza Strip with all its inhabitants to Israeli sovereignty. Sharett had brought the subject for debate following a request by Eytan for an urgent decision on the matter (see Eytan to Sharett, telegram SL6, 2 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5).

Sharett himself was against the idea, and proposed that no decision be taken at that stage on the future of the Gaza Strip. He foresaw serious difficulties in the absorption of the Arab inhabitants of the Strip, saying that "we have not yet matured sufficiently to absorb three hundred thousand Arabs".

Ben-Gurion disagreed with Sharett and supported the proposal, stressing the geopolitical advantages inherent in the annexation of that area; moreover,

he expected an easing off of the political pressure on Israel in the matter of the refugees if the Strip were annexed.

A majority of Cabinet members supported Ben-Gurion, and despite Sharett's opposition the Government resolved that "should Israel be offered the Gaza Strip with all its inhabitants the answer will be in the affirmative".

4. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 3 May 1949

Notes

1. Claude de Boisanger, French Representative on the Conciliation Commission.
2. Maurice Fischer, Israeli Minister to France.
3. Fawzi al-Mulqi, Jordanian Minister of Defence; head of Jordan's delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
4. Riad al-Muflih, Jordanian Deputy Minister of the Interior; member of Jordan's delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
5. Muhammad Abd al-Mun'im Mustafa, Director of Arab Affairs Division, Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; head of the Egyptian delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
6. Eytan to Sharett, telegram SL5, 2 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5.
7. See Appendix B, Main Volume, p. 780.
8. See No. 10, n. 1.
9. See Sharett's instructions to Eytan in telegram LS10, 5 May 1949, 130.09/2317/8, and cf. No. 10.
10. Muhammad Nimr Hawari, a Jaffa lawyer, former leader of the Nejada, a para-military youth organization; among the first Arab refugees to reach Jordan.
11. At the meeting Hawari stated that he "did not reject as a solution the establishment of an Arab state in the Triangle", but argued that "its inhabitants would be unable to make it economically or politically viable". He agreed to raise the subject before the Commission. (Sasson to Sharett, telegram ET9, 4 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5.) See also No. 12.
12. T. Yenisey, Turkish Deputy Representative on the Conciliation Commission.
13. Four words omitted here.
14. See Vol. 3, No. 8 and Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 108.
15. See No. 6.
16. Gershon Meron, Director, Economic Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of the Israeli delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
17. Fraser Wilkins, official at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; member of the U.S. delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
18. William Porter, U.S. Consul in Nicosia; member of the U.S. delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
19. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
20. George McGhee, from March till June 1949 Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, coordinator on Palestine refugee matters (see No. 49, n.1). On taking up his appointment McGhee visited the Middle East, and on 22 April he submitted to the Secretary of State a comprehensive plan for its economic development that included a solution to the problem of the Arab refugees. He recommended repatriation of 200,000 refugees to Israel, the remaining 500,000 to be resettled in Arab countries. His development plan was predicated on American–British cooperation and carried proposals for the raising of capital from governments, international organizations and private corporations. The U.N. and the Conciliation Commission were to have a central role in the execution of the plan.
21. Sharett to Eytan, telegram LS4, 2 May 1949, 130.02/2442/7.
22. At their meeting with Eytan on 30 April. See Vol. 2, No. 526.
23. Menachem Kahany, Israeli Representative at the U.N. European Headquarters, Geneva.

5. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Ethridge (Lausanne). 4 May 1949

Notes

1. This statement was part of a comprehensive speech delivered by Eban on 5 May at the Ad Hoc Committee of the Assembly's Political Committee during the debate on Israel's admission to the U.N. The speech was intended to create a favourable climate for Israel's admission and it set forth Israel's basic positions on the issues of Jerusalem, the refugees and the borders. (For the full text of the speech, see file 93.03/73/17 and also *GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 2, AHPC*, pp. 227–248.) For the essentials of Israel's position on Jerusalem and the borders, see Nos. 45 and 101. The text of the statement on the refugees was dispatched by Sharett to Eytan in advance (see his telegram LS354, 130.02/2441/12).

6. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Ethridge (Lausanne). 4 May 1949

Notes

1. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.

7. E. Elath (New York) to M. Sharett. 4 May 1949

Notes

1. Uriel Heyd (Heydt), First Secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
2. James Webb, U.S. Under Secretary of State.
3. Stuart Rockwell, official at the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
4. See No. 5 (Appendix).
5. See No. 2, nn. 1 and 5.
6. Reference is to the activity of the Australian delegation at the Ad Hoc Committee which did not obtain the support of the U.S. delegation until after Eban's speech of 5 May (see No. 5, n. 1). Following that speech, on 6 May, the U.S. allied itself with the Australian draft resolution recommending Israel's admission to the U.N.
7. See Nos. 2 and 3.

8. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 5 May 1949

Notes

1. See No. 4.
2. See No. 5 and n.1 *ibid.*
3. Eytan to Sharett, telegram SL12, 5 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5.
4. See Vol. 2, No. 505.
5. Pragai cabled back that Ben-Gurion, Sharett and Shiloah agreed to the principle of reuniting families and to the census, provided the latter was conducted within Israel and by its authorities (LS12, 7 May 1949, 130.09/2317/8). Eytan officially informed Boisanger of this in his letter of 7 May 1949 (130.02/2442/4).

No. 8 – Notes (continued)

6. Sharett proposed to clarify to de Boisanger that he had never intended to suggest that Israel would give up territory under her control; he had only hinted at the possibility of Israel reducing her territorial claims if a neighbouring independent Arab state were set up, whereas she might not do so if Jordan annexed the Arab areas of Palestine (telegram to Eytan, LS18, 10 May 1949, 130.02/2442/7).
7. See Vol. 2, No. 526, and Eytan to Sharett, telegram SL3, 2 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5. The technical committee of the Conciliation Commission was set up in May 1949. It was headed by the U.S. representative and comprised representatives from France, Britain and Turkey. It was charged with collecting material on development plans for the Middle East as conceived in the McGhee plan. (See No. 4, n. 20.)
8. For the meeting with the Jordanians, see No. 4; for the meeting with the Egyptian representative on 4 May, see Sasson to Sharett, telegram ET10, 4 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5. Sasson inferred from the conversation that "the Egyptians wish to sidestep any debate on the borders... so as not to recognize the existence of the State of Israel... and so as not to afford Jordan the opportunity of demanding the annexation of the Triangle". He gathered that the Egyptians wanted the U.N. to impose an agreement on the Arab states and Israel at Lausanne, and to assume control of the Arab parts of Palestine, with a free plebiscite to determine their future. The Egyptians had not finalized their position on the Jerusalem issue "and they want to start the talks with a debate on the refugee problem even if that takes two or three weeks".
9. In Sasson's opinion, the Lebanese refused to meet the Israeli delegates out of solidarity with Syria, whose delegates Israel would not meet until Syria withdrew from occupied Israeli territory (see Sasson to Sharett, telegram ET8, 1 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5).

9. E. Avriel[1] (Prague) to M. Sharett. 5 May 1949

Report: 130.11/2514/14

Summary

[. . . . .][2]

Avriel reports on his meeting with Berey[3] on 28 April. Replying to Avriel's memorandum of 17 February 1949[4] Berey declared that his government was in principle favourably disposed towards *aliyah* and would enable relatives of Israeli citizens to emigrate to Israel. Though sceptical of the need for Jewish emigration from Hungary, he stressed his government's readiness to take into consideration the mood prevalent in the Jewish community and expressed the hope that Israel would understand the Hungarian government's inability to allow mass emigration to Israel. Berey would not commit himself as to the number of the Jews who would be allowed to leave.

Replying to Berey's question as to the Jews' motivation to leave for Israel, Avriel pointed to three main reasons: the Holocaust, the new regime in Hungary, and the establishment of the State of Israel.

While accepting Avriel's explanation, Berey enumerated the difficulties facing the Hungarian government in this respect: first, many non-Jews would resent being discriminated against in favour of the Jews, who would be allowed to leave the country while they would have to remain and build the

socialist state; second, the state needed the Jews, a constructive and positive element in Hungarian society; and third, many of those leaving for Israel eventually emigrated to the Western countries, which were hostile to Hungary – and the government did not wish to augment these antagonistic emigrant communities. He asked Avriel what his government's attitude was to the fact that many Jews were leaving Hungary illegally through Czechoslovakia to Austria, and remaining there, instead of immigrating to Israel. Avriel replied that the Israeli representatives were making efforts to allay the fears of the Hungarian Jewish community, advising them to await the conclusion of the official negotiations, but delays in these made it difficult to dissuade the Jews from attempts at illegal departure from the country. Avriel admitted that Israel was not happy with this illegal flight, which might jeopardize official relations with Hungary, and said that no aid or support was being extended to those fleeing. Asked why Israel failed to have these fugitive Jews returned from Czechoslovakia to Hungary, Avriel replied that this was incumbent upon the Czechoslovak police, and that Israeli laws decreed admission to Israel for any Jew who so desired. Berey was evidently surprised to learn that the fugitives numbered over a thousand (actually there were already some seven thousand in Austria).

Notes

1. Ehud Avriel, Israeli Minister to Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
2. One paragraph omitted here.
3. Andor Berey, Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister.
4. The memorandum, dispatched to Laszlo Rajk, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, conveyed Israel's demand for the free emigration of Hungary's Jews (130.11/2492/22). See also Vol. 2, No. 395.

10. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Ethridge (Lausanne). 6 May 1949

Notes

1. In this letter (130.02/2447/6) Eytan gave the Israeli delegation's reply to two of the seven paragraphs in the Commission's memorandum of 11 April (Appendix B, Main Volume, p. 780). Regarding the first paragraph he referred Ethridge to his statement at the 30 April press conference in Lausanne, wherein he stated: "Recognizing that the problem of the refugees is one of the main problems confronting this Conference, the Israeli Delegation has come prepared to tackle it with sincerity and in a spirit of realism. We believe this problem to be soluble and are prepared to do everything possible to help in arriving at a solution. We shall cooperate with the United Nations and with the Arab States in implementing the solution of this problem, on the assumption that cooperation with the Arab States will extend to other spheres as well." As to the third paragraph, Eytan reminded Ethridge of Ben-Gurion's declaration to the Commission members on 7 April (minutes in Vol. 2, No. 479) that Israel would respect fully the rights of her minorities.
2. See No. 4, n. 9.

11. M. Namir[1] (Moscow) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 7 May 1949

Coded Tel. PI47; Recd: 8 May; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Following his telegram of 5 May,[2] Namir elaborates on his conversation with Zorin[3] during the reception at the Israeli Legation, in the presence of Yershov[4] and the East European ambassadors. Zorin complimented Israel on succeeding to solve her main problems in only one year: ousting the British, achieving independence, defeating the Arabs and arriving at peace agreements. He did not think that the British forces at Aqaba constituted any real danger to Israel. Reacting to Namir's remark that Israel was wary of over-optimism and anticipated numerous threats to her security, Zorin said that as long as Israel observed the "proper political course" – which he did not specify – the Soviet Union would continue to support her. Zorin denied foreign press reports linking Yershov's sojourn in Russia to Golda Meyerson's[5] departure for Israel, and Yershov added that he would soon be returning to Tel Aviv. Namir was impressed with the "extreme friendliness" of Zorin, Yershov, and the other Russian officials at the reception.

Notes

1. Mordecai Namir, Israeli Minister to the Soviet Union.
2. Namir reported on the reception held at the Israeli Legation in Moscow on Israel's Independence Day (5 May 1949, 130.11/2513/16).
3. Valerian A. Zorin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister.
4. Pavel Yershov, Soviet Minister to Israel, was on leave in Moscow from late April to October 1949.
5. Golda Meyerson served as Israel's Minister to the Soviet Union until mid April 1949. On her return to Israel she was appointed Minister of Labour.

12. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 8 May 1949 (14:00)

Coded Tel. ET11; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

[. . . . .][1]

According to Hawari, relations between the various Arab delegations at Lausanne had improved as a result of Anglo-American pressure. Jordan had agreed to defer her territorial claims for the time being and to join the other delegations in demanding the repatriation of the refugees; Egypt in return agreed to give due consideration to Jordan's claims and to support them when necessary. It was also resolved to strengthen the Arab League and through its offices settle all common issues.

Sasson and Hawari then discussed a possible appeal by the refugee delegation to the Commission and all the delegations – including that of Israel – to postpone debate on the refugee problem while the refugee delegation went to Israel for discussions with the Government there. Sasson estimates that such a move would enhance Israel's prestige among both the Arabs and the world at large; would temporarily stave off discussions on the refugee issue at Lausanne and at Lake Success; would exert pressure on the Conciliation Commission and on the Arab delegations to undertake deliberations on other issues; and would afford the refugee delegation an opportunity to see for themselves conditions in Israel and become convinced that the repatriation of all the refugees to Israel was quite unrealistic.

Sasson gathered that Hawari and his colleagues were certain that Jordan's plans regarding the Triangle could be foiled and that this region could be set up as an independent entity connected with Israel. Sasson requests Sharett's comments on his proposal.[2]

Notes

1. One sentence omitted here. In this telegram Sasson reports on his meeting with Muhammad Nimr Hawari, head of the Arab refugees delegation.
2. Sharett rejected Sasson's proposal and its rationale. He estimated that the international prestige envisaged by Sasson would be ephemeral and liable to cause "disappointment, bitterness and anger when we have to turn the delegation down". He cautioned against "risky speculations" which might result in worsening relations with the Arabs solely for the sake of a "short-lived manoeuvre". He disproved one by one the possible advantages envisaged by Sasson, and pointed in particular to the danger that the delegation, in touring the country, would discover "how numerous are the deserted villages forming with their lands extensive empty tracts". Sharett suggested that Hawari might be instrumental in (a) bringing about settlement projects in Syria without awaiting international aid, and (b) referring to Israel a group of serious Arabs who would be prepared to set up self-government in the Triangle. (Sharett to Sasson, telegram of 10 May 1949, 130.02/2451/13.)

13. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 9 May 1949

Notes

1. See No. 4, n. 20.
2. Draft of communiqué of 8 May 1949 in file 130.02/2441/9.
3. In file 130.02/2441/1. Eytan conveyed his delegation's assent to de Boisanger's proposal " . . . on the understanding that no communication is made to the press. It is, of course, clearly understood that this readiness in no way prejudices the right of my delegation to express itself freely on matters at issue, on which it fully reserves its position".
4. Telegram to Sharett, SL19, 9 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5.
5. Major Yehoshafat Harkabi, personal secretary to Foreign Minister Sharett.
6. Michael Pragai, secretary in the Foreign Minister's Bureau.
7. James G. McDonald, U.S. Ambassador to Israel.
8. See No. 10 and nn. 1 and 2 *ibid.*
9. See No. 8 and n. 5 *ibid.*
10. The list (in file 130.02/2447/6) is not appended here.

14. E. Elath (New York) to M. Sharett. 9 May 1949

Notes

1. Dean Rusk, Director, Office of U.N. Affairs, U.S. Department of State; member of U.S. delegation to the Third U.N. Assembly. From late May 1949 – Deputy Under Secretary of State.
2. See No. 5 (Appendix).

15. Meeting: M. Sharett – King Abdallah. (Shuneh, 5 May 1949, Document dated 9 May)

Report: 130.02/2408/13

Summary

Sharett was accompanied by Dayan[1] and Harkabi, with Abdallah al-Tall[2] escorting them from Jerusalem. The Jordanian Prime Minister[3] also participated in the meeting. Al-Tall was not invited to the political discussion but he attended the dinner preceding the meeting.

The King and the Prime Minister raised the problem of the withdrawal line in the Triangle, over which differences had arisen.[4] Dayan proposed that the Israeli forces advance in the undisputed area, leaving the remaining problems to be settled within a week at the Special Committee.[5] The King appeared worried about the new complication, making repeated references to the alarm of the inhabitants in the villages concerned, but was relieved when Sharett promised to issue the appropriate orders that very night.[6] The King then expounded on the necessity for peace and on the need to prepare public opinion to that end. Sharett explained that Israel shared this aim and therefore attached great importance to settling all outstanding issues. When the Special Committee dealing with Mount Scopus and Latrun had suspended its deliberations,[7] public opinion in Israel had been greatly let down – an atmosphere hardly conducive to peace.

The King asked whether Sharett and his colleagues did not agree that the problem of peace should be dealt with comprehensively, aiming at a general settlement. Sharett replied that prevailing opinion in Israel leaned towards progress in stages. The armistice agreement laid the foundations for walls to be erected with the settlement of outstanding issues, and only then could the roof – general peace – be put up. The Jordanian Prime Minister remarked candidly that Sharett's words made him infer that Israel was interested in settling only those issues whereby she stood to gain, and would decline further negotiations once all advantages had been obtained. Sharett explained that he had not meant this: Israel's ultimate objective was peace, but its achievement required the solution of concrete problems, this being done firstly by the reconvening of the Special Committee. Once the issues on that

committee's agenda were settled it would be possible to resume discussions at Lausanne. Sharett feared that the need for coordination between the various Arab delegations would create difficulties at Lausanne. The Jordanian Prime Minister countered that Jordan was not bound by the policies of the other Arab delegations and was prepared to sign a peace agreement with Israel even if the other Arab states did not. Sharett expressed satisfaction at this statement and declared that Israel would hold separate negotiations with each Arab state on issues of reciprocal concern. Thus, Israel would discuss Jerusalem only with Jordan, and not with Lebanon or Syria: Israel recognized no rights for other states in respect to Jerusalem except those inherent in their status as members of the United Nations; however, by virtue of the presence of his forces in Jerusalem King Abdallah made negotiations with him inevitable. From the King's expression, Sharett concluded that this statement gratified him considerably.

Questioned by the Prime Minister as to whether Israel would abide by the 29 November Resolution or negotiate only on the basis of *faits accomplis,* Sharett replied unequivocally that the Partition Resolution was no longer valid and that the only practicable basis was the actual state of affairs. The Prime Minister reacted angrily to Sharett's words, declaring that in such a case the Arab world had nothing to discuss with Israel and there could be no peace. Sharett then explained that the premises on which the Partition Resolution had been predicated had failed to eventuate, and the war had wrought a new situation which would have to form the basis for the peace negotiations. The Prime Minister demanded that Sharett clarify whether this implied that no changes in the borders were contemplated, and Sharett replied that Israel would acquiesce in "slight modifications beneficial to both sides".

The King remarked that, in common with Israel, he had also been implicated in the conflict against his will and that throughout the military operations his forces had never crossed beyond the borders of the Arab State, except in the case of Jerusalem – where, in fact, the clash with the Israeli forces had come about only because Israel took the military initiative.

The Prime Minister accused Israel of seeking a settlement whereby she alone would benefit, without offering any concrete *quid pro quo*, but Sharett reassured him that all of Israel's proposals at the Special Committee were postulated on mutual benefit: free access to Mount Scopus in return for free access from Bethlehem to the Old City; exchange of Latrun for a number of villages at present in Israeli hands – and the same approach would be taken towards problems to be discussed at Lausanne.

The King raised several times the problem of Gaza, pressing Jordan's vital need for a foothold on the Mediterranean coast. Sharett proffered use of the Haifa port, but the King insisted on territorial control of some part of the coast. Sharett finally agreed to place the problem of Gaza and Jordan's outlet to the sea on the Lausanne agenda.

Regarding the refugees, Sharett informed the Jordanians of development plans for the benefit of the refugees now under discussion in the U.S.[8] He

offered the King Israel's cooperation on this subject, pointing to possible common irrigation projects, but the Prime Minister and the King contended that the time had not yet come for such matters.

Sharett asked for their assessment of the *coup* in Syria,[9] and they both replied that they were awaiting further developments, and would recognize any government enjoying public support.

To Sharett's provocative question regarding the King's attitude with respect to Syria's existence in her present borders, the King replied that the concept of Greater Syria had been one of the fundamental ideas of the Arab Rebellion to which he owed allegiance to this day.

The meeting concluded with a near-promise by the King and by his Prime Minister to reconvene the Special Committee.

Notes

1. Then Commander of the Jerusalem area, and from July 1949 in charge of the Mixed Armistice Commissions by authority of the General Staff.
2. Abdallah al-Tall, Military Governor of Arab Jerusalem.
3. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda.
4. Reference is to withdrawal from the Kafr Qasim – Baqa area scheduled to commence on 6 May. On the preceding day the Arab reprsentatives had claimed that the map on a scale of 1:100,000, used during the negotiations, was not valid, and produced the maps (on a scale of 1:250,000) appended to the Armistice agreement as the binding ones. On these the demarcation line ran in the Arabs' favour.
5. A joint Jordanian–Israeli committee, without U.N. participation, set up in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Armistice agreement (see Vol. 3, Appendix H).
6. On the Foreign Minister's recommendation it was agreed to withdraw on the basis of the maps produced by the Arabs, but alreaby on the first day of the evacuation an accord was reached at the Armistice Commission that the 1:100,000 map would serve as the basis for the withdrawal, which was completed on 9 May. Israel made some concessions to the Arabs regarding land remaining in her territory: landowners resident on the Arab side were allowed to cross over to the Israeli side within two months to gather the crops remaining on their land. (See report on the evacuation of the Kafr Qasim – Baqa area, 9 May 1949, 130.16/2948/10; Dayan to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 10 May 1949, 130.16/2948/14.)
7. The committee's work had been suspended with the opening of the Lausanne Conference, the Jordanian representatives having been dispatched to Lausanne; substitutes were appointed only on 12 May, the committee then resuming its sessions.
8. See No. 4, n. 20.
9. A military *cour* led by the Syrian Chief of Staff, Husni al-Zaim, who assumed the reins of government on 30 March 1949.

16. A. Eban (New York) to M. Fischer (Paris). 10 May 1949

Notes

1. Jean Chauvel, Permanent Representative of France at the U.N.
2. Reference is to France's unexpected abstention on 9 May in the voting at the Ad Hoc Committee on a draft resolution recommending Israel's admission to the U.N. Eban apparently dispatched this cable on the night of 9–10 May.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 15 below.
4. Sections 1–6, dealing with Israel's position on Jerusalem as presented by Eban to the Ad Hoc Committee (see No. 5, n. 1), have been omitted here.
5. See No. 25.

17. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 10 May 1949

Notes

1. Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President of the U.S.A.
2. David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President of the U.S.A.
3. On President Weizmann's visit to Washington in April 1949 and his meeting with President Truman, see Vol. 2, No. 509, and Companion Volume to same, Editorial Note, p. 209.
4. See No. 5 and n. 1 *ibid.*
5. Isaac Halevy Herzog, the Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of Israel.

Editorial Note

Israel's Admission to the United Nations

On 11 May 1949 the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the recommendation by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Political Committee of the Assembly to admit Israel to the U.N. Thirty-seven states voted for Israel's admission, France among them; twelve – mainly the Arab states – voted against; nine states abstained, including Belgium, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain (see *GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 2, Plenary*, 191st, 207th Meetings, 13 April, 11 May, pp. 36–47, 306–336; *GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 2, AHPC*, 42nd–51st Meetings, 3–9 May, pp. 179–360).

18. E. Elath [Washington] to D. Acheson (Washington). 11 May 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 17.
2. See Vol. 2, No. 510 and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 944–7.
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. See No. 5 (Appendix).
5. For Acheson's reply see No. 31 and n. 4 *ibid.*

19. E. Elath (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 11 May 1949

Coded Tel. WIA2; Recd: 12 May; Inc.: 130.09/2308/9

Summary

Elath reports on his meeting with Rusk and Satterthwaite,[1] at which he was accompanied by Yuval.[2] Rusk suggested unofficial talks to clarify the refugee issue and smooth the way for the Lausanne talks. He revealed that his main intention was to have Israel admit immediately refugee families with

relatives in Israel. Elath made it plain that Israel was ready to discuss any proposal on any subject which would promote peace, but not even partial admission of Arab refugees would be countenanced while American plans for the settlement of this issue remained unclear and while serious doubts persisted about the sincerity of the Arabs' desire for peace. Rusk persisted, also demanding that Israel declare publicly that repatriation of refugees was imminent, whereupon Elath promised to transmit these demands to his Government.

Elath raised the subject of the negotiations with Syria and requested U.S. pressure on Damascus to withdraw from Israeli territory, similar to the pressure exerted on Israel to withdraw from Lebanese territory. To Satterthwaite's question as to why Ben-Gurion had refused to meet Zaim,[3] Elath replied that all the negotiations with the Arab states were being conducted through official delegations and there was no reason to change the procedure in the case of Syria. Rusk and Satterthwaite promised immediate action on the Syrian issue.

Notes

1. Joseph C. Satterthwaite, Director, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
2. Moshe Yuval, First Secretary at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
3. See Vol. 3, No. 296 and n. 5 *ibid.*

20. E. Elath (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 May 1949

Coded Tel. WIA4; Recd: 13 May; Inc.: 130.09/2308/9

Summary

Elath reports on his meeting with George Warren, U.S. Representative at the International Refugee Organization. From what Warren said it appears that the Department of State has no concrete plans for the resettlement of the refugees, and this explains the steady pressure on Israel to repatriate a large number of them. To be sure, Britain has offered her cooperation in resettling refugees in the Arab countries, but the Americans suspect that the British will use this opportunity to consolidate their position in the Middle East, thus rending inoperative an independent U.S. policy in that region. A further difficulty in formulating definite plans are misgivings lest corruption attend the distribution of moneys intended for the resettlement of the refugees among the Arab states.

Elath requests material on this subject in anticipation of another meeting with Warren.

21. E. Elath (Washington) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 May 1949

Coded Tel. WIA3; Recd: 13 May; Inc.: 130.09/2308/9

Summary

Elath reports on his meeting with Mrs. Pandit, the Indian Ambassador to the U.S. Mrs. Pandit stated, on behalf on her brother,[1] that India's problems with her Muslim neighbours and large Muslim minority had constrained her to support the Arab position on the Palestine issue. The Government of India had been following with sympathy Israel's War of Independence and extended congratulations on her achievements. India intended to recognize Israel at an opportune moment, and in Mrs. Pandit's opinion this may happen soon after the settlement of the Kashmir dispute.[2] Mrs. Pandit expressed willingness to strengthen the friendly relations between the two embassies in Washington and communicated Mr. Nehru's plans for close cooperation between India and Israel in the economic, cultural and other spheres.

Notes

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
2. Reference to the protracted Indian–Pakistani political and military dispute over control of the Jammu and Kashmir provinces, which for several years appeared regularly on the Security Council agenda.

22. Meeting in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Tel Aviv, 8 May 1949, Document dated 12 May)

Minutes: 93.03/87/11

Summary

The participants were: M. Sharett, L. Kohn, H. Raday,[1] S. Rosenne,[2] S. Eliashiv,[3] M. Comay, Miss E. Herlitz,[4] Y. Shimoni,[5] Z. Avnon,[6] and Z. Rudy.[7] The subject on the agenda was the character of Israeli missions abroad.

Raday introduced the subject and explained that the main problem was the status of Israel's missions with respect to the Diaspora. Jews abroad take great pride in the Israeli missions, and no longer consider the Jewish Agency the representative of the Jewish people. Though in his view this was a passing stage, Raday thought that the missions abroad should be so constituted as to be able to deal with Jewish affairs such as immigration to Israel and the transfer of Jewish property. The new state of affairs gave rise to issues which had to be dealt with, such as: to whom should information proceeding from the Israeli mission be addressed – to all Jews or to the Zionists alone, or

perhaps only to the non-Jews; what is Israel's stand on the question of dual loyalty of Jews.

Raday proposed the appointment of a committee to draft a working paper on the number of missions to be established, their location, the makeup of their staff, etc.

Sharett emphasized the dual function of the missions abroad, having to represent Israel *vis-à-vis* the foreign states and with respect to the Jewish world, and pointed out that the relationship between these two functions would need to be adjusted to the conditions in every separate country. He then dwelt on two basic facts compelling Israel to establish a relatively large number of missions: first, the creation of the State of Israel through a resolution of the United Nations, with the Palestine issue permanently on U.N. agenda; and second, Israel's existence as the state of the Jewish people, desirous to forge and maintain ties with the entire Jewish world, dictates an Israeli presence wherever there are large and important Jewish communities, whether or not the diplomatic ties are reciprocal.

Sharett stressed the importance of dispatching cultural attachés to the various countries, both because of Israel's potential contribution in this field and also with the aim of recruiting new talent abroad. He noted the tremendous response of American Jews in volunteering themselves and their know-how to Israel, but pointed out that there were also many talented Jews in the fields of science and technology who had failed to come forth – and these were precisely the ones Israel had to endeavour to reach. He also proposed initiating approaches to circles and persons able to exert influence on American policy, for example Lowdermilk[8] and Lilienthal.[9]

Kohn dwelt on American Jewry's substantial contribution to the establishment of the State and on the Diaspora's significance to Israel. However, he stressed the overriding principle that Israel alone was responsible for the formation of her policy and that the Jews in the Diaspora had no say in this matter.

Eliashiv pointed out the difficulty in drawing the line between Zionist interests and the State's interests insofar as the activities of the missions were concerned; each case, he said, would have to be decided on its merits. In his opinion, the head of every mission should be someone whose name and personality meant something to the local Jewish community. He contended that too many offices had been opened abroad and were overstaffed, and argued the need for economies. He criticized the missions' failure to supply a constant stream of information to the Ministry.

Sharett concurred with Eliashiv's last remark but added that the Ministry in Tel Aviv was partially to blame; he proposed some corrective steps.

Comay dwelt on the problems confronting the Israeli consular offices in the Dominions, where the Zionist organizations were well established and strong. His *pro tem* instructions to the representatives were to use their own judgment in accordance with prevailing conditions, though this arrangement was fraught with risk.

Rosenne deemed undesirable any rigid and detailed instructions during the initial period. In his opinion, Israel's missions abroad should be regarded by their host countries as representatives also of Zionism.

At the conclusion of the meeting it was resolved to set up a committee to deal with the subject discussed, composed of Messrs. Kohn, Rosenne and Shimoni, with Rudy as coordinator and secretary.

Notes

1. Haim Raday, Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Shabtai Rosenne, Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. Shmuel Eliashiv (Friedman), Director, East European Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. Esther Herlitz, Acting Director, United States Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5. Yaacov Shimoni, Deputy and Acting Director, Middle East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
6. Zvi Avnon, Director, Consular Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
7. Zvi Rudy, at the time secretary in the East European division.
8. Walter Lowdermilk, American expert on soil conservation and hydrology. In 1944 he published a plan for the development of the Jordan Valley and for diversion of the Jordan's waters for irrigation, which later served as the basis for the planning of the National Water Carrier.
9. David Lilienthal, Jewish American lawyer, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

23. E. Herlitz (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 13 May 1949

Notes

1. Pragai quoted Hare's views as expressed to Moshe Dayan on 10 May. Hare was then Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs at the Department of State. He told Dayan that American experts had concluded that the Arab countries had no sufficient room for the refugees and that the only solution was the repatriation of several hundred thousand refugees to Israel. (11 May 1949, 130.09/2317/8.)
2. Reuven Shiloah, Adviser on Special Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of the Israeli delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
3. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs Survey No. 2, 16 May 1949, 93.08/377/25.

Editorial Note

Israel and the U.N. debate on the Spanish issue

Several days after her admission to the U.N., Israel was called upon to cast votes at the General Assembly on two crucial international issues – the question of the Spanish regime, and the future of the Italian colonies in Africa (see Editorial Note, p. 24). A very narrow margin was anticipated on these two issues, and Israel's newly acquired vote could have a decisive influence.

Various delegations attempted to sway Israel, some demanding discharge of her debt to them for having supported her admittance to the U.N.

On the Spanish issue, the subject on the agenda was a draft resolution by several South American states, calling for repeal of the Assembly's 1946 recommendation to the member states to sever diplomatic ties with Spain. The East European states and several Central American countries opposed this proposal vigorously, advocating continuation of the diplomatic ban on Franco's regime. The Western powers were ambivalent: while attacking Franco's regime in public, their representatives abstained in the voting and furtively mobilized votes in favour of the proposed resolution.

For reasons of ''national conscience'', Israel's delegation decided to vote against the proposal, and on 16 May the South American draft resolution was defeated at the Assembly by the margin of two votes (see Eban to Sharett, 2 June 1949, 130.02/2404/9; *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948/9*, pp. 311–5).

24. M. Sharett (New York) to L. Kohn. 13 May 1949

Notes

1. Sharett left for New York on 10 May to attend the Assembly meeting which voted on Israel's admission to the U.N. He remained in New York for about a week and returned home on 23 May, after short visits to Geneva, Lausanne, Paris and Prague.
2. On some of the U.N. members' reaction to Israel's vote, see No. 30, para. 2.

25. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett (New York). 13 May 1949

Notes

1. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister.
2. Fischer was told this at the official banquet given by President Auriol in honour of President Weizmann on his visit to Paris (see Fischer to Sharett, 12 May 1949, 130.02/2382/12.)
3. Original erroneously has: ''alter''.
4. On Fischer's meeting with Schuman on 13 May, see No. 90 and n. 8 *ibid.*

Editorial Note

Lausanne Conference – the Protocol

The proposal by de Boisanger, the French Representative, to take the Partition Plan as the basis for negotiations at the Lausanne Conference was discussed at several meetings with the delegations. The Israeli delegation agreed to the proposal in principle subject to certain conditions (see No. 13, n. 3). The Arabs refused to place the territorial issue at the head of the

agenda, demanding that the refugee problem be the first and main topic of discussion at the talks. The Conciliation Commission accepted the Israeli conditions with some reservations, while rejecting outright the Arab demands. The Arabs deferred a final reply pending Israel's admission to the U.N., only affixing their signature on 12 May to the following protocol and a map of the Partition Plan attached to it as a working paper. W. Eytan signed an identical document and map on the same day. The three Conciliation Commission members signed the same two documents with each of the parties.

Protocol

The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly's resolution of 11 December 1948, regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the Delegation of Israel and to the Delegations of the Arab States that the working document attached hereto be taken as a basis for discussions with the Commission.

The interested Delegations have accepted this proposal with the understanding that the exchanges of views which will be carried on by the Commission with the two parties will bear upon the territorial adjustments necessary to the above indicated objectives. (See minutes of meeting of the Conciliation Commission with the Israeli delegation, 12 May 1949, 130.02/2441/9, and also telegrams from Ethridge to the U.S. Secretary of State, 12 May 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 998–9.)

26. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett (New York). 14 May 1949

Notes

1. 13 May 1949, 93.01/2180/37.
2. Report in file 130.02/2441/9.

27. A. Ukhmani[1] (Warsaw) to S. Eliashiv. 15 May 1949

Coded Tel. BI25; Recd: 16 May; Inc.: 130.09/2306/4

Summary

Ukhmani reports on the visit paid by Wakatowski, the Polish Acting Foreign Minister, to Barzilai[2] at the latter's residence. Wakatowski said, *inter alia,* that the Polish Government would welcome any Polish citizen wishing to return to Poland, but at the same time it would look favourably on the expeditious granting of Israeli citizenship to immigrants from Poland. He also assured Barzilai that the nomination of a Polish Minister to Israel was under active consideration.[3] Wakatowski was well-informed on events in Israel, and noted the unfortunate impression which the detention of Arab Commun-

ists in Israel[4] had made on him. He looked forward to an early signing of the commercial agreement with Israel.

Notes

1. Azriel Ukhmani, Counsellor at the Israeli Legation in Poland.
2. Israel Barzilai, Israeli Minister to Poland.
3. Cf. Vol. 2, No. 398 and n. 15 *ibid.*
4. Reference is to the detention in Israel as war prisoners of Palestinian Arab communists formerly imprisoned by the Egyptian authorities at a camp in Abu Agheila. The issue was debated in the Knesset at that time. (See *Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], First Session of the First Knesset, Vol. I, pp. 532–3.)

28. Meeting: S. Eliashiv – M. Moukhine.[1] (Tel Aviv, 17 May 1949)

Report: 130.11/2507/8

Summary

Pursuant to the Foreign Minister's telegraphic request,[2] Eliashiv invited Moukhine for a briefing on various matters: developments at Lausanne and Israel's policy as expressed in the Foreign Minister's address at the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset on 2 May;[3] negotiations with Syria; American plans for the development of the Middle East;[4] negotiations and understanding regarding the status of the British representative in Israel and his Israeli counterpart in Britain.[5] He also informed Moukhine of Sharett's meeting with King Abdallah.[6]

Eliashiv stated that Israel would not agree to collective negotiations with the Arab delegations at Lausanne, and would insist on separate talks with each delegation on the specific issues concerning the two countries. Israel would hold no talks with Syria until the Syrians withdrew from Israeli territory.

Concerning the refugees, Eliashiv made it clear that Israel would be willing to repatriate relatives of Arabs living in Israel, but not necessarily to their former places of residence. Israel would lend assistance and contribute to the resettlement of the refugees in Arab countries as well as recognize their right to reparations – but only in respect of abandoned lands. Moukhine was especially interested in Eliashiv's appraisal of the reasons motivating the British and Americans to work together for the development of the Middle East. Eliashiv told Moukhine about pressure brought to bear on Israel to acquiesce in repatriation of Arab refugees, and about Hare's conclusions that no solution for the refugee problem in the Arab countries was possible unless Israel accepted several hundred thousand of them.[7]

Eliashiv dwelt on Israel's relations with the neighbouring countries, on her desire to conclude a final settlement with Egypt but to refrain from rushing into a peace treaty with Jordan, which would imply recognition of Abdallah's annexation of the Triangle. He mentioned Jordan's special interest in the Gaza Strip and Egypt's readiness to forgo claims to this territory in view of the large number of refugees located there. He also told Moukhine about a

group of Palestinian Arabs opposed to Jordanian annexation of the Triangle and calling for the establishment of an autonomous body in that region, who had appeared at Lausanne.[8]

In conclusion Eliashiv raised the question of the loan Israel had requested from the Soviet Union and read out a paragraph from the minutes of Golda Meyerson's meeting with Vyshinsky.[9] Asked by Eliashiv how best to go about obtaining the loan, Moukhine suggested it was preferable for the Israeli Legation to conduct the negotiations in Moscow and submit the relevant material and Israel's proposal to the Soviet Government.

Eliashiv expressed Israel's wish to forge ties in various spheres with the Eastern as well as the Western bloc, and to send Israeli army officers for training to the Soviet Union provided the same arrangement were worked out with the United States. Moukhine remarked that there was indeed a great deal to learn from the Soviet Union in this field.

Notes

1. Mikhail Moukhine, Counsellor at the Soviet Legation in Israel.
2. Sharett to Eliashiv, X344, 12 May 1949, 130.09/2329/6.
3. In file 130.02/2441/1.
4. See No. 4, n. 20.
5. Negotiations on the status of the British mission in Israel lasted several weeks, with both parties aiming to extract maximum benefits from the establishment of the office: while Israel hoped that establishment of relations would entail *de jure* recognition by Britain, the British sought a privileged status in the protocol for their representative, notwithstanding their having recognized Israel only *de facto*. An official communiqué on 13 May, at the conclusion of the negotiations, stated that both countries' representatives would be elevated to the rank of Ministers; that no modification of the basis of the relations between the two countries had been discussed; and that – according to accepted procedure in Israel – the British representative would rank after representatives of countries which had accorded to Israel *de jure* recognition. (See report on "The status of the British mission in Israel", 9 May 1949, 130.02/2412/33; official communiqué in file 130.02/2385/21.)
6. See No. 15.
7. See No. 23.
8. See No. 4 and n. 11 *ibid.*, and No. 12.
9. Andrei Vyshinsky, the Soviet Foreign Minister. The meeting took place on 14 April; see summary in Vol. 2, No. 496, and full minutes in M. Namir's book: *Israeli Mission to Moscow* [Hebrew], pp. 116–21.

29. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 19 May 1949

Notes

1. No. 20.

Editorial Note

Israel and the U.N. debate on the Italian colonies in Africa

The issue of the future of the Italian colonies in Africa (Libya, Eritrea and Somalia) was put on the agenda of the Third Assembly, since no consensus had been reached by the four powers entrusted with its solution by terms of the Peace Treaty. During six weeks in April and May 1949, the Political Committee of the Assembly debated the claims for trusteeship advanced by Britain (Cyrenaica), Italy (Libya and Somalia), France (the Fezzan) and Ethiopia (Eritrea) – as opposed to the demand by the East European, Arab and Asian states for U.N. interim trusteeship, leading in the foreseeable future to independence for these colonies.

Conflicting opinions precluded adoption of a resolution, and only an understanding reached on 8 May between the Foreign Ministers of Italy (Sforza) and Britain (Bevin) averted a deadlock at the Committee. The two Ministers agreed on a 10-year British trusteeship for Cyrenaica; an Italian trusteeship for Somalia; an 8-year (beginning 1951) Italian trusteeship for Tripolitania; a 10-year French trusteeship for Fezzan; and the partition of Eritrea between Sudan and Ethiopia. The agreement was submitted to the Committee as a draft resolution and debated for several days, the Eastern bloc and the Arab and Asian states being strongly against it.

Voting took place two days after Israel's admission to the U.N., with the Israeli delegation participating. Israel voted against the British trusteeship and the annexation of part of Eritrea to Sudan, and abstained on the resolution as a whole. In a speech prior to the vote, Eban explained Israel's standpoint, which advocated in principle independence for the colonies, rejected any form of trusteeship subservient to the strategic interests of the various powers, and declared support for U.N. trusteeship of a limited period. Israel's stand astounded the Arab delegations and drew a favourable response from Asian countries and the Eastern bloc.

Notwithstanding opposition, the Bevin-Sforza draft resolution was adopted by the Committee and submitted for approval to the Assembly. Prior to the vote, vigorous pressure was brought to bear on the Israeli delegation from various contradicting sides: Rome pressed for an affirmative vote, while the East European delegations and even the Egyptian and Iraqi representatives urged steadfast opposition. The vote was conducted on the night of 17 May, with the clauses proposing the British and French trusteeships obtaining the necessary majority (Israel voting against British trusteeship), while the Italian clause was rejected (Israel abstaining). Defeat of the Italian clause destroyed the integrity of the agreement and led to the dissolution of the front supporting it. In the final vote the proposal was rejected by 31 to 17, Israel voting against with the East European countries, the Arab, Asian, and Latin American states, and France.

(See Eban to Sharett, 2 June 1949, 130.02/2404/9; *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948/49,* pp. 257–264.)

30. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett (Lausanne). 20 May 1949

Notes

1. Sharett requested details on public opinion response to Israel's recent voting at the Assembly (93.01/2205/12).
2. Gideon Rafael, Counsellor in the Israeli delegation to the U.N., reported in detail on the Assembly vote on the Italian colonies (his telegram to Sharett, No. 1713, 19 May 1949, 130.09/2328/5).
3. See letter from T. Arazi, 17 May 1949, 130.02/2454/15.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 19–20 above, and No. 24.
5. See Eban's 16 May speech in the Assembly, wherein he explained Israel's position on the Spanish issue, in file 130.02/2424/7, and in *GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 2, Plenary*, pp. 499–500.
6. Argentina. Moshe Toff, Director of the Latin American Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the delegation to the Third and Fourth U.N. Assemblies.
7. This is Eban's reply to Sharett's query in his telegram (see n. 1 above) whether there had been any response from Tel Aviv to his suggested approach of the Security Council on the Syrian issue (see Vol. 3, No. 304).
8. Ralph Bunche, Acting U.N. Mediator for Palestine.
9. See Vol. 3, No. 311.
10. Henri Vigier, U.N. Chairman of the Israeli–Syrian armistice talks.

31. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett (Lausanne). 20 May 1949

Notes

1. No. 18.
2. The vote on Israel's admission to the U.N.
3. See No. 5 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. For the full text of Acheson's letter, dated 18 May 1949, see file 93.03/72/29.

32. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to A. Eban (New York). 21 May 1949

Notes

1. Full minutes of the meeting in file 130.02/2441/9.
2. Cf. Editorial Note, pp. 5–6 above.
3. Eban duly wrote to the Secretary-General of the U.N., Trygve Lie, appending the proposal submitted by Israel to the Commission (23 May 1949, 130.02/2441/1).

33. S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 24 May 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to Israel's complaint of 23 May to the Israeli–Egyptian Mixed Armistice Commission regarding the seizure of goods destined for Israel on merchant ships passing through the Suez Canal (minutes of the meeting in file 130.02/2436/5).

2. At the meeting of the Commission on 31 May, the Egyptians rejected the complaint, maintaining that the issue lay outside the Commission's terms of reference. The Chairman accepted this argument, and at the following meeting (8 June 1949) the subject was deleted from the Commission's agenda. (Minutes in file 130.02/2436/5.)
3. Mahmud Riad.

Editorial Note

Memoranda on the refugees by the Arab delegations and by the Conciliation Commission

Two memoranda on the refugee problem submitted to the Israeli delegation on 18 May prompted the following letter.

In the first document (AR8) the heads of the Arab delegations presented the following demands: (1) repatriation of Arab owners of orange groves and other orchards and of the workers and technicians required to tend them; (2) unblocking of Arab bank accounts; (3) annulment of the Absentee Property Order and all acts ensuing from it; (4) suspension of seizure and sequestration of Arab property; (5) reunification of families; (6) assurance of freedom of worship and safeguarding of mosques and churches; (7) repatriation of clergy; (8) release of Waqf property; (9) assurance of human rights to returning refugees.

In the second document (IS16) the Commission reacted to Israel's reply to its memorandum of 11 April (see No. 10). The Commission accepted Israel's replies to most of the points raised, but was not satisfied with the reply to paragraph 2, and suggested that Israel reconsider her position on the following issues: compensation to Arab owners of uncultivated and abandoned lands and of abandoned urban property; compensation to repatriated refugees for cultivated and uncultivated lands and for urban property now occupied by Israelis; compensation for substantiated claims on movable property. The Commission also proposed that a census of Arabs residing in Israel be conducted with a view to the reunification of families, and that Arab owners of orange groves and other orchards be permitted to cultivate them. (Documents, dated 18 May 1949, in file 130.02/2441/9.)

34. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to C. Boisanger (Lausanne), 25 May 1949

Notes

1. Identical letters were dispatched to Yalçin and to Ethridge.
2. See No. 108.
3. Ethridge expressed disagreement with and regret at Eytan's last remark. He wrote that he considered the Commission's function was to mediate between the Jews and the Arabs and not to hold debates with this or that party. (His letter to Eytan, 26 May 1949, 130.02/2441/1.)

35. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to C. de Boisanger (Lausanne). 25 May 1949

Notes

1. Pursuant to the Lausanne Conference Protocol of 12 May and their memorandum of 18 May (see Editorial Notes, pp. 20–21, 26 above), the Arab delegations presented a document containing three additional demands: (1) repatriation of all refugees from the Arab areas of the Partition Plan; (2) withdrawal of Israeli forces from these areas, and international guarantees for the rights and status of the refugees pending completion of the withdrawal; (3) evacuation of Israeli institutions transferred to Jerusalem in disregard of the Assembly's resolution. (130.02/2447/2.)

36. M. Sharett's address at a meeting of the Heads of Divisions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Tel Aviv, 25 May 1949)

Report: 130.02/2446/7

Summary

Sharett dwells on the problems facing Israel at the Lausanne Conference and in her relations with the neighbouring states. Two main points are at issue at the Conference: the refugee problem, which concerns Israel and the Arabs, and the future of western Palestine, which concerns the Arab states alone. In his opinion, the Arabs are exploiting the refugee issue to deflect attention from their own internal conflicts, and because they prefer to have the Conference break up over an issue involving the U.N.'s interest and lay the blame at Israel's door.

Sharett discusses the memoranda on the refugee problem presented by the Arab delegations and by the Commission,[1] as well as Eytan's reply to these papers drafted according to his own instructions.[2] He debates the basic question of whether Israel should merely react to moves by the Arab delegations and the Commission, or whether Israel's delegation should take the initiative. One approach contends that prolonged negotiations do not harm Israel because "formal peace with the Arab states is not a vital necessity". Another opinion considers a speedy settlement to be in Israel's interest partly for internal considerations: the absence of formal peace is economically and militarily harmful. Furthermore, if the territorial, the refugee and the Jerusalem issues are not settled in direct negotiations with the Arabs before the next Assembly convenes, then the U.N. might intervene, imposing a solution detrimental to Israel. In Sharett's opinion, Israel should endeavour to have the Palestine question taken off the U.N.'s agenda. Public opinion in Israel errs in attaching little weight to U.N. resolutions; a good example of their importance is the recent resolution on the Italian colonies[3] which caused quite an upheaval. Every effort should be made to avoid a collision with the U.N. which might arouse criticism of Israel's very admission to the U.N.; in this connection he recalls Goldmann's[4] objections to Israel's joining the organization as against his own and Eban's stand.

Israel would be faced with serious difficulties at the Assembly if she had to mobilize a majority in her favour on the Jerusalem [. . . . .][5] or the refugee issues; account should be taken of the U.S. insistence on Israeli territorial compensation to the Arabs in lieu of areas occupied beyond the boundaries of the 29 November Resolution. Ethridge had a meeting with Eytan on that subject,[6] at which the State Department's exacting demands were amply demonstrated.

Sharett then attempts to examine the options open to Israel if a decision is taken to approach the Arabs directly. He reports on his meeting with King Abdallah,[7] and on the resumption of the work of the Special Committee,[8] stressing the problems involved in negotiations with the King who seeks Israeli acquiescence in his annexation of Arab Palestine. It is a moot question whether conditions are ripe for a settlement with Jordan.

Sharett now presents Israel's position in the armistice talks with Syria, and also reports on the proposed meeting with Zaim, which was called off upon Zaim's learning that Shiloah and Yadin[9] would attend in place of Ben-Gurion or Sharett. General Riley[10] has meanwhile transmitted to Israel Zaim's proposal for the settlement of 300,000[11] refugees in Syria, which Sharett deems important enough to warrant face-to-face talks with Zaim.

Another likely option emerged from Sasson's meetings with Lebanese representatives in Lausanne and Paris;[12] Lebanon may be the first to reach a settlement with Israel, thus playing an important part *vis-à-vis* the other Arab states. Sasson informed the Lebanese that the basis for negotiations would be the actual situation and not the 29 November Resolution or the refugees' demand for repatriation. Sasson is hoping to reach the other delegations through the Lebanese representatives and to negotiate with them on the basis of these principles.

Sharett concludes that Sasson's approach is a correct one, if it is resolved to take the initiative.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 26 above.
2. See No. 35.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above, and No. 30.
4. Nahum Goldmann, member of the Jewish Agency Executive; Chairman of the Executive, World Jewish Congress.
5. One sentence omitted here.
6. See Eytan to Raday, telegram SL30, 19 May 1949, 130.02/2442/5.
7. See No. 15.
8. See No. 15, nn. 5 and 7.
9. Colonel Yigael Yadin, Chief of Operations, G.H.Q., I.D.F. Cf. Vol. 3, No. 298 and n. 2 *ibid.*
10. Brigadier-General William E. Riley, Chief of Staff of U.N. Observers in Palestine.
11. Original has in error: "3,000". On the projected meeting with Zaim and his proposal regarding the refugees, see Vol. 3, Nos. 310, 319–321, 325, 326 and 328 and Companion Volume to same, pp. XXXVII–XXXVIII.
12. See No. 46.

37. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 27 May 1949

Notes

1. See No. 4, n. 20.

38. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 27 May 1949

Notes

1. In reply to Elath's telegram (No. 31), Sharett expressed deep anxiety over Acheson's views regarding the refugees. He proposed that it be made clear to the Americans that: (a) even if Israel agreed to repatriate refugees, only a small number could be absorbed; (b) repatriation would be conditional on the signing of a peace agreement; (c) the repatriates would be relocated in accordance with internal security considerations, with no reference to the Partition Plan. (Telegram of 25 May 1949, 130.09/2308/3.)
2. See No. 31 and n. 4. *ibid.*
3. See No. 5 (Appendix).
4. See, for instance, Nos. 7, 14, 18 and 20.
5. See No. 49.

39. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 27 May 1949

Notes

1. Abba Philip Schwartz, senior official in the International Refugee Organization.
2. See Vol. 3, No. 310.
3. See Vol. 2, No. 418, and Vol. 3, No. 246 and n. 5 *ibid.*
4. William H. Tuck, Director-General of the U.N. International Refugee Organization. His resignation was formally announced on 20 June.
5. Ezra Danin of the Middle East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of the three-man committee charged with the study of the refugee question. See also No. 69, n. 1.
6. Amended according to incoming version; outgoing version has ''host''.

40. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 28 May 1949

Notes

1. Cf. note 1 to Stabler's letter to the Secretary of State, 26 May 1949, in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1057.
2. Nuri al-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq. On the question of the refineries see No. 221, n. 3.

41. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to C. de Boisanger (Lausanne). 29 May 1949

Notes

1. See No. 32.

Editorial Note

Note from the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of Israel

On 29 May, a message from the U.S. President (No. 42) was handed to Mr. Ben-Gurion by James McDonald, the U.S. Ambassador to Israel. Having read the message, Ben-Gurion promised the Ambassador that a formal considered reply would come within a few days (see No. 64), but his immediate reaction was one of indignation. He accused the Department of State of ignoring two basic facts in its attitude to Israel: (a) that the State of Israel had come into being not as a result of the Partition Plan, but owing to a victory in the field very costly in casualties and achieved with no aid either from the U.S. or from the U.N.; and (b) that the Arab refugees were Israel's potential enemies and that their repatriation without a peace agreement would threaten Israel's security. (See Sharett to Elath, telegram IW88, 29 May 1949, 130.09/2308/3, and cf. McDonald to the Secretary of State, telegram of 29 May 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1074–5.)

42. J.G. McDonald (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion. 29 May 1949

43. M. Agami[1] (Bucharest) to S. Eliashiv. 30 May 1949

Copy: 130.11/2493/4

Summary

Agami expresses disappointment over the Israeli Minister's[2] last interview with Ana Toma, Secretary-General of the Rumanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[3] More than two months subsequent to transmission of Sharett's letter to Ana Pauker,[4] Toma professed ignorance of the matter to Rubin. Agami construes this as an affront to Israel, and views the failure to reply even negatively regarding immigration to Israel as a ploy to gain time. In his opinion, the Rumanians expect Jewish pressure for emigration to abate as a result of discouraging reports from Israel by new immigrants, as well as by the hostile propaganda being spread in Rumania. Total lack of means of livelihood will, in their opinion, induce Jews to take on employment in Rumania, even at low wages. A flat refusal might provoke a storm of protests in Israel and the world over, therefore protracted simulated negotiations seem better tactics to the Rumanians.

[. . . . .][5]

Agami reports on the plight of Rumanian Jews in general and of the Zionists in particular. The latter have begun to despair of mass emigration and are now urging an alternative demand for exit permits for some 500 Zionist activists. The Jews are mostly apprehensive of being drafted for work on the projected Danube–Black Sea canal and to forestall this are taking on employment in their home towns. Agami is also disappointed at the lack of

progress in commercial relations between the two countries, suspecting that there are elements in Israel anxious to avoid purchase of Rumanian goods.

[. . . . .][6]

In conclusion, he asserts that declarations of friendship by themselves are not enough for the development of amicable relations, all the more so as Israel is the party desirous of good relations and free emigration, so essential to its security.

Notes

1. Moshe Agami, Counsellor at the Israeli Legation in Bucharest.
2. Reuven Rubin, Israeli Minister in Rumania.
3. The interview took place on 28 May 1949 (full report in file 130.11/2493/12).
4. The Rumanian Foreign Minister; Sharett's letter, dated 11 March, was handed to Ana Pauker on 18 March (see Vol. 2, Nos. 433 and 450).
5. One paragraph omitted here.
6. One paragraph omitted here.

44. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to C. de Boisanger (Lausanne). 31 May 1949

Notes

1. The appendix (in file 93.03/73/17) has not been printed here, but see No. 5 and n. 1 *ibid.*

45. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to J. Barco (Lausanne). 31 May 1949

Notes

1. James W. Barco, Chairman of the Committee on Jerusalem, Palestine Conciliation Commission.
2. In file 130.02/2442/2.
3. In file 93.03/73/17. See also No. 5 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. See Vol. 2, No. 510, n. 3.

46. E. Sasson and Z. Liff[1] (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 31 May 1949 (15:00)

Coded Tel. ET12; Recd: 1 June; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Sasson and Liff report on their talks in Paris with the Lebanese,[2] conducted with the knowledge of the Lebanese government and the Arab delegations at Lausanne. The conversations dealt with the elements of peace, the territorial settlement, and the refugee issue. The Lebanese explained the difficulty the

Arab world had of coming to terms with their defeat at the hands of the Israelis and accepting all Israel's demands. They admitted that the refugee problem was of secondary importance and that many of the refugees could be absorbed in the Arab countries. Exploitation of this issue was of a tactical nature, the Arabs' main concern being the size of Israel's territory. The Arab states now all accept the Partition Plan. They will compromise on Jaffa and Ramleh but categorically insist on part of the Galilee as well as part of the southern Negev, so as to create territorial continuity between Egypt and Jordan. They are offering Israel the coast of Gaza in exchange for Eilat, a proposal which Sasson rejected. Both sides agreed to transmit to their governments the content of the talks.

The Lebanese inquired whether it was possible to arrange a meeting between Sharett and the Lebanese Foreign Minister in Paris. They urged Israel not to exacerbate matters at Lausanne, and to agree to discuss problems of minor importance so as to create a more congenial atmosphere. They informed the Israelis of an understanding between the Arab governments whereby territory conceded by Israel in the north would be annexed by Lebanon, in the Negev by Egypt, and in the east by Jordan.[3] This agreement facilitates cooperation and the show of a united front. Sasson surmises that this accounts for Abdallah's recent cooling off.

Notes

1. Zalman Liff, Adviser on territorial and development matters in the Prime Minister's Office; member of the Israeli delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
2. The meetings were held with the members of the Lebanese delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
3. Sharett was surprised at this last statement and concerned lest the Lebanese had somehow misunderstood Israel's position and were expecting territorial concessions on her part in the north and the south. He also asked Sasson to ascertain whether the idea of a meeting with the Lebanese Foreign Minister was an actual proposal by the Lebanese or whether it was an unsubstantial notion not requiring response. (Sharett to Sasson, telegram 20, 2 June 1949, 130.02/2442/7.)

47. E. Avriel (Prague) to M. Sharett. 31 May 1949

Report: 130.11/2514/14

Summary

Avriel reports on his meeting of 27 May with Rákosi,[1] at which he requested the release of the recently arrested Hungarian Zionist activists;[2] he told Rákosi the Israeli Legation had urged local Zionists to refrain from illegal activities and advised them to comply with the demand by the authorities to disband.

Rákosi refused to grant Avriel's request, claiming that the arrested Zionists had been involved in the illegal flight from Hungary of thousands of Jews. He admitted that the authorities were partly to blame for failing to curb the flight, but the burden of responsibility, he claimed, lay on the Zionist activists who had sown unrest and panic. He informed Avriel that they would soon be brought to trial,[3] and promised that Hungary would not exploit it for propaganda purposes.

Further on, Rákosi expressed disappointment at Israeli policy *vis-à-vis* Maki (the Israeli Communist Party). He raised the issue of Maki's participation in Knesset committees[4] and also mentioned Ben-Gurion's statement in the Knesset to the effect that the Soviet Union had helped Israel by making speeches.[5] He recalled the role played by the Soviet Union and other East European countries in Israel's War of Independence, and commented that even countries like "fascist and American-dominated" Italy, in the first instance, and Horthy's[6] Hungary in the second, did not exclude, respectively, communists and social-democrats from the principal parliamentary committees.

Avriel replied that every Jew in Israel was well aware of the Soviet Union's contribution to his country's independence, and that it was precisely Israel's present government which had abolished the restrictions imposed on Maki during the Mandatory regime. Maki enjoyed as much freedom as any other party, though it was hitherto not represented on some of the Knesset committees. Many in Israel still bore memories of the party's disloyal conduct during the pre-war struggle of the Jewish community. Opinions about Maki would improve once its unconditional allegiance and loyalty to Israel were manifest.

Rákosi was not too pleased with Avriel's reply, and they parted mutually dissatisfied with each other's statements.

Notes

1. Mátyás Rákosi, Secretary-General of the Hungarian Communist Party and Deputy Prime Minister.
2. Ten Zionist activists in Hungary were arrested early in May 1949 and charged with abetting illegal emigration (see Avriel to Friedman, telegram of 23 May 1949, 130.09/2342/12).
3. The trial took place in June. Three of the accused were dismissed for lack of evidence and the others were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. See also No. 117.
4. Maki MK's were not appointed to the Foreign Affairs and Security, Finance, and Labour Committees, but were represented on the Knesset, Economic, Interior, and Constitution, Law and Justice Committees.
5. Reference is to Ben-Gurion's statement of 10 March 1949, made at the conclusion of the debate at the Knesset on the composition and programme of the new government (see *Divrei Ha'knesset* [Knesset Reports], First Session of the First Knesset, Vol. I, p. 141).
6. Miklós Horthy, Regent of Hungary from 1920 to 1944.

48. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 1 June 1949 (24.00)

Coded Tel. ET13; Recd: 3 June; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

In a two-hour conversation at Lutry, Abd al-Mun'im informed Sasson as follows: (a) the Arab states are not prepared to sign peace agreements at this stage; (b) any agreement reached at Lausanne will be subjected to discussion and approval by the General Assembly, and will then come into force without ratification by the various parties; (c) following that, Israel will be able to pursue separate negotiations with individual Arab states for the establishment of economic and diplomatic relations; (d) the Arab states are determined to reject any frontiers beyond the Partition lines unless Israel provides suitable territorial compensation; (e) Egypt will not give up the Gaza Strip, and will moreover demand the southern Negev up to the Majdal–Dead Sea line; Abd al-Mun'im contended that the Americans were agreeable to this, and had promised their support; (f) Egypt categorically rejects the Ethridge plan for Gaza and its refugees; (g) the Arab position on the refugee issue is tactical in character; the problem does not weigh on the Arab states, and it is clear to them that Israel will evidently take back only a small part of the refugees, and that the Americans are working on development plans for the Middle East; (h) the Arab delegations have been instructed to remain in Lausanne unless asked by the Commission to return home; (i) any pressure designed to change the above stand should be brought to bear directly on the Arab governments and not on the delegations in Lausanne, whose authority is limited.[1] Sasson has not reported to Eban on this conversation.[2]

Notes

1. In response to the telegram, Sharett asked Sasson to ascertain whether there was no contradiction between the Lebanese position (No. 46) and Abd al-Mun'im's words and whether there was no possibility of "our having been led on" by the Lebanese. Sasson replied that there was in his opinion "no deceit or contradiction" but only differences of opinion, and that the Lebanese were attempting to take the initiative and bring about an "agreed and satisfactory conclusion" of the Lausanne talks. (See Sharett to Sasson, telegram TE23, 4 June 1949, 130.02/2442/7, and Sasson to Sharett, telegram ET20, 4 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5.)
2. Sharett cabled Eban the contents of Sasson's telegram (S170, 4 June 1949, 130.09/2335/12).

49. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 1 June 1949.

Notes

1. Satterthwaite was to be appointed U.S. Ambassador to Ceylon. McGhee was to replace him but with the more senior title of Assistant to the Secretary of State for Near Eastern and African Affairs, which would give him a higher standing than his predecessor's. The appointment was made by the President and ratified by the Senate.

No. 49 – Notes (continued)

2. See Editorial Note, p. 30 above.
3. No. 42.
4. See No. 64.

50. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 1 June 1949

Notes

1. John C. Ross, Deputy to the U.S. Representative at the U.N.
2. See No. 42.
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. Abraham Feinberg, U.S. businessman; formerly President, Americans for Haganah.
5. See Elath to Sharett, telegram W239, 1 June 1949, 130.09/2308/9.

51. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 2 June 1949 (12.00)

Coded Tel. ET14; Recd: 3 June; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Consequent upon his conversations with Abd al-Mun'im[1] and with the Jordanian Minister in Paris,[2] Sasson has reached the following conclusions: (a) Egypt and Jordan – with Britain as intermediary – have concluded an agreement on the division of southern Palestine: Egypt to get the Negev south of Beersheba, and Jordan – the area from Gaza to Majdal and up to the Dead Sea; (b) the Americans approve of this in principle though not in detail;[3] (c) until these provisions are achieved, Egypt and Jordan will stand fast on the armistice lines and refrain from separate negotiations with Israel; (d) the refugee issue is purely a tactical lever against Israel.

To foil this scheme, Sasson proposes that it be exposed in the press, stressing that Britain, Jordan and Egypt are trafficking in the fate of the refugees, which is of no real concern to them; Eytan should go to the United States for a fortnight to offset Ethridge's expected attempt to present Israel's position at Lausanne in a distorted way. Sasson anticipates total failure at Lausanne unless his proposed measures are promptly acted upon.

Notes

1. See No. 48.
2. Umar Zaki al-Afiuni.
3. The American members of the Conciliation Commission confirmed Sasson's information and also told him of an exchange of correspondence between Mulqi and Abd al-Mun'im. They stressed that the U.S. had not been actively involved in producing the agreement, but nevertheless considered it "indispensable for the territorial continuity between Egypt and the other Arab states and for the decision on the ultimate status of the Arab parts of Palestine". (Sasson to Sharett, telegram ET22, 5 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5.)

52. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 2 June 1949

Coded Tel. ET15; Recd: 3 June; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Sasson reports that the refugee delegation headed by Hawari is about to leave Lausanne, having despaired of the Conference's success. Hawari reiterated his offer to come to Israel, and Sasson urges Sharett to reconsider his previous telegram on this subject[1] and discuss it with Eytan and Liff.

Notes

1. No.12.

53. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 2 June 1949

Coded Tel. PI169; Recd: 3 June; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir warns against adverse political consequences resulting from an extension of the three-month-long stagnation in Israel's commercial activity in Moscow, caused mainly by lack of foreign currency. In his opinion, no effort should be spared to renew commercial relations as only through them could a commercial agreement and possibly also easy credit terms be attained.

Namir repeats his warning of 9 May to Friedman[1] against the inclination to abolish the post of Military Attaché in Moscow and urges the prompt filling of Ratner's position.[2]

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. Yohanan Ratner, Israeli Military Attaché in Moscow; his appointment terminated on 27 June 1949.

54. Meeting: M. Fischer – R. Busson (Paris, 3 June 1949)

Notes

1. René Busson, Director of the Bank of Syria and the Lebanon.
2. David Horowitz, Director-General, Ministry of Finance.
3. See No. 90.
4. One paragraph omitted here.

55. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to W. Eytan. 4 June 1949

Notes

1. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 26 above.
3. No. 41.
4. No. 44.
5. The members of the Commission were told by the Department of State that American pressure was being exerted on Israel from Washington and that Eytan would return from his consultations in Israel with "new – less extreme" instructions on the refugees and the territorial issue (see Sasson to Eytan, telegrams ET17, 3 June 1949, and ET24, 5 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5).
6. See No. 4, n. 20.

56. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 5 June 1949 (17.00)

Coded Tel. ET23; Recd: 6 June; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Sasson reports on his meeting with Said Beidas and Francis Jallād of the delegation of refugee property-owners at Lausanne. Both fulminated against the Arab states for exploiting the refugee problem to their own ends, i.e., the carving up of Palestine among themselves, and denounced the Conciliation Commission and the Americans in particular for tolerating such Arab tactics and failing to act in the cause of peace and stability. They proposed two possible solutions: an Israeli declaration to abide in principle by the U.N. Resolution of 11 December, conditional on Arab agreement to negotiate for peace; or an Israeli declaration of intent to negotiate directly with representatives of the refugees regarding their property and the refugee question in general. These steps would neutralize the cards in the hands of the Arabs and the Americans, especially in September,[1] as well as compel the Conciliation Commission to place the territorial and peace questions on the agenda. The two delegates believe that even if an agreement between Israel and the refugee representatives is attained, implementation would require several years, during which Israel could stabilize her frontiers and rid the U.N. of the Palestinian issue. In Sasson's opinion, the proposal deserves serious consideration.

Notes

1. The U.N. General Assembly was to convene in September.

57. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 5 June 1949

Notes

1. On the crisis in the Israeli–Syrian armistice negotiations see Vol. 3, Companion Volume, pp. XXXVIII–XXXIX.
2. See Vol. 3, Appendix H.
3. See Vol. 2, Appendix E(1).

58. M. Namir (Moscow) to S. Eliashiv. 5 June 1949

Orig.: 130.11/2500/13

Summary

Replying to Eliashiv's letter on the Israel–U.S.S.R. Friendship League,[1] Namir writes that though he had opposed establishment of the League, his party (Mapai) should not withdraw from it now that it is an established fact; on the contrary, Mapai members should use every League event at which the Russians are present, to attack the sectarian trend of the League which is likely to weaken sympathy towards the U.S.S.R. in Israel.

Namir criticizes Mapai's policy towards Russia and communism. In his opinion, one should not stint public displays of appreciation and expressions of friendship towards the Soviet Union; uncomplimentary and offensive remarks should be strictly avoided; extension of economic ties should be pursued, as well as social and cultural relations. Israel should strive for "balance" between manifestations of appreciation for the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and her leaders should avoid giving the impression of one-sidedness in their public appearances.

[. . . . .][2].

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. The second part of the letter, dealing with Namir's criticism of Mapai's policy versus Mapam, has been omitted here.

59. Memorandum by A. Levavi[1] [Moscow]. 6 June 1949

130.02/2408/9

Summary

Levavi analyses several of the problems facing Israel in the fashioning of her international policy subsequent to her admission to the U.N.

[. . . . .][2]

Israel desires peaceful development of the Middle East and does not object

to the organization of the region under the Western aegis. At the same time her interests require friendly relationships with Communist bloc countries for various reasons, e.g.: ensuring continued immigration from Eastern Europe; securing continued Eastern support of Israel in the U.N.; exploiting relations with the Communist bloc as a lever to get Western powers to consider Israel's interests in the Middle East; securing Israel's position in the event of Soviet military takeover of the Middle East should a third World War erupt.

Levavi nevertheless foresees increasing difficulties in maintaining a friendly policy towards the Communist bloc if the Cold War continues. Israel's economic development and the needs of immigrant absorption require a large influx of capital, and Israel might find it difficult to obtain such resources from the Western world if she turns out to be the sole obstacle to the extension of Western strategic influence over the entire region. Levavi also assumes that if a world war breaks out, Israel could not long maintain a position of strict neutrality without having her borders violated by one of the fighting parties.

Even in peacetime conditions Israel may find it extremely difficult to keep up her neutral foreign policy and lines of action should therefore be planned in anticipation of possible international developments. Levavi appends a scheme[3] enumerating alternative policies to be adopted in three contingencies: (a) both East and West retain their present positions towards Israel; (b) there is a marked deterioration in the Communist bloc attitude towards Israel, regarding immigration, support at the U.N. and in the international arena or both, with the Western attitude remaining unchanged; (c) there is a pronounced deterioration in the attitude of the Western world towards Israel in either or both the political and economic spheres, the East remaining unchanged.

Notes

1. Arye Levavi, Counsellor at the Israeli Legation in Moscow.
2. Paragraphs 2–5 have been omitted here. They contain an analysis of Soviet policy in the international arena and certain conclusions regarding the Soviets' position in the Middle East. Levavi inferred, *inter alia*, that seeing no imminent prospect of penetration into the Middle East, the Soviet Union was interested in obstructing development of the region by Western powers.
3. Not appended here.

60. U. Heyd (Washington) to M. Sharett. 7 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 42.
2. See No. 48.

61. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 7 June 1949

Notes

1. Trygve Lie, Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the U.N. Secretary-General.

62. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 8 June 1949 (13.00)

Coded Tel. ET26; Recd: 9 June; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Sasson reports on his meeting with the members of the U.S. delegation at Lausanne, following receipt by them of a cable from Washington on Eban's and Shiloah's meeting with Ross.[1] They took particular exception to Shiloah's accusations, spreading them among the other delegations and arousing general resentment. At the meeting they attacked the Israeli government, and also Eytan and Sasson. They saw Sasson's talks in Paris[2] as a deliberate attempt to obstruct the Commission, but were certain that Israel would fail at negotiations behind the Commission's back. Ethridge warned that he would give President Truman his frank opinion of Israel, exposing all her talk of justice and righteousness as hypocrisy.

Sasson tried to persuade Ethridge he was mistaken and to prove that the President's Note[3] was postulated on a misconception of Israel's stand, its only effect being to strengthen the Arabs and encourage their excessive demands. He also tried to disabuse Ethridge of any notion of territorial concessions on Israel's part, suggesting renewed discussion on the Gaza Strip.[4] Ethridge was adamant: he accused Israel of failure to support annexation by Jordan to which Sasson rejoined that this was a subject for discussion.

Notes

1. See No. 50, and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1096, n. 1.
2. See No. 46.
3. No. 42.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 5–6 above, and No. 4.

63. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 8 June 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to a statement by Philip C. Jessup, Deputy Chief of the U.S. delegation to the U.N., during the debate on the Palestine issue at the Political Committee of the General Assembly on 20 November 1948, as follows: "However, the United States approved the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the 29 November resolution and considered that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel. Reductions in such territory should be agreed upon by Israel and if Israel desired additions, it would have to offer an appropriate exchange through negotiations." (*GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 1, First Committee*, p. 682.)

No. 63 – Notes (continued)

2. See No. 48 and n. 2 *ibid.*
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. See No. 32 and n. 1 *ibid.*
5. Eban to Sharett, telegram T249, 6 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3.
6. See Vol. 3, Appendix C.
7. See Vol. 3, Appendices F, G, H.
8. John Foster Dulles, member of the U.S. delegation to the Third Session of the U.N. General Assembly. For his speech, see *GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. 1, Plenary*, pp. 953–5.
9. "Us" in original, presumably in error for "them".
10. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
11. The letter is in file 130.02/2441/1.
12. Cited in n. 5 above.

64. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to J.G. McDonald (Tel Aviv). 8 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 42.
2. Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
3. See No. 5 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. See No. 10 and n. 1 *ibid.*, and also No. 8, n. 5.
5. See No. 67, para. 2.
6. In reaction to Israel's reply, Rockwell drafted on 10 June a memorandum in the name of the Department of State on U.S.–Israel relations, proposing as follows: to refuse Israel's requests for assistance; to treat coldly Israel's representatives in the U.S.; to instruct the Export–Import Bank to hold up allocation of the balance of the loan granted to Israel; and to carry out a reassessment of the income tax exemptions on fund-drives for Israel (*FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1110; see also *ibid.*, pp. 1107, 1109).

65. U. Heyd (Washington) to M. Sharett. 9 June 1949

Notes

1. Ethridge's assignment at Lausanne terminated on 10 June, the post being filled temporarily by Raymond Hare, until the appointment a month later of Paul Porter.
2. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1109.
3. Matthew J. Connelly, Secretary to the President of the U.S.A.

66. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to P. de Azcárate (Lausanne). 10 June 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to penetration on 6 June of Israeli forces into no-man's-land at the Government House enclave in Jerusalem. This zone remained a point of contention between Israel, Jordan and the U.N. as its status had not been settled in the armistice agreement. The chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission reacted strongly to this act, protesting in writing to the Israeli authorities against what he termed a violation of the armistice agreement, and announcing suspension of the Commission's sessions pending Israeli withdrawal from the disputed area. Israel categorically rejected these accusations and threatened to leave the Mixed Armistice Commission unless its chairman retracted his letter. On General Riley's intervention the letter was withdrawn and the parties agreed to negotiate the disputed point. The Arabs meanwhile submitted a protest to the Conciliation Commission at Lausanne and threatened to withdraw from the talks. Eytan was asked to present Israel's position and he accordingly submitted to the Commission the letter at hand. (See circular by the Foreign Minister's Bureau to Israeli Missions abroad, 9 June 1949, 130.16/2948/22.)
2. The agreement was reached at the Israeli–Jordanian Special Committee on 23 April (see Vol. 2, No. 508; for summary of the affair see also Ramati to the I.D.F. Chief of Staff, 20 February 1952, 130.16/2948/22).
3. The Jordanians accepted the Israeli proposal, and a week later the forces of both sides withdrew from the area; the parties undertook to observe the *status quo* until a new agreement was reached.

67. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 10 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 64.
2. On 5 April 1949. See Vol. 2, No. 477; *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 890–4.
3. See Main Volume, p. 110, last paragraph.
4. At the conclusion of the meeting McDonald asked Sharett to take into account the following clarifications regarding the President's letter (No. 42): (1) The President's criticism of Israel's policy on the territorial issue did not refer to the Gaza Strip proposal but to Israel's intransigence regarding borders in general. Sharett replied that Israel was not blamed with intransigence but with territorial expansion. (2) The Government of the U.S. did not oppose granting of the Gaza Strip to Israel if there was consensus on that subject among the countries concerned, and on condition that Israel make adequate territorial compensation elsewhere, if so required. (See Sharett to Eytan, telegram LS53, 10 June 1949, 130.09/2317/8, and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1110–2.)

68. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 10 June 1949

Notes

1. Both approved Sharett's proposal (see Eytan to Sharett, telegram SL63, 12 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5).

69. T. Kollek (London) to M. Sharett. 10 June 1949

Notes

1. Teddy Kollek was then in London assisting Ezra Danin on a special mission regarding the Arab refugees. They were trying to interest British business concerns in employing Arab refugees in their Middle Eastern enterprises, as part of a comprehensive plan for the settlement of the refugees in Arab countries. Israel was to contribute to this project 10 to 15 million sterling on account of Arab property in Israel. (See Danin to Sharett, telegram, 3 June 1949, and also undated document redrafted by Marcus Sieff entitled "Resettlement and employment of Palestine Arab refugees in Middle East development schemes"; both in file 130.02/2444/19.)
2. Kollek is presumably referring to Eban's statement at the Ad Hoc Committee (see No. 5, n. 1) and to Sharett's exposé at the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on 2 May (130.02/2441/1).
3. See No. 54.
4. George Lewis Jones, First Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in London. Danin and Kollek met him unofficially on 2 June to discuss the refugees and the settlement with Jordan. He advised an Israeli public declaration of unilateral gestures with respect to the reunification of families, reparations for refugees, and a free port for Jordan within the Haifa port. He explained that such a declaration would not impair Israel's bargaining position, while it would help U.S. efforts to exert pressure on the Arab states. Danin and Kollek recommended that these proposals be given serious consideration (see report on the meeting; Kollek to Sharett, 3 June 1949; Danin to Sharett, 5 June 1949 – all these documents in file 130.02/2444/19).
5. John H. Hilldring, formerly (1946–47) U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas.
6. See Eban to Kollek, telegram, 31 May 1949, 93.01/2180/37.
7. Hilldring intimated to Kollek that Israel should not expect any real difficulties from the American administration on Jerusalem and the territorial issue; however, the problem of the refugees constituted a serious stumbling block in relations between the two states and Israel would be subjected to heavy pressure on this score. He himself criticized Israel's stand and apprised Kollek of the President's particular sensitiveness on this subject. (See Kollek to Eban, 6 June 1949, 130.02/2443/3.)
8. See No. 24, n. 1.
9. Emile Najar, Press Counsellor at the Israeli Legation in Paris.

70. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 June 1949

Notes

1. Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Permanent Representative at the U.N.

71. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to P. de Azcárate (Lausanne). 11 June 1949

Notes

1. Minutes in file 130.02/2441/9.
2. See Vol. 3, Appendix C.
3. Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.

72. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 11 June 1949 (11:59)

Coded Tel. ET27; Recd: 12 June; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Sasson reports on his meeting in Geneva with the Lebanese representatives to the Lausanne Conference. They stated that their government's instructions were to pursue further clarifications. However, the principles laid down by Sasson and his colleagues gave Lebanon no grounds to take the initiative and persuade the Arab governments to enter on comprehensive peace negotiations. Present conditions in the Arab world made it impossible to discuss peace without substantial concessions on Israel's part respecting territory or the refugees. They also explained Egypt's views on the imposition of peace by the U.N.,[1] adding that Syria and Lebanon, as well as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, were in accord with Egypt. Concerning Israel's proposal on Gaza,[2] they conveyed Egypt and Jordan's categorical rejection intimating that Israel should first seek general British and American support for its policy on southern Palestine.

Notes

1. See No. 8, n. 8.
2. See No. 44.

73. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 12 June 1949

Notes

1. Eytan informed Sharett of a casual, friendly talk he had with Mulqi, at which they agreed to meet again for further discussion on the matters at hand. Eytan requested instructions on how far he could go as regarded the annexation issue and other matters, and stressed the importance of direct talks with the Jordanians. (Telegram of 11 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5.)

74. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 13 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 42.
2. See No. 63 and n. 1 *ibid.*
3. No. 64.
4. One sentence omitted here.
5. Part of the sentence omitted here.
6. Part of the sentence omitted here.
7. Minutes in file 130.02/2447/2.
8. Minutes, *ibid.*

No. 74 – Notes (continued)

9. Reference is probably to the meeting of the heads of the Arab states in Beirut in March 1949, where the refugee issue was discussed with the members of the Conciliation Commission.
10. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
11. No. 71.
12. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
13. Ian Milner, Political Adviser in the Secretariat of the Conciliation Commission.
14. George A. Barnes, Deputy Principal Secretary of the U.N. Conciliation Commission; secretary of the Jerusalem Committee.
15. 20 June. See report on the meeting in No. 91; see also No. 113. At a preliminary meeting on 16 June Eytan received the impression that the Jordanians were eager for a peace settlement but needed a suitable *quid pro quo.* They regarded their annexation of the Triangle as a *fait accompli,* while the subject of the Gaza Strip had not been raised at all. (See Eytan to Sharett, Telegram SL75, 16 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5.)
16. Sasson, Eytan and Abd al-Mun'im met on 15 June. Abd al-Mun'im restated Egypt's position that the Majdal–Dead Sea line represented the future boundary between Israel and Egypt, quoting Western military experts in support. Sasson and Eytan concluded from this that the settlement of the Negev should proceed apace. (Eytan to Sharett, telegram SL73, 15 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5.)
17. A weight unit then in use in Palestine, equal to about 240 grams.
18. Garland E. Hopkins, Secretary of the Committee for Justice and Peace in the Holy Land, Associate Secretary of the Board of Missions and Church Extension of the Methodist Church.
19. Kermit Roosevelt, Middle East expert, employed in various capacities in the service of the U.S. Government.
20. Nahum Sternberg (Astar), official in charge of public relations and information in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Report on the conversation in file 93.08/377/28.
21. See No. 8, n. 5.

75. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to A. Eban (New York). 13 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 74.
2. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
3. In file 130.02/2441/1.
4. Nos. 35, 41 and 44.

76. E. Elath (Paris) to M. Sharett. 13/14 June 1949

Notes

1. Elath had stopped over in Paris for several days on his way to Israel for consultations.
2. Original erroneously has: "Syrians".
3. See No. 29.
4. Cyrus L. Sulzberger, Foreign Correspondent of the *New York Times.*

77. M. Eliash (London) to M. Sharett. 14 June 1949

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. Bernard Burrows, head of the Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.
3. On 9 June, there were British press reports on the lifting of the arms embargo to the Arab states, in order to "renew the equipment of the internal security forces of these countries" (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Information to Missions Abroad, No. 14, 12 July 1949, 130.02/4364/1).
4. Reference is to the resumption of French arms shipments to Syria in April 1949, following Zaim's *coup*.
5. For Bunche's position as then reported in the press, see No. 70.
6. Reference is to increasingly frequent Egyptian obstruction and interference in the free passage of British ships through the Suez Canal, which created tension between the two countries. Only towards the end of June did the Egyptians ease procedures for navigation of the Canal.

Editorial Note

The Minister of Foreign Affairs' speech at the Knesset

On 15 June, opening the Knesset debate on Israel's foreign policy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs made a political speech. The first part was devoted to a review of Israel's policy and her standing in the world from the establishment of the state until its admission to the U.N.; the second part dealt with the Lausanne conference and the main political issues it had generated. Sharett blamed the Arabs for the stalemate at Lausanne, and restated Israel's policy on territories and refugees. He vehemently opposed U.S. advocacy of the principle of territorial compensation or exchange of territories on the basis of the Partition Plan, warning in particular against "any renewed attempt" to encroach on Israel's sovereignty in the southern Negev. Sharett declared that any attempt to revert to the provisions of the Partition Plan as a basis for a territorial settlement took no account of developments in Palestine since that resolution was taken, and Israel would not acquiesce in it. Concerning the refugee problem, Sharett restated that admitting refugees in the absence of a peace agreement would be tantamount to committing suicide for Israel, but he nevertheless proclaimed Israel's readiness to pay compensation for abandoned lands, to facilitate reunification of families, and perhaps "to make an additional contribution by admitting a certain number" of refugees if peace were attained.

Concerning Jerusalem, Sharett strongly criticized hostile propaganda against Israel on the question of the Holy Places, and expressed regret that certain Catholic circles had been influenced by that distorted propaganda. He reaffirmed that Jerusalem constituted an indivisible part of Israel and announced the Government's readiness to allow U.N. supervision of the Holy Places. (*Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], First Session of the First Knesset, Vol. I, pp. 717–22.)

78. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to A. Eban (New York). 15 June 1949

Notes

1. Acheson was then in Paris to attend the conference of the Four Powers' Foreign Ministers on the problem of Germany.
2. See No. 4, n. 20.

79. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 15 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 78.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
3. Sharett concurred with Eban's views, accepting most of his arguments, except for the fifth point. In his opinion, Eban was overestimating the weight of the U.N. as an independent factor and ignoring the possible effects of increased American pressure on Israel, as well as the encouragement the Arabs would derive from the Commission reconvening in New York. (Sharett to Eban, telegram Y209, 19 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3.)

80. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Fischer (Paris). 15 June 1949

Orig.: 93.02/170/12

Summary

Rafael clarifies his position on Israel's relations with the Vatican following Fischer's letter to Eban of 5 June,[1] which warned against neglecting these relations. Rafael claims to have repeatedly explained to Sharett, ever since the Paris Assembly, the importance of the Vatican, and to have urged direct contact with the Holy See. He had so far failed to persuade Sharett of the potential serious danger emanating from the Vatican, and his suggestion to approach the Pope directly in order to clarify Rome's attitude to Israel was not approved. Believing that Sharett has somewhat modified his position lately Rafael urges Fischer to submit to Sharett a detailed plan of his own for Israel–Vatican relations. Rafael anticipates serious difficulties for Israel at the coming U.N. Assembly, especially on the part of Latin American countries, if relations with the Vatican are not regularized.

Notes

1. Letter in file 93.03/64/2.

81. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to S. Divon.[1] 16 June 1949

Copy: 130.02/2447/2

Summary

Sasson expresses disappointment with the Lausanne Conference and criti-

cizes Israel's policy. Two months after the Conference commenced, its objective – a peace settlement – seems no closer to attainment than ever. Every passing day reinforces the feeling among the Israeli and Arab delegations and the Conciliation Commission that the talks are barren and will end in failure.

Sasson recapitulates the attitudes of the three parties in Lausanne – the Israelis, the Arabs and the Commission itself – and suggests an alternative approach to official Israeli thinking, which would in his opinion further the peace talks. His estimate of the Israeli position is that " . . . the Jews think that peace can be achieved without paying the price – either maximal or minimal". They want the Arabs to cede the territory occupied by Israel; to absorb all the refugees in the Arab states; to accept frontier modifications favourable to Israel in central Palestine, in the south, and in the Jerusalem area; to waive rights to their property in Israel in return for compensation to be assessed by the Israelis and to be paid over a period of years after peace agreements have been signed; to institute immediate diplomatic and economic relations with Israel; and so on, and so forth.

The Arabs, while acknowledging Israel as an established fact, are in no hurry to extend official recognition in view of the terms set by the Israelis. Thus, for instance, as Abd al-Mun'im told Sasson, the Egyptians feel that recognizing Israel would strengthen not only the latter but also Jordan and Iraq, and would disturb the balance of power in the Arab world to the detriment of Saudi Arabia, Syria, Egypt and the Lebanon. Were an independent Arab state to be established in the Arab part of Palestine, says Abd al-Mun'im, the situation would perhaps be different. As it is, Israel's very actions are leading inexorably to the annexation of the Arab parts by Jordan, thus strengthening that country. Egypt therefore deems it imperative to perpetuate the present state of affairs and withhold recognition from Israel until such time as she feels strong enough militarily, economically and technologically to be able to withstand a separate or collective Israeli, Jordanian or Iraqi threat. Sasson finds that, from the Egyptian point of view, it is difficult to quarrel with this thesis.

As to the Conciliation Commission, its methods of work and ineffectual efforts only add fuel to the fire. Abd al-Mun'im told Sasson that even if the Egyptians agreed to withdraw to the international boundary as Israel demanded, the U.S. would not consent because the Americans opposed withdrawal without compensation. A similar stance is taken by the French, "who are inciting Syria and the Lebanon to demand the severance of the Galilee from Israel and its annexation by one of these countries". Sasson maintains that the members of the Conciliation Commission represent the policies of their various governments and are not fulfilling the function they were assigned: achieving a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states.

As to the refugees, they have been completely ignored. None of their

claims, explanations or proposals are heeded, yet everybody is exploiting their plight towards ends entirely unrelated to the refugees' aspirations. Jordan and Syria want the refugees presently within their territories to remain there, in order to benefit from the American and international aid extended to them. Egypt would rather have the refugee problem unsolved, so as to promote instability in Jordan and in Israel and to strengthen her own position. The plight of the refugees presently under Egyptian domination in the Gaza Strip does not move Egyptian policy makers, who are used to human suffering, poverty and high mortality in their own country.

Nor does Israel heed the appeals and plans of the refugees because it has been decided not to admit them under any circumstances. Sasson confesses that he himself supported that decision and he neither regrets nor is ashamed of it, because he still believes that the absorption of the refugees in the Arab states is the best guarantee for a formal settlement to evolve into a true and lasting peace; this however should not prevent Israel from using the refugees for positive action which would benefit both them and Israel.

As illustration, Sasson cites a proposal submitted to him in Lausanne by the refugees' representatives to the effect that Israel annex the Arab parts of Palestine, conditional on readmission of about one hundred thousand refugees and conferment of administrative autonomy on these Arab areas. The refugees also wanted Israeli active participation in their struggle for representation at the U.N. Assembly in September, help in organizing rebel troops to fight Arab occupation forces in the Arab parts of Palestine, and commitment to grant asylum to these rebels should their effort fail.

Sasson admits that at first sight this scheme sounds like pure adventurism, but on further consideration it appears feasible and likely to achieve: expulsion of Arab forces from Palestine, eradication of foreign influence, enlargement of Israel's borders, solution of the refugee problem, and pressure on the Arab states to come to a permanent settlement with Israel.

Notes

1. Shmuel Divon (Zelikson), senior official, Middle East Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

82. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 16 June 1949

Notes

1. Eban had not yet drafted the proposed letter when Sharett informed him that the same idea had occurred to him, and that Leo Kohn had already prepared a draft for President Weizmann to sign (13 June 1949, 130.02/2414/26); this was sent to Eban for perusal and possible comments, and underwent some modifications before being sent to President Truman. See No. 104 and n. 1 *ibid.*

83. E. Elath (Paris) to M. Sharett. 16 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 76.
2. See Hilldring's report to the Secretary of State on his visit to Israel and his talks with Israeli representatives in Paris and in New York, in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1249–52. See also Nos. 69 and 109.

84. A. Eban (Washington) to M. Sharett. 17 June 1949

Notes

1. The meeting was held at the request of the Israeli representatives desirous to clarify certain points in Israel's reply to the President's Note (Nos. 42 and 64). Cf. report on the meeting in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1148–53.
2. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
3. Reports of military preparations in the Syrian and Jerusalem sectors had reached the Department of State several days prior to the present meeting (on the sources of the information, see No. 89). On 14 June Rusk summoned Heyd to the Department of State and delivered a warning to Israel against resumption of hostilities (see Heyd to Sharett, telegram W258, 14 June 1949, 130.09/2308/9, and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1137).
4. For Sharett's reaction see his telegram to Heyd LS496, 20 June 1949, 130.16/2948/22.
5. Shiloah accompanied Sharett on his visit to Prague on 19–20 May 1949, but the files bear no evidence as to his activities in arms acquisition (see exchange of telegrams between the Legation in Prague and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 130.09/2342/12). There is, however, record of Yadin's visit to Prague in early June 1949, during which he met the heads of the military and defence establishment in Czechoslovakia and visited its military industry. He sought Czechoslovak aid in the training of the I.D.F. and found the Czechs "very interested in selling" light and medium arms to Israel, and even plans for the manufacture of arms in Israel. (Yadin to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, telegram CI154, 10 June 1949, *ibid.*)
6. This word has not been decoded in the incoming text.
7. Reference is to the Commission's Memorandum of 11 April 1949 (see Appendix B, Main Volume, p. 780) and to Ethridge's meeting with Ben-Gurion at Tiberias on 18 April (see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 925–7, 1151–2).
8. See No. 4, n. 20.
9. See No. 89 and n. 2 *ibid.*
10. See No. 82 and n. 1 *ibid.*
11. See No. 44.
12. At the same meeting Ethridge told Eban of his talk with Abd al-Mun'im, who claimed that Egypt did not seek to annex parts of Palestine but solely to resolve the refugee problem; Israeli gestures *vis-à-vis* the refugees would prompt Egypt to undertake separate peace negotiations including possible boundary modifications in the Gaza area. Proceeding on this information, Eban suggested that Abd al-Mun'im be sounded out on this matter (telegram to Sharett, X423, 18 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3). Eytan replied that he would approach Abd al-Mun'im for confirmation of his words to Ethridge, but added that, in meetings with the Israelis at Lausanne, Abd al-Mun'im continued to adhere to the Bernadotte Line as vital to Egypt's security (LA18, 20 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5).

85. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to P. de Azcárate (Lausanne). 19 June 1949

Notes

1. In file 130.02/2441/9.

86. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to P. de Azcárate (Lausanne). 20 June 1949

Notes

1. See Sharett to Eytan, LS64, 16 June 1949, 130.09/2317/8.
2. Minutes in file 130.02/2441/9.
3. Azcárate rejected Eytan's arguments, maintaining that the Commission's experience indicated that the Arab delegations were authorized to deal with all the issues raised at Lausanne (24 June 1949, 130.02/2441/1).

87. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 20 June 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 79.

88. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 20 June 1949

Notes

1. Eban's meeting with Trygve Lie and Cordier took place earlier that day, with Lie expressing deep anxiety over the possible resumption of hostilities in Palestine (cf. No. 84). The present telegram is the second of two reporting on that conversation, the first having been dispatched to Sharett on the same day (X426, 20 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3).
2. See No. 74.
3. No. 44.
4. Reference is presumably to the Arab delegations' 18 May memorandum on the refugees (see Editorial Note, p. 26 above). For Israel's reply see No. 108.
5. One paragraph, dealing with the Israeli–Syrian armistice negotiations, has been omitted here.

89. E. Herlitz (Tel Aviv) to U. Heyd (Washington). 20 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 84.
2. Reference is presumably to the Committee on Jerusalem's document of 15 April 1949 (Com. Jer./W16) entitled "Draft Proposal for an International Regime for the Jerusalem Area" (in file 130.02/2443/3; see there also Comay's letters to Eytan of 11 and 31 May 1949).

No. 89 – Notes (continued)

3. Samuel Kopper, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Kopper visited Israel in mid-June as part of a Middle East tour.
4. See No. 352, n. 5.
5. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1115.
6. No. 42.
7. See Editorial Note, p. 46 above, and No. 126.

90. M. Fischer (Paris) to E. Herlitz. 20 June 1949

Notes

1. Alexandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. For details of the meetings of 5 May with Binoche and with de Margerie, see Fischer's letter to Sharett of 6 May 1949, as well as the *Note Verbale* submitted by Fischer on the same subject, 5 May 1949, 130.02/2382/12.
3. Roland de Margerie, Director of the Africa-Levant Department, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
4. See Fischer's comments on a meeting with de Margerie held on 20 May 1949, 130.10/2530/7.
5. See No. 15, n. 9.
6. See No. 54.
7. According to an earlier record of Fischer's, the meeting was held on 20 May. See n. 4 above.
8. See No. 25 and Fischer's letter to Sharett, 15 May 1949, 130.02/2382/12.
9. See Fischer to Sharett, telegram of 19 June 1949, 130.09/2344/5.
10. Jacques Maritain, French philosopher; Ambassador of France to the Vatican, 1945–48. See exchange of letters between E. Najar and J. Maritain, 8 June 1949, 12 June 1949, 93.02/183/7.
11. See No. 78.
12. The document, dated 14 June 1949, is in file 93.02/183/2.

91. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 21 June 1949

Notes

1. Sharett relayed Ben-Gurion's observation that Eytan had gone too far in his promises to Mulqi regarding Gaza, and instructed Eytan to leave the door open for any possible discussion on this matter (telegram LS79, 24 June 1949, 130.09/2317/9).
2. June 27. Eytan had several additional meetings with Mulqi. For his impression of these meetings see No. 113.
3. Eytan to Sharett, telegram SL84, 21 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5; the gist of the telegram is given in No. 113.

92. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 22 June 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 46 above, and No. 126.

93. Bureau of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv) to E. Sasson (Lausanne). 22 June 1949

Coded Tel. TE34; Recd: 23 June; Outg.: 130.09/2317/8

Summary

Sasson is advised of an arrangement with Hakim[1] whereby some 5,000 Greek Catholic refugees who had infiltrated back to Israel would be allowed to remain, while 700 others would be readmitted, in exchange for Hakim's promise to refrain from demanding the return of additional refugees and to try and prevent infiltration. Hakim also stated in writing that this freed Israel from further obligation regarding the refugees and undertook to commend in the press Israel's treatment of the Church and of the Holy Places.

Israel desires a similar arrangement with the Maronites, and it is proposed to intimate to Mubarak[2] that he would be welcome to visit Israel, whereupon the Maronite churches in Israel would be ceremonially handed over to him and an arrangement on the Maronite refugees would be worked out. Political matters would also be discussed, and the visit would serve to silence criticism of Israel by the Catholic Church. Sharett requests Sasson's views on this proposal, particularly whether Mubarak's visit could adversely affect relations with the Lebanese government and its delegation in Lausanne.

Notes

1. George Hakim, Bishop of the Greek Catholic Church for Acre and the Galilee.
2. Ignatius Mubarak, the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut.

94. U. Heyd (Washington) to M. Sharett. 22 June 1949

Notes

1. Sharett instructed Eban to approach the Iranian Representative at the U.N., as well as the U.S. Government, and request their intercession on behalf of some 30 Iraqi Jews who had escaped from Iraq, had been detained by the Iranian police, and were now in danger of being returned to the Iraqi authorities (see Raday to Eban, Y216, 20 June 1949, 93.01/2181/3).
2. Gordon Mattison, Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
3. William C. Dunn, Assistant Chief, Division of Greek, Turkish and Iranian Affairs, U.S. Department of State; at that time Acting Chief of the Division.
4. Nasrollah Entezam, Iranian Permanent Representative at the U.N. See Eban's telegram to him of 20 June 1949 in file 93.01/2181/3.

95. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to P. de Azcárate (Lausanne). 23 June 1949

Notes

1. 20 June 1949.
2. Minutes in file 130.02/2441/1.
3. Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. U.N. Document No. A/927, 21 June 1949, 130.02/2441/10.

96. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 23 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 5, and see n. 1 *ibid.*
2. No. 18.
3. The General Assembly Resolution of December 11, 1948. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. No. 97.

97. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 23 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 96.
2. No. 42.
3. See No. 76, n. 1. For Israel's reply, see No. 101.

98. Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv) to the Ambassador of the United States in Israel. 23 June 1949

Notes

1. The document was handed to R. Ford, Counsellor at the American Embassy in Israel, on 24 June.
2. The document is in file 130.02/2443/3, and was published in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1153–4. It was drafted in consequence of Israeli–Jordanian tension over Government House, Jerusalem (see No. 66 and n. 1 *ibid.*, and No. 84). To relieve tension, the U.S. Government proposed to Israel and to Jordan that certain issues concerning Jerusalem, previously on the agenda of the Special Committee, be referred to the Mixed Armistice Commission (see No. 15, n. 5).

99. E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Eliashiv. 23 June 1949

Coded Tel. CI171; Recd: 24 June; Inc.: 130.09/2342/12

Summary

At a meeting with Avriel, the Bulgarian Ambassador[1] inquired about Israel's

intentions concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, and wondered why Israel was neglecting his country which had been so cooperative regarding immigration.[2] Avriel enumerated the difficulties in setting up an international network of missions and hinted at the possible opening of a consulate-general in Sofia. Avriel assumes that the Ambassador's approach was prompted by his government, and that the Bulgarians are ready for the time being to settle for a consulate-general. They are planning to send to Israel a commercial representative, who will probably be instructed to sound out Israel's intentions concerning diplomatic relations. Avriel asks for further instructions.[3]

Notes

1. Nenco Nikolaev, Bulgarian Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.
2. Actually it was Bulgaria that had requested Israel to defer appointment of an official representative in Sofia, this pending completion of Bulgarian Jewry's mass emigration to Israel, scheduled for March 1949 (see Vol. 2, No. 398, paragraph f).
3. Eliashiv replied that the idea crystallizing in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to accredit the Israeli Minister in Belgrade to Bulgaria. In view of the tense relations between the two countries, he suggested that Avriel "cautiously sound out" the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Ambassadors to Prague on the subject. (19 July 1949, 130.11/2493/4.)

100. A. Eban: *Aide-Mémoire* of Conversation with B.N. Rau (New York, 23 June 1949)

Notes

1. Bengal N. Rau, Indian Permanent Representative at the U.N.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 19–20 above.
4. Israel voted for the resolution, adopted at the Assembly by 47 to one (South Africa), enjoining South Africa, India and Pakistan to begin direct talks on the situation of the Indian minority in South Africa. Israel did not comply with South Africa's plea for an abstention.
5. Israel supported the Bolivian proposal for a commission to study the condition of Indians and Negroes in South America.

101. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to R. Hare (Lausanne). 24 June 1949

Notes

1. Nos. 96 and 97.
2. No. 18.
3. No. 5, and see n. 1 *ibid.*
4. No. 45.
5. See No. 31 and n. 4 *ibid.*

No. 101 – Notes (continued)

6. Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
7. No. 71.
8. Minutes in file 130.02/2441/1.
9. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
10. See Hare's reply of 27 June 1949, 130.02/2441/1.

102. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 24 June 1949

Notes

1. Sharett viewed with grave concern press reports alleging that the sub-committee on the territorial questions (see No. 95) would deal with the future of the Arab part of Palestine. He feared these reports would be construed as Israeli recognition of the Arab states' right to have a say on the future of the region, and stressed his recent promise to the Knesset that Israel would negotiate boundaries separately with each Arab state concerned (23 June 1949, 130.09/2317/8).
2. See No. 6.
3. No. 45.

103. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 24 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 75.
2. See No. 31 and n. 4 *ibid.*
3. See No. 5 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. See Appendix B, Main Volume, p. 780.

104. President Weizmann (Rehovoth) to President Truman (Washington). 24 June 1949

Notes

1. The present letter was subject to a number of modifications prior to approval of the final version printed here. The main changes were introduced following Eban's criticism of L. Kohn's draft (13 June 1949) and of a penultimate version brought to Eban to New York. Although the letter was handed to the President only on 6 July, following certain last-minute changes, the date of dispatch was not altered (cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1168–73, and see the various drafts of the letter as well as correspondence on the subject in file 130.02/2414/26; see also Eban to Sharett, telegram T272, 21 June 1949, Eban to Kohn, T331, 6 July 1949, 130.09/2329/7; Sharett to Eban, LS504, 22 June 1949, 130.09/2328/6; L. Kohn to Eban, Y231, 30 June 1949, 130.09/2329/12).
2. No. 42.
3. No. 64.
4. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
5. See No. 6 (Appendix).
6. See No. 95.

Editorial Note

Department of State's proposal for mediation between Israel and Egypt

On 24 June 1949, Dean Rusk handed Uriel Heyd the following *Aide-Mémoire*, adding a number of comments. He considered the Gaza Plan "worthy of serious consideration", but in his opinion its implementation would require territorial compensation to Egypt and conceivably to "another Arab state". He informed Heyd of his government's intention to initiate informal contacts between the representatives of Israel and Egypt designed to advance a settlement; he added, however, that his government would encourage direct contacts should Israel prefer to dispense with American mediation. He emphasized the urgency of dealing with the refugee problem both in view of the imminent termination of the present U.N. Relief project, and since planning for American allocations should be completed before the coming August. (See Heyd to Sharett, telegram W269, 24 June 1949, 130.09/2308/9, and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1177–8.)

105. *Aide-Mémoire* by the Government of the United States (Washington). 24 June 1949

Notes

1. No. 64.
2. No. 42.
3. Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 925–7.
5. Minutes of the meeting in file 130.02/2441/9.
6. See No. 5 and n. 1 *ibid.*

106. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 25 June 1949

Notes

1. Emended according to incoming text.
2. Nos. 96 and 97.
3. Jacob Robinson, Legal Adviser to the Israeli delegation at the U.N.
4. Eban replied that the figure of one hundred thousand or more refugees would in his opinion appease the Americans, whereas seventy five thousand would only incense them further; it was therefore preferable not to mention it at all. If the government could go as high as the first figure, there was a fair chance that the Americans would be appeased. (Telegram to Sharett, T291, 2[5] June 1949, 93.01/2181/3.)

107. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 26 June 1949 (01.00)

Coded Tel. ET32; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Sasson reports on a plan designed to utilize the coming recess in the Lausanne

Conference, adopted in concert with the Lebanese delegation, whereby (a) Mulqi and Ammoun,[1] both in favour of discussions on the territorial issue and on peace, would go to Cairo and attempt to change the attitude of the Egyptian government; (b) two of the refugee representatives would be allowed to pursue the same end in Cairo; (c) the Israeli and Lebanese Ambassadors in Washington would be instructed to persuade the Americans to help in turning the Lausanne talks into a peace conference and to influence the Egyptians accordingly; (d) similar instructions would be given to the Israeli and Lebanese representatives at the U.N.; (e) Sasson and the second member of the Lebanese delegation[2] would move to Paris to coordinate action between Washington, Lake Success and Cairo on the one hand and Beirut and Hakirya on the other, as well as to win French cooperation in turning the Lausanne talks into a peace conference and getting the Syrians to go along. This proposal aims to steer the Lausanne Conference in the desired direction once the talks resume, and is also designed to keep the discussions at Lausanne going, simultaneously with the U.N. Assembly session. The Lebanese delegates are to meet their Foreign Minister in Italy to obtain his approval of the proposal, which they requested Sasson to transmit directly to Sharett.[3]

Notes

1. Fuad Bey Ammoun, Director-General of the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs; head of Lebanon's delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
2. Muhammad Ali Hamada. Cf. Nos. 184 and 210.
3. Sharett replied as follows: "...again and again and again – does not this set us from the beginning on the path of joint negotiations with the entire bunch, including the territorial issue? Feel the need to meet you again face to face and discuss the situation and future plan of action" (telegram TE35, 27 June 1949, 130.09/2317/8).

108. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to P. de Azcárate (Lausanne). 27 June 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 26 above.
2. See No. 126.

109. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 27 June 1949

Coded Tel. IP152; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Sharett informs Namir of his decision to invite Gromyko[1] to Israel for a thorough clarification of open issues prior to the forthcoming U.N. Assembly, as well as to discuss the problem of *aliya*. The invitation will serve to

refute Soviet charges of Israeli pro-western orientation arising from frequent reciprocal American–Israeli visits; among recent visitors to Israel Sharett lists Donovan,[2] Hilldring,[3] Roosevelt[4] and Strang,[5] the latter coming on British initiative. Sharett requests immediate transmission of the invitation to Gromyko and asks Namir to emphasize that: (a) Gromyko's immense popularity in Israel consequent on his historic U.N. speech in 1947 will serve to strengthen the ties with the U.S.S.R.; (b) this visit would afford a good opportunity to clarify issues on the agenda of the forthcoming Assembly; (c) if necessary, Namir may remark that while many visitors come to Israel from the U.S. and Britain, there are none from Eastern Europe. Sharett is awaiting Namir's reply.[6].

Notes

1. Andrei Gromyko, a deputy to the Soviet Foreign Minister, head of the U.S.S.R. delegation to the second part of the Third Session of the U.N. Assembly. It was Andrei Vyshinsky who headed the delegation to the Fourth Session beginning September 1949.
2. Major-General William J. Donovan, former head of the U.S. Office of Strategic Services, visited Israel in April 1949.
3. See No. 83, n. 2.
4. Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., then newly-elected U.S. Congressman, visited Israel in June 1949.
5. William Strang, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, visited Israel in early June 1949 as part of a Middle Eastern tour.
6. See No. 112.

110. Meeting: R.M. Kidron – J. Beith (London, 28 June 1949, Document dated 29 June 1949)

Notes

1. Mordecai (Reginald) Kidron, First Secretary at the Israeli Legation in London.
2. John Beith, at that time Acting Head of the Eastern Department, British Foreign Office.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 46, and No. 126.
4. See No. 44.
5. Donald Jackson, of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.
6. Derek Brinson, of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office.

111. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 30 June 1949

Notes

1. Eytan reacts here to Sharett's telegram conveying Eban's enthusiastic support of the U.S. mediation proposal (see Editorial Note, p. 57 above) and his suggestion that Sasson and Shiloah be promptly dispatched to New York. Sharett hesitated about accepting the American proposal. On the one hand, he favoured any process which might lead to separate negotiations with the most important Arab state; on the other hand, he feared American mediation would bring about increased pressure on Israel owing to the American viewpoint on the Eilat and southern Negev issues. He requested Eytan's opinion. (LS82, 29 June 1949, 130.09/2317/8.)

2. See No. 74, n. 16.
3. In a consultation with Sharett, Eytan and Liff on June 6, 1949, Ben-Gurion endorsed Liff's proposal to offer Egypt ''instead of the Gaza strip a similar area in the Western Negev [on] the Egyptian border''. In a diary entry of the same day he expressed doubt whether ''this suggestion would appeal to the Arabs''. (See Ben-Gurion's diary, I.M.D.E.A.)
4. No. 105.
5. 15 June 1949, 130.02/2442/5.
6. See No. 119, first paragraph.

112. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 30 June 1949

Coded Tel. PI180, PI181; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Further to his telegram No. 633,[1] Namir reports on his meeting with Vyshinsky, who was ''amiable and very cordial''. He listened to Namir's explanation of the problems of immigration and settlement and of Israel's economic needs, and promised to re-examine Israel's request for wider commercial relations with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of Soviet financial credit. Vyshinsky evinced interest in the armistice talks with Syria, in the Jerusalem issue and in the Lausanne Conference, and heard out Namir's exposition on the refugee problem, which echoed the lines of Sharett's speech in the Knesset.[2] His remarks regarding Israel's underestimation of her achievements and her present satisfactory situation were similar to those made by Zorin.[3] Namir disagreed with Vyshinsky's assessment, citing the absence of peace and threats of retaliation as factors forcing Israel to remain alert and to keep increasing her strength in the interests of peace and security. Vyshinsky expressed agreement with this argument.

Namir conveyed Sharett's invitation to Gromyko,[4] and Vyshinsky replied off the record that the Soviet Union was not in the habit of sending official government representatives on courtesy visits abroad unless the visit had a specific and previously defined object. There had been some exceptions to this rule during the War, but it was not likely that his government would now set a new precedent even for such a prestigious invitation as Sharett's. An official reply would come in due course, but even if negative, it should be interpreted as strict adherence to the established norm and not as lack of appreciation of the invitation. Vyshinsky noted that though cultural emissaries were being sent abroad by VOKS,[5] these were not official representatives of the Soviet Government.

Namir assumes that the Russians will decline the invitation but the very fact that it was extended will affect in a positive way relations with the Soviet Union, apart from having given pleasure to Vyshinsky.

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 46 above.
3. No. 11.
4. See No. 109.
5. The central Soviet agency for cultural relations with foreign countries.

Editorial Note

Suspension and resumption of the Lausanne talks

Following the stalemate at Lausanne, the Conciliation Commission acceded to the State Department's proposed suspension of the talks between the end of June and 18 July In the interval the delegations were to conduct consultations with their governments, the State Department was to increase American pressure on the parties, and the new American Representative on the Commission was to assume his functions. (See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1155, 1164–5.)

The Israeli delegation that returned to Lausanne shortly after resumption of the talks was somewhat different: R. Shiloah replaced W. Eytan as head of the delegation, and T. Arazi replaced G. Avner; E. Sasson remained on. (See also No. 136.)

113. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 1 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 74, n. 15, and No. 91.
2. Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.

114. Bureau of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 1 July 1949

Notes

1. Dayan's proposal was rejected by the Mixed Armistice Commission at its meeting on 1 July. Riley sided with Jordan. It was resolved to appoint a sub-committee to investigate the details of the complaint. (See Foreign Minister's Bureau to Eytan, telegram TE41, 3 July 1949, 130.09/2317/8.)

115. U. Heyd (Washington) to E. Herlitz. 1 July 1949

Notes

1. Charles David Ginsburg, American jurist.

No. 115 – Notes (continued)

2. See No. 44.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 46 above.
4. Isaiah L. Kenen, Director of Information, Israeli delegation to the U.N.
5. Eliahu Ben Horin, Jewish American journalist and writer, at that time Adviser on Middle Eastern affairs to the American Zionist Emergency Council.

116. Meeting: M. Fischer – R. de Margerie (Paris, 1 July 1949)

Notes

1. Record of the conversation in file 130.10/2530/7. See also No. 90.
2. Adnan al-Atassi was head of the Syrian delegation to the Lausanne Conference.
3. Félix Albert Vanthier, Counsellor at the French Legation in Tel Aviv; at the time Chargé d'Affaires.
4. René Massigli, French Ambassador in London.
5. Fischer met de Margerie on 11 July and was briefed on the latter's conversations in London with M. Wright on British policy in the Middle East (record of the conversation in file 93.02/164/10). See also No. 133.

117. S. Eliashiv (Tel Aviv) to E. Avriel (Prague). 1 July 1949

Copy: 130.11/2493/4

Summary

Eliashiv requests details on the resumed negotiations in Budapest[1] and on the repercussions there of Israel's reaction to the Budapest trial.[2] He draws Avriel's attention to Sharett's statement in the Knesset concerning the trial,[3] and to the indignant reaction of the Israeli press against events in Hungary. As a result of the trial, Israel's participation in the Youth Festival in Budapest[4] is being reconsidered, and will probably be cancelled, on the pretext that it is essential to save foreign currency in times of austerity.

[. . . . .][5]

Concerning Israel's Legation in Rumania, Sharett had impressed upon the Israeli Minister the need to revise the present quasi-official, friendly and informal nature of relations with circles of questionable influence in favour of universally accepted norms of official relations. The Minister was also told that should there be no improvement in Rumania's attitude, he would have to be recalled from Bucharest. The Rumanians have meanwhile sent to Israel a Counsellor, who is acting as a pro tem Chargé d'Affaires, and a Consul, and have likewise submitted the name of a candidate for the post of Minister to Israel. These recent Rumanian moves may, in Eliashiv's opinion, demand reconsideration of Israel's envisaged line of action.

Notes

1. The subject of the negotiations was the emigration of people who had relatives in Israel (see Eliashiv to Ukhmani, 1 July 1949, 130.11/2492/20).
2. See No. 47, nn. 2 and 3.
3. In his speech of 20 June Sharett said *inter alia*: "...it is incumbent on [Hungarian] official policy to resolve the contradiction between averred amity towards Israel and disregard of her most vital needs. ...those who think that it is possible to reconcile true friendship towards the State of Israel with vilification of Zionism – are trying to reconcile a pair of opposites. ...the State of Israel will not abet any Jew in breaking the law in his country of residence, but will also insist on the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel and will not cease in its efforts to attain that end". *(Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], First Session of the First Knesset, Vol. I, pp. 763–4.)
4. Reference is to the Festival of Democratic Youth scheduled for August 1949 in Budapest. Avriel reacted strongly to the reported decision, warning against its possible adverse effect on the *aliya* negotiations should Israel's absence be construed as a protest against the Budapest trials. Sharett disagreed with Avriel and stressed the great harm caused to Israel by the Budapest trials: "We cannot," he said, "conduct our struggle for *aliya* in a manner that demoralizes our youth and undermines the self-respect of the people as a whole"; what had happened required reaction "and we should not be deterred by the possibility that our absence might be construed as demonstration against demonstration". (Avriel to Friedman, telegram 184, 7 July 1949; Sharett to Avriel, telegram IC124, 10 July 1949, 130.09/2342/12.) In the event, an Israeli delegation did attend the festival. See also No. 143.
5. One paragraph omitted here.

118. E. Avriel (Prague) to S. Eliashiv. 1 July 1949

Coded Tel. 182; Recd: 3 July; Inc.: 130.09/2342/12

Summary

The Finnish Minister in Prague[1] called on Avriel and read out to him a note from his government, expressing surprise at the absence of diplomatic or consular relations with Israel. Reference was made to Finland's concern for the Jews during the War, her sympathetic attitude during Israel's war of independence and her interest in commercial ties with Israel. [–].[2] The Finns advocated the appointment of an Israeli Consul-General in Helsinki and expressed their readiness for the immediate dispatch of a Consul-General to Tel Aviv. The Finnish Minister asked for the Israel government's comments. Avriel requests a reply.[3]

Notes

1. Eduard H. Palin.
2. One word has not been deciphered here.
3. Eliashiv asked Avriel to inform the Finns that Israel could not at present afford the expense of setting up a mission in Finland; the dispatch of a Finnish Consul-General to Israel would, however, be most welcome and Israel would reciprocate at the earliest opportunity (Eliashiv to Avriel, 19 July 1949, 130.11/2493/4).

119. W. Eytan (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 2 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 133, n. 1.
2. One word has been omitted here.

120. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 3 July 1949

Coded Tel. ET34; Recd: 4 July; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

In a conversation with Sasson the Lebanese delegate to Lausanne disclosed that Hare had discussed with the heads of the Arab delegations the necessity of pronouncing their readiness to absorb those refugees unwilling to return to Israel, and had met with an affirmative response. He also revealed that the Arab delegations would be prepared to discuss a peace settlement once the Lausanne Conference reconvened. The delegations had reciprocally agreed to forgo, if necessary, their territorial claims in northern and central Palestine in order to gain the Negev, and had elaborated two alternative proposals for the modified boundaries. Upon Sasson's unequivocal reaction that no such proposal would ever be acceptable to Israel, the Lebanese delegate retorted: "Your own supporters and friends are discussing these proposals and are encouraging these claims". This reinforces Sasson's misgivings regarding American mediation.

121. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 4 July 1949

Coded Tel. ET35; Recd: 5 July; Outg.: 130.02/2442/5

Summary

Sasson reports on the outcome of Edmond Rock's[1] activity in London. Upon his return to Lausanne Rock met the representatives of the refugees with Mulqi as chairman, and informed them that he had obtained Britain's consent to resettle immediately, at her expense and with the aid of international funds, about 200,000 refugees in Jordan, on condition that some 20,000 of them enlist in the Arab Legion. Rock reported that Foreign Office officials had advised the Arab delegations to hold fast to their present position until after the U.N. Assembly, so as to enable the British and American representatives to exert pressure on Israel at the Assembly with the aim of reducing her territory. Mulqi suggested that Hawari go to Jordan and organize recruitment among the refugees.

Notes

1. An Arab public figure from Jaffa. During the war he moved to Jordan and assisted King Abdallah on the refugee problem. Rock served as adviser to the Jordanian delegation to the Lausanne Conference.

122. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 4 July 1949

Notes

1. On 1 July Sharett instructed Heyd to inform Rusk officially of Israel's consent to American mediation (see Editorial Note, p. 57 above) and to propose that the venue be New York (see telegram IW112, 1 July 1949, 130.09/2308/3).
2. 1948. See Vol. I, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 41.

123. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan (Lausanne). 5 July 1949

Notes

1. No. 111.
2. No. 63.
3. See Vol. I, Appendix A.
4. See Vol. 3, Appendix C.
5. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.

Editorial Note

Cabinet debate on the Arab refugees

At its 5 July meeting, the Cabinet discussed Sharett's proposed public announcement of Israel's readiness to absorb 100,000 refugees – including those already admitted (25,000) and those to be admitted within the framework of the reunification of families (10,000) – in exchange for a peace settlement. The official announcement was meant to offset growing American pressure in this matter. Most of the Government members supported Sharett's proposal, though many did so hesitatingly or with reservations, but Ben-Gurion, as well as D. Joseph, opposed it. Ben-Gurion feared that the proposed figure would neither satisfy the Americans nor appease the Arabs, and it was doubtful whether it would advance a peace settlement. He also believed that the large number of refugees to be admitted might threaten the security of the state, and rejected a declaration liable to invite additional pressure on Israel. To avert a vote against the Prime Minister, Sharett suggested to sound out first the Americans whether such a declaration would ease pressure on Israel and turn it against the Arabs. The Cabinet adopted this last proposal and authorized Sharett – once the effectiveness of such a step

had been examined – to announce Israel's readiness to raise the total number of repatriated refugees to 100,000 conditional on the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab states. In the spirit of this resolution, Sharett cabled Eban the following communication.

124. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 6 July 1949

Notes

1. Arthur Lourie, Israeli Consul-General in New York, member of the Israeli delegation to the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. See No. 127.

125. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 6 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 111 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. Eban elaborated on this subject in a second telegram of the same date (T337, 93.01/2181/4), conveying his impression from the conversation with Ross that, should peace eventuate between Israel and Egypt, the U.S. might forgo its plan for the cession of Eilat to Egypt in exchange for the Gaza Strip.
3. See No. 40.

126. G. Avner (Lausanne) to P. de Azcárate (Lausanne). 8 July 1949

Notes

1. No. 108.
2. Original erroneously has: "June 5". See Editorial Note, p. 46 above.
3. Two words garbled in the original.

127. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 8 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 124.
2. See No. 134.
3. Dillon S. Myer, President of the U.S. Government Institute for Inter-American Affairs.

128. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 8 July 1949

Notes

1. Cf. record of conversation in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1208–9.
2. At a press conference on July 6.

129. A. Eban (New York) to G. McGhee (Washington). 8 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 128.
2. The enclosure, not appended here, is in the file.

130. G. Rafael (New York) to A. Eban (New York). 8 July 1949

Orig.: 93.03/71/19

Summary

On the eve of Eban's departure for Israel, Rafael makes him privy to some reflections on Israel's policy. Rafael thinks that the major deficiency in the Israeli activity at Lausanne lay in the absence of a well-defined policy and in faulty planning. "Grand strategy by itself is not enough; the objective to be reached and the compromises to be made on its behalf should also be determined in advance." From the minutes of the Conference he infers that Israeli representatives do not always accord due consideration or preparation to their appearances before the Commission. One of the contributing factors to this state of affairs is the relatively large number of Israeli representatives appearing before the Commission and the lack of coordination between them. Thus, for instance, the Americans based their accusations of Israeli schemes for territorial aggrandizement on Liff's exposé before the Sub-committee,[1] in which he advocated assigning Tulkarm to Israel to facilitate implementation of the Lowdermilk Plan.[2] Rafael assumes that an exposition on the same subject by the head of the delegation would have left a different impression on the Americans. A similar lack of coordination in Israeli positions seemed evident to Rafael in the appearances of Sasson and Hirsch before the Sub-committee[3] on 14 June. Since minutes of the Commission's sessions are transmitted to Washington, Paris and other places, they might arouse there doubts as to Israel's earnestness and her attitude to the Commission.

Concerning the negotiations with Egypt, Rafael thinks that Israel should aim at an agreement on as many issues as possible. In his opinion it is best to keep negotiations with Egypt separate from those with Jordan and avoid accentuating the points of contention. He also advises widening the scope of the negotiations to include matters of common interest, such as international issues on the agenda of the forthcoming U.N. Assembly; in this connection he refers to the impression made on the Arabs by the Israeli stand on several questions debated at the last Assembly.[4] As to Jordan, in Rafael's opinion the main problem is not Eilat or Gaza but Jordanian annexation of the eastern part of Palestine.

[. . . . .][5]

Rafael raises the question of administrative changes in the Embassy in

Washington and in the delegation to the U.N. and recommends the appointment of political and economic assistants, in addition to Levontin.[6] He himself is continuing his efforts to organize a representative group comprising individuals from commerce, industry, science, the professions, and other sectors who will create and promote interest in development plans for the Middle East. He has already approached several persons, among them young Roosevelt, Cummings[7] and Robert Nathan,[8] all of whom supported this idea as a means not only of solving the refugee problem but also of attracting to the Middle East American capital which would bring about an economic and a social revolution. Rafael endorses Cordier's project for the dispatch of a mission of experts to the Middle East[9] and recommends Israeli cooperation with such a mission when it arrives, as its findings might decide the issue in the debate on the refugees in the next Assembly.

Rafael reverts to the subject of relations with the Vatican and the importance of making suitable connections in Rome. He urges Eban to arrange for a thorough discussion on this matter with Myron Taylor,[10] who is in the President's confidence, is well-liked at the Vatican, and is at the moment in Europe.

Regarding the repatriation of refugees, Rafael feels it should be conditional on a peace settlement, the Arab states' consent to resettle the remainder within their borders, and foreign aid towards the absorption of the repatriates in Israel.

In conclusion, Rafael recommends that Eban address a selected group in Israel on the international situation, stressing particularly the importance of the U.N. in peace keeping and its accomplishments during the past several years. This might effect a change in the cynical and generally pessimistic atmosphere prevalent in Israel regarding the chances of keeping the peace.

Notes

1. Reference is presumably to Liff's exposé before the Conciliation Commission at Lausanne on May 31st, 1949 (minutes in file 130.02/2441/9). Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1124–5).
2. See No. 22, n. 8.
3. Minutes in file 130.02/2441/10.
4. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above.
5. One paragraph omitted here.
6. Avigdor Levontin, Assistant Legal Adviser, Israeli delegation to the U.N.
7. Herbert J. Cummings, Director of the Near East Division, U.S. Department of Commerce.
8. Robert R. Nathan, Jewish American economist; Economic Adviser to the Israeli Embassy in Washington and Director of the Jewish Agency Economic Department in New York.
9. See No. 127.
10. Myron C. Taylor, the U.S. President's Personal Representative at the Vatican.

131. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 8 July 1949

Coded Tel. PI185; Recd: 9 July; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

During the ceremony[1] Namir held a conversation with Shvernik[2] and Gromyko. Shvernik showed interest in the questions of immigration, industry, employment, housing, absorption of immigrants, demography, and Arab refugees. Namir gave a brief account of these matters and took advantage of the opportunity to reiterate his request for financial credit from the Soviet Union, previously made at his meeting with Vyshinsky.[3] With reference to the refugees, he hinted at a possible proposal by Israel, as instructed in Sharett's telegram No. 154.[4] Shvernik listened avidly to Namir's exposition, while Gromyko was enthusiastic about Namir's argument for settlement of the Negev in order to curb foreign incursionism. The talk was held in a very friendly atmosphere.

Notes

1. Namir's presentation of credentials, which took place at the Kremlin on 6 July (Namir to Sharett, telegram 669, 6 July 1949, 130.11/2513/17).
2. Nikolai Shvernik, President of the U.S.S.R.
3. See No. 28 and n. 9 *ibid.*
4. Sharett had instructed Namir to prepare the ground should Israel eventually specify the number of refugees she would be prepared to admit on the attainment of peace, further to the 25,000 refugees already repatriated and the 10,000 who would most probably come within the framework of family reunification (see Editorial Note, pp. 65–6 above, and Sharett to Namir, telegram of 3 July 1949, 130.09/2325/3).

132. E. Herlitz (Tel Aviv) to U. Heyd (Washington). 11 July 1949

Coded Tel. IKA18; Outg.: 130.09/2308/3

Summary

Herlitz reports on Sharett's meeting with McDonald, at which the latter raised two problems: (1) On the Jerusalem issue: the Department of State desires Israel to reconsider her reservations concerning the proposed transfer of the Special Committee's functions to the Mixed Armistice Commission.[1] In the Department's opinion, agreement on a permanent status for Jerusalem is possible prior to the U.N. Assembly if Israel agrees to discuss matters above and beyond Paragraph 8 of the armistice agreement with Jordan, including boundaries – not necessarily those agreed on at Rhodes. Sharett replied: (a) no new negotiations could begin before the previous agreement had been implemented; (b) this would imply recognition of Abdallah's rule over the other half of Jerusalem; (c) in the event of Arab demand for the return of the Arab quarters of Jerusalem, would the Americans exact Israeli acquiescence?

(2) Concerning the refugees: if the Arab states and Israel do not discharge their obligations, the U.S. will wash her hands of the whole matter, as no funds were now available. Sharett replied that Israel would cooperate in a solution to the refugee problem; steps had been taken for the reunification of families,[2] but pressure by the U.S. only exacerbated matters on the domestic front.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 98.
2. See No. 126.
3. Cf. report on the conversation in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1215–6.

133. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett. 11 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 119, para. 3. Sharett replied that de Boisanger's proposal should be courteously rejected, on the grounds that any plans formally submitted by the Commission would of necessity involve pressure on Israel for concessions. Israel would, however, be happy to take into serious consideration informal proposals by the members of the Commission. (Telegram 111, 15 July 1949, 130.09/2344/2.) Fischer conveyed Sharett's reaction to de Boisanger at their meeting on July 16. See No. 138.
2. See No. 116 and n. 5 *ibid.*
3. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above.

134. A. Lourie and G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 12 July 1949

Notes

1. See Nos. 124 and 127.
2. Reference is to Egypt's response to the American mediation proposal. Heyd cabled on the same day to Sharett a hitherto unconfirmed report that Egypt had accepted it and was ready to open negotiations with Israeli representatives in New York. This report was disproved several days later, and eventually the Egyptians rejected the American proposal. (See Heyd to Sharett, telegrams W296, 12 July 1949; W298, 14 July 1949, 130.09/2308/10.)

135. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 12 July 1949

Coded Tel. PI188; Recd: 13 July; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir was received by Gromyko, who evinced considerable interest in the Lausanne talks and the refugee issue. Namir cited the number of refugees so far admitted to Israel, as reported in Sharett's telegram No. 154,[1] and

mentioned the new instructions for the reunification of families,[2] as well as the possibility that Israel would specify the number of refugees she would be ready to repatriate when peace is attained. Namir pressed Gromyko on the subject of trade and financial credit, eliciting the reply that Gromyko was aware of the problem, which was at the moment under consideration at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. In compliance with Telegram No. 160,[3] Namir requested Soviet support for Israel's admission to the Universal Postal Union. Gromyko expected the U.S.S.R., the Ukraine and Byelorussia would lend their assistance. He expressed heartfelt thanks for the invitation to Israel,[4] but claimed the government's decision was still pending. Namir has not yet located Sobolev,[5] but will keep trying and will inform Sharett accordingly.

Notes

1. See No. 131, n. 4.
2. The announcement is given verbatim in No. 126.
3. Untraced.
4. See Nos. 109 and 112.
5. Arkady Sobolev was Assistant Secretary-General of the U.N. in charge of Security Council Affairs, until his resignation at the end of April 1949. Sharett, who had described Sobolev as "very intelligent and *sympathique* and well informed on our affairs", asked Namir to renew contact with him on his return to Moscow (telegram 159, 10 July 1949, 130.09/2325/3).

136. Consultation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Tel Aviv, 13 July 1949)

Minutes: I.M.D.E.A. 230.72/897

Summary

The participants: M. Sharett, A. Eban, E. Elath, W. Eytan, E. Sasson, R. Shiloah, L. Kohn. On the agenda: (1) resumption of the Lausanne talks; (2) ways to utilize the government's planned announcement on the repatriation of 100,000 refugees.

(1) A proposal is made that Shiloah replace Eytan at Lausanne for the second stage of the talks, accompanied by Kohn. Sasson's return to Lausanne is a foregone conclusion, as his presence there represents for the Arabs a token of Israel's sincere desire to make peace. Sharett informs the forum of Ben-Gurion's inclination to dispatch Sasson to Damascus for direct peace talks with the Syrian ruler. In Kohn's opinion, Eytan's absence from Lausanne might be construed as a departure from the line with which he had hitherto become identified; this might adversely affect his future credibility as a representative of Israel.

Summing up, Kohn's argument prevails, but no decision is taken on the delegation's composition.

(2) Turning to the second question on the agenda, Elath analyses the American position. Three factors are operative there: the State Department,

the White House and the U.N. Of these, the Department of State might prove helpful to Israel and able to influence the White House. The timing for the announcement of Israel's readiness to admit the 100,000 refugees is a purely tactical matter, and the choice of the right moment could win Israel favourable public opinion on the eve of the Assembly.

Sharett expounds on the careful distinction to be made between a confidential notification to the U.S. government of Israel's intention and a routine official announcement. A statement on the subject to the Commission would be considered a public announcement, but should the State Department inform the newly-appointed American Representative on the Commission of Israel's confidential communication, and should the latter in turn divulge it to the Arabs – that would be different. In any case, the matter of the 100,000 is dependent on the following three conditions: (a) attainment of peace; (b) a comprehensive and definitive solution of the refugee problem: without it, the 100,000 will not be repatriated; (c) retainment of Israel's present borders: any alteration in the extent of Israeli-controlled territory would involve a proportionate change in the number of refugees to be admitted, there being a direct link between the refugee problem and the territorial issue.

In conclusion, it is resolved to notify the Americans confidentially of Israel's readiness to absorb 100,000 refugees, the French to be similarly notified. Any communication to the Conciliation Commission should be withheld pending assessment of contribution to the advancement of peace. In any case, Cordier's reply should first be awaited.

137. Address by M. Sharett at a Political Consultation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[1] (Tel Aviv, 13–14 July 1949)

Minutes: I.M.D.E.A. 230.72/897

Summary

Sharett discusses policy regarding negotiations with the Arab states, and Israel's relations with the U.S.A., France and Britain. This takes on two aspects: the general one of Lausanne, with the resumption of the talks, and the more limited one of the talks in Washington and New York, particularly in view of the American offer to mediate between Israel and Egypt.[2] Sharett wishes to ascertain which of the Arab states would sign a separate peace with Israel and negotiate outside the Lausanne framework. For Israel, separate settlements with Egypt, Lebanon and Syria are desirable. Jordan is a more difficult problem, as this would involve acquiescence in her annexation of parts of Palestine and Jerusalem. As to Egypt, there are unconfirmed rumours of an imminent affirmative answer to the American mediation proposal.[3] However, agreement with Israel is not as vital for Egypt as for Jordan. Egypt's pressing problem is the refugees in the Gaza Strip. The U.S. does not oppose Israeli annexation of the Gaza Strip; in fact, American consent to this

is designed to extract from Israel (a) admittance of a much larger number of refugees, (b) territorial compensation in the Negev.

The Arabs are expecting a different Israeli approach with the resumption of the Lausanne talks. The Government has resolved to admit 100,000 refugees,[4] but this is the extent to which Israel will go. [. . . . .] Sharett opposes L. Kohn's proposal[5] to challenge the Commission as, in his view, this is unlikely to induce a reversal of the American position. As to Eban's analysis:[6] it was penetrating but not all-encompassing, having overlooked certain aspects of American policy. For instance, the Jerusalem issue is used by the U.S. to exert pressure on Israel, threatening – unless Israel reaches agreement with Abdallah – to place it on the U.N. agenda, with dire consequences for Israel, as the outcome would be the renewal of the internationalization scheme. Sharett thinks that the present state of an armistice without peace poses no immediate danger to Israel, but in the long run it will jeopardize her economic and social development and adversely affect her international relations, while providing grounds for the U.S. to continue exerting pressure.

As for the conclusion ensuing from the discussion on the desirability of divorcing the refugee problem from the peace settlement, Sharett wishes to caution the speakers. He suggests proposing to the Arabs that if they cooperate with the Sub-committee on the refugee problem, Israel would agree to commit herself to specific numbers, although actual admission would be subject to the attainment of peace.[7]

Sharett advises against public pronouncements and declarations about the vital importance of peace for Israel and her endeavours to attain it, because frequency makes such statements suspect. Moreover, the Arabs might think that Israel is indeed desperate to sign any sort of agreement.

American interests in the Arab world dictate a U.S. stand on the refugee issue that will demonstrate its support for Arab claims. Israel cannot ignore this when called upon to make some contribution to the solution of the problem. Incidentally Sharett remarks that one of the lines of argumentation in America should be that Israel is not beholden to the U.S. Americans should be made aware, in an indirect manner, that Israel's domestic situation requires delicate handling, to keep her from falling into the arms of the East.

[. . . . .][8]

As regards the forthcoming U.N. Assembly, Sharett would rather not have the Palestine issue on the agenda at all, which may indeed happen if there is progress at the Lausanne talks; it is therefore in Israel's interest to keep these going.

Sharett suggests telling de Boisanger that Israel will welcome any constructive ideas on the Commission's part, but will not consent to proposals implying unreasonable Israeli concessions.[9] He reiterates Israel's basic stand that the territorial issues should be settled with each Arab state separately; exception could only be made regarding the refugee question. Eytan's prop-

osal to set up subcommittees[10] at Lausanne is consonant with Israel's position on the refugees, but on the territorial issue a comprehensive debate with all the Arab states is to be avoided. Thus, for instance, the issue of Jerusalem is a matter for discussion between Israel and the U.N., possibly with the one other country concerned participating, but not all the Arab states should be made a party to it.

Concerning Transjordan, Sharett admits having revised his opinion several times; he has reached a point of conviction that there was no alternative to peace negotiations. Being wary of American pressure on the territorial issue, he thought a settlement with Jordan might forestall this. A peace treaty is not everlasting, and Israel could cope with eventual crises such as an attempt by Zaim to take over Jordan, or a Jordanian attempt to take over Syria. Negotiations with Jordan pose, however, a grave domestic problem for Israel, as they would entail concessions in Jerusalem. In the meantime, the likelihood of internal unrest in the Arab parts of Palestine may work to Israel's advantage, and this led Sharett to put off a final decision on negotiations with Jordan, having concluded that the future of these parts will be determined by internal Arab conflicts. There had already been a possibility of Egypt's supporting an Arab independence movement in those regions and coming to a tripartite alliance with Israel and the local Arabs. According to Mulqi, the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty did not apply west of the Jordan river.[11]

Notes

1. The following attended the consultation: A. Eban, E. Elath, W. Eytan, S. Eliashiv, S. Divon, D. Horowitz, E. Herlitz, L. Kohn, I.J. Linton, Z. Liff, Y. Palmon, T. Kollek, M. Comay, J. Robinson, S. Rosenne, R. Shiloah, E. Sasson, E. Gordon, G. Meron. Only the Foreign Minister's address appears here; omissions of other speakers' remarks are marked in the text.
2. See No. 122, n. 1.
3. See No. 134, n. 2.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 65–6 above.
5. In Kohn's estimate, the Conciliation Commission could only be harmful to Israel's interests, and it was therefore desirable to try and replace it by a U.N. mediatory apparatus.
6. Eban analysed the special nature of the crisis in Israeli–American relations: "This time the White House and the Department of State hold identical positions on the refugee issue and there is unanimity among all concerned. The problem of the refugees is at present also weighing on the U.S. and is bound to exercise the forthcoming Assembly." He suggested relieving some of the pressure on this matter and thus breaking up the united American front. He summarized the position in a few points: "(a) The crux of our political situation is the refugee issue. (b) The choice to be made is between seeking peace with all or only some of the Arab countries. (c) Regarding Transjordan, it must be absolutely clear that no peace agreement will be signed if this implied the annexation of the Triangle by Transjordan. (d) It depends on the Conciliation Commission itself whether and to what extent the Palestine issue appears on the agenda of the forthcoming Assembly. (e) As long as the 'likelihood' remains of an Assembly debate on this subject or of U.S. intervention in the matter – the very existence of this 'likelihood' will inhibit progress towards direct negotiations; only when this is eliminated will the way be open to direct contacts and to a direct decision."

No. 137 – Notes (continued)

7. A recess took place here. Sharett continued his address on July 14.
8. One sentence omitted here.
9. See No. 133 and n. 1 *ibid.*
10. See No. 74, p. 124.
11. See No. 113.

138. Meeting: M. Fischer – C. de Boisanger (Paris, 16 July 1949, Document dated 18 July 1949)

Notes

1. No. 133.
2. Henri Bonnet, French Ambassador to the U.S.
3. See No. 133, n. 1.

139. A. Lourie (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 July 1949

Notes

1. Colonel Efraim Ben-Arzi, Israeli Military Attaché in Washington.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 65–6 above.
3. 16 July. See Lourie's record of the conversation in file 93.03/3037/11.
4. See No. 36 and n. 11 *ibid.*
5. See also No. 159.

140. Meeting: M. Eliash – E. Bevin (London, 19 July 1949)

Notes

1. Michael R. Wright, Assistant Under-Secretary of State at the British Foreign Office, charged *inter alia* with Middle Eastern policy.

141. T. Arazi (Paris) to W. Eytan. 19 July 1949

Notes

1. The conversation took place on 19 July.
2. Reference is to a consultation on the subject of the refugees, held in Paris at the end of May. See also No. 69.
3. 19 July 1949, 130.02/2444/19.

142. E. Avriel (Prague) to M. Sharett. 19 July 1949

Report: 130.11/2494/1

Summary

Avriel reports on his meeting with Berey on 12 July regarding *aliya*. Berey criticized Sharett's statement in the Knesset[1] "which constitutes interference in Hungary's internal affairs and places obstacles in the way of the negotiations". Avriel countered that he would rather discuss the problem of immigration itself instead of Sharett's statement, and remarked that the trial of Zionist activists in Hungary[2] had been held while negotiations were going on, this having a very adverse effect on Israeli public opinion. Berey sought Avriel's opinion on the proposals submitted to Bentsur,[3] and Avriel made it clear that they were unacceptable in their present form. The Government of Israel could not sign an undertaking not to transgress the laws of Hungary as this was so self-evident that it did not require a special commitment. By the same token, Israel could not append its signature to a document implying it had been organizing illegal emigration from Hungary. Moreover, Bentsur could not commit Israel to one thousand emigrants, a figure not agreed on in the course of the previous conversations. Berey contended that his government had never promised that 5,000 Jews would be allowed to emigrate, the only official pronouncement being his communication to Avriel of 28 April regarding emigration of relatives.[4]

[. . . . .][5]

Berey demanded that Israel desist from aiding illegal emigration, and Avriel replied that Israel had not been aiding this movement; there was no desire for unorganized immigration, but for an agreement with the Hungarian authorities conducive to a well-ordered selection of immigrants. Israel aspired to negotiations based on mutual understanding and devoid of friction. The Government of Israel had advised the Jews to await the outcome of negotiations, but they had finally lost their patience. Every Jew, including those fleeing from Hungary, had the basic legal right to immigrate to Israel and on this there could be no compromise.

Berey categorically ruled out the possibility of renewing negotiations, stating that the only basis for further talks on emigration was the document given to Bentsur. Israel could suggest changes in its text for his government to consider, but he doubted that any deviation from the number or categories of authorized emigrants was possible.

[. . . . .][6]

The conversation then turned to relations between Hungary and Israel. Berey stressed Hungary's sympathy for Israel during the War of Independence, and Avriel dwelt on Israel's need of Hungarian support and of uninterrupted emigration to Israel; he also suggested the desirability of examining the relations between the two countries on a wider international plane, not confining oneself to the narrower political imperatives of Hungarian Jewry.

In this context, Avriel requested an audience with Mr. Rákosi in order to discuss bilateral relations and the possible repercussions of Hungary's uncompromising emigration policy on an international level.

Notes

1. See No. 117, n. 3.
2. See No. 47, nn. 2 and 3.
3. Shmuel Bentsur, Israeli Consul in Budapest. The Hungarian proposals submitted to Bentsur were extremely rigid: the right to emigrate to be restricted to people having either parents or children in Israel; to orphans under the age of 10 with a brother or sister in Israel; and to married women whose husbands lived in Israel. The total number of emigrants was not to exceed 1000. (See "Protokoll in Sachen der Auswanderung ungarischer Staatsbürger nach Israel", June 1949, 130.11/2502/15.)
4. No. 9.
5. One paragraph omitted here.
6. Two sentences omitted here.

143. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Avriel (Prague). 20 July 1949

Coded Tel. IC136; Outg.: 130.09/2342/12

Summary

In reply to Avriel's telegram,[1] Sharett instructs him to deny rumours of Israel's boycott of the Democratic Youth Festival and to inform the Hungarian authorities as follows: (a) Israel is in a state of emergency and cannot reasonably be expected to act as if conditions were normal. Foreign currency is severely limited thus making it an unwarranted luxury to send a group of young people to an international festival abroad. (b) Those able to leave without involving the state in an excessive expenditure of foreign currency would be allowed to do so. (c) Stringent restrictions have been imposed on travel abroad, including attendance at vital international congresses. (d) Israel categorically rejects imputations of hostility towards East European countries, particularly in view of the participation of the Histadrut (General Federation of Labour) at the Milan congress[2] and considering the remarkable restraint of the Israeli public in the face of incessant vilification of Israel and her Government by the East European press and of the Budapest Trial.[3].

Notes

1. Avriel transmitted the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' protest against Israel's boycott of the Democratic Youth Festival, in which the Hungarians characterized the boycott as "an expression of hostility not only against Hungary but against all the popular democracies". Avriel requested that his avowed advocacy of Israel's participation in the festival be taken into account when considering the final decision. (Telegram to Eliashiv, 19 July 1949, 130.11/2499/22.)

No. 143 – Notes (continued)

2. The second congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions was held in Milan from June 29 to July 10, 1949. Most western Trade Unions had left the Federation earlier that year, claiming it was under complete Communist domination. They convened a conference in Geneva (June 25–6) where a preparatory committee was elected to draw up the constitution of an alternative organization. The Israeli General Federation of Labour (Histadrut) sent a delegation to the Milan congress and an observer to the Geneva conference. (See file 130.02/2408/3.)
3. See No. 47, nn. 2 and 3.

144. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 21 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 134.
2. See No. 139.
3. Elath replied that the interview had been set for Wednesday, 27 July; but see No. 160 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. Sharett met McDonald on 27 July, apprising him of the Government's resolution on the admission of 100,000 Arab refugees on the lines indicated in the present communication (see telegram to Elath, IW138, 28 July 1949, 130.09/2308/3, and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1265; see also Sharett to Shiloah, telegram TE49, 28 July 1949, 130.09/2317/8).
5. Incoming version reads here ''rates''.

145. S. Eliashiv (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 24 July 1949

Coded Tel. IP174; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Eliashiv reports on the meeting at Milan between Histadrut delegates and Kuznetzov and Korneev.[1] The Russians objected to inclusion of the immigration problem on the plenum agenda. A meeting was arranged on Kuznetsov's initiative and under his chairmanship with representatives of Rumania and Hungary, who promised support for Israel's claims before their home governments. This was the first instance of Soviet representatives agreeing to discuss Israel's demand for immigration from Eastern bloc countries. Kuznetsov expressed his desire for a solution to the problem satisfactory to all concerned.

Notes

1. Vasili V. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. All-Union Central Committee of Trade Unions, headed the Soviet delegation to the Milan congress (see No. 143, n. 2); Korneev was member of the delegation. The meeting with the Histadrut delegates took place on July 6. For further details see R. Burstein to P. Lubianiker, 7 July 1949, 130.02/2403/3.

146. M. Sharett: Guidelines for Israeli Missions Abroad. 25 July 1949

130.02/2444/19

Summary

Briefing of the Lausanne Delegation by the Foreign Minister

1. With the signing of the armistice agreement with Syria, the circle of agreements consolidating Israel's territorial status is complete. Control over Israeli sovereign territories, hitherto dependent on a shaky balance of armed forces, is now reaffirmed by agreements binding on the other parties and endorsed by the U.N.
2. On the face of it, this new state of affairs frees Israel from the compelling need for formal peace treaties with her neighbours, with the armistice agreements substituting for such treaties in two major respects: stabilization of the boundaries and a guarantee against renewed aggression. It is therefore Israel's duty, even for tactical reasons *vis-à-vis* the Arabs, to refrain from demonstrations of anxiety over the lack of peace and put up a calm and self-confident front.

   On the other hand, it would be a delusion to imagine that a state of armistice is in itself sufficient and that the idea of a formal peace treaty may be abandoned as irrelevant and nonessential. Even from the territorial aspect one should not underestimate the additional element of security and stability to be granted by a durable peace treaty. Israel's total isolation from her neighbours is also an acute problem, the perpetuation of which will force her to remain an alien body in the Middle East and greatly reduce her development potential. Limitations on the development of tourism; barring of the Suez Canal to export and import traffic; refusal of Swiss banks to grant loans to Israel before peace is attained; the problem of Jerusalem and its irksome complications; the ominous threat from the Gaza Strip – these and other manifestations demonstrate the severe handicaps under which Israel presently labours and of which she will only be rid when formal peace is attained.
3. It is, then, Israel's duty to persist in her efforts for an early attainment of peace, both as a goal in its own right and as a tactical dictate of political wisdom. At the same time one should avoid – despite the seeming contradiction – presenting peace as an urgent, totally essential goal for Israel.
4. It follows that, if only for tactical reasons, Israel must appear at the second stage of the Lausanne talks as sincerely eager for the success of the Conciliation Commission's mediation efforts and as an active partner in its endeavours. All the more so, since basically the Lausanne talks provide the best opportunity present for direct contacts with the Arab states. Here, too, correct tactics dictate that direct contacts with the Arab delegations be characterized as complementary to the Commission's efforts.

5. Compelling tactical considerations dictate that we not only make a pretence of cooperation but that we apply ourselves to rescuing the Lausanne talks from their present impasse and to improving their chances of success. The annual Assembly of the United Nations is not far off; considering the complex of factors affecting the discussion of our problem at the Assembly, and in particular, given the present climate in Washington, we can but regard as highly disadvantageous for us to have the Palestine issue put on the coming Assembly's agenda.
6. The only way to ensure that this item is excluded from the agenda, is to breathe new life into the Lausanne talks and to break the deadlock. On the eve of the Assembly's opening we must impart the impression that the Lausanne negotiations have a fair chance of success, and that this must not be jeopardized by a general debate which might exacerbate conflicts and make the parties entrench themselves in their present extreme positions. If such an impression is created and reflected in the report of the Conciliation Commission, there will doubtless not only be no difficulty in postponing the debate till the next Assembly, but the majority of the members will also be delighted to be rid of an onerous and annoying problem. France's definite inclination against the Palestine issue appearing on the agenda[1] reflects the attitude of many other members.
7. Attempts to revive the Lausanne Conference are imperative also because of the urgent need to relieve the tension between Israel and the U.S. engendered mainly by the refugee problem.
8. From the international aspect, the refugee problem is different from the territorial issue. Delay in a final territorial settlement and our refusal to give up any of the areas under our control do not imply any serious international threat for us. A majority of votes – let alone a two-thirds majority – in the Assembly for the detachment of any area from the State of Israel, would be difficult to muster. Many states would certainly be wary of creating a precedent whereby the Assembly may infringe on the territorial integrity of a sovereign state, particularly a member of the U.N. The refugee problem, however, is in a different category, to the extent that one is not dealing with the welfare of a single state, but with that of a multitude of people in distress, facing poverty, hunger, disease and death. Not surprisingly then, the Department of State and the White House are much more of a mind on the refugee problem than on the territorial issue; the refugee problem is the one agitating public opinion; and even circles sympathetic to us do not regard as defensible our declared position on this issue.
9. From the point of view of the U.N. and the U.S., the refugee problem essentially is not a moral but a practical one: not who is responsible, who is in the right, but what is the solution. Even unfriendly circles are now prepared to admit that the problem was not of Israel's making but caused by Arab aggression. But even friendly circles will not accept the thesis

that, as we are not responsible for the problem, it does not behoove us to contribute to its solution.

10. In fact, we ourselves have accepted this position: we have rejected responsibility for the problem; we have declared our interest in its solution; we have agreed to make our contribution not only through the payment of financial compensation for abandoned lands, but also through the admission of a certain number of refugees and their resettlement within the framework of a comprehensive peace agreement. This position was officially and publicly defined by Israel's Representative at the U.N., appearing before the Ad Hoc Committee at the last Assembly.[2] Yet, this position is still not regarded as satisfactory. Two additional demands were initially presented to us: numerical definition of our future contribution, and immediate implementation. The second demand was subsequently withdrawn, perhaps as a result of our declared readiness to admit relatives of the Arab residents of Israel.[3] On the other hand, pressure regarding the first point has continued and even increased.

11. One cannot ignore the force of the argument levelled at us on this point, i.e.: considering your agreement in principle to the admission of a certain number within the framework of a peace settlement, your refusal to name a figure beforehand is unreasonable. You argue that you cannot at present commit yourselves to a specific number because you do not know the nature of the future peace, but this argument does not hold water because you have agreed to accept the Gaza Strip with all its population. Furthermore, a general commitment is worthless because in such cases it is not the principle but the quantity that matters. One obstacle creates another. As long as there is no firm commitment on your side, the Arab states are not prepared to commit themselves to absorb the remaining, larger part of the refugees. If both parties refuse to commit themselves, any project for the solution of the problem is merely academic. With no detailed plans one cannot attempt to estimate the costs, and with no estimates – no allocations will become available, not even for temporary relief. The U.N. will not be able to procure unlimited additional contributions.

12. The need to rescue our policy out of its impasse in the matter of the refugees and to divert American pressure from ourselves to the Arab states has necessitated reconsideration of our tactics. In anticipation of the second stage of the Lausanne talks and following soundings in Washington and at the U.N. in New York on the possible reaction to our proposal, we came to the conclusion that it was time to define Israel's contribution to the resettlement of the refugees, and to specify in the course of negotiations how many we would be prepared to admit.[4] This would include those Arabs who have so far been allowed to return as well as those who will be permitted to reunite with their families. The number given will relate to the present area of the state and will not be

linked to territorial expansion – i.e., it will not be conditional on the proposed attachment of the Gaza Strip to Israel.

13. This step should be presented as a considerable concession on our part, denoting a clear departure from our previous position. We should therefore make it conditional on the following: (a) onset of peace negotiations by the Arab states as a precondition for our declaration of intent; (b) implementation of peace and a commitment to a comprehensive solution to the refugee problem, as a precondition to our implementing our pledge. The risk to our security that we shall be incurring justifies and dictates the first stipulation. The argument advanced by those who demand this undertaking from us – namely, that it is the missing link in the chain of the resettlement plans, justifies and dictates the second stipulation. In other words, only if the Arabs enter upon peace negotiations shall we be prepared to define our contribution; and only if our contribution ensures a comprehensive solution of the problem, shall we be prepared to implement it. We shall be bound by the specified number only if it is made unmistakably clear, first, that no further claims will be made upon us, and second, that our contribution is part of the comprehensive and final solution of the entire problem.
14. It will no doubt be claimed that our contribution is not adequate and should be substantially increased; these demands must be categorically rejected and we should emphatically and unequivocally declare that this is the very limit of our concessions and our offer is final. It should be made clear that, as we bear no responsibility for the problem but are nevertheless willing to help in its solution, the extent of our contribution can bear no relationship to the dimensions of the problem but solely to the extent of our abilities – and only we are qualified to determine this. It must also be most forcibly emphasized that in the light of our bitter experience, even in a context of peace, an increase in our Arab population even by the number specified constitutes a very grave security risk for the State of Israel. If our contribution is considered insufficient, then we shall retract our offer and wash our hands of the whole affair.
15. These, then, will be our instructions to our delegation at Lausanne: following initial soundings of the Commission and the Arab delegations through informal talks, the delegation will inform the Commission that if the Arab delegations are prepared to enter on peace negotiations the Israeli delegation will then agree that the refugee problem be put on the agenda as the first item; once the discussion of this item as part of the comprehensive peace negotiations begins, the Israeli delegation will specify the total number of Arab refugees that the Government of Israel will be prepared to admit, with the explicit stipulation that this contribution will constitute part of a binding comprehensive plan for the solution of the problem and that it will be implemented solely within the context of a durable and comprehensive peace settlement.

16. Our readiness to discuss the refugees as part of the comprehensive peace negotiations does not imply abandonment of the Israeli delegation's declared desire to negotiate with each Arab state on the peace questions relevant to that individual state alone, or its unwillingness to negotiate all the pending issues collectively with all the Arab states. This principle must however be regarded with a certain amount of flexibility. The refugee problem by its very nature necessitates a collective framework of negotiations, as no single Arab state can be required to bear sole responsibility for those refugees currently residing within its borders. A territorial issue such as the Gaza Strip may also be simultaneously pertinent to two Arab states; conversely, we absolutely cannot brook inclusion of the Jerusalem issue as a subject for collective negotiations with all the Arab states, but must argue instead that it is of no concern to any Arab state not actually occupying any part of it.
17. One should however bear in mind that the Arab states went to war as a group, and since we cannot change the fact that they have all been invited to the Lausanne Conference, we should not dogmatically adhere to the principle of separate negotiations. Our initial approach was that separate negotiations were more likely to succeed, and this was clearly demonstrated by the armistice agreements; this thesis, however, should be realistically tested anew, and if collective or coordinated negotiations can lead to more progress, then the principle should be sacrificed to the objective, and not vice versa. In this respect, the Lebanese initiative launched towards the conclusion of the first stage of the Lausanne Conference[5] may be worth re-examination.
18. To the extent that it depends on us, we should reassess the possibility of direct negotiations and a separate settlement with Egypt, and also concentrate efforts on contacts and negotiations with Syria. Changes effected in the personnel of the Syrian delegation[6] may be beneficial to us. In negotiating with Syria we should beware of making or hinting at any promise that we agree to frontier modifications on the Syrian border along the Jordan and the Lakes. The Syrian delegation should be encouraged to consider the idea of developing their country through large-scale absorption of refugees, with assurances that our material and technical aid towards that objective will be forthcoming.
19. If negotiations with Egypt materialize, we may assume that they will focus on the Gaza Strip problem. Until we reach the stage of negotiations, no discussion of this issue should be broached. If this subject is raised by the Commission or by the U.S. or by Egypt itself, we should reaffirm our willingness to annex the Strip with its present inhabitants, while also explaining the grave difficulties involved in absorbing such a large and indeterminate mass of population and our concomitant reservations. Above all, we should make it absolutely clear that the number of refugees we have agreed to admit irrespective of territorial expansion is not in addition to but inclusive of the Gaza population. Estimates of the

Gaza population vary, but in any case Israel will not absorb more than 200,000 people.

20. A possible way of dealing with the surplus population in the Gaza Strip would be to persuade Syria to accept them in the context of the large refugee resettlement project which the Zaim government is now reported to have under consideration. Another option could be an agreement whereby Jordan would absord the surplus in exchange for free port rights in Gaza similar to those rights of a free port and free access which we are prepared to give them in Haifa.
21. Any demand of territorial compensation for the Gaza Strip, whether to Egypt or to Jordan, should be rejected out of hand, and justified thus: the benefits of Israeli annexation of the Strip are offset by the disadvantage of an increase in her Arab population; the net benefits are reaped by Egypt, who having admittedly never sought to expand beyond the desert is now freed of the heavy burden of supporting a large mass of refugees. If matters actually reach this stage and a softening of our flat refusal becomes necessary, we might discuss modifications in the northern Negev borders, both in the east and in the west, i.e. on Egypt's and Jordan's behalf, but under no circumstances would we contemplate concessions to anybody in the southern part of the Negev, inclusive of Eilat.
22. Perhaps the best policy as regards the Gaza Strip would be to let matters rest and make no hard and fast decisions on its future. If this turns out to be the only practical measure at this juncture, we should examine the advisability of proposing that the refugees we have agreed to admit be taken from the Gaza Strip, which would ease matters for the Egyptians and contribute to the peace process.
23. We should renew and foster contacts with the Jordanian delegation, mainly striving to preserve practical arrangements for the settlement of pending issues. Any commitment to a peace settlement which would imply our recognition of Jordanian sovereignty west of the Jordan should be avoided at present. Possible unrest in that area and agitation against annexation, as well as the uncertain future of the Hashemite Kingdom owing to the expansionist ambitions of both Syria and Iraq, dictate extreme caution and moderation on our part *vis-à-vis* the future of the Arab part of Palestine. In the meantime we should keep exploring the possible creation of an autonomous entity in the Arab part of Palestine that would be associated with Israel, and encouraging agitation towards that end.
24. Regarding negotiations on Jerusalem, we should insist that the entire area of the city now under our control be incorporated in the State of Israel, and that the Jewish quarter in the Old City also be included in that arrangement, so that if the need arises we can safely acquiesce in its demilitarization. We ought to demand an international regime for the Old City, in lieu of its partition. Alternatively, we can agree to the

partition of the entire city between a Jewish and an Arab administration, without laying down hard and fast rules as to the nature of the Arab administration. The present demarcation line could serve as the boundary between the two zones, with certain mutually agreed upon modifications. We should accept U.N. supervision of the Holy Places in Jerusalem.

25. We must seriously and wisely endeavour to foster good relations with the members of the Commission, persuading them of our sincere wish for close cooperation. On the other hand, we should resist the Commission's tendency to concentrate on trivial details and to complicate the problem by taking points out of context and discussing them separately. We must also fight the notion that the Commission may arrogate to itself authority to submit officially solutions of its own, but should this question come up anew the members of the Commission should be told that we would be glad to consider any proposal put to us unofficially.
26. No negotiations should be broached on the reunification of families, either with the Commission or with the Arab delegations. It must be made clear that this proposal was made by the Government of Israel out of purely humane considerations and that it has nothing to do with the negotiations taking place at Lausanne. We should publicly denounce the fact that the Arab states have so far ignored Israel's proposal.

Notes

1. See No. 138.
2. See No. 5 (Appendix).
3. See No. 126.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 65–6 above.
5. See No. 107.
6. See No. 188.

147. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 25 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 144, para. 4.
2. See No. 134, n. 2.
3. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1248.

148. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 26 July 1949 (11.00)

Coded Tel. ET41; Recd: 27 July; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

De Boisanger confidentially informed Sasson that: (a) the Arab states have

reached the consensus that Lebanon will request placing the Palestine issue on the U.N. Assembly agenda; (b) at a private meeting of the Commission Porter reiterated U.S. endorsement of territorial compensation by Israel to her neighbours in exchange for a peace settlement; he hinted at detachment of the southern Negev starting from parallels 30°–31°;[1] (c) at the same meeting the participants discussed the need for fresh initiative on the part of the Commission, to be presented in an unofficial and non-binding form; (d) the Lebanese delegate had confided to de Boisanger that the Arabs were expecting the Assembly to revalidate the partition plan and to pass an additional resolution on the repatriation of the refugees and on their property.

Notes

1. Reference is to the area lying south of parallels 30° or 31° crossing the southern Negev. See also No. 149.

149. G. Avner (Lausanne) to W. Eytan. 26 July 1949 (23.00)

Coded Tel. ET43; Recd: 27 July; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

At a meeting with Porter, Avner was informed that: (1) A debate at the Assembly is unavoidable, but if there is progress at Lausanne the Commission will endeavour to shorten the debate. (2) Within the next four weeks Porter hopes to obtain from all the parties a declaration of intent to reach a peace agreement and solve all future disputes by peaceful means, renouncing territorial expansion by force; a formula for the solution of the refugee problem based on numbers to be absorbed by each country; general lines for a territorial settlement. (3) America is still apprehensive of Israeli designs in southern Lebanon and in central Palestine; the U.S. maintains that the armistice lines cannot in justice serve as a basis for a territorial settlement; Israel should relinquish ambitions for additional territory and return some of the areas under her control in order to restore equilibrium to the region, otherwise American pressure will persist; Israel will be recompensed for the loss of territory by American guarantees for peace and security as well as capital for development; the U.S. would like Israel to give up the southern Negev up to the 31st parallel,[1] including Beersheba, though other possibilities would be considered, such as withdrawal in Western Galilee or in the Lydda–Ramle area, or in the Negev to the 29 November lines while giving up Auja and certain other areas. The Americans understand Israel's difficulties in making these concessions, but international well-being demands immediate peace in the Middle East and a just peace requires concessions. (4) Porter is prepared to exert pressure on the Arabs regarding the plan to re-unite families.[2]

Notes

1. Cf. No. 148, para. 3.
2. See No. 126.

150. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 26 July 1949

Notes

1. With the U.S. Secretary of State. See Nos. 144 and 147, and No. 160 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. See No. 126.

151. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 26 July 1949

Notes

1. Jacob Blaustein, President of the American Jewish Committee.
2. Louis Johnson, U.S. Secretary of Defense.

152. A. Eban (New York) to E. Elath (Washington). 26 July 1949

Notes

1. The Cabinet meeting took place on 19 July 1949.
2. See Nos. 136 and 137.
3. See Nos. 144 and 150, and No. 160 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. Report dated 21 July on the status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in Palestine (U.N. Document S/1357, 26 July 1949, *SCOR*, Fourth Year, Supplement VIII 1949, pp. 1–7; also in file 130.02/2447/7). See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.
5. See Vol. 3, Appendix H.
6. See Vol. 3, Appendix I.
7. See No. 122, n. 1.

153. J. Tsur[1] (Montevideo) to H. Raday. 26 July 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2415/14

Summary

Tsur reports on a series of meetings with Brazilian personalities on the subject of relations between Israel and Brazil.

(1) Toff met Fernandes, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, and solicited Brazil's support for Israel at the forthcoming Assembly on the Jerusalem and territorial issues. Fernandes was explicit about Brazil being mainly preoccupied with renewal of diplomatic relations with Spain, and as long as Israel did

not change its policy towards Spain she could not expect Brazil's support;[2] if no Israeli backing for Spain's admission to the U.N. was possible, there should at least not be active opposition. Reacting to Toff's feeler on the subject, Fernandes asked that the dispatch of an Israeli minister to Rio de Janeiro be put off till after the U.N. Session. Tsur regards this as a tactful "ultimatum", unmistakable in essence.

(2) Tsur, accompanied by David Shaltiel,[3] spoke with Macedo Soares, the Brazilian Ambassador in Montevideo, about the difficulties facing Israel in her relations with Brazil. Soares traced the root of the problem to the total lack of information and propaganda for Israel in Brazil. The influence of the Church, very strong in Brazil, was generally detrimental to Israel, with no one to present Israel's case. The establishment of a legation in Brazil would enable Israel to disseminate accurate information, clear the atmosphere and arouse public sympathy. Soares noted the importance of Shaltiel's visit to Rio de Janeiro, the excellent impression he had created and the contacts he made there.

(3) Toff and Tsur met Pimentel Brandão, Brazil's Ambassador to the Pan-American Union, and discussed the same problem with him. The Ambassador explained Brazil's compelling need of full diplomatic relations with Spain for economic and political reasons, and accused the great powers of "amusing themselves with slogans of a boycott against Franco" at the expense of the small states. As to Franco's attitude towards Jews, Pimentel Brandão claimed that Franco had personally told him during the war that he "would never join in persecuting Jews" and that he even "gave instructions to facilitate their rescue".

Pimentel Brandão said that he fully understood Israel's motives for voting against Franco at the Assembly, adding that, out of all the U.N. members, Israel's was possibly the only fully justified vote. He disagreed with Fernandes' view on the postponement of diplomatic ties with Israel, pointing to the inconsistency of Brazil's seeking diplomatic relations with Spain while denying them to Israel. He thought public opinion would be greatly aroused if it became known that the exchange of ministers with Israel was being delayed because of the Spanish issue, and the resulting storm might even lead to the Foreign Minister's resignation. All efforts should be directed at opening Israel's legation in Rio de Janeiro; this would lead to a change in the political climate and facilitate normal relations between the two nations. Pimentel Brandão suggested that political pressure be exerted through (a) constant and extensive propaganda in the press; (b) meetings with Members of Parliament and influential politicians; (c) questions in Parliament addressed to the Foreign Minister; (d) emphasis on the fact that Argentina, Brazil's arch-rival, had appointed a minister to Israel and might gain the sympathy of the Jewish world; (e) reference to economic losses sustained by Brazil owing to the absence of diplomatic relations with Israel, in contrast to the economic negotiations being conducted between Israel and Uruguay and Argentina.

Notes

1. Jacob Tsur, Israeli Minister in Uruguay; from August 1949 – accredited also to Argentina.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 19–20 above.
3. David Shaltiel, Inspector-General of the I.D.F. and from October 1949 Commandant of the Frontier Force, went on a fund-raising mission to Latin America in early July.

154. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 27 July 1949 (11.00)

Coded Tel. ET44; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Sasson reports on the Israeli delegation's appearance before the General Committee of the Conciliation Commission[1] on July 26, and its presentation of Israel's position as well as the arrangements for the reunification of families.[2] The delegation criticized the Arab states for failure to accept Israel's invitation and requested that the Commission intervene without delay, explaining that Arab cooperation in the reunification of families would not preclude the right to demand subsequently broadening the categories of family relationships. The Commission, including the American representative, were favourably impressed and promised to try and influence the Arabs. In conclusion the Commission proposed a compromise formula that would satisfy the Arabs while not prejudicing the Israeli position.[3]

Notes

1. Minutes in file 130.02/2441/10.
2. See No. 126.
3. The Commission's formulation accorded repatriation rights within the terms of the reunification of families to all dependents of the head of the family at the outbreak of the hostilities, excepting those who took an active part in the war (Sasson to Sharett, telegram of 27 July 1949, 130.02/2447/2). Sharett opposed this formulation, deeming it an attempt on the Commission's part to increase the number of the refugees to be repatriated, and he reproached Sasson for having too hastily promised the Commission that he would advise his government to accept it (see Sharett to Sasson, telegram 51, 29 July 1949, 130.02/2442/8, and also No. 157).

155. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 27 July 1949 (17.00)

Coded Tel. ET45; Recd: 28 July; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Salvator Cicurel[1] had been asked by Karim Thabit[2] to meet Sasson and inform him on behalf of King Faruq that: (a) Egypt is trying to improve the condition of its Jews and as a first step is gradually releasing detainees and property; (b) Egypt is in earnest about a possible understanding with Israel,

and requests desisting from the attacks on her in the Israeli press and radio and also in the foreign press. At Sasson's request Cicurel cabled Thabit that the meeting had been duly held, and requested permission to return to Egypt and relay Sasson's reply.[3] If such permission is granted, Sasson intends prompting him to press for direct negotiations with Israel outside the Lausanne format.[4]

Notes

1. Salvator Cicurel, President of the Jewish community in Cairo.
2. Karim Bey Thabit, Press Adviser to King Faruq and an influential figure at the Egyptian Court.
3. For additional details of the meeting see Sasson's letter to Sharett, 31 July 1949, 130.02/2447/2. See also No. 175.
4. Sharett thought the contact with the Egyptians had possibilities and asked Sasson whether denunciations of Egypt by "Kol Israel" should be discontinued. He suggested that Sasson steer the talks not only towards separate negotiations but mainly towards convincing Egypt and having Egypt convince the other Arab delegations that Israel's pledge to take 100,000 refugees is adequate. He instructed Sasson to refrain from raising the question of Gaza at this stage, leaving to his discretion whether to intimate to the Egyptians that "Israel did not particularly care" whether the Strip remained in Egyptian hands for the time being. (Sharett to Sasson, telegram TE50, 28 July 1949, 130.09/2317/8.)

156. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 27 July 1949

Notes

1. See No. 139.
2. Cf. Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below, and No. 220.
3. Mahmud Fawzi, the Egyptian Permanent Representative at the U.N.

157. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah and E. Sasson (Lausanne). 28 July 1949

Coded Tel. TE47; Outg.: 130.09/2317/8

Summary

Sharett reacts to Sasson's and Avner's cables,[1] criticizing their position on the reunification of families. He does not think the Commission should have been urged to press the Arabs on this matter, it being sufficient that Israel had denounced them for failing to respond to the offer, letting the Commission draw its own conclusions. Sharett takes exception to the fervour with which the Israeli delegation had presented the matter at their meeting with the Commission, as in his opinion Israel had discharged her obligation by making the proposal; the onus was now on the Arabs.

Sharett asks the members of the delegation "to purge Porter of all the garbage with which the boys at the State Department filled his head" on the territorial issue. He refers them to Eliash's 19 July meeting with Bevin[2] at which the latter had agreed to Israel's presence in Eilat, refrained from demanding cession of parts of the Negev and settled instead for free passage, and denounced Truman as scheming to wrest territories from Israel. It should be tactfully pointed out to Porter that the U.S. had more than once taken a hasty, uncompromising stand on an issue and had then been left in undignified isolation by her less inflexible associates.

Notes

1. Nos. 149 and 154.
2. No. 140.

158. A. Eban (New York) to R. Shiloah (Lausanne). 28 July 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 156.
2. See No. 147 and n. 3 *ibid.*
3. See No. 148, para. (c); Sasson's telegram was sent to Eban on 27 July (Y258, 130.09/2329/12).
4. See No. 133, n. 1.
5. See Nos. 136 and 137.
6. See No. 148, para. (a), and cf. n. 3 *ibid.*

159. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 28 July 1949

Notes

1. For the background to this interview and for further details on the conversation see No. 177.
2. Cf. No. 139.
3. See No. 134, n. 2, and No. 147.
4. For a detailed report of this conversation see No. 177, and cf. Acheson's memorandum of 1 August 1949 in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1272.
5. Charles F. Brannan, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture.

160. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 28 July 1949

Notes

1. Elath accepted the Department of State's suggestion that he meet with Rusk instead of with Acheson, on discovering that the meeting with the latter might be put off owing to urgent Congressional commitments (see No. 144 and n. 3 *ibid.*, and also the exchange of telegrams, Elath to Sharett, W319, 26 July 1949, 130.09/2308/10, and Sharett to Elath, IW136, 27 July 1949, 130.09/2308/3).

No. 160 – Notes (continued)

2. Cf. record of the conversation in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1261–4.
3. Elath discussed the meeting in two additional telegrams. He thought the Department of State would not react at this stage to Israel's proposal on the refugees but would await the crisis that would eventuate at Lausanne owing to the Arabs' refusal to commit themselves to resettlement of the balance of the refugees. Only then would the Department of State renew its pressure on Israel and on the Arabs to close the gap between their positions. Elath wanted it made perfectly clear to Porter that 100,000 was the maximum number of refugees Israel would be prepared to admit. His impression was that the Americans had not raised the territorial issue at the meeting so as not to press Israel in several issues simultaneously. (Telegrams to Sharett, W327, W329, 29 July 1949, 93.01/2181/4.)

161. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 28 July 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to the anticipated debate in the Security Council. Eban was sounding out its members' positions. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below, and No. 220.

162. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 29 July 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/5

Summary

On arrival in Lausanne Shiloah met Porter and Rockwell. Having been apprised beforehand of Porter's talk with Avner,[1] he decided to take that opportunity to disabuse the Americans of the notion that Israel could be pressured into significant concessions by brandishing the threat of the forthcoming Assembly. Porter replied that his task was to break the deadlock in the conference and that he had till September to determine whether there was any chance of reaching a settlement through negotiations. In the event of an affirmative answer, the U.S. would settle for a brief debate in the Assembly; otherwise, there would be a demand for a comprehensive debate on the issue. Shiloah warned Porter that in such an eventuality, both Israel and the Arabs might concentrate their efforts on presenting their cases to the Assembly and neglect the Lausanne talks.

The territorial issue was then raised. Shiloah mentioned the importance of the Negev to Israel and the President's personal commitment in this matter.[2] He rejected the military argument, but was unable to cite Bevin's comments to Eliash having then been unaware of that meeting.[3] He emphasized that if the Negev were taken away from Israel, it would be destined to remain a desert, while under Israel's aegis new settlements had been established there and many others were in the planning. Shiloah reminds Sharett that in his previous telegram[4] he had mentioned the urgent need to settle the southern Negev as soon as possible even if such intensive activity involved risks and large investments. Shiloah thinks that he partially succeeded in shaking some of Porter's assumptions and that his efforts had not been wasted.[5]

At a further encounter with Porter, this time with no one else present, the latter declared that he had been extremely impressed by Shiloah's arguments and had become persuaded that Israel's attachment to the Negev was more profound than he had supposed. He claimed to be sympathetic towards Israel and intimated that the President had sent him to Lausanne for that very reason, but that the President's attitude might undergo a change if Porter were to fail in his mission. He urged Shiloah to cooperate with him and discuss informally various plans and proposals. He was pleased with Israel's modified position on the refugee problem but dissatisfied with the figure mentioned by Israel, regarding it merely as a basis for further discussions.

Further to his cabled report[6] Shiloah writes about his courtesy calls on the French and Turkish Representatives and on an informal meeting he and Sasson had with the members of the Commission. On those occasions the Protocol of 12 May[7] was mentioned only by the Turkish Representative, and although Shiloah attempted to minimize its importance, he is afraid the Turks might seize on it to exert pressure on Israel. Shiloah apprised the members of the Commission of the Government's resolution on the refugees[8] and recalled in this context Eban's statement at the Political Committee.[9]

On the morning of 29 July, Azcárate gave Shiloah a draft of the Commission's proposed announcement to the Arabs concerning Israel's proposal,[10] but the Israeli delegation did not find it satisfactory as it did not duly express Israel's emphasis on direct talks with the Arabs. It was therefore decided to submit an amended version to the Commission.[11] Azcárate and the others think that the Arabs will agree to open discussions with the refugee problem leading the agenda of the peace negotiations, but they will probably demand that the peace talks be initially conducted not face to face but through the Commission. Shiloah has cabled Sharett for instructions,[12] and his opinion is that this formula should be accepted.

De Boisanger has been somewhat taken aback by Porter's pace and energetic action and is particularly worried about American threats to take the Palestine issue to the U.N. Assembly. He was relieved to learn from Sasson about Shiloah's comments to Porter on this subject, and is trying to rally all available forces against a debate in the Assembly. He is endeavouring to influence the Arabs and the French Ambassador in Washington as well as the U.S. administration to fall in. He would appreciate Israel's cooperation and suggests that Eban's and Elath's services be enlisted to this end. From Sasson's talk with Abd al-Mun'im it emerges that the Egyptians are of the same opinion; Sasson is reporting on this separately.[13]

Notes

1. No. 149.
2. At his meeting with President Weizmann on 19 November 1947 (see Ch. Weizmann, *Trial and Error*, pp. 458–9).
3. See No. 140.
4. Shiloah to Sharett, 28 July 1949, 130.02/2442/6.

No. 162 – Notes (continued)

5. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1266.
6. See n. 4 above.
7. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
8. See minutes of the Commission's meeting with the Israeli delegation on 28 July 1949, at 3.45 p.m. (130.02/2441/10), and also Editorial Note, pp. 65–6 above.
9. See No. 5 (Appendix).
10. See draft of the notification to the Arab delegations, 29 July 1949, 130.02/2447/2.
11. Shiloah to Azcárate, 29 July 1949, *ibid.*
12. Telegram S98, 29 July 1949, *ibid.*
13. See No. 163.

163. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 29 July 1949 (16.00)

Coded Tel. ET48; Recd: 30 July; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Sasson reports on his meeting with Abd al-Mun'im, who told him that as a result of Sasson's letter to Colonel Sherine,[1] he had been instructed by the Egyptian Court to make contact with the Israeli delegation. Abd al-Mun'im did not know of the American mediation proposal.[2] He mentioned King Faruq's considerable influence over Zaim and enquired whether there had been direct contacts between Israel and Syria. He expressed satisfaction over Israel's new position *vis-à-vis* the refugees[3] and promised to use his influence with the Arab delegations to that effect. He asked that Israel refrain from raising the territorial issue at the present stage, agreeing that this should be discussed with each delegation separately. He claimed that there was no Arab consensus about discussing the Palestine issue at the U.N. Assembly and volunteered to try and persuade Porter to drop the subject and thus enable the Lausanne Conference to proceed as if there were no Assembly in the offing. It was mutually agreed to hold frequent meetings; Shiloah will attend the next one.[4]

Notes

1. Ismail Sherine; for the contents of the letter see No. 167 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. See Editorial Note, p. 57 above.
3. See No. 146, para. 15.
4. See No. 178.

164. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 31 July 1949

Copy: 130.02/2441/1

Summary

Shiloah reports on his talks with Porter and on their growing personal rapport.

He regards Porter as a "man of stature", ready to learn and to understand the Israeli standpoint. Porter has come to realize that he cannot intimidate the Israeli delegation and that the entire problem is much more complicated and delicate than he had imagined.

That morning he had discussed with Shiloah procedures for the Commission's sessions, due to resume on the following Tuesday. Porter expressed fear that a new crisis might be triggered if Israel specified the number of refugees she is ready to absorb, with the Arabs rejecting it and Israel refusing to amend it. To avert this, he would concentrate at this stage only on the principles involved without going into details. His aim is to get the Arab governments to agree that the refugee problem must be solved only within the framework of an overall development project, with every country contributing its share according to its absorptive capacity. He thinks that the Department of State erred in emphasizing a numerical commitment. He suggested that, in addressing the Commission, Shiloah affirm Israel's undertaking of a reasonable contribution to the solution of the problem which would be qualified by economic and security considerations and conditional on the Arab states contributing their share. Regarding the number to be admitted, he suggested using the term "in the neighbourhood of", believing that such a formulation will be instrumental in persuading the Arabs to announce their readiness to absorb refugees and to begin direct negotiations with Israel. Porter is simultaneously aiming at the appointment by the U.N. of a committee of experts that, with the aid of Arab and Israeli experts, will examine development and absorption plans and determine the amount of international aid required. Porter thinks that only when such a committee begins functioning will the refugee issue come off the U.N. Assembly agenda. Shiloah has cabled Sharett for instructions.[1] He himself is inclined to accept Porter's proposals. He thinks it advisable to avoid a crisis at this stage of the conference, and though he does not wish to indulge in wishful thinking, the recently improved atmosphere holds out certain prospects of progress. The Arabs, and Abd al-Mun'im in particular, are displaying a more moderate policy, and Porter had indicated a willingness to learn and to understand. The fact that he is President Truman's confidant and that he occasionally takes exception to the State Department's instructions also creates a more hopeful climate.

Questioned by Porter, Shiloah said that he did not at present intend to raise the Gaza issue. Israel had once reacted affirmatively to the proposal that she annex the Strip, and in the event that this is suggested again, it will be given favourable consideration. Porter confided that his instructions were to raise this issue at the appropriate time and to pressure the Egyptians accordingly.

Shiloah reports that Riley visited Lausanne and sought to establish what his authority was *vis-à-vis* the Commission. Riley briefed Porter on the military and territorial background of the problem; Shiloah thinks that Riley explained that it would be unrealistic to try and extort from Israel significant territorial concessions. Riley also advised Porter to visit Israel and the neighbouring

countries and Shiloah accordingly invited Porter on Israel's behalf. While Riley was in Lausanne Ballentine[2] informed him of increased Israeli activity in the vicinity of Government House, Jerusalem, and complained of Israeli provocations against U.N. personnel. Shiloah asks Sharett to make appropriate inquiries.

[. . . . .][3]

Notes

1. Telegram ET53, 31 July 1949, 130.02/2442/6. Sharett instructed Shiloah to accept Porter's formulation but to reject any proposal for the U.N. to appoint a committee of experts that would determine Israel's capacity to absorb the refugees. It should be explained to Porter that the Government's suggestion had aroused intense internal opposition, also within Sharett's own party, and that any "further concession on numbers or on conditions would shake the government". He warned that Arab obstinacy may "arouse internal pressures to withdraw the proposal, pressures which the government would not be able to withstand". (See telegram TE62, 2 August 1949, 130.02/2442/8.)
2. Colonel Samuel Ballentine, U.S.A., Chairman of the Israel–Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission from July 1949.
3. Last paragraph omitted here.

165. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 31 July 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Pursuant to Sharett's comments, Sasson explains that the delegation had not urged the Conciliation Commission to press for family reunification;[1] it was the Commission, regarding this as part of its function, that put pressure on the Israelis. Sasson enumerates the tactical advantages resulting from the delegation's stand when appearing before the Sub-committee: (1) Arab pressure on the Commission and the Commission's pressure on Israel were relieved; (2) the Arab states were brought to cooperate with Israel in this matter; (3) an optimistic mood was created among the members of the Commission, raising hopes for the success of the conference; (4) the Israeli move gave proof to Rockwell and to Porter of Israel's good intentions, contradicting information they had received in America of Israel's intransigence and extremism.

Sasson explains that these advantages did not involve the admission of a single additional refugee nor any modification of the basic stipulations in the Government's statement on the unification of families.[2] Sasson favours the compromise formula proposed by the Commission[3] and points out its advantage for Israel to the extent that it allows the matter to be long drawn out without bringing criticism on Israel.

The delegation explicitly told the Commission that Israel would not be bound by any reservations on the part of the Arabs, and that any number of refugees admitted within the framework of family reunification would be

later deducted from Israel's overall contribution to the solution of the refugee problem.

Regarding frozen Arab assets in Israel, the delegation had informed the Commission that Israel was willing to release the sum of LP 50,000–100,000, on two conditions: (1) that the Arab countries release a similar amount, (2) that a special, Arab-Israeli commission be set up to oversee implementation of this plan.

The Commission members had been favourably impressed by Israel's statement on this subject and this again engendered an atmosphere propitious to Israel. [. . . . .].[4] Sasson argues that this move will not be prejudicial to Israel's interests.

At the same session the delegation raised the subject of Israeli goods confiscated by the Arab states, and Sasson requests instructions on whether to raise the issue again at future meetings.

Notes

1. See No. 157, para. 1, and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. See No. 126.
3. See No. 154, n. 3.
4. One sentence omitted here.

166. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 31 July 1949

Notes

1. Cf. Acheson's telegram to McDonald of 26 July 1949, in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1256–7.
2. Cf. No. 136, para. 1.

167. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 1 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports a marked improvement in the attitude of the Egyptian delegation on the resumption of the Lausanne talks. Personal contacts between himself and the head of the Egyptian delegation, Abd al-Mun'im, have grown closer, and their talks are frequent and amicable. Sasson cannot exactly determine whether the change is prompted by tactical or material considerations, but the immediate result is a marked improvement in the climate at Lausanne and better relations all round. The Egyptian representative's favourable reaction regarding the refugee question during the Commission's last session with the Arab delegations rankled the Jordanian representative, but the French and American representatives were pleased with the position taken by Egypt, and told Sasson that it was conducive to progress.

As already reported to Sharett,[1] when they last met Abd al-Mun'im told Sasson that at his audience with King Faruq, while the talks were suspended, the King had enquired why the Americans complained about him and wanted him replaced, and why Sasson was pessimistic about the outcome of the conference and blamed Egypt for its failure. The King had showed Abd al-Mun'im the letter to Colonel Sherine[2] in which Sasson had expressed concern over the Lausanne talks and invited Sherine to Europe for talks on the situation. The letter had caused embarrassment to Abd al-Mun'im, but, in order not to damage Sasson's prestige with the Egyptians, he had claimed to have avoided Sasson out of a sense of shame for his inability to fulfill a promise made at Rhodes to obtain the immediate release of Jacob Weissmann and the subsequent release of all Jewish detainees in Egypt. According to Abd al-Mun'im, the King gave his immediate undertaking that this would be carried out, and asked him to "tell the Jews at Lausanne" that the Egyptian government desired peace and stability in the Middle East but could not sign a peace treaty with Israel in the next few months because of the internal situation in Egypt and in the whole Arab world.

Sasson assumes that in citing this story the Egyptian representative probably intended to repudiate recent reports broadcast by *Kol Israel* about Egyptian preparations for resumption of hostilities. He contended that the latest arms acquisitions by Egypt were unrelated to the situation in Palestine, and were merely designed to effect reorganization of the Egyptian army and enhancement of its internal and external prestige.

Abd al-Mun'im told Sasson about his consultations in Egypt with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, Arab diplomatic representatives and Azzam Pasha.[3] They had all concurred with the King that an honourable compromise should be found, but they all suspect Israel of favouring Jordan and of having already signed, with British collusion, secret political and military accords with King Abdallah.

Abd-al-Mun'im was apparently aware of Israel's wish to initiate contacts with Zaim;[4] he repeatedly stressed King Faruq's influence over Zaim and also praised the Syrian President's courage and enterprise. He warned, however, that Zaim was fickle and unreliable and that it was difficult to determine whether or not there was a foreign power behind him.

In conclusion, the Egyptian representative requested that his meetings with Sasson be kept secret.

Notes

1. No. 163.
2. The letter, dated 26 May 1949, is in file 130.02/2441/1.
3. Abd al-Rahman Azzam, Secretary-General of the Arab League.
4. Cf. No. 166, and also No. 136, para. 1.

168. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 1 August 1949

169. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 1 August 1949

Notes

1. Rudolfo Muñoz, member of the Argentine delegation to the U.N.
2. Jacob Herzog, Director, Department of Christian Communities in the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
3. Thomas J. McMahon, American clergyman; National Director of the Near East Welfare Association, head of the Pontifical Mission to Palestine. See No. 179.

170. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 1 August 1949

Notes

1. Semen K. Tsarapkin, member of the Soviet delegation to the U.N.; President of the Security Council in August 1949.
2. Untraced. For the background to Eban's talk with Tsarapkin, see Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below, and No. 220.
3. Sharett had informed Eban that the agreement signed with the Ford Company was at that stage limited to vehicle supply and that the construction of an assembly plant was still under negotiations. Sharett suggested telling Tsarapkin that Israel would welcome a similar arrangement with Soviet enterprises, and asked to add that Israel had long been attempting to sound out Moscow on the possibilities of credit purchases from the Soviet Union along the lines of the American loan to Israel, but no positive answer had so far been received (cf. Namir to Meron, PI217, 11 August 1949, 130.09/2325/4). Sharett also endorsed Eban's denial regarding the Standard Oil concession. (Telegram Y274, 10 August 1949, 130.09/2329/13.)

171. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 2 August 1949 (11.00)

Coded Tel. ET55; Recd: 3 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Shiloah protested to Porter about U.S. opposition to direct Israeli–Arab contacts and warned him that this attitude was detrimental to the Commission's work. In Shiloah's opinion, the Lausanne talks could succeed only if they were accompanied by direct contacts between Israel and her neighbours. Porter concurred and promised to seek Department of State permission to encourage the Arabs at Lausanne to meet the Israeli representatives. Shiloah counsels against taking McDonald completely in Israel's confidence.

172. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 2 August 1949

Notes

1. The meeting was held in anticipation of the scheduled Security Council debate on the status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in Palestine. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below, and also No. 220.
2. See No. 205 and No. 220, para. 5.

173. S. Ginossar[1] (Rome) to M. Sharett. 2 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2396/15

Summary

On reception of Sharett's telegram OR/12 of 31 July, Ginossar arranged a meeting with Riley for transmission of its contents.[2] The gist of the conversation was communicated in an earlier telegram;[3] this letter gives the full report.

Ginossar first tried to analyse the reasons behind the Vatican's stand on the internationalization of Jerusalem. He thought that if the object was to protect the Holy Places and Christian religious life in the city, the Vatican could conceivably be persuaded to use methods designed to achieve this aim which would not antagonize Israel. He mentioned the possibility of direct contacts between Israel and the Holy See and conveyed Sharett's request that Riley sound out the Vatican on this subject in the course of his talks there.

Riley's initial reaction was disinclination to comply with Sharett's request, doubting that he was competent to intervene in a matter within the province of the Conciliation Commission. But he subsequently changed his mind and asked for details of Israel's proposal on international supervision of the Holy Places. Ginossar referred him to Eban's statement of 5 May 1949[4] at the U.N. and explained that he did not yet know details of the plan but he understood that the Government of Israel would be willing to grant the supervisory body and the religious institutions all the privileges necessary for their safe and unimpeded activity, provided they did not infringe the security of the State. The arrangement, said Ginossar, might be patterned after the special rights enjoyed by diplomatic missions which are granted immunity by the State provided they do not transgress its laws.

The second alternative propounded by Ginossar was an international regime for the Old City only, but Riley was less keen on this possibility. To entice him, Ginossar explained that, in such an eventuality, Israel would be willing to assist in the municipal services of this quarter and would permit its inhabitants to participate in the economic life of Jerusalem. Riley agreed that this could be an acceptable solution for the economic problems of the Old City, but showed no enthusiasm for the whole idea.

In conclusion Riley promised to do his best to get answers to Sharett's queries and to see Ginossar on his next visit to Rome, his schedule permitting.[5]

Ginossar adds that at his meeting with the Papal Nuncio in Rome the latter showed interest in the details of Israel's proposal for international supervision of the Holy Places, and was particularly eager to know whether the religious bodies in the envisaged scheme referred only to the Holy Places or comprised also churches, monasteries and other ecclesiastical institutions. Ginossar is reporting separately on his meeting with the Nuncio.[6]

Notes

1. Shlomo Ginossar, Israeli Minister in Italy.
2. General Riley was scheduled to have an audience with the Pope on August 9, 1949. Sharett instructed Ginossar to request Riley to ascertain during his audience whether the Vatican would settle for an international regime in the Old City instead of the whole of Jerusalem, or, alternatively, agree to the establishment of a supervisory body for the Holy Places and for Church privileges. Sharett also wanted to know what issues were of such vital interest to the Catholic Church that no concessions could be expected. Finally he considered it desirable to sound out Riley after his visit on whether it would be worth while for Israel to send an unofficial delegation to the Vatican to seek common ground with the Pope. (Telegram in file 130.09/2356/1.)
3. RO2, 2 August 1949, 130.09/2356/1.
4. See No. 5, n. 1.
5. The following two sentences were inserted in Ginossar's own handwriting.
6. 4 August 1949, 130.02/2396/15. Ginossar attached great importance to the meeting, and in particular to the discussion on Jerusalem initiated by the Apostolic Nuncio, Francesco Borgongini Duca. Ginossar inferred that the Vatican wished to assess Israel's position and proposals on the Jerusalem issue, and did not reject out of hand the proposal for international supervision of the Holy Places. But serious talks had to be preceded by a more concrete and detailed Israeli proposal on the powers of the international body and the categories of the religious institutions to be supervised.

174. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 3 August 1949 (22.00)

Coded Tel. ET57; Recd: 4 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Shiloah reports on his meeting with the Conciliation Commission earlier that day,[1] at which he gave a resumé of Sharett's statement in the Knesset[2] and, further to his letter of 29 July,[3] demanded a firm declaration by the Commission to the effect that the Arabs view the resumption of the Lausanne talks as the beginning of peace negotiations and that they accept Israel's two preconditions for the admission of one hundred thousand refugees. Shiloah proceeded only after the Commission had undertaken to issue an official announcement on this subject.[4] He reviewed the background to the refugee problem along the lines of President Weizmann's letter to President Truman[5]

and clarified Israel's position as expressed in the recent exchange of telegrams with Sharett.[6] Shiloah emphasized that Israel alone could decide how many refugees could be absorbed by the state, and no foreign guarantees for her security could be considered adequate in this context. Porter announced that the Commission would very likely recommend the establishment of a committee of experts to examine development projects.[7]

Notes

1. Complete minutes of the meeting are in file 130.02/2441/10.
2. On 1 August, at the opening of the Knesset debate on the armistice agreement with Syria, Sharett made a statement on the subject of the refugees. He announced that the Government had resolved in principle "to determine presently the extent of its eventual contribution to the solution of the refugee problem as part of the comprehensive peace settlement between the Arab peoples and Israel and of a comprehensive plan for the solution of the refugee problem". Sharett deliberately refrained from specifying the number of refugees the Government would contemplate admitting, but stated that any figure given would include those refugees already repatriated and also those who would return in future within the framework of family reunification. Sharett reiterated the Government's position that Israel was in no way responsible for the circumstances that created the refugee problem, and her contribution to its solution, involving though it did economic and security risks, was made solely out of humane considerations and sympathy for the refugees' plight. (*Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], First Session of the First Knesset, Vol. II, pp. 1195–6.)
3. See No. 162 and n. 11 *ibid.*
4. For the Commission's announcement of 3 August 1949 see file 130.02/2447/5.
5. See No. 104.
6. See No. 164 and n. 1 *ibid.* In his telegram ET52 of 31 July 1949 Shiloah informed Sharett of the proposals regarding the refugees which he was about to submit to the Commission and requested Sharett's approval (130.02/2442/6).
7. Cf. Porter's report on the conversation in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1281–2.

175. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 3 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports that Salvator Cicurel still has not received a reply to his cable to Karim Thabit and that he cannot explain this delay.[1] Thabit may be wary of committing anything to writing, or perhaps the delay is due to personal changes in the Egyptian Cabinet.[2] In the meantime Sasson has drafted for Cicurel a reply to the King's communication, the gist of which is:

Sasson was certain that the Government of Israel would give very serious consideration to the King's message, regarding it as an earnest of Egypt's willingness to participate in the restoration of peace; at the same time he drew the King's attention to the Egyptian press and radio attacks on Israel and suggested they be stopped. He expressed satisfaction with the first manifestations of change in the Egyptian delegation's attitude at Lausanne, and asked

that the head of that delegation be instructed to cooperate with Sasson in order to advance the talks. He urged the King to instruct Egyptian representatives in various international and inter-Arab bodies to desist from attacking the Government of Israel so that Sasson could persuade Jews around the world not only to refrain from denouncing Egypt but also to help her develop relations with the West. He was willing to meet secretly with any representative of the King's, in view of the importance of direct contacts between representatives of the two countries.

Sasson is confident that Thabit will deliver his letter to King Faruq, who might as a result send a special representative to meet him.

From a conversation with Abd al-Mun'im Sasson gathers that the new Egyptian prime minister opposes reinforcement of the Egyptian army, preferring a political solution; it is therefore reasonable to assume that if Sasson's communication is brought to his attention it will be accorded due consideration.

Notes

1. See No. 155.
2. A new government headed by Husain Pasha Sirri was installed in Egypt on 26 July.

176. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Eliash (London). 3 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 140.
2. See No. 174, n. 2.
3. See No. 187 and n. 1 *ibid.*

177. E. Elath (Washington) to W. Eytan. 3 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2382/22

Summary

Further to previous telegrams dispatched since his arrival from Israel,[1] Elath now gives a fuller account of his conversation with President Truman on 28 July.

On his return to Washington Elath learnt from people close to the President that Truman spoke bitterly of Israel's uncooperative attitude concerning his demand for the admission of refugees; this notwithstanding the President's past support for the admission to Palestine of one hundred thousand Jewish refugees from Europe. Hilldring saw the President following his visit to Israel and gave him an account of Israel's difficult economic situation and the problems in absorbing Jewish immigrants, which bar the large-scale admis-

sion of Arab refugees. Hilldring favoured settlement of the refugees in Syria and Iraq as a stimulus to the development of these countries. He described to the President Israel's democratic character and her sincere desire to cooperate with the President and the Government of the United States.[2]

Elath's audience with the President was speedily arranged and took place before he had an opportunity to meet Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who was then busy with urgent matters relating to the Congressional debate on the Atlantic Treaty.[3]

The gist of Elath's talk with the President has already been cabled,[4] and the letter at hand supplies additional details. The President was warm and friendly and kept Elath longer than normally customary. Elath described Israel's economic situation and stressed the magnitude of its proposed contribution in accepting one hundred thousand refugees notwithstanding dire financial straits. He outlined the security problems consequent upon admission of the refugees, given the aggressive pronouncements by the Arab states and their accelerated rearmament, but stressed that the Government of Israel's decision sprang out of purely humane motives and of its wish to cooperate with the Government of the United States; Israel could accept no share of the blame for the catastrophe which had befallen the refugees in the course of a war of aggression waged on her by the Arab states.

The President expressed understanding of Israel's position and gratification at the Government's willingness to cooperate. He explained that he saw in the refugees both a human and a security problem and he thought an early solution would avert future developments detrimental to Israel. He emphasized his desire to work for the development of the Middle East and in particular for the regions of the Euphrates and the Tigris. His plan for the development of backward areas would serve the needs of the Middle East and would also assist the remainder of the refugees to become useful citizens of those countries in which they find permanent refuge.

The President went on to say that he expected good results from the resumed Lausanne Conference and that Porter was among the best of his advisers.

Elath pointed to the dangers inherent in a possible Security Council resolution to lift the arms embargo in the Middle East, which might adversely affect the Lausanne talks. Rearmament of the Arab countries would increase their inclination to launch a second round of fighting and lessen the chances of a peace settlement. Both sides might have to direct their resources to rearmament instead of to development and settlement. The President seemed impressed with Elath's argument and said he would discuss the subject with the Secretary of State.

Elath then touched on the territorial problem and raised the Negev issue, asking the President to help foil any scheme to detach the southern Negev from Israel. He reminded the President of his personal role in the attainment of the 29 November resolution which had given the Negev to the Jewish State,[5] and explained the importance of the entire region, including Eilat, for

Israel's economic development. Elath inferred that the President supported Israel's claim to the town of Eilat.

The President evinced interest in the implementation of the development plans mentioned by President Weizmann at their last meeting,[6] and in this connection he stressed the importance of agriculture for Israel's economic consolidation and for the reestablishment of its people in their motherland.

In conclusion Elath asked the President to help Israel find a military expert who would assist in the organization of the Israeli army along the democratic lines of the United States army, and the President promised to give this matter his attention.

Elath subsequently heard from Eddie Jacobson[7] and from Niles that the President had been pleased with the conversation, praising Elath's sincerity and expressing his admiration for the pioneer spirit prevalent in Israel.

In Elath's opinion the interview had again demonstrated the President's sympathy for and interest in Israel, but he advises against being deluded into the belief that Israel's offer for the admission of one hundred thousand refugees has conclusively ended the controversy between Israel and the U.S. in this matter: in his estimate, the crisis may recur when the problem of absorbing the remainder of the refugees in the Arab states is raised at Lausanne.

Notes

1. Elath had left at the beginning of July for consultations in Israel and returned to Washington towards the end of the month.
2. See Hilldring's report on his conversation with the President in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1249–52.
3. See No. 160, n. 1.
4. No. 159.
5. See No. 162, n. 2.
6. On 25 April 1949. See Vol. 2, No. 509, and Companion Volume to same, Editorial Note, p. 209.
7. Edward Jacobson, former business partner of Harry S. Truman.

178. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 4 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on his and Shiloah's meeting with Abd al-Mun'im.

Both sides expressed their desire for peace and their willingness to do all in their power to advance the Lausanne talks. Though these were general statements, Sasson felt there was good faith and earnestness on both sides, not just politeness or flattery. Abd al-Mun'im spoke of his appearances before the Commission and of his ''unconditional agreement'' to the two preconditions set by Israel for negotiations on the refugee issue.[1] He was

delighted that Israel was not insisting on signed peace treaties at Lausanne, regarding this not only as flexibility on Israel's part but also as evidence that Israel understood the situation and the atmosphere in the Middle East and was therefore seeking genuine peace and not just a scrap of paper. Shiloah gave Abd al-Mun'im details of the Israeli delegation's meeting of August 3 with the Commission on the refugee issue,[2] and hinted at the possible extent of Israel's contribution to the overall solution of this problem. He explained the motives behind this decision and the economic and security considerations that made this a maximum offer. Abd al-Mun'im did not raise objections, but Sasson did not interpret his silence necessarily as agreement with Israel's position: he might not have seen fit to argue on numbers when the talk turned on principles and on cooperation. He did request details on the categories of refugees Israel would be willing to admit, and Shiloah asked him to await the arrival at Lausanne of Zalman Liff who, as an authority on the refugee question, would certainly have all the particulars.

Regarding the territorial issue, both Shiloah and Sasson reiterated Israel's insistence on separate talks with each Arab state, trying to convince Abd al-Mun'im that this approach was not only eminently reasonable but that it also served vital interests of both Israel and the Arabs. Abd al-Mun'im concurred, but added that there were certain issues which compelled his continued appearance before the Commission together with the other Arab delegations, such as the Protocol of 12 May,[3] the Commission's mandate in the Jerusalem and Holy Places issues, the political future of the Arab parts of Palestine, and so on. He promised, however, to take into account Israel's position and give it his utmost consideration, availing himself of his authority to carry the Lausanne talks to ultimate success.

Abd al-Mun'im then proceeded to present the Egyptian territorial claims. He admitted having told the Israeli representatives at Rhodes that his country had no territorial ambitions in Palestine; while this has not changed, the lessons learnt from the war force Egypt to adopt security measures. Military experts from the U.S.A., Britain, France, Belgium and other countries have advised Egypt to hold on to the Gaza Strip – extending it along the border with Egypt, to extend the Egyptian boundary up to the Dead Sea along the Majdal–Beersheba line, and to annex the southern Negev.

Sasson notes that Abd al-Mun'im had advanced these claims in the past, but in a peremptory manner and as a condition *sine qua non*, while on this occasion his manner was courteous and intimated that he was open to bargaining and to a compromise. Sasson and Shiloah did not react, preferring to leave the matter at that.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 65–6 above.
2. See No. 174 and n. 1 *ibid.*
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.

179. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 4 August 1949

Notes

1. The meeting took place on 28 July. On 4 August McMahon met Ben-Gurion. For a detailed report on the meetings see Herzog's document entitled "Mons. T. McMahon's Visit", filed under the date of 19 October 1949 in 93.03/3037/14.
2. Joseph M. Proskauer, Honorary President of the American Jewish Committee. Eban informed him of Sharett's telegram and urged him to intervene (18 August 1949, 93.03/3037/13). See also No. 314 and n. 8 *ibid.*
3. Eban suggested that Sharett confront McMahon firmly, pointing out to him that his proposal had very few supporters and that Israel had conclusive proof that even the U.S. Government did not endorse his approach. Furthermore, the interests of the Catholic Church would not be served by a head-on confrontation with Israel, which would be taken as proof of conservative leanings in Catholic circles. Eban said he would write to Proskauer, urging, however, that the Conciliation Commission's recommendations be presently ascertained, since they – and not McMahon's views or Israel's aspirations – would determine the course of the debate at the U.N. Assembly. (Eban to Sharett, telegram X470, 5 August 1949, 93.01/2202/1.) For further developments in this matter, see No. 215 (Appendices).

180. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 5 August 1949 (16.30)

Coded Tel. ET63; Recd: 6 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Shiloah reports on a meeting with the Conciliation Commission at which Porter attempted to extract an Israeli undertaking for the admission of a larger number of refugees. The delegation reacted strongly, asserting that the time had arrived for the world and for the Arabs to understand that it was the latter who had attacked Israel in violation of U.N. resolutions, and it was they who were responsible for the plight of the refugees. Israel's contribution was maximal, involving as it did grave risks to her security and future. The delegation members demanded that the Commission be firm with the Arabs and compel them to assume responsibility for the problem and for the resettlement of most of the refugees in Arab countries. Shiloah and Sasson again demanded direct contacts with the Arabs. The delegation's adamant position set back the Commission, with Porter and the French representative adopting a conciliatory tone.[1]

Notes

1. Cf. Porter's report on the meeting and his recommendations for action in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1287–9.

181. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 5 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson, Shiloah and Arazi met Yalçin on 4 August at the latter's initiative. As in the past, he appeared to be interested in only one thing – peace in the Middle East, no matter whether this involved Israeli or Arab concessions. He was worried over current international tension and claimed that the Middle East could withstand any Russian onslaught pending arrival of help from the West, provided the countries in the area cooperated among themselves as well as with the Western democracies. His concern and this conviction moved him to exert pressure on both Israel and the Arabs to come to an understanding. He thought Turkey had erred in joining the Conciliation Commission and felt she should withdraw as soon as possible; at the moment Turkey could neither initiate diplomatic relations with Israel nor develop political and economic relations with the Arab states if she wanted to remain an unbiased mediator as far as both sides were concerned. This concept has led him to the conclusion that he must support the American proposal for the Palestine issue to be referred back to the General Assembly in September.

That same evening Shiloah and Sasson met de Boisanger, whose attitude was diametrically opposed to Yalçin's. He was against referring the issue to the Assembly and said that he had rallied in his support the Quai d'Orsay, the French embassy in Washington and the French delegation to the U.N. He was also canvassing the heads of the Arab delegations at Lausanne, and his impression was that all of them, without exception, accepted his arguments and his conclusions. He urged the Israeli delegates to back him up, and both Sasson and Shiloah assured him that they were entirely in accord with him and doing their best to make the talks succeed. De Boisanger denied rumours about France scheming to detach Western Galilee from Israel and give it to the Arabs. He admitted that Syrian and Lebanese emissaries occasionally came to the Quai d'Orsay claiming that area, but France had made no promises and had in fact tried to persuade them of the absurdity of their claims. He favoured removing the Jerusalem issue from the agenda of the forthcoming U.N. Assembly, and suggested that Israel and Jordan publicly undertake to preserve the *status quo* in Jerusalem pending overall settlement of the Palestine issue. This commitment would facilitate submission by the Conciliation Commission of a brief report to the U.N. Secretariat with the request that the issue not be raised at the Assembly. Asked by Sasson and Shiloah to define *status quo,* he explained that it meant Israel should not declare Jerusalem her capital and should desist from transferring the government offices to the city.

182. A. Eban (New York) to R. Shiloah (Lausanne). 5 August 1949

Notes

1. Samuel (Sam) Shneiderman, American journalist.
2. At the meeting of the Security Council. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.
3. See Nos. 167 and 178.
4. See No. 205 and No. 220, para. 5.
5. See No. 33 and nn. 1 and 2 *ibid.*
6. See letter dated 21 July 1949 from the Assistant Secretary of State, Ernest Gross, to Senator Edwin Johnson, enclosed with Eban's letter to Sharett, 2 August 1949, 130.02/2443/3.
7. No. 158.

183. M. Eliash (London) to M. Sharett. 5 August 1949

Notes

1. Alexander Knox Helm, the British Minister in Israel, was at that time in London for a conference of British representatives in the Middle East.
2. No. 176.

184. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 6 August 1949 (11.30)

Coded Tel. ET64; Recd: 7 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

At a meeting with the second member of the Lebanese delegation,[1] Sasson learned that the Lebanese government no longer insisted on internationalization of Jerusalem, and would consent to its partition between Israel and Jordan if there were no other option. The Lebanese delegate intimated that the Vatican might also acquiesce in such a solution. He added that Israel's contribution to the settlement of the refugee problem seemed to the Arabs minimal and would not be accepted by them unless accompanied by additional concessions, either on the refugees or in territory, or by strong American pressure on the Arab states.

Notes

1. Muhammad Ali Hamada. Cf. No. 210

185. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Barazi (Damascus). 6 August 1949

Notes

1. Muhsin al-Barazi, Syrian Prime Minister.

186. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 7 August 1949

Copy: 130.02/2441/2

Summary

Following ten days' sojourn in Lausanne, Shiloah gives his impressions of the conference. Both the atmosphere and relations with the Commission's members have improved, particularly with the Americans, yet Shiloah is far from confident about the conference's outcome. The crisis, in his opinion, is still acute, and originates not in Lausanne but in Washington and London. Sasson has already cabled the gist of their talk with de Boisanger[1] and Shiloah adds that in all his meetings with Porter he has found the latter eager to complete his task before the next Assembly. Shiloah's first impression was that Porter had accepted the mission in order to achieve a quick success where his predecessors had failed, but following numerous encounters with Porter, he admits he had been mistaken. Porter strikes him as a high-minded person, ready to understand the Israeli viewpoint, who may, with due attention, be won over. His authority, however, has been narrowly limited by the Department of State, which determined beforehand the solution to be imposed on Israel. True, Porter is the President's confidant and could under certain circumstances overstep the Department of State's instructions, but the President at this point shares the State Department's views, and Porter knows it. Shiloah thinks he can nevertheless influence Porter on the territorial issue, mainly on the Negev. Porter is aware of the President's personal commitment concerning the Negev[2] and he himself is convinced that only Israel is capable of developing and settling this region. He had been impressed by Shiloah's account of Israeli settlement in the Negev, and Shiloah is again recommending that this activity be intensified; he also hopes that the report published by Bilby on the settlement of Eilat is correct.[3]

Porter does not agree with the State Department's estimate that Arab territorial continuity is vital for Western strategic needs and he finds no justification for compensating the Arabs territorially. Notwithstanding this favourable attitude, Shiloah fears that Porter will ultimately have to yield to the State Department's dictates and he therefore advises directing efforts at the Department itself, the U.N. circles, and especially the White House. He proposes two lines of action: (a) pressuring the Arabs to enter on direct negotiations, (b) keeping the Palestine issue out of the forthcoming Assembly's agenda.

Shiloah has invited Porter for a short visit to Israel to gather firsthand impressions of conditions there, and especially in order that he might meet the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs.[4] Porter is shortly scheduled to meet President Weizmann.[5]

Concerning Britain's attitude to Israel, Shiloah has already cabled to Sharett[6] his reaction to the Eliash–Bevin meeting.[7] He disagrees with Eliash's appraisal that there has been a substantive shift in Bevin's and the

Foreign Office's policy towards Israel, and warns against unjustified optimism in that respect, citing William Strang's and Michael Wright's hostility towards Israel as manifested at the recent conference of British diplomatic representatives in the Middle East. These two regard Israel as a stumbling block to any British or Western strategy in the Middle East, and have developed a theory that Israel, over-zealous for independence, will not cooperate with the West and might even form a united front with the Arab states to free the Middle East. There is apprehension about any approach between Israel and the Arab states, and recent moves towards contacts with Zaim have caused great concern in London and even in Paris.[8] Shiloah adds that one of the main conclusions of the London Conference was that there was need for a new and sound framework for the unstable regimes in the Middle East, and instead of propping up the Arab League it was resolved to concentrate on unifying the Arab countries in a Moslem league led by Pakistan. Shiloah's conclusions have been confirmed by J. Reed,[9] who had followed the conference and obtained information from the participants at Shiloah's request. This is why Shiloah is sceptical about the advisability of getting Britain involved in Israel's affairs.

Shiloah remarks that at his recent meeting with President Weizmann the latter had shown him Elath's letter on his talk with President Truman,[10] and that he had not found in it any intimation of Truman's pledge to abide by his commitment on the Negev. Shiloah raises this subject as various cables received from Israel and from the United States have created the unfounded impression that President Truman had reaffirmed his Negev commitment.

Notes

1. De Boisanger had told Sasson that Porter was attempting to persuade the Commission members to present the U.N. Assembly with proposals for comprehensive solutions to the refugee, the territorial and the Jerusalem issues, recommending that the Assembly adopt and impose them on all the parties. Porter estimated that his government would be able to rally a majority in the Assembly for his proposals. Yalçin was sympathetic to Porter's recommendations but de Boisanger opposed them and adamantly demanded continuation of the Lausanne talks. De Boisanger told Sasson he was apprehensive of U.S. pressure on France and urged prompt Israeli action in America. (7 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.)
2. See No. 162, n. 2.
3. Israeli soldiers were then engaged in reclamation works to strengthen the Israeli hold over Eilat (Operation *Arava*, July–August 1949). News of the operation were carried by the Israeli and foreign press (see *Davar*, 5 August 1949). Kenneth W. Bilby, foreign correspondent of the *New York Herald Tribune* in the Middle East, reported on the operation on 6 August 1949 (see Kenen to Sharett, telegram of 8 August 1949, 130.09/2328/5).
4. Sharett agreed to this suggestion, see No. 198.
5. President Weizmann went on vacation in Switzerland on July 19, returning to Israel in early October.
6. ET70, 7 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.
7. No. 140.
8. Cf. Arazi to Eytan, letter of 7 August 1949, 130.02/2441/2.
9. Not identified; spelling of name uncertain.
10. 29 July 1949, 105/1914. For Elath's talk with President Truman see Nos. 159 and 177.

187. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah and E. Sasson (Lausanne). 7 August 1949

Copy: 130.02/2447/5

Summary

Sharett writes about the commotion caused in Israel by the unauthorized publication of the Government's proposal concerning the refugees, the uproar continuing after his statement in the Knesset.[1] He acknowledges that as a result his position has been somewhat shaken, but concludes that Israel's contention that one hundred thousand refugees was the maximum she could admit has been conclusively proved.

Sharett criticizes the lack of logic of those who oppose the Government's proposal, and in particular the cry against the resulting increase in the Arab minority population of Israel. The opposition, he thinks, should have objected several months earlier, when Israel first announced its commitment to repatriate a certain number of refugees as part of the overall settlement. Furthermore, several weeks prior to the Government's decision the fact was brought to the attention of the Knesset and also published in the press that Israel was willing to take the Gaza Strip with all its inhabitants, and no objection was raised then, although the annexation would also have involved a large increase in the Arab population of Israel.

Sharett assumes that ultimately Israel will not be called upon to discharge her obligation unless accord is reached, and, in that case, even greater concessions will be expected of her.

Regarding the population of the Gaza Strip, Sharett refers to a meeting with Ben-Gurion, Kaplan[2] and Liff at which this question was discussed and found to be extremely complex. Sharett is convinced that in no case would Israel be able to absorb more than two hundred thousand of the inhabitants of the Strip, of whom sixty five thousand are permanent residents, with the remainder being refugees. Even with this limitation the Arab minority in Israel would reach 380,000.

Sharett expresses his gratification at the developing personal relations between Shiloah and Porter[3] and at the meetings with Abd al-Mun'im.[4] He adds that Eban has reported on Fawzi's[5] courtesy and great moderation and that Divon notes a similar change manifested in the Cairo radio and press.

Sharett had summoned McDonald on the eve of the latter's departure for the U.S. and had expressed grave displeasure at the American Government's presumption in attempting to dictate to Israel abstention from direct contacts with the Arab states. Sharett wished McDonald to transmit to his Government Israel's view that the problem of peace with her neighbours was first and foremost Israel's own concern and responsibility, and her own judgment would continue to determine Israel's actions in this matter. Direct contacts could but ease the Conciliation Commission's assignment and, considering that there is no guarantee of that body's success, Israel would be derelict in

her duty if she neglected parallel efforts at direct contacts. The United States, said Sharett, would be taking upon itself grave responsibility should she compel Israel to put all her eggs in one basket.

Despite these forceful words, Sharett fears that it will ultimately be the U.S. that will determine the fate of the direct contacts as the Arabs will be more impressed by the American than by the Israeli arguments.

Sharett suggests that Sasson and Shiloah sound out the Syrians on the possibility of direct talks. At the same time he expresses doubts concerning the advisability of renewed approaches to the Jordanians, especially if these involve new overtures to King Abdallah who has already been bitterly disappointed by Israel and should not be subjected to further disillusionment.

In conclusion, Sharett inquires whether Shiloah and Sasson made use at Lausanne of London's favourable shift in policy towards Israel, the genuineness of which has been confirmed by various sources.[6]

Notes

1. On 31 July the press carried reports on Israel's agreement to take 100,000 refugees. Although the leakage caused embarrassment to the Government and to Sharett in particular, he decided that in his Knesset speech he would specify no number and limit himself to stating the basic points of the Israeli proposal (see No. 174, n. 2). Debated during that week among Mapai's Knesset faction, in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and in the Knesset plenum, the Government's proposal encountered "heated" and "most indignant" opposition. Sharett was particularly hurt by the reaction of his party colleagues, some of whom failed to support him during the Knesset debate, while his advocates "were only the Agudath Israel people". (See Sharett to Shiloah, telegrams TE53, 29 July 1949, TE54, 31 July 1949, TE59, 31 July 1949, TE61, 2 August 1949, TE63, 3 August 1949 – all in file 130.09/2317/8.)
2. Eliezer Kaplan, Minister of Finance.
3. See Nos. 164 and 186.
4. See Nos. 167 and 178.
5. See No. 182, and Eban to Sharett, telegram X472, 5 August 1949, 93.01/2202/1.
6. See Nos. 140, 157 and 183, and cf. No. 186.

188. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 8 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson encloses copy of a letter he has sent to the Syrian Prime Minister al-Barazi following a consultation held with Shiloah and Arazi; they had judged preferable a direct approach to the Syrian prime minister rather than to Adnan al-Atassi, the head of the Syrian delegation at Lausanne. They feared that Atassi could be *persona non grata* with Zaim or, alternatively, might, out of excessive caution, reject the Israeli overture outright, without referring it at all to his government. To forestall any charge by the Commission about

stealthy Israeli dealings with the Arabs, Sasson made a point of writing to al-Barazi about the benefits accruing to the Lausanne talks from direct contacts between Israel and the Arabs.[1]

De Boisanger informed Sasson of a conversation a member of the French Legation's staff in Damascus had with Zaim on the subject of the Conciliation Commission and the chances of a peace settlement with Israel. Zaim said that under certain conditions he would be prepared to ignore public opinion in his country and in the Arab world and make separate peace with Israel. These conditions involved shifting the boundary line with Israel to the Jordan River and in certain places to the Lake of Galilee. He had instructed his delegation at Lausanne accordingly. Zaim also said that Syria would be prepared to absorb a large number of refugees provided substantial international aid were forthcoming, and on condition that Israel would also repatriate a substantial number. Sasson told de Boisanger that none of the Syrian demands were acceptable but Israel would nevertheless be interested in a face-to-face talk with Zaim.

Earlier in the day Sasson met Rockwell, who appeared pessimistic about the outcome of the Lausanne talks. He told Sasson that American diplomats in the Middle East were exerting considerable pressure on the Arab governments, with some success, but they were all convinced that Israel must make further concessions in the refugee issue. Rockwell repeatedly stressed that there had been no change in American policy and denied that his government was demanding detachment of the Negev from Israel: the U.S. favoured territorial compensation, either in the Negev or the Galilee or in any other area.

Notes

1. No. 185.

189. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 8 August 1949

Notes

1. In anticipation of the Cabinet meeting on Jerusalem scheduled for 9 August, Sharett consulted Eban on the proposal for an immediate transfer of government offices and the Knesset to Jerusalem (8 August 1949, 130.09/2329/13). See also No. 192, para. 5, and n. 17 *ibid.*
2. In an additional telegram Eban gave further arguments against the proposal: "...Error would be of grandiose proportions. What of B[en]-G[urion] pledge to fight issue at General Assembly session? Forgot to add to debit side all hope peace with Arabs killed as they would feel whole world as pressure group their behalf". (Telegram to Sharett, X477, 9 August 1949, 93.01/2202/1.)

190. A. Eban (New York) to R. Shiloah (Lausanne). 8 August 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above.

191. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 9 August 1949

Coded Tel. ET72; Recd: 10 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Further to Sasson's telegram[1] and Shiloah's report of his latest conversation with Porter, sent with Avigur,[2] Shiloah now informs Sharett of Porter's intention to return to the U.S. for consultations. Shiloah gathers that Porter has come to the conclusion that his narrow instructions from the State Department bar the attainment of a compromise settlement and he is therefore considering handing in his resignation. Shiloah recommends urgent diplomatic action in Washington to forestall Porter's resignation. He suggests that the Feinberg plan[3] be put into operation, that Porter's friends in the U.S. be activated, and that T. Kollek be immediately dispatched to the States for this purpose.

Notes

1. Sasson reported on a "long and thorough" conversation between de Boisanger and Porter, from which it emerged that the latter was "depressed and convinced that he had nothing more to do at Lausanne". Each further talk with Shiloah strengthened his impression that Israel "would make no voluntary concessions, regardless whether the present instability in the East lasted for years". De Boisanger advised Porter to visit Israel and to meet Ben-Gurion and Sharett, but Porter was not enthusiastic about this suggestion. He favoured submission of the issue to the Assembly and vigorous American intervention there. (9 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.)
2. Shaul Avigur, Deputy Minister of Defence.
3. The reference is unclear, but see No. 226 and Shiloah to Sharett, telegram ET59, 3 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.

192. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah and E. Sasson (Lausanne). 9 August 1949

Copy: 130.02/2447/5

Summary

Sharett advances some conclusions concerning the situation in Lausanne:

(1) While he recommends not pressing for an immediate decision on the future of the Gaza Strip, Sharett is of the opinion that Israel should not object to a comprehensive settlement of the refugee problem, leaving out the Gaza issue for the time being. Such settlement might thin out the Strip's population

and thus relieve some of Israel's burden should an accord on Gaza be later reached with Egypt.

(2) Regarding the plan Porter presented to the Arabs,[1] Sharett wants it made absolutely clear to Porter that he cannot have it both ways – conducting negotiations for an agreed compromise at Lausanne and at the same time imposing solutions in the Assembly. Israel will go along patiently if he wishes continued negotiations, but if he intends to attack the problem in the Assembly then Israel must prepare to resist and to reconsider her offer in respect of the refugees. Porter should not overestimate the power of the U.S. at the Assembly and should recall what befell the Bernadotte Plan[2] and the Trusteeship proposal;[3] he ought not to venture into another American fiasco at the U.N. Sharett is absolutely certain that the U.S. would not be able to muster the necessary two-thirds majority for a resolution that violates a member state's sovereignty, by compelling it to admit masses of people from outside its borders and by detaching parts of its territory – a resolution which might be taken as a precedent. Porter must be told that Israel will not jeopardize its security by taking refugees under compulsion, and that many member states would support Israel and defeat the American proposal should it be brought to the Assembly.

The delegation is instructed to ascertain the Commission's plans on Jerusalem so that Eban can work out his line of action at the U.N.[4]

(3) Sharett disagrees with Shiloah's assessment of the Bevin–Eliash talk,[5] given that Bevin was clear and explicit and there was no reason to doubt his intentions. Other sources have also confirmed the shift in British policy towards Israel; it is thus pointless to ignore it and to forgo an attempt at rapprochement not fraught with risks. Sharett has instructed Eliash to set his sights on limited objectives. If Bevin were to ask about Israel's position on the territorial issue and on the problems of Jerusalem, Haifa, and the future of the Arab parts of Palestine, Eliash was to reply[6] that none of these issues was immediately pressing, and only the refugee problem demanded an urgent solution. Israel had made a specific proposal to the Arabs and would be grateful if Bevin could use his influence and persuade the Arab states to accept it. In this connection Sharett discloses that Helm had recently told Eliash that the Foreign Office considered the Israeli proposal adequate.[7]

While drafting the letter at hand Sharett received Shiloah's last communication, whose arguments have failed to convince him.[8]

(4) As for Elath's meeting with President Truman, Sharett encloses Elath's telegram on the meeting at which Truman had explicitly mentioned the southern Negev,[9] though not as emphatically as desired. Sharett adds that Shiloah's remarks in the letter just received threw light on the character of Porter's mission, and thus dictate some revision in the first paragraph of this present letter,[10] to the effect that efforts must be focused on the Department of State instead of on Porter.

(5) Sharett remarks that there is a movement afoot within the Cabinet for the transfer of the Administration and the Knesset to Jerusalem. Bernard

Joseph[11] and Rabbi Maimon[12] initiated it and were seconded by Remez.[13] A committee was appointed, where Sharett strongly opposed the proposed step, deeming it a reckless move on the eve of the reconvening of the General Assembly. He worried that it would be construed as defiance of the United Nations, raise an outcry among Israel's friends, prejudice all the matters at stake and promote the internationalization plans. Sharett has cabled Shiloah and Eban asking their opinion.[14] At the Cabinet meeting that morning Kaplan, Golda Meyerson and Shazar[15] supported Sharett while Ben-Gurion forcefully sided with the opponents. While understanding Sharett's arguments regarding the Assembly, Ben-Gurion thought that no public declarations were called for and that the government offices should simply be transferred to Jerusalem. In Sharett's view, Ben-Gurion does not realize that any Cabinet resolution on this subject would most probably be widely publicized; it would just not be possible to camouflage the move. Sharett managed to put off a vote pending consultation of Israel's representatives abroad. Eban's reply came immediately after the meeting[16] and Sharett assumes that Shiloah's reply is on the way.[17]

(6) Updated information on the situation in Eilat[18] will be conveyed by Z. Liff.

Notes

1. Cf. No. 186, n. 1.
2. Reference is to the U.N. Assembly session in Paris, autumn 1948, in the course of which the Bernadotte Plan was shelved.
3. Reference is to the State Department's March 1948 proposal to replace the Partition Plan with a trusteeship regime in Palestine. This was debated at a special U.N. Assembly in April of that year but was utterly defeated with the proclamation of the State and Truman's recognition of Israel.
4. See No. 179, n. 3.
5. See No. 186 and n. 6 *ibid.*
6. See No. 176.
7. See No. 183.
8. No. 186.
9. No. 159.
10. Sharett presumably meant the *second* paragraph of the letter at hand.
11. Dov (Bernard) Joseph, Minister of Supply and Rationing and of Agriculture.
12. Rabbi Yehuda Leib Hacohen Maimon, Minister of Religious Affairs and Minister for War Victims.
13. David Remez, Minister of Transport.
14. See his telegram to Shiloah, LS95, 8 August 1949, 130.02/2442/8, and No. 189, n. 1.
15. Zalman Shazar, Minister of Education and Culture.
16. See No. 189 and n. 2 *ibid.*
17. Shiloah replied that "from the vantage point of Lausanne one could hardly have chosen less suitable timing..." and that "the proposed act would be construed as open defiance of the Assembly and might gravely affect our endeavours to preserve the friendship or at least the neutrality of many countries". He added that he had seen Eban's telegram and that he and his colleagues "concurred completely with his arguments". (Telegram to Sharett, ET74, 10 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.)
18. See No. 186, n. 3.

193. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah (Lausanne). 9 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 186, n. 1.

194. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 9 August 1949

Notes

1. Moshe Witkon, Economic Adviser at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
2. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1297–8.

195. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 9 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 63, n. 1.
2. See No. 140.
3. See Nos. 159 and 177.
4. The President had expressed to Feinberg his utmost satisfaction with Elath's announcement on the refugees, and declared that he would not press Israel to admit refugees in excess of her absorptive capacity (Elath to Sharett, telegram W339, 3 August 1949, 93.01/2181/5).

196. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 9 August 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below, and No. 220.

197. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 9 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2397/19

Summary

Barzilai assumes that the contents of his letter to Raday and Eliashiv[1] have been brought to Sharett's attention, and he wishes to devote the letter at hand to the problems of immigration from Poland.

On his return to Warsaw he had a long talk with the Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Director of the Eastern Division also being present, giving the Polish officials impressions of his visit to Israel. He admitted there were difficulties in absorbing new immigrants but denied exaggerated reports

in the foreign press of mass re-emigration and economic collapse, stressing that Israel's independence and strength were interrelated with uninterrupted immigration. He praised Kuznetsov for arranging a meeting between the Israeli delegation and the Hungarians and Rumanians to discuss the problems of Jewish emigration from their respective countries.[2] Barzilai added that Israel appreciated the fact that relations with Poland in this respect had never reached a critical stage, though the situation was not entirely satisfactory. He explained that many in Israel considered policy towards Jewish emigration to be the test of friendship and cooperation.

The Poles replied that three quarters of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust in Poland had already left the country, the majority for Israel; Poland had been the first country to allow emigration to Israel of persons of military age; neither emigration nor emigration propaganda had ever been banned. They also hinted at an imminent solution to the problem of emigration, intimating that they preferred the arrangements on this subject to be considered a result of an internal Polish decision rather than of negotiations between the two countries. The official announcement would accordingly be made to the Jewish bodies in Poland. They also said that Jews who had emigrated to Israel would not be allowed to return to Poland and no return visas would be issued in future to such emigrants.

Several days after the aforesaid meeting came the announcement by the Minister of Public Administration delivered to a delegation of the Committee of the Jewish Communities, the gist of which had already been cabled to Israel.[3] The Minister approved its publication but would not tolerate its use for loud publicity and propaganda. The Israeli Legation has accordingly been requested by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to refrain from issuing reports on this subject.

As for the immigrants' rights, the commercial agreement with Poland enables them to take out a certain amount of money, and Shamir[4] is negotiating arrangements that would allow artisans to take out their tools.

In conclusion, Barzilai stresses the importance of successfully integrating Polish Jews in Israel, as this will determine the extent of immigration from Poland and perhaps from other Eastern European countries. He strongly recommends that this subject be given serious attention in the very near future.[5]

Notes

1. 6 August 1949, 130.11/2492/20.
2. See No. 145.
3. The Minister had announced that the Polish Government would permit emigration to Israel provided the Jewish emigrants relinquished their Polish citizenship and accepted exit permits valid for Israel only. He stated that ten thousand exit permits would be issued to Jews till the end of 1949. (Ukhmani to Eliashiv, 12 August 1949, 130.09/2306/4.)
4. Itzhak Shamir, Economic Adviser at the Israeli Legation in Warsaw.
5. See No. 358.

198. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah (Lausanne). 10 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 186.
2. See No. 192.
3. See No. 192, nn. 2 and 3.
4. Shiloah replied that he was neither tense nor worried and that he had only wanted to acquaint Sharett with the atmosphere in Lausanne. In the meantime, Porter had told him off the record that he thought Israel's position "reasonable and justified" and that he would advance it in his scheduled New York consultations. He would also recommend the transfer of the Commission's venue to New York. (Telegram SL101, 11 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.)

199. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 11 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on several subjects:

(a) Two members of the "Gaza Government" arrived at Lausanne on 10 August; two delegates of the Gaza Strip refugees are due to come the next day. Hawari assumes their role is to advise the Egyptian delegation at Lausanne and to obstruct any agreement between Israel and the Arab delegations. The first to visit them was "little" Porter.[1]

(b) De Boisanger resents "big" Porter's[2] public and private carrying on as if he were the central figure in the Commission, as well as his impatience and his attempts to thwart continuation of the Commission's work. Sasson frequently sees de Boisanger and tries to influence him as far as possible.[3] The latter would like Israel to refrain from provocative acts in Jerusalem which might incense France and the Vatican, and also to refer optimistically to the atmosphere at Lausanne and to the need to have the Commission bring its work to a successful conclusion.

(c) Sasson and Shiloah were invited to dine with Porter and Rockwell on 10 August. They spent six hours together and the hosts were courteous and friendly. The Americans wished to ascertain Israel's views on the possibility of changing the venue of the talks to New York. When Sasson said that it would be a pity to sacrifice the agreeable atmosphere prevailing at Lausanne, Rockwell replied that the American delegation was not aware of any particular improvement, nor of any reason to keep expecting "miracles". He explained that American interests dictated shortening the Lausanne talks as far as possible and liquidating the Arab–Israeli conflict. These objectives could be attained either through direct American pressure on Israel and on the Arabs or by means of a new resolution at the Assembly. The U.S. could affort to waste no more time because of the worsening international tension and because the Middle East might suddenly turn communist by default. Sasson's rejoinder about there being no guarantee of the U.S. obtaining the

requisite majority in the Assembly seemed to make no impression on Rockwell. When Sasson raised the question of Israel's security with respect to the admission of refugees, Rockwell retorted that Israel's agreement to annex Gaza with its three hundred thousand refugees had vitiated that argument.

(d) At Sasson's urging, de Boisanger had Azcárate ask the heads of the Arab delegations to recommend to their governments that the Arab League Political Committee not adopt any resolution which might adversely influence the Lausanne talks. De Boisanger also promised to ask the French Minister in Cairo to raise this subject with the Egyptian Prime Minister.

Notes

1. William Porter.
2. Paul Porter.
3. In a telegram dispatched on the same day Sasson reported on a close session of the Commission at which de Boisanger and Porter had an acrimonious argument over the latter's announcement that the Commission should prepare to move to New York and to submit to the U.N. Assembly a proposal of its own. De Boisanger rejected this dictate and threatened to denounce the Commission publicly and to submit a separate report to the Assembly. (ET75, 11 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.)

200. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to R. Shiloah (Lausanne). 11 August 1949

Notes

1. No. 193.
2. Untraced.
3. The Interim Committee ("Little Assembly") discussed on 10 August 1949 a proposal by the U.S. to recommend to the next Assembly prolongation without a time limit of the Committee's activity. The Interim Committee had been set up by the General Assembly at the end of 1947 as a provisional body to deal between sessions with issues referred to it by the Assembly. The Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries had opposed the institution of the Interim Committee, claiming it violated the U.N. Charter and was designed solely to circumvent the Soviet veto in the Security Council.

   Israel resolved to abstain in the voting on the American resolution; in a brief speech Eban explained that, while duly appreciative of the Committee's importance, Israel felt that its composition was defective and that the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc countries should be co-opted (see "Information to Israeli Missions abroad", No. 22, 24 August 1949, 130.02/4364/1, where the date is erroneously given as 11 August).

201. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 11 August 1949

Notes

1. Cf. Acheson to Porter, telegram of 9 August 1949, confirming Elath's information (*FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1291). Reacting to Porter's report, Acheson instructed him to make it absolutely clear to Shiloah that Israel's assumptions were entirely groundless and that there were no differences in approach among the President, the Department of State and the U.S. delegation at Lausanne. Ross was simultaneously asked to give Eban the gist of Acheson's telegram. (See No. 202 and cf. No. 225.)

No. 201 – Notes (continued)

2. See No. 194.
3. See No. 195.
4. In his reply, Sharett sought to mollify Elath and to exonerate Shiloah; he thought Shiloah had accurately assessed the President's reaction and had acted correctly in sharing his impressions with Porter without quoting the President directly (telegram IW158, 12 August 1949, 130.09/2308/3). Sharett simultaneously cabled Shiloah about Elath's misgivings and asked him to clarify matters (tel. LS103, 13 August 1949, 130.09/2317/8). Shiloah replied that he had done nothing to embarrass Elath and that he had been very circumspect in his talk with Porter; Porter himself, possibly out of embarrassment and discomfiture, had not shown him Acheson's cable and had only incidentally mentioned its main points (telegram SL102, 14 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6).

202. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 11 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 201 and nn. 1–4 *ibid.* For Elath's talk with President Truman see Nos. 159 and 177.
2. See No. 166.
3. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1256–7.

203. A. Eban (New York) to A. Cordier (New York). 11 August 1949

Notes

1. Eban wrote this letter to Cordier in anticipation of the latter's scheduled meetings with government leaders in Washington and with the U.N. Secretary-General on the subject of the expected debate on the Palestine issue at the forthcoming Assembly; Cordier, who in the main agreed with Eban, promised he would relay these arguments to the people he intended to see (see Eban to Eytan, 12 August 1949, 130.02/2424/23).
2. The agenda submitted by the Secretary-General comprised three items: proposals for an international regime in Jerusalem; protection of the Holy Places; relief for the refugees. The Conciliation Commission was scheduled to submit a report on the first two items and the U.N. Secretary-General – on the third.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.

204. A. Eban (New York) to E. Elath (Washington). 11 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 186.
2. See *GAOR, 3rd Sess., pt. 1, Plenary*, pp. 953–5.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.
4. Claude de Boisanger. See No. 199.
5. Untraced.
6. See No. 203.

205. A. Eban (New York) to W. Austin (New York). 11 August 1949

Notes

1. Warren R. Austin, U.S. Permanent Representative at the U.N.
2. See No. 33 and nn. 1 and 2 *ibid.*
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below, and No. 220.
4. Sir Terence A. Shone, Deputy to the Permanent U.K. Representative at the U.N. The letter has not been traced, but its contents may be found in Eban's telegram to Sharett, X478, 11 August 1949, 93.01/2202/1.

206. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 12 August 1949

Orig.: 93.03/87/11

Summary

Sharett gives Eban two important news items:

(1) The Conciliation Commission has been informed by the Office of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch that their Church will acquiesce in any settlement for Jerusalem adopted by the U.N. This was meant to imply that the Greek Orthodox Church was not an out-and-out supporter of the internationalization plan, the reason for this being its rivalry with the Catholic Church. Jacob Herzog was explicitly told that if during the debate at the U.N. it appeared that the Vatican was about to carry the day, the Greek Orthodox Church would enlist the help of all the countries in which it was paramount, including the Soviet Union.

(2) Guatemala's Consul in Tel Aviv [. . . . .][1] told Sharett that while in Guatemala last May he was informed that his government had rejected the Papal Nuncio's appeal for support at the U.N. of the Vatican's Jerusalem policy, and that it would support the city's inclusion in the Jewish State.

Notes

1. Four words have been omitted here.

207. President Truman (Washington) to President Weizmann (Rehovoth). 13 August 1949

Notes

1. The letter at hand was drafted by Wilkins of the Department of State (see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1305, n. 1) and was delivered to the Israeli Ambassador in Washington on 18 August (see No. 225).
2. No.104.
3. No. 42.
4. No. 64.

No. 207 – Notes (continued)

5. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
6. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
7. Cf. Nos. 159 and 177.
8. No. 105.
9. The greetings were added in President Truman's own hand.

208. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 14 August 1949 (11.30)

Coded Tel. ET82; Recd: 15 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Sasson has been informed that the political future of the Negev and the Galilee was discussed at a meeting of the Syrian and Lebanese prime ministers on 5 August. It was resolved to urge Egypt to give up her claims in the Negev in order to promote the negotiations at Lausanne and facilitate detachment of the Galilee or, at least, either its eastern or its western part, from Israel. The rationale was security and resettlement of refugees. De Boisanger told Sasson that Syria intended to demand, *inter alia*, annexation of the Galilee when borders were discussed at Lausanne.

209. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 14 August 1949

Notes

1. For full account of the conversation see Liff's memorandum to Sharett, 14 August 1949, 130.02/2441/2.

210. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 14 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on the latest developments at Lausanne.

(a) Hamada has informed him that the heads of the Syrian, Lebanese and Egyptian delegations cabled their respective governments, urging that, at the meeting of the Arab League Political Committee, they should refrain from adopting extreme resolutions that would limit the delegations' authority or spoil the atmosphere at Lausanne and obstruct the talks. They had also informed Rockwell of their readiness to continue the Lausanne talks. Regarding the Jordanians, who had taken a different stand, Hamada explained that they expected, through British and American intervention at the coming U.N. Assembly, to get endorsement of Jordanian annexation of the Arab parts of

Palestine; some domestic considerations were also driving Jordan to create an impression of intransigence.

(b) De Boisanger was elated with his success at overruling Porter on the continuation of the talks at Lausanne. He thought his outburst against Porter on the eve of the latter's departure for America had had the effect of persuading the Americans to reconsider their decision.[1] De Boisanger would like Israel to be more flexible in future negotiations so as to justify his opposition to Porter. He would have Israel refrain from rejecting Arab or American proposals outright, even if they were absurd or aggravating; he also requested the Israeli delegation not to bring up the subject of the forthcoming Assembly in either private or formal sessions with Commission members. De Boisanger informed Sasson that the Commission intended to submit a questionnaire on the refugee and the territorial issues to Israel and the Arabs,[2] and recommended that Israel formulate her replies moderately and with due deliberation.

(c) A.H. Silver,[3] now sojourning in France, paid a visit to the Israeli delegation at Lausanne and wished them success.

(d) Sasson notes that the invitation for a meeting he had extended a few days earlier to the head of the Jordanian delegation at Lausanne has so far remained unanswered; he has heard that Mulqi is about to leave for London to join King Abdallah, who is due there on the 18th for talks and consultations with the British. Sasson, with the concurrence of his colleagues at Lausanne, thought it advisable to send greetings to the King through the Jordanian Minister in London. He accordingly wrote him a letter dwelling on the need for direct talks between the Israeli and the Arab delegates at Lausanne, and also mentioning that Mulqi had not so far responded to his invitation.[4]

(e) Sasson is planning to approach the head of the Egyptian delegation with a proposal for direct negotiations outside Lausanne, similar to those Eytan held in the past with Fawzi al-Mulqi.[5] Sasson will request instructions if he meets with a positive response.[6]

Notes

1. See No. 199 and n. 3 *ibid.*
2. See No. 213 (Appendix).
3. Chairman of the American Section of the Jewish Agency Executive and of the American Zionist Emergency Council.
4. The enclosure, omitted here, can be found in the file.
5. See Nos. 91 and 113.
6. See Nos. 218 and 232.

211. U. Heyd (Washington) to M. Sharett. 14 August 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.
2. Cf. No. 63, n. 1.
3. A military *coup* took place in Damascus on 14 August, led by Colonel Sami al-Hinawi and a group of fellow officers. Husni al-Zaim, the Syrian ruler, and his prime minister, Muhsin al-Barazi, were executed, with Hinawi appointing himself president of the "Revolutionary Council" and Chief of Staff.
4. See No. 240 and Nos. 242–244.
5. See No. 222.
6. See telegram to Shiloah, NA21, 15 August 1949, 93.01/2181/5. Shiloah replied that he was inclined to believe the report corresponded with the facts and that, despite the risks involved in the proposed establishment of a new commission, the members of the Israeli delegation viewed "the American retreat from the Jessup formula and from McGhee's demand for the repatriation of 250,000 refugees as an immense achievement". The members of the delegation recommend that "Porter's endeavours be encouraged but" that Israel "should be on the alert to ensure that the Experts Commission's recommendations are not binding". (Telegram to Sharett, ET89, 16 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.) Even prior to receipt of this telegram Sharett had come to the conclusion that Porter's attitude was "basically positive and he has already contributed to the easing of American pressure" on Israel. He congratulated Shiloah on his work at Lausanne (telegram TE75, 15 August 1949, 130.09/2317/8).

212. E. Najar (Paris) to W. Eytan. 14 August 1949

Notes

1. For impressions of Sablier's visit to Lausanne, see also Arazi to Eytan, 7 August 1949, 130.02/2441/2.
2. Reference is to the I.D.F.'s plan to detonate on that day a large quantity of explosives left over from the war in a tunnel close to Damascus Gate. U.N. observers in Jerusalem had been consulted on this operation and had given their approval, but Jordanian authorities and representatives of foreign states in Israel had voiced apprehensions concerning possible damage to the foundations of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and to other buildings in the vicinity. The I.D.F. rejected these objections and Operation Blast, as it was code-named, was carried out on 23 August 1949.
3. The telegram has not been traced. Concerning the reference to Riley, cf. No. 220, para. 6.
4. René Neuville, French Consul-General in Jerusalem.
5. See Vol. 3, Nos. 317–321 and 323–328, and Companion Volume to same, pp. XXXVI–XXXVII.

213. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 15 August 1949

Copy: 130.02/2441/2

Summary

At a meeting with the Conciliation Commission held that morning, Yalçin

handed to the Israeli delegation the enclosed memorandum (see Main Volume, No. 213, Appendix), expressing the hope that the Government would reply within eight days. The Arabs were being given the same document with the same request.

Sasson informs Sharett of a consultation on affairs at Lausanne held in the presence of Rafael, who stopped over in Lausanne on his way to the U.S. The summaries and conclusions, now under preparation, will be submitted to the Ministry.[1]

Notes

1. See No. 214.
2. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
4. See No. 162 and n. 8 *ibid.*
5. See No. 174 and n. 4 *ibid.*

214. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 15 August 1949[1]

Copy: 130.02/2441/2

Summary

Further to his telegram,[2] Shiloah reports on his meeting with McDonald in Paris. McDonald, who appeared dejected, told Shiloah that he felt his standing at the White House and the Department of State was deteriorating. He complained of not being consulted on policy, and said he would question in Washington whether his mission had not become pointless. Shiloah tried to raise his spirits.

Talking with Najar in Paris, Shiloah suggested that he meet with Quai d'Orsay officials and encourage them to support de Boisanger regarding continuation of the Lausanne talks. Shiloah hopes that Najar has reported to Sharett on his talks with the French.[3]

Consultations with Rafael in Paris, and later with Sasson in Lausanne, had brought them to the following assessment of the situation at Lausanne:

(a) *The Commission*

(1) *Turkey*. Turkish policy has been the least independent among the governments represented on the Commission. Security considerations have compelled Turkey to support every American line without regard for her own position in the balance of power in the Middle East. The Turks acknowledge having erred in consenting to join the Commission, as this has hurt their relations with both Israel and the Arabs. Shiloah and his colleagues estimate that Turkey will therefore support the American move to bring the issue before the Assembly if there is no significant progress in the talks, and they do not expect the Turks to support Israel's attempt to steer the Commission to a new approach.

(2) *France.* Shiloah thinks that France's special interests in the Middle East influence her stand in the Commission. France prefers the talks to continue at Lausanne rather than have the issue put before the Assembly. For reasons of prestige and to advance his own personal career, de Boisanger wishes the talks brought to a successful conclusion. France suspects the U.S. of scheming to undermine her influence in North Africa and the Middle East and sees in the proposed adjournment of the Conference a move in that direction. Shiloah concludes that France shares Israel's concern for continuation of the Lausanne talks and direct negotiations with the Arabs. On the other hand, Shiloah notes that France, like Turkey, is hitched to the American wagon, and will in the end give way to American insistence. Regarding the territorial issue, France has plans of her own, seeking to appease Israel by supporting her position on the southern Negev while simultaneously satisfying the Arabs by detaching Israeli territory in the north for resettlement of refugees. The French estimate that the Americans could not oppose this plan which dovetails with the Jessup formula.[4] (In a conversation after the letter at hand had been typed out, Rockwell told Shiloah that the U.S. would prefer the Arabs to get their territorial compensation in the Negev, but would also settle for the Galilee.)[5] Shiloah adds that he assumes France will support Syrian claims for border modifications with Israel.

(3) *The United States.* In view of the deteriorating international situation and her own weakened position in the Far East, the U.S. is deeply apprehensive about security in the Middle East. According to the Americans, stability in this region cannot be attained without settlement of the Israeli–Arab conflict, which can only be achieved by appeasing the Arabs in territory and in respect of the refugees. In their opinion the most appropriate area for territorial compensation both from the security and the political aspects is the southern Negev, and, as regards the refugees, Israel must admit a larger number. As long as there is a likelihood of extracting these concessions from Israel at Lausanne, the U.S. will favour continuation of the talks, but if these fail, America will endeavour to transfer the debate to the Assembly. The Americans think that any proposal of theirs can attain the necessary majority in the Assembly if they lay the groundwork well in advance. If they cannot justify to the Assembly a demand for an imposed solution because not all approaches to negotiations have been exhausted, they will claim that the resolution of 11 December 1948[6] is couched in vague terms and cannot serve as basis for direct negotiations. They will then ask the Assembly to adopt a new resolution imposing on the parties direct negotiations based on predetermined and clearly defined premises.

(b) *The Arab States*

The Palestine war has shaken the regimes in Egypt, Syria and Iraq and sown unrest in the entire Arab world. Ruling circles fear for their position both as a result of the war and because of the spread of communism in the Arab countries. They need American help in their struggle against communism and the Russian menace.

The Arab states, and Jordan and Syria (i.e., prior to Zaim's overthrow)[7] in particular, deem it advantageous to absorb refugees in order to benefit from large-scale development projects.

Owing to the Arab governments' dependence on the U.S., they will acquiesce in any settlement firmly advocated by the Americans even if it should entail coming to terms with the present territorial situation and absorbing the majority of the refugees.

In conclusion, Shiloah recommends working out an Israeli plan for resettlement of the refugees and development of the Middle East, and proceeding with the work of the three-man committee.[8]

Notes

1. In an appended letter dated the following day, Shiloah told Sharett that he and his colleagues had drafted the document at hand prior to receiving details on the Syrian *coup d'état* and before having read Ginsburg's report (No. 211). Notwithstanding this new information they decided to dispatch the letter as drafted, because they thought events did not call for a fundamental change "in assessing the positions of the various factors in the Lausanne game". (130.02/2447/5.)
2. Telegram SL98, 10 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.
3. See No. 212.
4. See No. 63, n. 1.
5. The sentence in parentheses was inserted and initialed in Shiloah's hand.
6. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
7. See No. 211, n. 3.
8. The three-man committee on the refugee problem, composed of J. Weitz, E. Danin and Z. Liff.

215. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 15 August 1949

Orig.: 93.03/87/11

Summary

Sharett encloses two letters addressed to Proskauer (see Main Volume, No. 215, Appendices A and B) and dwells on some additional grave aspects of his and Herzog's talks with Monsignor McMahon.[1]

The latter clearly hinted that if Israel did not reach an agreement with the Catholics, the weight of their influence in the entire Middle East would not redound to the advantage of Israel and the Jewish communities; he laid special stress on the importance of a secure status for the Catholic Church in Jerusalem as a bastion against communism in the Middle East; he kept reiterating that the Catholics had *not* opposed the establishment of the Jewish State and had *not* obstructed Israel's admission to the U.N., implying that should Israel aggravate them, strong antagonism towards her would be aroused.

Though these threats did not unduly worry Sharett insofar as the outcome of the campaign in the forthcoming Assembly was concerned, he nevertheless thought that the problem of Israel–Vatican relations was not limited to the arena of the U.N. but constituted a permanent factor for the State of Israel and world Jewry. The note of anxiety in Sharett's telegram to Eban[2] and also in his letter to Proskauer related to the wider and permanent problem and not necessarily to the current stage of affairs.

As regards the voices raised in the Cabinet on the transfer to Jerusalem,[3] Sharett hopes that Eban's cables[4] will help him shelve the issue for the time being.[5]

Notes

1. Cf. No. 179.
2. *Ibid.*
3. See No. 192, para. 5.
4. See No. 189 and n. 2 *ibid.*
5. At the 17 August Cabinet meeting Sharett's view prevailed by 6 votes against 4, and it was resolved to defer for the time being any decision on the transfer of the Knesset and the government offices to Jerusalem.
6. Original erroneously has: "1949". See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
7. One paragraph omitted here.

216. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 15 August 1949

Notes

1. Sharett cabled Eban for urgent comments on the Ginsburg–Porter conversation (15 August 1949, 130.09/2329/13). See No. 211.

217. E. Elath [Washington] to C. Clifford (Washington). 15 August 1949

Notes

1. This letter was drafted by A. Eban.
2. See No. 104.
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. See No. 63, n. 1.
5. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.
6. See No. 192, nn. 2 and 3.
7. At the Security Council debate on the armistice agreements. See No. 190, para. 3, and Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 below.

218. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 16 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on his and Shiloah's meeting with Abd al-Mun'im.

Concerning the Syrian *coup d'état*,[1] Abd al-Mun'im felt it was too early to draw any conclusions. The American representatives on the Conciliation Commission, he said, regretted the happening very much because shortly before the *coup* they had reached an agreement with Zaim to absorb a large number of refugees. Abd al-Mun'im enquired how Israel would feel about the Palestine issue being raised at the U.N. Assembly, and Shiloah and Sasson replied that this would undermine the Lausanne talks, upset the atmosphere, exacerbate relations between Israel and the Arab states, worsen the plight of the refugees, and seriously delay attainment of a final settlement. They[2] remarked on the emerging coincidence of foreign policy positions between Israel and Egypt at the Assembly with regard to the Italian colonies, the Interim Committee, and so on, and indicated that this process would not flourish in an atmosphere of bitter argument. They read out to him relevant passages from Eytan's last letter on Israel's foreign policy,[3] and got the impression that Abd al-Mun'im had paid serious attention to their arguments. He claimed he had not yet consulted with his government on the subject of the Assembly and confirmed Lebanon's intention to place the issue on the agenda.

Shiloah and Sasson suggested holding talks outside the format of the Commission, and Abd al-Mun'im readily agreed; the first meeting was set for 20 August,[4] to deal with the Commission's recent memorandum on the refugee and the territorial issues.[5] The Egyptian representative conceded that it was desirable to coordinate the replies to encourage the Commission to continue its efforts. The matter of the Mixed Committee appointed the previous day to deal with the problem of frozen assets[6] was also discussed, and Abd al-Mun'im promised the Israelis he would instruct his representative on that committee to be flexible.

Abd al-Mun'im then discussed the attitude of the various members of the Commission regarding referral of the Palestine issue to the Assembly, and his conclusions corresponded with those reached at the delegation's consultation already reported on.[7]

Abd al-Mun'im informed Shiloah and Sasson of his government's assent to the entry into Egypt of Israel's delegates to the International Health and Food Conference. A telegram to that effect has been dispatched to Sharett.[8] Another telegram is on the way, requesting instructions for the forthcoming meeting with Abd al-Mun'im.[9]

Notes

1. See No. 211, n. 3.
2. The following four sentences were added and initialed in the margin in Shiloah's hand.
3. No. 200.
4. Actually, the 19th. See No. 232.
5. No. 213 (Appendix).
6. See minutes of the committee's first meeting, 16 August 1949, 130.02/2441/10.
7. No. 214.
8. SL106, 15 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.
9. Telegram ET87, 16 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6.

219. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 17 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

On arrival at Lausanne Sasson met Hawari and found him bitter and dejected [. . . . .].[1] He told Sasson that the Government of Jordan had disbanded the refugee organization, closed down their headquarters, arrested several of its members, delayed departure of the refugee delegation for Lausanne, and prohibited transfer of money to Hawari and to the leaders of the organization who are in Switzerland or in Syria and Lebanon. A law has also been promulgated forbidding Jordanian citizens and those under Jordanian jurisdiction from having any contact with Jews, under penalty of death. The heads of the Arab delegations at Lausanne have refused to see Hawari, accusing him of having contacts with the Israeli delegation [. . . .].[2]

[. . . .][3] Sasson thereupon dictated a letter for Hawari to address to Fawzi al-Mulqi, demanding his immediate intervention with the Jordanian government to rescind all measures against the refugee organization, and threatening to appeal to the Conciliation Commission, as well as to convene a press conference and disclose unseemly conduct by the governments of Jordan and the other Arab states. Sasson also urged Hawari to contact immediately Said Beidas and Shukri al-Taji,[4] inviting them to Lausanne to set up a new refugee delegation.

Acting upon Hawari's letter, Mulqi sent a number of telegrams to the Jordanian government, and a week later Hawari was informed that there had been a change of policy towards his organization in Jordan. With the arrival of Beidas and Taji at Lausanne, Hawari again became *persona grata* with the Arab delegations, although he was treated with some reservation.

Simultaneously, Hawari sent off a series of letters to his friends and acquaintances in the Arab countries, to the Arab press, to Azzam Pasha and to Riad al-Sulh,[5] in anticipation of the forthcoming meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League. In all his letters he urged the Arab states to acknowledge *faits accomplis* in Palestine and to accept Israel's existence. Some of his letters were actually published in the Arab press. In talks with

editors of Arab newspapers sojourning in Switzerland Hawari strongly criticized the "unrealistic attitude" of the Arab delegations to the Lausanne Conference, accusing them of attempting to expand their territories at the refugees' expense.

Hawari and his colleagues have been exerting pressure on the Conciliation Commission, demanding participation at the Commission's meetings with the Arab and the Israeli delegations. This followed on the heels of a demand by the Mufti's emissaries for recognition as representatives of the Palestinian Arabs. In the struggle with the Mufti's supporters Hawari's side appears to be prevailing presently, and Sasson hopes it will continue thus.

Sasson requests that the contents of this letter be communicated to S. Divon and to Y. Palmon.[6]

Notes

1. One sentence omitted here.
2. Second part of this sentence omitted here.
3. One sentence omitted here.
4. Shukri Bey al-Taji, citrus grower and public figure from Jaffa.
5. Riad al-Sulh, Lebanese prime minister.
6. Yehoshua Palmon, Adviser on Arab Affairs in the Prime Minister's Office.

Editorial Note

Security Council debate on the armistice negotiations and truce provisions

Following the signing of the armistice agreement with Syria, R. Bunche submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General a report on the status of the armistice negotiations and the truce in Palestine (see No. 152, n. 4). His conclusion was that the truce provisions of 15 July 1948 had been made redundant by the armistice agreements and he therefore recommended, in a draft resolution appended to the report, that the Security Council rescind the truce arrangements and reduce to the absolute minimum the staff of U.N. Supervisors. The practical outcome of the resolution would have meant lifting of the arms embargo in the Middle East.

The Security Council debated Bunche's recommendations through four of its sessions, on 4, 8 and 11 August 1949. Despite misgivings voiced by some of the members on the risks of lifting the arms embargo, the Council as a whole supported Bunche's main recommendation. The Soviet representative demanded complete abrogation of the U.N. supervisory and mediatory apparatus, including the Conciliation Commission, and favoured direct contacts between the parties to achieve a permanent settlement. His proposals on these lines were rejected by the Council, which finally adopted a resolution based on Bunche's proposal and submitted by France and Canada, which was passed by a majority of votes, with two abstentions – the Soviet Union and Ukraine:

The Security Council,

Having noted with satisfaction the several Armistice Agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the parties involved in the conflict in Palestine in pursuance of its resolution 62 (1948) of 16 November 1948,

1. *Expresses the hope* that the Governments and authorities concerned, having undertaken, by means of the negotiations now being conducted by the Conciliation Commission for Palestine, to fulfil the request of the General Assembly in its resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948 to extend the scope of the armistice negotiations and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, will at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

2. *Finds* that the Armistice Agreements constitute an important step toward the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine and considers that these agreements supersede the truce provided for in Security Council resolutions 50 (1948) of 29 May and 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948;

3. *Reaffirms,* pending the final peace settlement, the order contained in its resolution 54 (1948) to the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to observe an unconditional cease-fire and, bearing in mind that the several Armistice Agreements include firm pledges against any further acts of hostility between the parties and also provide for their supervision by the parties themselves, relies upon the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of these Agreements;

4. *Decides* that all functions assigned to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine having been discharged, the Acting Mediator is relieved of any further responsibility under Security Council resolutions;

5. *Notes* that the Armistice Agreements provide that the execution of those Agreements shall be supervised by mixed armistice commissions whose chairman in each case shall be the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine or a senior officer from the observer personnel of that organization designated by him following consultation with the parties to the Agreements;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the continued service of such of the personnel of the present Truce Supervision Organization as may be required in observing and maintaining the cease-fire, and as may be necessary in assisting the parties to the Armistice Agreements in the supervision of the application and observance of the terms of those Agreements, with particular regard to the desires of the parties as expressed in the relevant articles of the Agreements;

7. *Requests* the Chief of Staff mentioned above to report to the Security Council on the observance of the cease-fire in Palestine in accordance with the terms of this resolution, and to keep the Conciliation Commission for Palestine informed of matters affecting the Commission's work under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948.

(See *SCOR, Fourth Year,* 433rd–435th, 437th Meetings, 4, 8, 11 August 1949; *ibid.*, Resolutions, pp. 8–9.)

220. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 17 August 1949

Memorandum: 130.02/2424/23

Summary

Comments on Security Council Meetings, 4–11 August
Arms Shipments

(1) On the eve of the meeting it had become obvious that an extension of the arms embargo in the Middle East was unlikely. Bunche and the British and American governments found it expedient to regard the armistice as temporary peace and to put an end to restrictions and to all remnants of international supervision. The fact that Israel had previously urged abolition of the Observer machinery undermined the present demand for an extension of the embargo. Tsarapkin, the Soviet representative on the Security Council, confided that he feared prolongation of the embargo might also involve continuation of all the other truce provisions. The Soviet Union's main objective is to hasten the removal of outside intervention and this entails adopting the concept that the armistice supersedes the truce with all its conditions and restrictions. The neutral members (Canada, Norway, Argentina and Cuba), while leaning towards continuation of the embargo,[1] declared that the decision lay with the arms supplying powers.

(2) Notwithstanding the anticipated setback, the Israeli delegation persisted in its original demand for the following reasons:

(a) The campaign for an extension of the embargo focused widespread attention on the speedy rearmament policy of the Arab countries despite the abject poverty of their population, while it limelighted Israel's policy of peace, progress and development for the Middle East.

(b) The campaign also served its purpose in Washington, where there was a spate of speeches in Congress censuring and questioning Arab aims. The Egyptian ambassador was compelled to meet the press and to pledge that Egyptian rearmament was directed not against Israel but against Soviet expansionism. This in turn caused an angry reaction from Tsarapkin at the Security Council.

(c) The U.S., Britain and France had to commit themselves publicly not to flood the Middle East with surplus weaponry beyond that required for defence and domestic security.

(d) The Arab representatives were forced to declare – for the first time and with due emphasis – that they would abide by the armistice agreements and had no intention of renewing hostilities. This naturally promotes the impression of stability in the Middle East – to Israel's advantage.

(3) Tsarapkin proposed amendments only in those clauses of the draft resolution dealing with the U.N. officers and their functions. The Soviet

representative later claimed that if his emendations had been adopted, he would have voted for the resolution in its entirety, *viz.*, for liquidation of the truce and lifting of the embargo.

(4) Tsarapkin's amendments echoed Israel's policy, but had been formulated in extreme terms and with disregard for certain clauses in the armistice agreements. Eban had explained to Tsarapkin that Israel wanted strict observation of these agreements because they safeguarded her borders, and because Israel contended that U.N. bodies were not authorized to effect even the most minor change in the armistice agreements. He suggested that Tsarapkin modify his demand for the recall of all U.N. personnel and give the parties the option to retain those officials who might be of assistance in implementing the armistice agreements. Egypt and Syria had supported Eban's argument. Tsarapkin later explained that he agreed with Israel and that he had not necessarily meant to amend the resolution but rather to underscore the principle of removal of all foreign factors, leaving the Palestine issue to the contending parties.

(5) Israel succeeded in extracting from Bunche a decision condemning the Egyptian blockade,[2] and future action will thus be founded on this favourable decision instead of appealing against the unfavourable decision by the Chairman of the Armistice Commission.[3] The Egyptians will apparently have to yield in this matter, lest the issue be laid before the Security Council and they be accused of violating the peace and defying the Mediator. Sir Alexander Cadogan and Sir Terence Shone were helpful in getting the blockade lifted, owing to Britain's desire to ship oil to Haifa from the Persian Gulf through the Suez Canal. Shone had written to Eban declaring that "his Government's position was identical on this issue with that of the Government of Israel".[4] On the other hand, the British most adamantly clung to their demand for the lifting of the arms embargo.

(6) The French representative waged an unsuccessful campaign against Riley, attempting to place his functions under the supervision of the Conciliation Commission. M. Chauvel defined the Conciliation Commission as "a tool at the disposal of the negotiating governments".

(7) The Israeli representatives had urged the Canadians and Bunche to amend in the phrasing of the resolution the clause declaring that the truce was no longer necessary; instead they proposed the more unequivocal definition that the armistice canceled the truce and superseded it.

(8) The crux of the Security Council resolution lies in the appeal to the parties to settle the outstanding issues through negotiations leading to an agreement. This note was heard from many speakers, including the U.S. representative. Bunche had said in his speech that a face-to-face meeting was a guarantee for agreement, and Eban alluded to this in his own speech before the Council. Eban remarks on the lack of coordination in American policy: while the Department of State is about to declare that negotiations between the parties will not lead to an agreement and that the gulf between Israel and the Arabs is unbridgeable, Austin comes out with an enthusiastic speech in

favour of a settlement reached through negotiations and common consent. Whoever now urges imposition of a settlement on the parties without their agreement will of necessity appear as defying the recent Security Council resolution.

(9) The Egyptian representative made a good impression with his courteous remarks about Israel. For the first time ever he mentioned the name "Israel" and addressed "the distinguished representative of Israel". He agreed with Eban's definition of the armistice as a temporary peace agreement not subject to unilateral modification, and he also suggested that the parties be permitted to decide on the release of the U.N. officers appointed with their assent to serve as chairmen of the armistice commissions.

(10) Eban intends to exploit the adopted resolution along the following lines: (a) to invoke the resolution in order to refute American contentions that the time for negotiations is over and the moment has arrived to impose a solution; (b) the consensus at the Security Council had been that resumption of hostilities was unlikely and that the parties' commitments should be taken as sincere and binding. This conclusion enables Israel to argue that it is groundless to contend that the Palestine issue constituted a threat to international peace; the conflict is now of a political nature and the states concerned should be afforded the opportunity of settling it through direct negotiations; (c) the majority of the speakers sang the praises of the armistice agreements; this enables Israel to warn against attempts to undermine the agreements by advancing proposals unacceptable to either side.

Notes

1. Cf. No. 161.
2. Cf. No. 172, No. 182, para. 2, and No. 205.
3. See No. 33, n. 2.
4. See No. 205, n. 3.

221. M. Eliash (London) to M. Comay. 17 August 1949

Notes

1. No. 176.
2. See No. 211, n. 3.
3. The Haifa refineries had been idle since April 1948, with cessation of the oil flow through the Iraqi pipeline as well as the supply of crude oil by sea from Tripoli, Lebanon. Towards the end of hostilities the British Foreign Office sounded out Iraq and Egypt on the possible resumption of the oil flow and passage of tankers through the Suez Canal, but with no success, and the refineries remained inactive for many months. In September 1949 the refineries' management informed Israeli representatives of their intention to resume operations with crude supplied from Venezuela and also from the Middle East, through the Suez Canal. Israel had refrained, for economic and political reasons (see No. 278), from revoking the concession and nationalizing the refineries, and entered upon negotiations with the company, demanding certain rights and dues in exchange for ratification of the concession.

222. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 18 August 1949

Notes

1. No. 211.
2. Sharett had consulted Shiloah and Eban prior to formulating his recommendations. See *ibid.*, n. 6, and No. 216.

223. A. Eban (New York) to R. Shiloah (Lausanne). 18 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 228.
2. See No. 211, n. 3.

224. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 18 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 211.
2. Last part of the sentence omitted here.
3. See No. 63, n. 1.
4. Telegram NA36, 19 August 1949, 93.01/2202/1.
5. See No. 225.

225. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 18 August 1949

Notes

1. No. 207.
2. See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1281–2.
3. See telegram of 9 August 1949 in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1291; see also No. 201.
4. Telegram W362, 18 August 1949, 93.01/2181/5.
5. Cf. account of this conversation in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1323–6.
6. Telegram NA35, 18 August 1949, 93.01/2202/1. Reports from Washington had convinced Shiloah that "Porter had not prevailed over the Department and the crisis had not abated". He recommended acquiescing to the proposal for the establishment of the survey commission if it appeared that the debate would thereby be postponed till after the U.N. Assembly and on condition that its recommendations would not be binding (telegram to Sharett, ET94, 20 August 1949, 130.02/2442/6).

226. Meeting: A. Feinberg – P. Porter (New York, 16 August 1949, Document dated 18 August 1949)

Notes

1. The conversation was taken down by Arthur Lourie.
2. See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1315–6.

227. A. Eban (New York) to the Permanent Representative of Turkey at the United Nations (New York). 18 August 1949

Notes

1. Selim Sarper, Permanent Representative of Turkey at the U.N.
2. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 above.
4. See No. 220, para. 8.

228. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 August 1949

Notes

1. Original erroneously has: "Clifton".

229. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 19 August 1949

Notes

1. President Truman.
2. See No. 207 and n. 1 *ibid.*

230. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 20 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

De Boisanger told Sasson that Porter had been invited to the Quai d'Orsay for 22 August to discuss the Lausanne conference. De Boisanger had also been invited to attend the meeting, and before his departure he tried to find out from Rockwell whether there had been any change in the U.S. position following Porter's visit to Washington. Rockwell claimed there had been no such change and that he was for the Assembly adopting an interim arrangement that would help bridge the gap between the parties. When de Boisanger tried to convince him that he was mistaken, Rockwell evaded discussion and would only say it was undignified for the members of the Conciliation Commission and their governments to carry on pointlessly at Lausanne with no hope of positive results.

De Boisanger has learnt from the heads of the Lebanese and Egyptian delegations that they both favoured continuation of the Lausanne talks. The Lebanese delegate said that he intended to reply to the Commission's latest memorandum[1] in a flexible manner so as to facilitate continuation of the

talks. His government would comply with France's request to refrain from placing the Palestine issue on the Assembly's agenda. The Egyptian delegate expressed his opinion that referral of the Palestine issue to the Assembly would exacerbate relations between Israel and the Arab states and would push both sides to extreme positions. His government had instructed him to remain in Lausanne until an acceptable solution was found. Questioned by both Arab representatives, de Boisanger answered that Israel had no misgivings about going to the Assembly and was certain she stood to lose nothing by it; however, Israel was desirous of peace and appreciated the difference between an agreed solution and an imposed one.

De Boisanger told Sasson he foresaw an acute clash with Porter if the U.S. were to suspend the Lausanne conference. He wanted Israel to help him stave this off by giving a flexible reply to the Commission's memorandum. He intended to report to his superiors in the Quai d'Orsay on his meeting with President Weizmann[2] which proved Israel's intention to arrive at a negotiated peace with the Arabs.

In conclusion, de Boisanger revealed he was asked by the Quai d'Orsay to prepare for a discussion on the Jerusalem issue and on the Commission's relevant report, which was about to be submitted to the Assembly.[3]

Notes

1. No. 213 (Appendix).
2. See No. 186, n. 5.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 181 below.

231. M. Amir (The Hague) to the West European Division. 20 August 1949

Report: 93.26/435/4

Summary

(1) Amir reports on his meeting of 19 August with the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs, at which he raised the question of Holland's *de jure* recognition of Israel. Replying, the Minister referred to the question of Jerusalem which was troubling the Dutch government, and indicated how strongly the Papal encyclical "Redemptoris Nostri"[1] had influenced catholic circles in Holland. He explained that the coalitional nature of the Dutch government compelled it to exercise caution in its policies, but agreed to bring up the recognition question for reconsideration.

Amir described the proposal for international supervision of the Holy Places, stating that it was acceptable to both Israel and Jordan and that it was preferable to the internationalization scheme while achieving identical objectives. The Minister suggested that the relevant information be given to the Director of Political Affairs. In conclusion, the Minister told Amir not to

expect a decision concerning recognition before his departure for Belgium in September, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the government were at the moment heavily burdened with the Round Table conference on Indonesia.[2]

(2) That same afternoon Amir met Vigeveno, head of the Department of Political Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, who requested the text of Israel's proposal on the Holy Places, and conceded that internationalization was not the only possible solution to the Jerusalem problem. He asked for material which could convince Holland's influential Catholic circles of Israel's good will in resolving the problem of the Holy Places. In answer to Amir's argument about Catholic countries like France having extended *de jure* recognition to Israel, Vigeveno explained that Dutch Catholics, isolated at the northernmost reaches of their Church in Europe, felt called upon to be "more Catholic than the Pope".

In respect to recognition, Vigeveno proposed an interim arrangement on the British model,[3] according full diplomatic status to the representatives of both countries. Amir rejected this proposal, just as he had at his meeting with Boon,[4] and explained that the Government of Israel preferred to await full recognition. Vigeveno nevertheless urged Amir to transmit his proposal to his government, and Amir accordingly requests an early reply. He also takes this opportunity to complain about delays in replies to his queries and cites in particular his letter of 1 August[5] concerning desecration of Holy Places.

Notes

1. Reference is to the encyclical "Redemptoris Nostri" issued by the Pope on 15 April 1949 on the occasion of Easter. The Pope called for the establishment of a regime based on international law in Jerusalem and its environs, and for safeguarding the Holy Places and the privileges of the Catholic institutions (see Vol. 2, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 207).
2. A Round Table conference on the transfer of authority in Indonesia from the Dutch to the colony's local inhabitants opened at The Hague on 23 August in the presence of U.N. observers. The conference came to a successful conclusion on 2 November, and Indonesia declared its independence on 27 December. (See also No. 254, para. F.)
3. See No. 28, n. 5.
4. Hendrik N. Boon, Secretary-General of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. The meeting was held on 12 August 1949. (Report dated 14 August 1949 in file 93.26/435/4.)
5. In file 93.26/435/17.

232. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 21 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson and Shiloah met Abd al-Mun'im, head of the Egyptian delegation, on 19 August. The venue for the meeting, which lasted about seven hours, was a small town outside Lausanne. On the agenda were the territorial issue, the

refugee problem, and economic cooperation. Sasson and Shiloah emphasized that they regarded Abd al-Mun'im as representative of Egypt alone, and therefore only issues of bilateral concern would be discussed.

Shiloah stressed the importance of the Negev for Israel and refuted Egyptian claims, based on Western military experts' opinions, concerning the importance of the Negev to Egypt for reasons of security and territorial continuity. He proposed that Egyptian and Israeli army personnel hold military discussions and consultations with the object of coming to a military agreement.

Abd al-Mun'im rejected the proposal, on the grounds that statesmen and not military men generally decide policy, and in this connection he cited the regrettable interference of Syrian military personnel in their country's political affairs.[1] He explained that Egyptian policy was based on two elements: (a) establishment of a buffer zone between Israel and Egypt and between Egypt and Jordan by making the entire Negev Arab, i.e., Arab-Palestinian and not Arab-Egyptian or Jordanian; (b) gradual improvement in political and economic relations with Israel which would eventually evolve into normal relations; in the interim Egyptians would come to accept Israel as a permanent entity with no aggressive designs and would forget past belligerency.

Abd al-Mun'im added that with the Negev as a buffer between Israel and Egypt a large part of the refugees could be settled there, Jordan would be unable to annex it, and the independence of the other Arab parts of Palestine would be guaranteed.

Contesting the Israelis' allegation that the Partition Plan had allocated the Negev to Israel, Abd al-Mun'im cited the Galilee, which though allocated to the Arab State was now occupied by Israel, with little prospect of its being yielded to the Arabs.

When Shiloah and Sasson declared that Israeli surrender of the Negev was absolutely out of the question, Abd al-Mun'im replied that, if so, there was no basis for an understanding between Israel and Egypt, and referral of the issue to the Assembly was inevitable. He added that in case of an Assembly decision favourable to Israel Egypt would comply, give up her claims, evacuate Gaza and withdraw to the international border – but then there would be no prospect of understanding and peace between Israel and Egypt and a state of "cold war" would probably ensue. Speaking somewhat emotionally he said: "...Egypt does not want a common border with Israel. Egypt would have been happy if Israel had not come into existence, and did everything possible to forestall this. Egypt is convinced that an Israeli state, alien to the Arabs in all respects, amidst an Arab ocean, will of necessity be a permanent cause of conflicts, complications and instability in the Middle East." Words alone, he claimed, could not bring about a change of heart in the Egyptians. He had expressed himself similarly to the Americans and warned that, to regain the confidence of the Arab world, America had to keep Israel from becoming large, strong, and densely populated. Egypt would not feel safe with three or four million well educated, energetic and dedicated

Jews on her borders. Abd al-Mun'im would not be reassured by Shiloah and Sasson as to the lack of foundation for Egypt's fears and maintained that past experience forced Egypt to consider carefully her own interests.

Discussion of the Negev took up the entire meeting and the other subjects were not touched. Abd al-Mun'im was not inclined to set a date for a further meeting in view of Israel's position; he promised to transmit the gist of the conversation to his government.[2]

Notes

1. See No. 211, n. 3.
2. Sasson cabled the gist of the conversation to Sharett on 19 August 1949 (ET93, 130.02/2442/6).

233. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Israeli Delegation in Lausanne. 21 August 1949

Coded Tel. TE88; Outg.: 130.09/2317/8

Summary

It is reported that King Abdallah intends to discuss annexation of the Triangle during his stay in London and that he will request the British to extend their military commitments to Jordan to that region as well. Eytan suggests that this be relayed to Boisanger, to Egypt and to other interested parties, and that a statement opposing the annexation be elicited from Hawari and his colleagues.

234. A. Ukhmani (Warsaw) to the East European Division. 21 August 1949

Orig.: 130.11/2502/10

Summary

Barzilai's conversation at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the announcement by the Minister of Public Administration to the delegation of the Committee of the Jewish Communities (reorganized after Kahane's[1] departure) have been duly reported in Ukhmani's telegrams.[2] Once the special committee working on the details of the arrangement has finished its work, an announcement is expected on the new procedures for emigration to Israel.

Several factors, mostly domestic, led the government to reach this decision, and these included the desire to arrest the migration current and to integrate the Jews into the Polish economy. The Minister and the Legation also played their part in it. Some circles, mainly that of Zachariasz,[3] made

unsuccessful attempts to have the government follow the Rumanian-Hungarian example. Others had deluded themselves that the Jews would be absorbed into the new way of life in due course and that the urge to emigrate would subside, but they were wrong. About 2,000 Jews are still departing every month, and some 20,000 applications are awaiting processing at the Ministry.

The new procedure will give the Jews a choice between renouncing their Polish citizenship and emigrating to Israel or integrating into Poland's economic life. The authorities assume that not more than 15,000 will want to give up their citizenship, but the Legation's estimate is about 25,000. Ukhmani expects that the new policy will also generate increased anti-Zionist propaganda, aiming to discourage and reduce emigration. Ukhmani foresees three main changes in the life of the Jewish population: (a) all Zionist activity will cease; (b) the Central Committee of Polish Jews will be abolished; (c) exclusively Jewish philanthropic bodies, such as the JDC, will be banned. In short, the uniqueness of Jewish public life in Poland will disappear as a result of emigration to Israel.

Notes

1. David Kahane, until then President of the Rabbinical Council in Poland.
2. See No. 197 and n. 3 *ibid.*, and also Ukhmani to Eliashiv, telegram of 13 August 1949, 130.09/2306/4.
3. Szymon Zachariasz, a leading figure in the Central Committee of Polish Jews; member of the Communist Party.

235. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 22 August 1949

Copy: 130.02/2424/12

Summary

Eban comments and makes recommendations concerning Israel's policy on the question of former Italian colonies.[1]

(a) Israel should be conspicuously active in this matter, advocating independence or direct U.N. trusteeship unequivocally and unconditionally. Earlier reservations concerning Italian interests in Tripolitania should be discarded, so that there is complete identification with the general position of the Asian members.

(b) In order that Israel's position be unequivocal and coherent, *both* British and Italian trusteeship should be opposed in favour of independence under U.N. aegis.

(c) From talks with the Italian representative Eban inferred that Italy did not set high hopes on her likely return to North Africa. Latin-American bloc members understand and respect Israel's siding with the peoples of the East, as does the U.S.

(d) At a time when the Arab world is beginning to come to terms with the existence of the Jewish State, Israel's active cooperation in such a vital issue should make a strong and favourable impression on the Arabs.

(e) Eban consequently recommends that Israel support any resolution for immediate or early independence for the colonies; oppose trusteeship by any individual power; support direct U.N. trusteeship in the context of a proposed temporary trusteeship.

(f) Eban has learned from authoritative sources that the Asiatic and the Soviet blocs will demand immediate independence for Libya and direct U.N. trusteeship for Eritrea and Somalia, and in his opinion Israel should adopt this position.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above.

236. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 23 August 1949

Coded Tel. ET98; Recd: 24 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Porter apologized to Shiloah for being unable to divulge to him the gist of the proposals on hand without the Commission's prior authorization.[1] He has however told Shiloah of the results of his visit to Washington: (a) his visit had averted an "explosion" in U.S.–Israel relations; (b) he has succeeded in convincing his government that a political settlement is still premature and that efforts should be concentrated on solving the refugee problem through economic aid for the development of the Middle East; (c) he has obtained the President's authorization for uninterrupted *pro tem* aid to the refugees pending an alternative basis for a solution; (d) the Conciliation Commission will not be dissolved; (e) circumspect conduct by Israel will neutralize the Jessup formula[2] with which Porter himself is not in accord; (f) Porter advises Shiloah to refrain from accusing the Commission of failure to encourage direct talks: he himself can testify that he had urged the Arabs to enter on direct negotiations; in his opinion, direct talks cannot possibly succeed at this stage; (g) Porter's line enjoys the support of both Lie and Bunche.

Notes

1. See No. 237.
2. See No. 63, n. 1.

237. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 23 August 1949

Coded Tel. ET99, ET100; Recd: 24 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

The French representative[1] informed Sasson that: (a) the three governments have authorized the appointment of a Survey Group; (b) the Commission has asked the Secretary-General to select the Group members from candidates named by the governments represented on the Commission as well as by Britain; (c) the Group members will be U.N. employees and not representatives of the governments, appointed by the Secretariat and responsible to the Commission; (d) the Commission will not consult with the parties on the establishment and the composition of the Group; (e) Boisanger stressed the importance of Britain's participation in the Survey Group; (f) the Group will employ a large number of experts and technicians.

The U.S. has not yet abandoned the idea of referring the Palestine issue to the Assembly, but is acceding to France's request not to rush matters. Once the Survey Group has been set up, the Commission will for a time continue with discussions on the territorial issue and will then resume its sessions in New York around mid-October. In the light of the Survey Group's report and its own findings, the Commission will come to a decision on the nature of its recommendations to the Assembly.

De Boisanger told Shiloah that France and the Vatican were worried about the hidden significance of the Prime Minister's latest speeches in and about Jerusalem.[2] They suspected Israel of planning to confront the Assembly with a *fait accompli*. De Boisanger has consequently demanded immediate appointment by the Commission of a U.N. representative in Jerusalem, in accordance with the Assembly's resolution, paragraph 8, last sentence,[3] and the Commission complied. The representative's function will be to preserve the *status quo* while maintaining contact with the parties. Should Israel refuse to cooperate, France will demand an immediate decision in the Assembly. De Boisanger would like a reassuring reply from Israel before his forthcoming meeting with Schuman, who is about to depart for the United States.[4]

Notes

1. Claude de Boisanger.
2. Reference is to Ben-Gurion's speech of 2 August, on the reopening of railway communication between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv, and to his Knesset speech of 16 August on the occasion of Herzl's reinterment in Jerusalem. In the first speech he had said, *inter alia*, that "everything that is now in Tel Aviv should be transferred to Jerusalem" (see Review of the Hebrew Press, 8 August 1949, 130.02/2443/3, and cf. No. 263).
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. See No. 252, para. (a).

238. J. Tsur (Montevideo) to A. Drapkin[1]. 23 August 1949

Copy: 93.03/73/2

Summary

Tsur reports on his conversation with the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs, César Charlone. [. . . . .][2] Tsur acquainted him with Israel's policy regarding Jerusalem and the refugees, and got the impression that some of these views were favourably received, though no promises were made. Charlone said that the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of small nations was paramount in Uruguay's foreign policy and his country would not compromise on it. He expressed the wish to see Tsur again before the coming Assembly, and it was understood that they would also discuss Uruguay's views on the issues before the U.N., particularly Spain and the Italian colonies. Tsur believes that no significant change is to be expected in Uruguay's position during the forthcoming Assembly.

Notes

1. Avraham Drapkin, Acting Director of the Latin-American Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. First part of the letter omitted here.

239. T. Arazi (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 24 August 1949

Orig: 130.02/2447/5

Summary

Arazi reports on his meeting with Omar Jabiri, member of the Syrian delegation at Lausanne and his country's Chargé d'Affaires at Bern. Arazi expressed his sympathy with Syria's present distress,[1] adding that Israel had no preferences for any particular regime in Syria and no intention of interfering in her internal problems. The two then analysed their nation's common interests and dwelt on possible economic gains for Syria from the development projects proposed for the Middle East. Arazi said that Israel was interested in Syria's development, economic stability, and rise in the standard of living of her population. Arazi and Jabiri then discussed the possibility of commercial relations between the two countries.

Jabiri had read the article on the economic problems of the Middle East which had appeared in the 17 August[2] issue of the Beirut *Commerce de Levant* (copy of which is appended).[3] He said that he was aware of these problems and earnestly wished that the present state of affairs caused by the war would soon pass. He also regretted the procrastination at Lausanne. He was prepared to submit to his Foreign Ministry a report on this conversation,

requesting instructions on whether he would be permitted to maintain the contacts with Israel.

Replying to Jabiri's question on Israel's contribution to the refugee resettlement project for Syria, Arazi said that most of the capital for that purpose would come from outside sources, with Israel making payments for abandoned refugee lands in her own territory.

In discussing the questionnaire submitted by the Conciliation Commission[4] to the delegations at Lausanne, Arazi observed that obviously unrealistic territorial claims on the part of the Arabs would create a negative image and arouse in them a sense of political defeat.

In conclusion, Jabiri said he was uncertain whether the members of the new Syrian Cabinet, most of whom lacked political experience with the Palestine issue, would be able grasp the essentials at that stage or whether time alone would show them the realities of the situation. He promised he would let Arazi know as soon as he received instructions from his Government.

Notes

1. See No. 211, n. 3.
2. Original has in error: "17 August 1948".
3. The document has been omitted here.
4. No. 213 (Appendix).

240. O. Gass[1] (Washington) to E. Kaplan. 24 August 1949

Coded Tel. WIA24; Outg.: 93.01/2181/5

Summary

Further to his telegram No. 374 of the preceding day,[2] Gass reports on his interview with Sauer[3] at which he inquired after the reasons for the suspension of action on the loan agreements for ports and railways. Sauer explained that the Bank had been ready to grant new loans for the last three weeks, but that the State Department vetoed any discussion of new loan agreements for the time being, although it did not demand the revocation of existing loan agreements or of the $100,000,000 allocation. The Bank was thus forced to defer discussion of new loans until the veto should be withdrawn. Hoping for a change in the State Department's position, the Bank had so far refrained from informing Israel of the situation, but now the Bank has officially notified the State Department that Gass was being apprised of the political veto and asked to transmit this information to his Government.

Three weeks previously the State Department had asked the Bank to notify Israel that new agreements would not be negotiated owing to adverse economic developments in Israel, but the directors were unanimous in their refusal to resort to such a falsehood.

Somewhat later the State Department requested that the Bank suspend negotiations on new agreements without giving any reason, but this evasion was also rejected by the Bank management. The State Department next put forward the argument that Israel's policy on the refugee issue was in violation of her own pledges. Gaston[4] categorically rejected this argument, too, stating that Israel's actions in no way contradicted Kaplan's earlier declaration before the Bank management.[5]

The State Department finally asserted that in the interests of peace and stability in the Middle East, new agreements should not be negotiated. Gaston at first rejected this argument as well, but in the end he had to give in to the State Department. Gaston and Sauer are both convinced that the U.S. Government has reneged on its pledges to Israel; however, they have no choice but to bow to the State Department's veto on agreements that have not yet been signed.[6] However, the veto notwithstanding, the Bank promises that finalized agreements will not be affected, but adds that only action at the highest political level can lead to the withdrawal of the veto.

Gass requests that, in his contacts with U.S. representatives in Israel, Kaplan refrain from disclosing his knowledge of the above mentioned steps which the Department of State had taken to pressure the Bank. Gass had no objection, however, to Kaplan's revealing his knowledge of the formal political veto by the Department of State. Gass requests that Sharett be apprised of the contents of this telegram.[7]

Notes

1. Oscar Gass, Economic Adviser to the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
2. Telegram from Elath and Gass to Kaplan, W374, [23 August 1949], 93.01/2181/5, informing Kaplan of the veto cast by the Department of State on further implementation of the loan to Israel. (For the loan agreement see Vol. 2, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, p. 178.)
3. Walter Charles Sauer, lawyer, General Counsel of the Export–Import Bank, Washington.
4. Herbert E. Gaston, Chairman of the Export–Import Bank, Washington.
5. Kaplan had been conducting negotiations with the Export–Import Bank prior to the signature of the loan agreement on 17 February 1949.
6. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1062, 1110, 1311–13.
7. For further Israeli activity and its results see Nos. 242–244, 247.

241. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 25 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on his meeting with Rockwell, whom he found less concerned about the international situation. Rockwell expressed his satisfaction with the Israeli delegation's appearance before the Conciliation Commission that morning,[1] saying that it had had a large share in the improvement in relations

with the American delegation since the resumption of the talks. The members of the American delegation submitted reports to this effect to the White House and the State Department, noting that the members of the Israeli delegation have evinced the utmost understanding of American interests in the Middle East and a sincere desire for a settlement of the Palestine issue.

Regarding Jerusalem, Rockwell said that the American delegation had agreed, albeit reluctantly, to France's demand for the appointment of a U.N. official representative in Jerusalem.[2] The U.S., however, does not insist on the internationalization of the city, but would be willing to compromise on this issue. Nonetheless, Rockwell made it clear that at the present stage, the U.S. did not wish a confrontation with France, the Vatican and other Catholic countries. He therefore advised Israel not to oppose the appointment, but to cooperate with the representative "in order not to provoke France and to avoid unnecessary turmoil at the forthcoming Assembly."

Rockwell added that the American position was that the two principal issues of international consequence were the refugees and Jerusalem, while the territorial issue was of secondary importance, concerning as it did only Israel and the Arab states. He advised Israel to rid herself of the illusion that there were any differences of opinion between the White House and the State Department regarding the principle of territorial compensation, and he expressed the hope that this had been unequivocally demonstrated during Elath's recent conversation with McGhee.[3] Rockwell also advised Israel to refrain from mobilizing American Jewry to exert pressure on the White House, as this only increased antisemitism in the U.S. and enmity towards Israel in the State Department.

In Rockwell's estimation, the Conciliation Commission had at the moment no effective role to perform; he said that solely in the interests of "domestic harmony" the American delegation had acceded to de Boisanger's request not to dissolve the Commission and had agreed to hold a number of meetings with the Israeli and Arab delegations on the subject of the Memorandum, and on its territorial section in particular.

Rockwell told Sasson that his private proposal regarding "Rafah's corner"[4] still stood and that he had submitted it in writing to the State Department.

Replying to Sasson's inquiry on the outcome of the State Department's proposal to mediate between Israel and Egypt, Rockwell said that this idea had been shelved in view of the Egyptian Government's negative reply.[5] When Sasson pointed out that those members of the Egyptian Cabinet who had responded negatively had in the meantime been replaced by more moderate ministers,[6] Rockwell agreed that perhaps the State Department's attention should be directed to that fact. Rockwell next posed a number of questions on the situation in Egypt and the Arab countries and expressed his regret at Zaim's murder.[7] He said Zaim had agreed to admit 250,000 refugees.

Sasson took this opportunity to try to convince the State Department that its estimate of the number of refugees in the Gaza Strip was exaggerated. He

quoted the Technical Committee's report[8] which set the figure at no more than 160,000–180,000, but Rockwell said he disagreed with that estimate.

Notes

1. For minutes of the meeting see file 130.02/2441/10.
2. See No. 237.
3. See No. 225.
4. Rockwell proposed to divide the Gaza Strip between Israel and Egypt. Israel would receive the northern part of the Strip up to Khan Yunis while Egypt would take possession of the southern sector up to and including Auja; Eilat would remain under Israeli control. (See Lourie to Sharett, 18 August 1949, 130.02/2444/19 and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1287, 1301.) See also No. 267.
5. See No. 134, n. 2.
6. See No. 175, n. 2.
7. See No. 211, n. 3.
8. See report submitted to the Conciliation Commission on 20 August 1949, 130.02/2441/10.

242. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 25 August 1949

Coded Tel. IWA23; Outg.: 130.09/2308/3

Summary

Even before receiving Elath's telegram,[1] Sharett had cabled him detailed instructions for an immediate interview with Dean Acheson[2] and the President on the subject of the veto on the loan to Israel. He had advised Elath to emphasize that the State Department's step was a blow to the friendship between the two countries and that, should it be made public, the Americans would stand accused of a breach of faith as well as obstruction of Israel's economic consolidation. Sharett also proposed that Elath make it utterly clear that the Americans were grossly underestimating Israel's moral and physical capacity for endurance if they hoped to force a change in Israel's position through suspension of the loan. Their step will only reinforce Arab intransigence and delay the achievement of peace. Israel requests that America reconsider this step before it is made public, thereby causing irreparable harm. Sharett intended to inform Ford[3] of the above that very day.

Notes

1. Elath suggested meeting Acheson on the subject of the suspension of the loan (see No. 240) and making it clear that "the State Department's political veto [was] a serious breach of faith" and would cause harm in Israel and Lausanne. He proposed to approach the President only if he failed with Acheson, stressing that owing to the fundamental importance of the issue he wished to avoid using his personal contacts in the White House, preferring to act through official channels. (Telegram WIA23, 24 August 1949, 93.01/2181/5.)
2. Sharett to Eban, telegram Y301, 25 August 1949, 130.09/2329/13. See also telegram IWA24, 25 August 1949, 130.09/2308/3.
3. Richard Ford, Counsellor at the American Embassy in Israel, deputized at that time for the ambassador, who was on home leave.

243. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 25 August 1949

Coded Tel. WIA26; Recd: 26 August; Outg.: 93.01/2181/5

Summary

Meeting unofficially with McDonald and Niles on 24 August, Elath pointed out the detrimental effects upon U.S.–Israel relations if the suspension of the loan[1] were made public. They both agreed with him, though McDonald tried to make much of the fact that the State Department used the term "suspension" rather than "cancellation" of the loan. He hinted that the decision had been made by junior State Department officials, without the Secretary's knowledge, and that it could possibly be reversed. On 25 August, Niles saw the President, who had known nothing of the whole affair, and who – says Niles – was extremely displeased at not having been consulted on such an important matter.[2] The President promised to give the issue his immediate attention, at which Niles suggested that he consult McDonald, who was due to see him that day.[3].

Notes

1. See Nos. 240 and 242.
2. It appears from documents of the Department of State that as early as June of the same year the Department had recommended to the President to suspend the loan to Israel and the President took a personal decision to that effect on 15 August. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1110, 1311–3, 1332.
3. McDonald told Elath that his attempts to secure the removal of the veto on the loan before the matter reached the stage of formal discussion had been unsuccessful. Nevertheless, during his audience with the President the latter had promised that the matter would "work out". (Elath to Sharett, telegram W377, 26 August 1949, 93.01/2181/5.) Cf. also J. McDonald, *My Mission in Israel*, pp. 186–7.

244. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 25 August 1949

Notes

1. See also No. 240 and Nos. 242 and 243.
2. See Nos. 224 and 237.
3. Cf. report on the conversation in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1328–31.
4. See No. 247.

245. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 26 August 1949 (17.00)

Coded Tel. ET104; Recd: 27 August; Outg.: 130.02/2442/6

Summary

Sasson reports that the Commission decided to discontinue the Lausanne talks

on 15 September. The parties' replies to the Memorandum[1] and subsequent discussions on these replies were to serve as the basis for the Commission's report to the Assembly. De Boisanger is certain that the Americans intend to raise the issue in the Assembly eventually, and accordingly he advises Israel to be politic in her replies to the Memorandum and emphasize clearly her support of the continuation of the talks at Lausanne.

Notes

1. No. 213 (Appendix).

246. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 26 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on the following developments:

(a) At a meeting with the Turkish delegation, Yalçin related that the Americans were angry at the Commission's failure. They were hoping that the Survey Group would help them save face and further their economic plans for the Middle East. The Commission will resume its sessions only when the Survey Group has reported its findings.

(b) Subsequently the Turks raised the question of *de jure* recognition of Israel. Yenisey remarked that, as far as he knew, the decision had already been taken, and that the formal announcement would be made at the conclusion of the Lausanne talks. It has been resolved to dispatch to Israel a Minister and not a Consul-General. Yenisey told Sasson that his Government would be happy to welcome him as Israel's first Minister in Turkey.

(c) Sasson wishes to explain to Sharett the reason for his mistake in having told the Commission[1] that two Arab governments had already given affirmative replies on the issue of family reunification. He had been misled by the second part of the Ministry's telegram No. 588 to the effect that Jordan had not yet replied to the letter of 1 July.[2] From this he had concluded that the other two governments, Egypt and Lebanon, had already replied in the affirmative. Sasson expresses regret for his error which he will attempt to rectify at the earliest opportunity.

Earlier that day he had had the opportunity to censure the Arab states' intransigence at a chance meeting with de la Tour du Pin[3] and Rockwell, who both promised to make the matter known to the Commission's members and to urge them to admonish the Arabs.

(d) Sasson offers an analysis of the Arabs' reasons for preferring to continue the Lausanne talks rather than submit the issue to the Assembly: (1) personal preference; (2) fear – especially on the part of the Mufti's faction – that the debate in the Assembly will be based on the existing state of affairs and hence that the Arabs would lose whatever advantages they might gain

from implementation of the 29 November Resolution; (3) fear that the Assembly would recognize Jordan's annexation of the Arab parts of Palestine; (4) the Arabs' desire not to appear unrealistic in demanding the impossible in the Assembly; (5) the Arabs' awareness that the Commission's resolutions are far from binding and hence may be ignored under certain circumstances; (6) the Arab delegations' preference that the weighty decision of going to the Assembly be taken by the Political Committee of the Arab League rather than by themselves.

Notes

1. On 11 August 1949. See minutes in 130.02/2444/10.
2. See No. 126.
3. Count de la Tour du Pin, Assistant to the French Representative on the Conciliation Commission.

247. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 26 August 1949

Notes

1. See No. 244.
2. On the same day Sauer told Gass the Department of State had decided to withdraw the political veto and had promised that the loan agreements would be implemented regularly. Sauer intimated that the idea of using the political veto had originated with McGhee who had apparently acted on his own and who now retreated from his plan owing to the vigorous pressure by Elath and to the Bank's sympathetic attitude to Israel. (See Gass to Kaplan, N938, 26 August 1949, 130.09/2337/12.) Cf. No. 243, n. 2.
3. Sharett instructed Elath to cancel his projected meeting with Acheson. This instruction was to McGhee's satisfaction but was strongly criticized by Gass who contended that the political advantages accruing from this affair had not been fully exploited. For Sharett's reply to Gass's complaints see his letter to Elath, 19 September 1949, 130.02/2456/10.

248. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 26 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2412/26

Summary

Although he does not wholeheartedly agree with the observation that Britain's attitude towards Israel has improved substantially, Eytan nonetheless thinks that the time has come to prepare public opinion in Israel for a *rapprochement* with Britain. The appointment of a British representative to the Survey Group[1] and the fact that the present American line makes it incumbent on Israel to seek allies wherever they can possibly be found – are factors compelling Israel to speedy action in this matter. In his estimation, preparing public opinion for closer relations with Britain will not be as

difficult as might appear at first sight, but the Government should act with circumspection, mobilizing the Knesset Committee for Foreign Affairs, the press and radio. Eytan hopes that Z. Aharonovitch[2] can be enlisted for this project and also suggests that G. Agron[3] be consulted.

Eytan adds that *de jure* recognition by Britain at this time would be helpful in this matter (''it would put everybody in a good mood'').

Notes

1. See No. 237.
2. Zalman Aharonovitch (Aranne), Chairman of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, Secretary-General of Mapai.
3. Gershon Agron, head of the Information Services in the Prime Minister's Office, Editor of the *Palestine Post.*

249. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 28 August 1949

Telegram; Outg.: 130.02/2441/2

Summary

Sasson reports that, in response to the Commission's Memorandum,[1] the Arab delegations have agreed on a uniform joint reply[2] to include the following points: (a) a demand for the repatriation of all the refugees to their former places of residence; (b) an announcement that Jordan and Syria alone are prepared to absorb those refugees unwilling to return to Israel; Egypt and Lebanon will declare themselves unable to admit even a single refugee; (c) a separate chapter to be devoted to the Galilee and its absorptive capacity; (d) a demand that Israel be required to evacuate all territories occupied by her in violation of the 29 November Resolution, and insistence upon the principle of territorial compensation; (e) a demand for an international regime for Jerusalem and Jaffa and the corridor connecting these two cities, with Jaffa serving as a free port and the corridor as a free passageway for Muslim and Christian pilgrims to Jerusalem; (f) a demand for the cooptation of Arab representatives to the Survey Group; (g) an announcement of their readiness to go to the Assembly. Their reply will be based on the resolutions of 29 November and 12 May,[3] and on international law, and will be phrased in explicit and uncompromising terms.[4].

Notes

1. See No. 213 (Appendix).
2. See memorandum of 29 August 1949 in file 130.02/2447/4.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
4. For explanation of the Arabs' uncompromising attitude see No. 252, para. (e).

250. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 29 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on the situation at Lausanne:

(a) He finds it difficult to understand why there occurred a change for the worse in Egypt's attitude towards Israel as evidenced in the last meeting with Mun'im.[1] One possibility may be the instability of King Faruq's position at the resumption of the Lausanne talks last month. Internally, his government was unrepresentative of the people and it ruled by force of arms; externally, he was at odds with both the Hashemite and the British blocs. During the past month the King succeeded in consolidating his rule; his new coalition government represents all the political trends, and free elections to the Parliament are about to take place; relations with the Hashemites and the British are also improving as evidenced by the following: (a) at the conference of British diplomatic representatives in the Middle East it was resolved that the Arab world should be reunited and recruited to the British cause; this required reaching an understanding with Egypt; (b) the Syrian *coup d'état*[2] had removed Husni al-Zaim and his opposition to the Hashemites and the extension of British influence in the Middle East; his successors viewed the preservation of the *status quo* in the Arab world as their principal task. In these new circumstances, thinks Sasson, Faruq stands to gain nothing from a hasty agreement with Israel, and hence the change in his attitude.

(b) The Saudi Minister of Defence, Emir Mansur, met Hawari at Evian and discussed the Lausanne Conference with him. Subsequently Hawari submitted to him a memorandum [. . . . .][3] in which he dwelt on the uncompromising attitude of the Arab delegations at Lausanne and on the territorial ambitions of their governments. He explained that the Arabs had no alternative but to recognize the facts created in Palestine and to cooperate with Israel "for the good of the refugees" and in the interest of "tranquillity and stability in the entire Middle East".

(c) Replying to the first part of the Commission's Memorandum,[4] Hawari demanded the readmission to Israel of all the refugees wishing to return. Replying to the second part, he demanded that Israel's territory be left at its present extent in order to allow the absorption of a large number of refugees. His reply aroused the anger of the Arab delegations and there were attempts to prevent him from submitting his memorandum.

Notes

1. See No. 232.
2. See No. 211, n. 3.
3. One sentence omitted here.
4. No. 213 (Appendix).

251. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 29 August 1949

Notes

1. Telegram NA44, 29 August 1949, 93.01/2202/1.

252. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 30 August 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on events at Lausanne:

(a) De Boisanger returned reassured from his meeting with Schuman,[1] who had promised to approach Bevin and Acheson and request them not to raise the Palestine issue at the Assembly but instead to influence the Arabs to abandon their intransigent position and be more realistic. Schuman had also agreed with de Boisanger that the Jerusalem issue should not be discussed separately at the forthcoming Assembly and that the appointment of a U.N. representative in Jerusalem to maintain the *status quo* should be considered adequate for the time being. Schuman had promised to instruct Chauvel accordingly.

(b) On 29 August the Conciliation Commission endorsed the Jerusalem Committee's report[2] and resolved to state in the accompanying letter to the U.N. Secretariat that it would be desirable not to raise the Jerusalem issue in the forthcoming Assembly but to postpone it until the Arabs and Israel reach an overall settlement of the Palestine issue. De Boisanger suggested that Eban discuss this subject with the U.N. Secretary-General and plan his moves in accordance with Israel's objectives.

(c) At its meeting on 29 August, the Conciliation Commission resolved to suspend its Lausanne sessions on 15 September, and to use the intervening period to clarify the territorial issues in accordance with the Arab and Israeli replies to its recent Memorandum[3] and to draft the report to the U.N. Secretariat. It was also resolved to resume the Commission's activity in New York on 20 October, and have Azcárate and his staff remove for the recess to Jerusalem to aid the Survey Group and urge it to submit its preliminary report not later than 20 October. At this meeting Porter sounded extremely pessimistic; in his opinion there was no prospect whatsoever of bringing the parties to an agreed settlement.

(d) In reply to Trygve Lie's suggestion that Azcárate be appointed U.N. Permanent Representative in Jerusalem, the Commission announced that it could not possibly dispense with his services and asked that another candidate be proposed.

(e) On 29 August the Arab delegations submitted to the Commission their joint reply to its last Memorandum.[4] Sasson considers the Arabs' reply

absurd, inasmuch as it precludes any further discussion at Lausanne or elsewhere. Hamada gave Sasson two reasons for the Arabs' uncompromising reply: (1) the Arab delegations had been instructed by their governments to submit a uniform reply containing all the territorial claims of each Arab state in maximal form; (2) on the basis of their talks with the Americans, the Arabs were utterly certain that the issue would be referred to the Assembly. Hamada added that the Arab delegations consider the Lausanne episode closed.

Notes

1. Cf. No. 237, last paragraph.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 below.
3. See No. 213 (Appendix).
4. See No. 249 and n. 2 *ibid.*

253. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 30 August 1949

Orig.: 130.20/2479/8

Summary

Elath wishes to supplement the summary of the meeting with Ben-Arzi on 29 August on the subject of Israel's political standing in the U.S. The summary itself is to be delivered to Sharett by Ben-Arzi within the next few days.[1]

(a) It should be emphasized that the assessments presented in the summary are based on mere assumptions, and Ben-Arzi has been requested to exercise restraint in drafting the summary.

(b) The American Government is growing increasingly bellicose and Acheson is being steadily drawn into the compass of the policy of the military circles. The transition from the Marshall Plan to the Atlantic Treaty has linked American policy to a purely military strategy in Western Europe. This makes for a weakening in Israel's position based as it is on American and U.N. public opinion. The President is being increasingly influenced by the Secretary of Defense and accordingly measures of an almost military nature are becoming more acceptable. In Elath's opinion, heavy American pressure on Israel is to be expected and he has good reason to believe that in case of military necessity, the U.S. will not hesitate to use force to compel Israel to abandon her neutrality and place herself entirely at the disposal of the U.S. This information has reached Elath from the same source from which he had obtained the survey of the strategic situation.[2] The Americans have apparently come to the conclusion that war was inevitable and that ''whoever is not with us is against us''.[3]

(c) In spite of what has been said above, there is no assurance that a change in Israeli orientation in favour of the U.S. will immediately and automatically bring about a *volte-face* in American policy towards Israel. However, should Israel abandon her policy of neutrality, her standing with

influential circles in the U.S. and with certain members of the Administration would probably be improved.

(d) Possible disruptive effects on Israel's domestic relationships as a result of the policy changes described above have not been considered here.

(e) Even though Elath does not see a necessary connection between the recent loan crisis[4] and the general attitude of the U.S. Government towards Israel, he thinks that the crisis subsided when it did mainly because McGhee did not want to complicate matters during the second stage of the Lausanne talks. There is no guarantee that a similar crisis will not occur in the future. The groundwork for such an event has already been laid and the State Department's influence upon the President has withstood a severe test, as President Truman's last letter to President Weizmann may show.[5] Israel's position in the U.S. has weakened as a result of a general weakening of the Jewish community and Zionist circles, and the Daniel Frisch affair[6] bears witness to the decline of the Zionist Organization and the Zionist parties.

(f) To summarize, Elath considers it incumbent in the present situation on Israel to modify drastically and improve her relations with the U.S. without a radical reversal of the policy of neutrality which Elath himself considers to be right and justifiable on all accounts. At the moment he pins his hopes on Sharett's forthcoming visit to the U.S., although Sharett's last meeting with the Secretary of State[7] had not brought about any significant change.

Notes

1. See "Summary of views expressed at the meeting of the Embassy staff of [29 August 1949]". The document was meant for the eyes of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister exclusively. (93.08/376/41.)
2. 19 August 1949, 93.01/2181/5.
3. Elath added the last remark after the letter had been delivered, sending the text to Sharett in telegram WIA29, 31 August 1949, 93.01/2202/2.
4. See Nos. 240, 242, 244 and 247.
5. No. 207.
6. Daniel Frisch, President of the American Zionist Organization. Frisch had then made a political move which caused resentment at the Israeli Embassy in Washington: he had cabled Acheson asking for elucidations of the intentions of the U.S. in her policy on the territorial and the refugee issues. He had subsequently been invited to see McGhee from whom he heard reassuring explanations which he then published in the press. Elath resented Frisch's independent actions, fearing that they had aided the State Department's "game of pretence" versus Israel and that they could harm "Israel's vital interests at this critical time" and endanger "the unity of the public activity in America". (See Elath to Frisch, 22 August 1949, 130.02/2389/1; Frisch to Acheson, telegram of 16 August 1949; and undated document containing Frisch's address to the Executive Committee of the Zionist Organization of America on his activity in Washington, 93.08/377/29.)
7. See Vol. 2, No. 477 and n. 5 *ibid.*

254. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 30 August 1949

Memorandum: 130.02/2404/9

Summary

Eban analyses in detail a number of issues which are on the agenda of the U.N. and recommends as to the policy which Israel should adopt in each case.

THE FOURTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1949

Preface

(1) Various reports and surveys have been received lately by the Israeli delegation to the U.N., among them those by J. Robinson, G. Rafael, I. Kenen and N. Robinson;[1] M. Comay has been instructed to prepare a memorandum on the Southwest Africa question and to submit his conclusions simultaneously to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and to the delegation.[2] Among the U.N. Documents received and transmitted to the Foreign Ministry were the U.N. Secretary-General's annual report, the report of the Special Committee on the Balkan countries (UNSCOB), and the report of the Interim Committee on Korea.[3]

(2) The U.S. Government has supplied the delegation with an exhaustive written and oral analysis of solutions the U.S. deems acceptable.[4] The other delegations have not yet been sounded on their governments' opinions, and consequently the various questions are being discussed from their fundamental and general aspect.

A. POLITICAL ISSUES

(a) *The former Italian colonies*

(3) This is undoubtedly the central issue before the Political Committee of the Assembly. The question, as well as Israel's relevant policy at the previous Assembly, were discussed in a paper submitted to the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the end of May.[5] Eban recommends that Israel now oppose the return of Italian rule to Libya, rather than abstain as at the last Assembly, but otherwise abide by the principles then adopted.

THE AMERICAN PROPOSAL

(4) However, vague principles will not suffice when the delegation is called on to take a definite stand on this or that proposal. The American proposals run as follows:

(a) Libya's independence to be granted within 3–4 years, with continued British rule in Libya proper and French rule in the Fezzan in the interim.

(b) A U.N. Advisory Committee to be appointed for the interim period, to function alongside the provisional British and French authorities in order to

supervise the establishment of a Libyan Legislative Council and the transfer of authority to the new Libyan government. The Committee is to be composed of representatives of the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, Egypt, Pakistan and a South American country, as well as two representatives of the local population.

(c) Ethiopia to receive eastern Eritrea with the ports of Asmara and Massawa, which are to have special municipal status in accordance with their higher level of development than that of their surroundings.

(d) Western Eritrea to be annexed to the Sudan either directly or by way of a trusteeship.

(e) Somalia to be placed under Italian trusteeship under the supervision of the Trusteeship Council.

EBAN'S RECOMMENDED ISRAELI POSITIONS ON THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS

(5) (a) Israel will consent to a brief British and French interim rule in Libya, provided these two countries undertake to cooperate with the U.N. Israel will support any reasonable proposal to shorten the interim period.

(b) The Advisory Committee should be of a wide international character and integrate all the elements at the U.N., as were UNSCOP, the Committee on Kashmir and others. Representatives of small and larger nations should also be included. The Committee should enjoy enough authority to implement U.N. resolutions though challenged by the provisional administrative powers.

Some minorities, including a Jewish one, will find themselves under Arab rule in an independent Libya. The Advisory Committee should extract from the local authorities prior commitments regarding the rights of these minorities, such as freedom of language, religion, education and emigration; these commitments are to be incorporated in the statutory laws of the country or in its constitution prior to recognition of its independence by the U.N.

(c) Israel ought to support Ethiopia's claim for an outlet to the sea, but the territory to be annexed in eastern Eritrea should be kept to the required minimum.

(d) Israel should object to the annexation of Eritrea by the Sudan. The U.N. Charter applies to the inhabitants of that region no less than to those of Libya. If Eritrea cannot be awarded immediate independence, an international trusteeship regime should be instituted.

(e) Israel ought to support trusteeship for Somalia, but the local inhabitants should be consulted. Direct U.N. trusteeship is preferable.

(6) The suggested approach is in line with the main elements of the American proposal, while reckoning with the Soviet and Asiatic viewpoints, and should thus be acceptable to both sides.

(7) Israel should insist on direct U.N. trusteeship for Somalia and such parts of Eritrea as are not annexed to Ethiopia, as the nature of the interim regime is of vital importance when the transition period may be extensive.

(8) The Arab states made a number of token proposals for Libya's immediate independence, and the Soviet bloc and the Asian representatives supported them, although in practice all these states acknowledged the need of a transition period under trusteeship or under U.N. supervision. The principle of independence is so vital that Israel may also support similar proposals whenever they are made, while refraining from posturing and welcoming moderate proposals that involve a short transition period.

(9) In the event of an unsatisfactory or flawed comprehensive proposal, Israel must do the utmost to have the defective clauses corrected. A negative attitude must, however, be avoided, since it is highly desirable for the sake of U.N. prestige that a solution be reached in the course of the forthcoming Assembly. Israel's vote should therefore be cast for an arrangement as close as possible to her basic position.

(b) *Greece*

(10) Though the Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) had failed in mediating between Greece and her neighbours, the Conciliation Committee set up during the Paris Assembly with the cooperation of the Soviet bloc had managed to achieve most of its objectives. This leads Eban to the following conclusions:

(a) A mediating body recognized by all the parties is more likely to succeed than one whose mandate is disputed.

(b) Of the remaining unresolved issues, that of the Greek–Albanian border is difficult and complicated. Efforts should therefore be directed at settling the Greek–Bulgarian and Greek–Yugoslav disputes, and to this end the American proposal for three separate mediating bodies commends itself. Once the two milder disputes are settled, the third will be isolated and localized, and will lose its unsettling influence.

Taking up a position on the best method of mediation does not commit Israel to any opinion on the merits of the case.

(c) *Korea*

(11) This is the most difficult problem of all those endangering world peace today, as the real protagonists are the United States and the Soviet Union, and the General Assembly has thus little say in the matter, except whether or not to dissolve the U.N. Commission on Korea. Israel should keep clear of commenting on the merits of the case but support any practical proposal for the continued presence of the U.N. in this sensitive region.

(d) *Southwest Africa*

(12) In the last three years the Assembly adopted two resolutions concerning this region, placed under South African mandate by the League of Nations:

(a) It was resolved that South Africa had to turn the mandatory regime into a trusteeship, similarly to all other mandatory powers of countries which had not attained independence immediately following the Second World War. The South African government refused to carry out this resolution.

(b) It was resolved that, pending settlement of Southwest Africa's future, the government of South Africa was under the obligation to submit annual reports on the situation there. In July 1949 the South African government announced that no further reports would be submitted, as they gave occasion for hostile criticism at the Trusteeship Council.

(13) Though Israel owes a debt of gratitude to South Africa for her constant support, Eban thinks a position critical of South Africa's policy is inevitable for the following reasons:

(a) Israel's own experience with a mandatory power, and her struggle against arbitrary rule by that power, would make it both inconsistent and dishonest to acquiesce in a similar arbitrary regime imposed by South Africa on her ward.

(b) In addition to ethical considerations, one cannot ignore the fact that South Africa means to impose on the population of Southwest Africa the cruel restrictions of Malan's[6] racist policy, and to prevent the establishment of an independent state whose more liberal regime might affect by its example and proximity South Africa's population.

(14) South Africa's policy will probably meet with universal criticism, though manifested in different forms and degrees. The U.S. will reportedly propose taking the case to the International Court of Justice at the Hague; while the practical value of such a move is questionable, Israel cannot but support it or even propose it herself.

(e) *Safeguarding of human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania*

(15) The background of this problem is given in detail in N. Robinson's memorandum. In his own paper several weeks ago, Eban had disputed Robinson's conclusions.

(16) Eban's recommended noncommittal attitude on Israel's part regarding the Mindszenty affair[7] was based not only on practical considerations of relations with the Soviet bloc, but also on an element of uncertainty regarding the trial: there is no proof that this is an infringement of human rights rather than a criminal trial conducted according to Hungarian accepted legal practices. Eban views the affair as an episode in the struggle between the communist regime and the Catholic Church, in which the latter has not been innocent of spiritual coercion over its believers.

Eban therefore recommends total Israeli abstention on this issue, both in the debate and in the voting, though publicly rejecting any argumentation designed to deny the U.N. the right to intervene in any case of infringement of human rights.

(f) *The Indonesia issue*

(17) This issue will apparently not be raised unless the Hague Conference[8] ends in failure and in that eventuality Israel will have to define her position according to the obtaining circumstances.

(g) *Atomic power and disarmament*

(18) Eban sees no basis for Israel's involvement in this debate, except conceivably joining a consensus among the smaller nations in favour of increased efforts at achieving accord among the great powers.

[. . . . .][9]

Notes

1. Nehemiah Robinson, international lawyer, Director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress. The memoranda and the reports are in file 130.02/2404/9.
2. See No. 295 and n. 15 *ibid.*
3. For U.N. Documents A/930, A/935 and A/936 see *GAOR, 4th Sess.*, Supplements Nos. 1, 8 and 9.
4. See memorandum dated 26 August 1949 appended to covering letter from Liverhant to Sharett, 29 August 1949, 130.02/2404/9.
5. Eban to Sharett, 2 June 1949, *ibid.* See Editorial Note, p. 24 above.
6. Daniel Malan, South African Premier and Foreign Minister.
7. Reference is to the trial in Hungary of, and life sentence imposed on, Cardinal József Mindszenty and to the trials in Bulgaria of a number of clerics, which had aroused a stormy debate at the Third Session of the U.N. Assembly. The Assembly had adopted a resolution noting the violation of human and citizenship rights in Bulgaria and Hungary and referring the subject to the Fourth Assembly for further debate.
8. See No. 231, n. 2.
9. Parts (b), (c) and (d) of the Memorandum have been omitted here. Part (b) deals with determining Israel's position on problems of organization touching the forthcoming Assembly, part (c) deals with economic, social and financial problems and part (d) with legal issues.

255. R. Shiloah (Lausanne) to C. de Boisanger (Lausanne). 31 August 1949.

Notes

1. No. 213 (Appendix).
2. See No. 174 and nn. 1 and 2 *ibid.*
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
4. See Vol. 3, Appendix C.
5. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 above.
6. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.

256. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 31 August 1949

Coded Tel. RI155; Inc.: 130.09/2296/9

Summary

Rubin reports on his meeting with Ana Pauker,[1] at which he had been accompanied by Agami. The Rumanian Foreign Minister said she had not replied to Sharett's letter[2] because she had considered it a personal communication requiring no reply, but she had nonetheless communicated its contents to the Government. In reply to Rubin's appeal for free Jewish emigration to Israel, she said there had been a past decision to allow emigration and, as far as she knew, Jews had in fact left for Israel. When Rubin acquainted her with the present situation, she immediately called a person Rubin supposed to be the Secretary-General of the Party, and asked that the issue be put on the agenda of that night's meeting of either the Party or the Cabinet. [. . . . .][3] Rubin suggests that the fact that the interview took place be reported on Israel Radio though without mentioning the subject of the discussion.

Notes

1. For a complete record of the meeting see document dated 13 September 1949 in file 130.02/2457/19.
2. See No. 43 and n. 4 *ibid.*
3. Two sentences omitted here.

257. A. Eban (New York) to T. Lie (New York). 1 September 1949

Notes

1. See No. 205.

258. M. Simon[1] (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 1 September 1949

Copy: 130.02/2412/2

Summary

On the basis of a talk he had with J. Mallah,[2] the Greek Diplomatic Representative in Israel, Simon attempts to analyse Greece's attitude towards Israel. Mallah had given two reasons for Greece's unsympathetic attitude at the U.N.: (a) concern for Greek inhabitants in Middle Eastern countries, and (b) the understanding between Greece and the Arab states whereby the latter would support Greece's special claims, such as the one for territory in southern Albania. Mallah concluded that for these reasons Greece would

refrain from openly supporting Israel and would not extend *de jure* recognition in the near future.

Mallah was endeavouring to oppose the internationalization of Jerusalem through the offices of the Greek Patriarch, whom he was trying to convince that internationalization would strengthen the influence of the Catholic Church on one side and of the Russian Orthodox Church on the other, to the detriment of the Greek Orthodox Church.

[. . . . .][3]

Notes

1. Michael Simon, Chief of Protocol at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Joseph N. Mallah, Diplomatic Representative of Greece in Israel.
3. One sentence omitted here.

259. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 2 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 below.
2. See No. 209 and cf. No. 199 and No. 214, para. 3.
3. See No. 221, n. 3.
4. See No. 254.

260. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 2 September 1949

Notes

1. John Snyder, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury.
2. Sidney Sherwood, Secretary of the Export–Import Bank, Washington; attached to the Economic Survey Mission as financial expert.
3. Emanuel Celler, Member of the U.S. House of Representatives (Democrat).

Editorial Note

Shmuel Eliashiv's tour of the Eastern European countries

S. Eliashiv left on a six-week tour of the Eastern European countries in mid-August, visiting Prague (16–19 August), Budapest (20–23 August), Bucharest (24–28 August), Sofia (29–30 August), Belgrade (31 August–3 September), returning to Prague (4–6 September), then Warsaw (7–12 September) and Moscow (14–28 September). In the course of his journey he met foreign ministers, diplomats and other officials and made a careful study of Israel's relations with the countries of Eastern Europe. He also met leaders

of Jewish communities and representatives of Zionist parties and learned about their living conditions and the problems of emigration to Israel. (The travel diary is in file 130.11/2513/18, and a report on the visit in Poland is in file 130.11/2514/4.)

261. S. Eliashiv (Belgrade) to M. Sharett. 2 September 1949

Coded Tel. JU12; Recd: 3 September; Inc.: 130.09/2298/8

Summary

Eliashiv reports on his tour of Eastern Europe. In Sofia he met the Deputy Foreign Minister and Foreign Ministry high officials, who evinced sincere sympathy for Israel and desire for Israeli diplomatic representation there. They are not inclined to approve the emigration matter already agreed upon and Eliashiv foresees difficulties on that count. More details follow in a letter.[1] In Belgrade he met Bebler,[2] who stressed Yugoslavia's traditional support of Israel and promised that they would this time act independently.[3]

Notes

1. Letter untraced.
2. Aleš Bebler, Yugoslav Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.
3. Cf. No. 269.

262. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 4 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on his talk with Azcárate regarding future activity of the Conciliation Commission and the tasks of the Survey Group.

Azcárate concurred with Sasson that it was pointless to reconvene the Commission before the Survey Group's report was available, and that New York was not the ideal venue for the Commission's deliberations. He argued that the Israelis were misjudging American intentions: the Americans have not yet abandoned their intention to raise the Palestine issue at the next Assembly; but to keep anyone from questioning their motives they are planning to do so (a) by having the Commission reconvene close to Lake Success on a date not too late to prevent the issue from being raised in the Assembly, and (b) by having the Commission come to a complete deadlock shortly after it has reconvened. Both the Israelis and the Arabs have helped the Americans in this last respect through their replies to the Commission's memorandum,[1] particularly regarding the territorial part.

As regards locating the Survey Group in Beirut – a proposal advanced by

the Department of State and likely to be endorsed – Azcárate explained that the West did not want the Survey Group's task to be limited to determining the Arab countries' capacity to absorb refugees; the resettlement of the refugees should also facilitate Western economic and political penetration of the Middle East as part of the plan to contain communism and prepare for a third world war. He hoped Israel would understand this aim and consent to the Survey Group making its headquarters in Beirut.

Sasson concludes that the more the reconvening of the Conciliation Commission is delayed, the longer referral of the Palestine issue to the Assembly will be put off.

Notes

1. See No. 249 and nn. 1 and 2 *ibid.*, and No. 255.

263. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 4 September 1949

Notes

1. François Lefèbvre de Laboulaye, official at the Africa-Levant Department, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; charged with Palestine affairs.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 below.
3. See No. 237, n. 2.
4. In March 1949. See Vol. 2, No. 435.
5. See No. 249.
6. See No. 212, n. 2.
7. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above, and No. 254.

264. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 5 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports on the following:

(a) On receipt of Sharett's telegram LS112[1] he notified Rockwell that Israel was agreeable to the Survey Group being based in Beirut.

(b) Sasson discussed with Rockwell the need to hold off the New York session of the Conciliation Commission until after the Survey Group submitted its report, and Rockwell promised to cable the Department of State to that effect and also to bring the matter for consideration at the next session of the Commission.

(c) Rockwell told Sasson that prior to the conclusion of its work at Lausanne, the Commission would comment on Israel's and the Arabs' replies to its memorandum[2] and would submit proposals to narrow the gap between their approaches and to moderate their territorial claims. The delegations will

then be asked to transmit the Commission's recommendations to their governments, to obviate the need to refer back for further authorization when these come up for discussion in New York. Sasson sees in this American proposal a ploy to bring the talks in New York to an immediate stalemate and thus have the issue referred to the Assembly.

(d) Deliberating with Shiloah and Kollek on action to be taken in the U.S. during the recess in the Commission's work, Sasson advocated concerted effort to keep the Commission from reconvening while the Assembly was in session, or at least to postpone the resumption of the talks as much as possible. Sasson enumerates ways to achieve this and the concomitant advantages to Israel from this line of action.

Notes

1. Sharett advocated Beirut instead of Jerusalem as the seat of the Survey Mission: a Jerusalem base might be interpreted as an indication that the refugees would be resettled in Palestine, while Beirut was an important Arab centre. Moreover, the Mission's members might become too inquisitive about matters concerning Israel if they were located in Jerusalem. (4 September 1949, 130.02/2442/8.)
2. See No. 213 (Appendix) and No. 281.

265. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 5 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/4

Summary

Sasson encloses a letter from the Conciliation Commission dated 5 September transmitted to the Israeli delegation that afternoon together with a draft declaration to be signed by the delegations upon termination of the Lausanne talks [see Main Volume, No. 265, Appendices]. Sasson requests instructions on the reply to be given. He asks whether Israel has reservations concerning the proposed declaration, and whether the delegation should sign it at all considering Israel's recent reply to the Commission's memorandum of 15 August.[1]

Notes

1. See No. 213, Appendix, and No. 255.

Editorial Note

Israel's participation in the Regional Conference of the World Health Organization in Alexandria

The Regional Conference of the World Health Organization was to meet in

Alexandria on 12 September 1949. Israel's participation in the conference created controversy in Egypt and was the subject of protracted discussions between Israel and the U.N. On 29 August, following a stormy two-day debate, the Egyptian Government decided to allow entry to the Israeli delegates. This decision raised a storm in the Egyptian press and intense opposition at the Court. Prior to that decision the question of what passports the Israelis would use to enter Egypt had been debated: the Egyptians refused to recognize Israeli service passports but consented to their substitution by U.N. service passports. A. Eban, E. Sasson and others favoured acceptance of the Egyptian proposal but the Foreign Minister opposed it and only assented after repeated efforts at persuasion by the former and by the U.N. Secretary-General. In the meantime, to counter the Egyptian Government's decision, King Faruq sought postponement of the conference and a change of venue. Israel was agreeable, and the conference ultimately convened at Geneva on 12 October 1949. (For material on this subject see file 130.02/2405/8.)

266. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 5 September 1949

Notes

1. Eytan instructed Eban to accept the Secretary-General's proposal, but only against an undertaking that Israel's representatives would not be subject to any discrimination at the conference; should this occur, the conference would be immediately suspended by authority of the U.N. (telegram Y332, 7 September 1949, 130.09/2329/13).

267. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 6 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Sasson reports that earlier that day Rockwell told him he had been charged by the Commission with the task of persuading the Arab and Israeli delegations to sign the joint declaration on the refugee issue.[1] He claimed that with the declaration the U.S. Government could obtain refugee relief funds from Congress and the U.N. for several additional months prior to final resettlement. Sasson replied that his government would probably have comments on the draft declaration and asked about the Arab position. Rockwell said his impression was that the heads of the Arab delegations were not too eager to sign the joint declaration, lest this be construed as agreement on their part to separate the refugee from the territorial issue. They too referred the matter to their governments.

Rockwell declared that refusal by either of the parties to sign the proposed declaration would compel the Commission to issue its own statement on the positions of both parties as given in their replies to the Commission's memorandum of 15 August.[2]

Further on Rockwell wanted Sasson's off-the-record personal opinion on what was best for Israel – continuation of the *status quo* or peace with the Arabs. Sasson answered that peace was more vital for the Arabs than for Israel and the Arabs should therefore pay its price. He declared that Israel would under no circumstances contemplate unilateral territorial concessions, but would be prepared to enter into negotiations based on reciprocal concessions and equal benefits for both sides. This concept stood at the base of Israel's readiness to discuss Rockwell's suggestion regarding Israeli–Egyptian exchange of territory in the Gaza–Rafah–Auja area.[3] Rockwell said he understood this attitude but contended that it did not apply equally to each and every Arab state – Jordan and Egypt, for instance, could compensate Israel but Syria and Lebanon had nothing to offer. Sasson replied that compensation need not necessarily be territorial in character and other possibilities could be sought. He added that peace need not be signed simultaneously with all of Israel's neighbours: the Arab manoeuvre of appearing as bloc should be thwarted.

Sasson consented to Rockwell's request for permission to report on this conversation to the Department of State.

Notes

1. See No. 265, Appendix B.
2. No. 213 (Appendix) and Nos. 249 and 255.
3. Cf. No. 241 and n. 4 *ibid.*

268. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 6 September 1949

Notes

1. Henri Vigier.
2. Reference is to the settlement on their land of Kibbutz Ha'On.
3. See Vol. 3, Nos. 343 and 345, and Appendix I, article 5, para. 5.
4. Eban replied that the matter could not be brought before the Security Council as long as it did not constitute a threat to the peace or repudiation of an agreement. He suggested urging Riley to replace Vigier as Chairman with somebody not hostile to Israel, and said he would try to have Bunche endorse the Israeli interpretation of his proposal, viz., evacuation of all Syrian police forces from the demilitarized zones and full restoration of normal civilian life. (Eban to Sharett, telegram X545, 9 September 1949, 130.09/2337/12.)

269. M. Ishai[1] (Belgrade) to M. Sharett. 6 September 1949

Coded Tel. JU15; Recd: 7 September; Inc.: 130.09/2298/8

Summary

Ishai reports on his meeting with Marshal Tito,[2] who led off with questions

on Israel's economic situation, the prospects for a settlement of the Jerusalem issue and relations with the Arab states. After being briefed on these matters, Tito described the situation in his country and said that a strong Yugoslav delegation would be sent to the U.N. and would this time act independently. He expressed the hope for deeper friendship between Israel and Yugoslavia, with special emphasis on commercial relations.[3]

Ishai adds that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' telegram of the 5th[4] had been received shortly before the interview with Tito, which was arranged rather unexpectedly. He had inserted the instruction "Urgent" in the coded text on Eliashiv's advice.

Notes

1. Moshe Ishai, Israeli Minister to Yugoslavia.
2. For full report of the meeting see Ishai's letter to Sharett, 7 September 1949, 130.11/2494/4.
3. Negotiations on a commercial agreement with Yugoslavia were then being launched. See Ishai to Meron, telegram JU16, 6 September 1949, 130.09/2298/8.
4. UJ15, 5 September 1949, 130.09/2298/7. Sharett complained that cables from the Legation came with delay and suggested that the degree of urgency be given uncoded in the address and not within the coded text.

270. A. Drapkin (Tel Aviv) to the Israeli Legation in Buenos Aires. 6 September 1949

Notes

1. Pablo Manguel, Argentine Minister to Israel.

271. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 7 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

De Boisanger expressed regret that Sasson would not attend the second stage of the conciliation talks in New York, indicating that the Commission's members construed this as an Israeli attempt to obstruct the Commission's work. Sasson argued that he did not believe in an imposed solution and would not cooperate with those intent on bringing this about.

De Boisanger declared that he and his Government were doing all they could to keep the issue from being raised in the U.N. Assembly; he had ensured that Schuman's speech before the Assembly would denote French support for an agreed solution and opposition to any move for renewed debate or new resolutions in the Assembly.[1] The Americans, added de Boisanger, were for referring the issue to the Assembly, in the hope that this would force

Israel to surrender territory and the Arabs to sign peace agreements with Israel. Israel had to cooperate with the Commission if she wished to avert this.

De Boisanger then reverted to his contention that there were certain territorial concessions Israel had to make as the price of a peace settlement, and referred to the Syrian claim to border modifications up to the River Jordan, which France favoured.

Sasson dismissed any possibility whatsoever of Israel acceding to the Syrian demands and asked de Boisanger to tell his Government that the Syrians could not be bought at Israel's expense. De Boisanger explained that French interests in the Middle East dictated accommodation with the Arabs, but that this indeed should not be achieved at Israel's cost, and agreed to Sasson's suggestion that France and Israel enter on a serious dialogue on the subject of their interests in the Middle East.

Sasson concludes by voicing fears that renewed discussion of the Palestine issue at the Assembly will aggravate relations between Israel and the Arab world, while continuation of the Commission's work would prevent radicalization of the Arab position.

Notes

1. See No. 263, last paragraph, and cf. No. 307 and n. 3 *ibid.*

272. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 7 September 1949

273. J. Herzog (Tel Aviv) to D. Ben-Gurion and M. Sharett. 7 September 1949

Copy: 130.02/2451/4

Summary

Herzog summarizes recent activity on the question of Jerusalem:

(1) Close relations have been established during the last few months with representatives of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of the Old City, designed to convince them that internationalization of Jerusalem would lead to increased Catholic influence in the city. At the last meeting they concurred with this view and declared themselves ready to fight internationalization with all the means at their disposal. Given their connections in Arab countries, they cannot come out openly against the plan, but they undertook not to contest Israel's assertion, on some future suitable occasion, that the Christian world as a whole was not necessarily in accord with the Vatican on this matter and that the Greek Orthodox Church had not expressed itself in favour of internationalization. They also promised to notify Athens and Washington of their strong opposition to the plan.

(2) As to the Vatican, recent reports indicated that the rift between the Secretariat of State and the Congregation for the Eastern Churches regarding the Jerusalem question has not been bridged. The Secretariat of State considers internationalization of Jerusalem a last opportunity for Christian interests to get a foothold in the Middle East. When Herzog last met McMahon before his departure,[1] the latter voiced the Vatican's fears for the future of Christianity in the Middle East as a result of the Pan-Islamic movement. They are also apprehensive of a possible change of regime in Israel which might lead to an accounting with Christianity. On the other hand, the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, headed by Cardinal Tisserant, fears the isolation that might ensue from a diminished Christian rule in internationalized Jerusalem, and would risk the absence of a secure base as long as Christianity is not regarded as an alien element in the Middle East. Herzog and his colleagues have encouraged Vergani[2] and Hakim to adopt Tisserant's point of view by offering them certain concessions,[3] and approached the Maronites to lend their support to this end.

(3) King Abdallah's visit to Spain is apparently also connected with the Jerusalem issue. Spain wishes to restore Spanish religious interests in the Holy Land. A new Spanish Consul-General[4] has been dispatched to Jerusalem and the Director of the Middle East Department in the Spanish Foreign Ministry is suspected of being at present in Jerusalem posing as a journalist. As Abdallah is the only Arab ruler who has not espoused the internationalization plan, Spain may conceivably be trying to win him over to the general Arab position, perhaps by offering to enthrone one of his line in Morocco and thus greatly enhance his influence.

Spain's intervention in Jerusalem would afford the Vatican a more reliable ally than France, mainly preoccupied with her own interests, or Italy, currently at odds with the Vatican on the question of the former Italian colonies; it might also influence the Latin American countries.

Herzog advocates neutralizing the Spanish gambit by coming to a direct agreement with France.

Notes

1. See No. 179.
2. Antonio Vergani, Vicar-General of the Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem for the Galilee; Special Representative in Israel of the Apostolic Legate for Palestine.
3. See No. 93.
4. Don Antonio de Cierra y Levita, the Duke of Terranova.

274. E. Sasson (Lausanne) to M. Sharett. 8 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

At a parting meeting, Abd al-Mun'im told Sasson that he planned to retire from civil service and devote himself to writing a book on the problem of Palestine, which, he assured, would be "100% objective". He was willing to return home by way of Paris, unless otherwise instructed by his Government, and meet Sharett there.

Abd al-Mun'im severely criticized the members of the Conciliation Commission who had never manifested neutrality but instead promoted their own governments' interests. He was also resentful at the heads of the other Arab delegations who had neglected the work at Lausanne and had then voted to move the conference to New York, knowing it might imply an imposed solution, solely for their personal pleasure. He accused the Americans of posing everywhere as masters and saviours of the world, while they were actually set on world domination and subjugation to the dollar. Abd al-Mun'im excoriated the Survey Group for their concealed imperialistic designs, and also the leaders of the Arab states for their refusal to acknowledge defeat in the war with Israel and for their lack of political maturity by advancing absurdly extreme demands as a reward for their rout. He declared he did not want to be a party to "such a decadent or aberrant policy". He also criticized Israel for "paying lip service" to the cause of peace and "appearing everywhere as a self-confident conqueror", and claimed that Israel did not even try to fathom the severity of the blow sustained by the Arab countries and was not seeking the required remedy.

Abd al-Mun'im agreed with Sasson that it was best to put off renewal of the Conciliation Commission's activity in New York, thus preventing debate on the Palestine issue at the Assembly certain to exacerbate relations between Israel and the Arab world. His proposal to convene the Commission only when the Survey Group had concluded its work had been turned down by the members of the Commission and by the heads of the Arab delegations. Abd al-Mun'im hopes to convince his Government to procrastinate in accepting the Commission's invitation to come to New York and to try and persuade the Arab states to come around to the same view.

Abd al-Mun'im conceded that the Arabs had put in exaggerated territorial claims in their replies to the Commission's memorandum of 15 August,[1] but asserted this was not their last word, at any rate not that of Egypt. He promised to transmit to his Government Sasson's proposal for continuation of private talks in Paris, parting from Sasson with manifestations of sincere friendship and pledges of abiding good will.

Notes

1. See No. 249.

275. Meeting: Y.H. Levin – H. Evatt (Canberra, 8 September 1949)

Notes

1. Yehuda Harry Levin, Israeli Consul-General – and from November 1949 Chargé d'Affaires – in Australia, and Consul-General in New Zealand.
2. John W. Burton, Permanent Head of the Australian Department of External Affairs.
3. Cf. Editorial Note, p. 181 below.
4. John Hood, Australia's Permanent Representative at the U.N.
5. Keith Shann, member of the Australian delegation to the U.N.
6. Reginald Pollard, Australian Minister of Commerce and Agriculture.

276. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 8 September 1949

Coded Tel. IP208; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Eytan instructs Namir to continue contacts with the Ethiopian Minister.[1] Israel had asked the Emperor of Ethiopia for recognition several days after the establishment of the State,[2] and implicitly reiterated the request in a cable on 11 March apprising him of the election of the President and the formal installation of the Government. No reply to these cables had been received. Namir should now indicate to the Minister that Israel will greatly appreciate his Government's recognition, and also point out that Israel had allowed the Ethiopian Consul in Jerusalem to function normally after the inception of the State as a mark of friendship towards his country.[3]

Notes

1. Namir reported on his meeting with the Ethiopian Minister to Moscow, B.T. Shoumiye, at which he had raised the issue of Ethiopia's recognition of Israel. The Minister was most sympathetic towards Israel, saying, *inter alia*, that "there was no serious reason for his Government's failure" to recognize Israel and that "there had been a misunderstanding caused by random and trivial factors". He described himself as a personal friend of the Emperor and offered to approach him directly regarding recognition. Namir asked him to delay his approach until he could supply him with authoritative and suitably formulated material. (See Namir to Sharett, telegram PI234, 3 September 1949, 130.09/2325/4.)
2. See Vol. I, No. 12, n. 1.
3. For a further meeting with the Ethiopian Minister see No. 397.

277. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 9 September 1949

Coded Tel. WIA30; Recd: 10 September; Outg.: 93.01/2181/6

Summary

Elath reports having been summoned to the Department of State, where he

met Hare and Stabler.[1] He was accompanied by Keren.[2] Hare announced receipt of a secret communication from Lausanne apprising him of the Israeli Government's intention to transfer additional ministries and institutions to Jerusalem, and thus create *faits accomplis* before the General Assembly convenes.[3] Should that be true, Hare added, it would have detrimental effects on the endeavours of the U.S. and the Conciliation Commission to solve the problem of Jerusalem.

Elath deemed the report groundless, but promised to convey the warning to his Government.[4] His impression was that the report from Lausanne had caused serious concern at the Department of State.[5]

Notes

1. Wells Stabler, American Chargé d'Affaires in Jordan, later assigned to the Egypt and Sudan desks in the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs at the Department of State.
2. Moshe Keren, Counsellor at the Israeli Embassy in Washington.
3. Cf. No. 192, para. 5.
4. In an angry and caustic reply Sharett instructed Elath to tell his American interlocutors that their accusations against Israel were undignified and that Israel had no intention of confronting the Assembly with a *fait accompli*. At the same time he informed Elath that the Cabinet had taken a decision in late August to transfer three ministries to Jerusalem, and that the move was being implemented very slowly so that actually only a number of departments had so far been transferred to the capital. (IW208, 18 September 1949, 130.09/2308/4.)
5. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1366–7.

278. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 11 September 1949

Notes

1. The telegram dealt with the reopening of the oil refineries at Haifa (6 September 1949, 93.01/2202/2).
2. See No. 221, n. 3.

279. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 11 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2428/1

Summary

Eytan is concerned about the steadily worsening crises in three of the four Mixed Armistice Commissions, caused mainly by unilateral actions on the Israeli side. He cites the cases of Baqa al Gharbiya, Wadi Fukin and Samra, which had afforded the other side the opportunity to complain against Israel. In the majority of cases the facts had constrained the Chairmen to vote with the Arabs, to the detriment of Israel's image. Eytan wonders who has been

responsible for these actions and whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been consulted on their possible political repercussions. He is afraid that an accumulation of such incidents will ultimately militate against Israeli interests, which dictate that Israel demonstrate to the U.N. that the armistice agreements had bestowed stability on this area. How can Eban – asks Eytan with concern – defend the armistice agreements at the U.N. when Israel herself keeps violating them?

280. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Eliash (London). 11 September 1949

Draft:[1] 130.02/2408/9

Summary

Sharett reacts to Eliash's memorandum of 2 September[2] dealing with Israel's policy towards the Eastern and Western blocs:

(a) Israel cannot identify explicitly with the West owing to problems of emigration from the Eastern bloc countries.

(b) Deviation from the policy of non-identification with the West would strike the Jews of Eastern Europe as total abandonment by Israel, while to the Jews of Soviet Russia it would signify a step towards the inexorable severance of their spiritual link with Israel.

(c) Alignment with the West would be an act of ingratitude towards the Soviet Union and its allies who had assisted Israel at critical stages. Israel is still in need of whatever help she can find. The British position as manifested at the U.N. and the Department of State's policy on the crucial issues of borders and refugees only underscore the need of continued international Soviet support.

(d) A shift toward the West would bring about a severe domestic crisis which in turn would also affect Israel's foreign policy; everything possible should be done to avert such a crisis.

Eliash may cite the first three arguments in talks with trustworthy people, but should carefully avoid mention of the last one. He may also stress in such talks that Israel's democratic character places it within the family of Western nations, but at the same time he should explain that a policy of non-alignment is the only right course for Israel during the initial period of the state's consolidation. Israel's vital interests militate against involvement in the "cold war"; additionally, as a member of the United Nations, Israel must not despair of the possibility of preventing the outbreak of hostilities.

In conversations with reliable people Eliash should explicitly acknowledge the importance of the Atlantic Treaty, of the reconstruction of Western Europe, and of demonstrations of armed might as a deterrent against the Soviet Union, but should emphasize that Israel is opposed to a preemptive attack by the West.

As regards attempts to draw certain analogies between the Soviet Union

and Nazi Germany, Sharett dwells on the basic differences between the two regimes and their respective leaders. He hopes that stabilization of relations between East and West, which will come when the spread of communism is contained and no additional countries turn into ''popular democracies'', will reduce the risk of war and perhaps eliminate it altogether. If war does break out, Israel will not remain neutral, but there is no need to enunciate policy in advance of eventualities.

In conclusion Sharett argues that the only effective step to counter Sovietization of the Middle East would be the initiation of extensive development projects for the region. Any attempt to undermine Israel's strength should be decried as weakening such development efforts. The Arabs, says Sharett, will always ally with the stronger side, and their present opposition to communism is based on the ruling classes' fear of a communist regime, while the opposition to communism in Israel has deep and fundamental roots.

Notes

1. The concluding section of the draft has not been traced, nor has the final version dispatched to Eliash; see, however, No. 292, n. 2.
2. The memorandum is in file 130.02/2408/9.

281. Note by the Conciliation Commission to the Israeli Delegation in Lausanne. 12 September 1949

Notes

1. A similar communication was dispatched on the same day to the Arab delegations (130.02/2442/4).
2. Nos. 213 (Appendix) and 255.
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. The letter is in file 130.02/2441/2.
5. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
6. The third signature, presumably that of the French representative, is illegible.

282. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 12 September 1949

Notes

1. B. Shiva Rao, member of the Indian delegation to the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. No. 100.
3. For Nehru's scheduled visit to the U.S. see No. 317, and see also No. 342.

283. J. Tsur (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 12 September 1949

Report: 130.02/2383/3

Summary

Tsur reports on his conversations with the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and with the Deputy Minister, first commenting on the nature of the relationship between Grunberg[1] and the former Foreign Minister,[2] and on the changes he has been trying to introduce since his appointment as Minister to Argentina. He then describes the new Foreign Minister [. . . . .],[3] who stated frankly that the final word on foreign policy was the President's.

The Foreign Minister expressed personal sympathy with Israel's goals and promised that his Ministry would remain supportive of Israel in future. He showed interest in commercial ties with Israel, undertaking to promote the Israeli view that it was important to open the Israeli market to Argentinian products by means of a commercial treaty. He concurred with Israel's policy regarding direct negotiations with the Arab states, unhindered by the powers, but did not react to Tsur's remarks on the refugees and on Jerusalem.

From his talk with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs [. . . . .][4] Tsur had the impression that though he was willing to promise a great deal, his powers were limited. He was very courteous and full of admiration for Israel's achievements. He subscribed to Israel's assessment that a prolonged debate on the Palestine issue at the forthcoming Assembly was futile and that the Jews and the Arabs should be allowed to reach agreement by themselves. He also upheld Israel's position on Jerusalem and hoped his Government's endorsement would be forthcoming; he requested a memorandum on this subject.

The Deputy Minister asked Tsur to convey to the Government of Israel Argentina's views on the subject of the Italian colonies,[5] as follows: (a) Argentina is for recognition of the colonies' right to independence, to be granted within two or three years; (b) pending independence, the colonies should be governed by a group of European states to include Britain and Italy; (c) in that context, Italy should be awarded special privileges. Tsur responded by saying that Israel shared Argentina's sympathy for Italy.

Notes

1. Carlos Grunberg, Legal Adviser at the Israeli Legation in Buenos Aires; in charge of Israel's affairs in Argentina prior to the establishment of the Legation.
2. Juan A. Bramuglia, Argentina's former Foreign Minister.
3. Five words omitted here.
4. One sentence omitted here.
5. See Editorial Note, p. 24 above, and No. 254.

Editorial Note

The Conciliation Commission's Plan for the Establishment of an International Regime for Jerusalem

The Jerusalem Committee of the Conciliation Commission published its plan for an international regime for Jerusalem on 13 September 1949. It recommended partition of Jerusalem into two demilitarized zones, Jewish and Arab, with extensive administrative autonomy for each zone, as well as the establishment of four governing bodies: a Commissioner, to be appointed by the U.N., who would supervise the Holy Places, demilitarization, and human rights; a 14-member mixed Council, appointed partly by the zonal authorities and partly by the Commissioner, to deal with administrative and development matters common to both zones; an International Tribunal; and a Mixed Tribunal, representing the two communities.

The plan had been submitted to the U.N. Secretary-General on 1 September, and several days later a copy was handed to the Israeli representatives at Lausanne.

(See U.N. Document A/973, Draft Instrument Establishing a Permanent International Regime for the Jerusalem Area, *GAOR, 4th Sess., AHPC, Annex I,* pp. 10–14. See also file 130.02/2447/4.)

284. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 13 September 1949

Notes

1. 13 September 1949, 93.03/69/21. Sharett requested urgent dispatch of a draft of Israel's reaction to the Jerusalem Plan.
2. Eban's draft arrived late in Israel, and in the meantime the Government spokesman issued on 14 September Israel's initial reaction to the plan. It stated, *inter alia,* that "although this plan differs in certain respects from previous proposals for an international regime in Jerusalem, it still retains concepts shown by experience and practice to be unworkable and it appears to ignore the fundamental problem of sovereignty, without a satisfactory solution to which there will be no stable arrangement in Jerusalem". The plan, it said, "includes a number of specific provisions which neither the Government of Israel nor the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem could conceivably accept". Any "arrangement designed to sever, to whatever degree, Jewish Jerusalem from the living body of the State of Israel will be foredoomed". (See *Davar,* 14 September 1949.) An official reaction to the plan was issued on 16 September – see No. 293.

285. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 13 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. Sharett replied that at first glance he saw difficulty in Israeli sponsorship of the proposal, which – unless tied up with a demand for an international regime in the Old City – might involve Israel in express acceptance of Arab sovereignty there (Y258, 16 September 1949, 130.09/2329/13).

286. S. Eliashiv (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 13 September 1949

Coded Tel. BI71; Recd: 14 September; Inc.: 130.09/2306/4

Summary

Eliashiv and Barzilai met the Polish Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wierblowski, who accused Israel of falling increasingly under American influence, of organizing her army on the American model, of discriminating against officers of Polish origin and generally against immigrants from Eastern Europe, of oppressing Arab communists, and of taking adverse positions in the Trade Union movement. Barzilai and Eliashiv refuted his accusations, whereupon Wierblowski conceded that Israel's particularly complex position dictated a neutral and independent policy.

Barzilai's meetings with Sluczanski,[1] Director of the Foreign Ministry's Eastern Division, and with Kotyn, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, were of lesser import.[2]

Notes

1. Original erroneously has: "Nluczanski".
2. See report on Eliashiv's visit to Warsaw in file 130.11/2514/4.

287. E. Elath (Washington) to W. Eytan. 14 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2420/10

Summary

Elath reviews the affair of the political veto on the loan to Israel, first noting that the officials of the Export–Import Bank had behaved throughout with extreme rectitude, courageously withstanding all sorts of pressure exerted by the Department of State;[1] the Chairman of the Bank's Executive should be particularly commended on that count.

As to the sequence of events:

(1) The decision to suspend the loan had apparently been taken by the Department of State immediately or very soon after the 29th of May. The threats regarding the territorial and refugee questions contained in the note of 29 May[2] had doubtless been seriously meant. Discussions between the Department of State and the Bank began in June, soon after the dispatch of the said note.[3]

(2) Israel's readiness to admit 100,000 refugees eased the pressure for a while, but as soon as it became clear that the Arabs would not settle for that number, the Department of State renewed and increased the pressure both on Israel and on the Bank. Had the Bank not stood firm, the Department of State would have carried out its scheme shortly after McGhee's first announcement to Elath.[4] It is thus clear that the whole plan did not originate overnight and

that the State Department's efforts to implement it were closely tied with developments at Lausanne since the 29th May.

(3) Upon arrival from Lausanne Porter found in Washington an atmosphere of hostility to Israel: "We always said we could not expect of the Jews willingness to cooperate with us and a desire for peace", he was told by the people of the Near East Division. The promoters and drafters of the 29 May note found in the Lausanne crisis an additional opportunity to bring things to a still more serious crisis. It was presumably then that President Truman's letter to President Weizmann was drafted,[5] and Truman's endorsement of the letter convinced the Department that the White House was behind them. The veto came at about the same time, as the State Department's ultimate weapon in exercising authority over the Bank's Executive.

.(4) Porter's idea of the Survey Group caused confusion at the Department of State, as it lowered tensions and cooled tempers. His plan to precede political negotiations with economic negotiations was at odds with the Department's prevalent views. Even McGhee, the initiator of the development plans for the Middle East, did not hide his disappointment at Porter's recommendations which were approved by both the President and the Secretary of State *against* the advice of the Near East Division. This demonstrates the degree to which McGhee is captive of his advisers in the Division, not free to act even in the field of the development policy named after him.

[. . . . .][6]

(9) The following conclusions emerge from these events:

(a) The note of 29 May was part of a well thought out and detailed plan, and but for the Bank's firm opposition the loan would have presumably been suspended prior to Porter's arrival. The facts show a lack of coordination at the Department of State, because the veto was announced at the very moment that Israel's readiness to cooperate with the Survey Group was reported from Lausanne. This announcement made it impossible for McGhee to insist on exercising the veto and it was he, in Elath's opinion, who finally decided to revoke it.

(b) There is no doubt that McGhee had played a central role in the whole affair. At a subsequent luncheon with him[7] Elath carried away the definite impression that McGhee had taken the matter personally, and this was also evident by his obvious relief at the cancellation of Elath's meeting with Acheson, which probably saved him a deal of personal embarrassment. Elath thinks this experience will not necessarily make McGhee a friend of Israel; he may well join the ranks of those in the Department of State who still rankle at the "discomfiture" Israel caused them by not being defeated in the war.

(c) The veto fiasco should not be taken as a sign of a general shift in the State Department's policy towards Israel, as it was merely the result of fortuitous circumstances. The present "truce" will last only until Israel's reaction to the Survey Group's recommendations is known. In Elath's opinion, the Department of State expects no miracles from the Survey Group and they are eagerly awaiting the day they can unfold the Lausanne story at the

Assembly, in the expectation that they will fare better on the Palestine issue than they did in the past.

(d) Nevertheless, Elath recommends exploiting the loan affair in order to mend relations with McGhee and his assistants.

(e) The most urgent conclusion to be drawn is that the balance of the loan must be immediately put to use. A friend of Elath's at the Department of State told him that miracles do not happen every day, and if Israel does not hurry she might be the loser by millions of dollars.

(f) Elath finds satisfaction in the fact that Israel refrained from using unofficial connections to exert pressure on the White House or on the Department of State in this affair. He thinks Israel's image has improved, she having held her ground and conducted herself with dignity and without resort to outdated methods.

(g) Elath remarks on the utter secrecy with which the entire affair has been handled, which prevented unnecessary complications.

Notes

1. See No. 240 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. No. 42.
3. Cf. No. 240, n. 5, and No. 243, n. 2.
4. See No. 194.
5. See No. 207 and n. 1 *ibid.*
6. Paragraphs 5–8, dealing with the sequence of events as presented in Nos. 240, 242, 243, 244 and 247 and in the notes to these documents, have been omitted here.
7. See No. 247.

288. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 14 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above, and No. 284, n. 2.
2. No. 284.
3. Sharett was surprised at Eban's ''apparent confusion'' and explained he preferred that the official announcement due to be published in the press on September 16 be couched in stronger terms than the Government spokesman's statement – ''crescendo [is] more effective than diminuendo'' (see No. 293, and Sharett to Eban, telegram Y257, 15 September 1949, 130.09/2329/13; for Eban's reply [''crescendo working''] see telegram 1349, 15 September 1949, 93.03/69/21).

289. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 14 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above, and No. 284.
2. Reference is to the Mexican representative's election to membership in the Economic and Social Council of the U.N.
3. See No. 254, para. 4.
4. *Ibid.*, paras. 5–9.

290. S. Eliashiv (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 14 September 1949

Coded Tel. BI72; Recd: 15 September; Outg.: 130.09/2306/4

Summary

Eliashiv reports on the considerable uncertainty affecting the Jewish community in Poland in anticipation of large-scale emigration to Israel, having its roots mainly in adverse reports coming from Israel. He emphasizes that the country's success in absorbing the first groups of immigrants will influence those that follow, and in case of failure Israel's endeavours for immigration from other countries will be adversely affected. He asks that special attention be paid to the immigrants from Poland, and to their speedy housing and employment: "This is a very serious matter", he warns, and all the parties concerned, including the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut, should be notified accordingly.

291. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 15 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
2. Abraham Feller, General Counsel and Director of the Legal Department, U.N. Secretariat.
3. Nos. 285 and 289.

292. D. Ben-Gurion [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 15 September 1949

Copy: I.M.D.E.A. 230.72/896

Summary

Ben-Gurion recommends that Sharett, in his reply, formulate Israel's policy as follows:[1]

(a) Regarding the great world controversies, Israel is neither passive nor neutral. Ideologically, she is democratic and anti-communist. Politically, she favours peace and cooperation between the democratic world and the communist countries.

(b) In periods of peace Israel should not side in advance with the democratic community: (1) This would not serve the cause of peace. (2) The democratic bloc does not guarantee the State's vital interests in the spheres of immigration, security, borders, Jerusalem, relations with the neighbouring countries.

(c) Israel's espousal of political independence in the international arena does not mean she will stand idle should there actually be a totalitarian assault on democracy.

Israel has refrained from involvement in the Cold War for reasons of vital importance to the State and in the hope that peace can be maintained.[2]

Notes

1. Ben-Gurion comments here on the preliminary version of Sharett's letter to Eliash (No. 280) which had been submitted to him for perusal prior to final drafting.
2. Sharett replied that most of Ben-Gurion's formulations had been incorporated in his letter to Eliash, except for the one in para. b(2), which he thought could be construed as a gambit for negotiating Israel's alignment with the Western bloc in return for aid and guarantees in all matters referred to in Ben-Gurion's letter (19 September 1949, I.M.D.E.A., 230.72/896).

293. Statement delivered by M. Sharett at a Press Conference (Tel Aviv, 16 September 1949)

Notes

1. The statement, containing Sharett's official reaction to the Conciliation Commission's Jerusalem Plan, was published in the press on the following day (see Editorial Note, p. 181 above, and No. 284 and n. 2 *ibid.*).

294. M. Keren (Washington) to M. Comay. 19 September 1949

Notes

1. Comay had instructed Elath to ask the State Department to appeal to the Iranian Ambassador in Washington on behalf of Jewish refugees from Iraq then being turned back by the Iranian border guards (93.01/2202/2).
2. See No. 94.
3. Abbas Seyghal, representative of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Israel.
4. William Burdett, the U.S. Consul in Jerusalem.
5. See No. 375.

295. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv): Information to Israeli Missions Abroad. 19 September 1949

Circular: 130.02/2404/9

Summary

The circular seeks to define recommended positions for the forthcoming U.N. Assembly. Eban's and Rafael's memoranda[1] with their views on the various matters to be dealt with by the Assembly had been brought in full in *Information for Members of the Cabinet*, No. 56. Differences of opinion on several issues have elicited the subjoined reservations and comments on the recommendations by Israel's U.N. representatives.

The former Italian colonies

(1) (a) In his letter to Sharett of 13 September 1949[2] Ginossar quotes

Count Zoppi, Director of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Zoppi had told Ginossar that same day that Italy was seeking support of various member states, including Israel, for her newly formulated proposals, and Ginossar presumes the reference was to states that had abstained at the voting on that subject at the former U.N. Assembly, including Sweden and Turkey.

(b) These are the Italian proposals, as listed by Zoppi:

Eritrea. Territorial integrity and immediate independence following provision of a constitution and other preliminaries by an international commission, on which Italy would be represented. In the interim the country would be governed by the British. Britain, however, opposes this proposal, insisting on partition and annexation of a large area to Ethiopia. Italy in turn strongly objects to this, but would concede an outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, without partition.

Tripolitania. Independence in two years' time, with interim British administration supervised by an international commission to include Italy. Italy wants the U.N. resolution to include a clause providing for negotiations between an independent Tripolitania and Italy on their common interests.

Italy will not intervene in the case of Cyrenaica and will agree to the principle of unification of all parts of Libya.

Somalia. Italy demands Italian trusteeship under U.N. supervision. Zoppi explained this was a matter of national pride for the Italian people, in order to participate in the governing of backward societies, and a matter of prestige for the Italian Government, to offset public criticism of its complete failure in the matter of the colonies.

(c) *The prospects at the U.N.* Zoppi was certain of full Latin American support and expected Arab support for the Italian proposals on Tripolitania and Eritrea. He was worried about Soviet opposition to the make-up of the proposed international commissions, from which he assumed Soviet representatives would be debarred by Western opposition. In answer to Ginossar's question, Zoppi declared that Soviet bloc representation would not be inimical to Italian interest, but as a loyal partner in the Atlantic Treaty Italy could not propose or support it.

On the question of Somalia Zoppi was more apprehensive, as there was apparently no agreement with the Arabs, and he feared the creation of a united front comprising the Soviet bloc, most of the Asian states and the Arabs against the Italian proposals. A single vote could be decisive here, and Zoppi was consequently asking for Israel's support. The possibility that Israel would vote against Italy, i.e. would be even less friendly than on the previous occasion, had evidently not even crossed his mind.

Zoppi was openly bitter about Britain's opposition to Italian presence in Africa and ascribed the loss of Italy's colonies mainly to this. He had warned the British that if they undermined Italian interests in Africa, Italy would of necessity turn to the Arabs, to the eventual detriment of British interests. Ginossar surmises Zoppi meant this also as a warning to Israel.

(d) *Ginossar's reply to Zoppi.* Ginossar reviewed Israel's voting record

in the last Assembly and the rationale for it, as given in Eban's memorandum.[3] He stressed that Israel had abstained instead of voting against on a number of clauses because of her sympathy for Italy. He said that though still not notified of Israel's expected position, he thought Israel would not oppose the proposed arrangements for Tripolitania and Eritrea, including an outlet to the sea for Ethiopia, but there might be difficulties on Somalia and perhaps also on the composition of the commissions.

(2) *Ginossar's comments on Italy's claims and on Eban's suggestions.* Ginossar refers to Eban's latest memorandum subsequent to the 22 August memorandum,[4] recommending positions on Eritrea and Tripolitania – though not on Somalia – in accordance with those of Italy. Eban suggests voting against Italian trusteeship in Somalia, and in favour of broadening the base of the international commissions, viz., for inclusion of Soviet representatives. Ginossar takes issue with Eban's opinions, and proposes that Italy be supported on these two issues, pointing out that consolidation of Italian influence in Tripolitania would benefit the Jewish minority there, which has already appealed to the Italian Government, through Perlzweig[5] and Cantoni,[6] for its protection.

Ginossar comments on Eban's two main arguments, (1) the principle of independence for subject peoples, and (2) identification with the positions of Asian countries in general and with those of the Middle East ones in particular. On (1), Ginossar argues that with all due sympathy for subject peoples, he did not suppose Israel intended unqualified adherence to abstract principles. He thinks a distinction should be made between individual ethics and political ethics, and that Israel need not strive at loftier conduct than all other countries in the world. He doubts whether Israel's vote on the Italian colonies issue at the May Assembly had indeed raised the U.N.'s ethical level. As it is, Israel's vote has been construed as an attempt to win the Arabs and not as a result of ethical considerations. Israel's championship of the wishes of the Italian colonies' population and of an outlet to the sea for Ethiopia is unconvincing and incompatible with her opposition to the return of the Arab refugees and to Jordan's demands for an outlet to the sea. Ginossar doubts whether Israel can appear at the U.N. both in the guise of a righteous judge and as a contending party. Concerning (2), Ginossar thinks it unlikely that Israel will gain favour with the Arabs for her support of the liberation of their African kinsmen. On the other hand, he fears a radical change in Italy's attitude should Israel oppose her at the Assembly. Failure of the Sforza plan led to a change in Italy's policy; unable to attain a settlement against the Arabs' wishes, she began courting them: in the Italian Parliament Count Sforza praised "the noble Arab nation",[7] the Italian Minister in Cairo met Azzam Pasha – and these were only some examples. Ginossar believes Israel will need Italy's help in future and must avoid offending her. He adds that Italy's *rapprochement* with the Arab bloc might lead the Latin American states to a similar approach.

Ginossar disagrees with Eban's estimate that Western influence may in

future wane but the peoples remain, whose sympathy Israel will be in need of. He does not believe that relations between nations are based on sympathy or on the memory of past favours. In his opinion, the time for a Middle Eastern orientation in Israel's policy will arrive only when the Middle East comes to terms with Israel's existence. Until then, Israel must keep her few friends, among which Italy is one of the best.

In conclusion, Ginossar urges reassessment of Israel's position on both the proposed commissions and Italian trusteeship in Somalia, as a vote cast against Italy might be considered an unjustified and hostile act and would cause a great deal of bitterness.

Further on excerpts are given from Avner's 9 September memorandum[8] to Eytan, also dealing with Italian–Israeli relations. Avner recalls Italy's past assistance to Israel and briefly touches on present relations between the two countries. Israel demands Italian understanding and cooperation regarding acquisition of armament, the Jerusalem issue, compensation to Italian nationals and institutions for war damage – while on a vital issue for the Italians Israel is not prepared to accommodate them. The Italians cannot understand this, and reject the argument that Israel's opposition to them can promote peace with the Arabs.

In his memorandum of 19 September[9] Avner summarizes Israel's views on the question of the Italian colonies [. . . . .].[10]

Three recommendations on the Italian colonies, as given in a memorandum by the Division of International Organizations of 13 September,[11] are also presented:

(1) Support of the British proposal, recommending that in its resolution on Libya the General Assembly take note of the economic ties between Tripolitania and Italy, and the special position of the Italian community in Libya. In this context, the rights of the Jewish community in Libya can be discussed.

(2) Assent to direct U.N. trusteeship over Somalia and the remaining parts of Eritrea, with a proviso that the Governors of these two areas be Italian.

(3) Support of the American proposal enabling Italy to participate in the development of Africa other than through direct rule, such as her inclusion in the organization dealing with the economic development of Africa.

Indonesia

A short memorandum from the Director-General to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, dated 8 August 1949,[12] is quoted. Eytan thinks that, considering Holland's traditional endorsement of Israel, a vote favourable to Holland is warranted; this notwithstanding Israel's inclination to support Indonesia in accordance with the principle against European penetration into Asia and for the national liberation of peoples under colonial rule. It would be desirable

for Israel to vote with Holland, or at least to abstain, so as to avoid being labelled an ingrate.

Eban sharply criticizes this approach,[13] insisting on strict adherence to the principle of Israel's regional responsibility. A vote with Holland would hurt Israel's prestige *vis-à-vis* the Americans, the Russians and the Latin world, all of whom support Indonesia.

The Division of International Organizations' comments[14] on this issue are as follows: (1) One should take into account that Indonesia is an Islamic country and will presumably support the general Arab line, as did Pakistan. (2) One should recall the cruelty to which the Dutch were subjected by the Indonesians during the Japanese occupation and later, during their war with the Dutch. (3) Israel's general policy should follow the line of neutrality, with no ascription of blame to the Dutch.

[. . . . .][15]

The Southwest Africa issue

The following recommendations were submitted by M. Comay: (a) Israeli support for the contention that a Mandate is a trust given by the international community, and that the Mandatory power should be responsible to the U.N. (b) While maintaining this position, Israel must reject the view that a recommendation by the Assembly has a mandatory character. (c) Opposition to the proposal to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice. (d) Israel should express her position only on the principles involved without attacking the South African Government.

The Division of International Organization came out in support of Comay's position.[16]

Notes

1. See No. 254 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. The letter is in file 130.02/2424/12.
3. Eban to Sharett, 2 June 1949, 130.02/2404/9. See also Editorial Note, p. 24 above.
4. No. 235.
5. Maurice L. Perlzweig, head of the Department of International Relations of the World Jewish Congress and its representative at U.N. bodies.
6. Raffaele Cantoni, President of the Union of Italian Jewish Communities and member of the World Jewish Congress Executive.
7. The circular erroneously has: "Hebrew"; it has been corrected according to the original letter.
8. The memorandum is in file 130.02/2424/12.
9. *Ibid.*
10. This section of the document has been omitted. Avner expressed support for some of Eban's recommendations and opposition to others, such as that on the Somalia issue, on which Avner favoured abstention.
11. This document is in file 130.02/2424/12.
12. The correct date is 30 August. The document is in file 130.02/2424/12.
13. In his telegram to Eytan, X583, 16 September 1949, 93.01/2202/2.

No. 295 – Notes (continued)

14. In the document referred to in n. 11 above.
15. Paras. 1–5 of the summary have been omitted here; they deal with the historical background of this issue and with the U.N. Assembly's involvement in it. The main points are to be found in No. 254, para. (d).
16. In the document referred to in n. 11 above.

296. S. Ginossar (Rome) to M. Sharett. 19 September 1949

Coded Tel. RO6; Recd: 20 September; Inc.: 130.09/2356/2

Summary

Pursuant to Sharett's telegram No. 25,[1] Cantoni met Cardinal Tisserant to ascertain whether it would be practicable for Ginossar to approach the Vatican regarding dispatch of a delegation and negotiations with the Holy See. Tisserant replied that his views on Jerusalem were close to those of Israel and he had made them known to the Pope. The Pope was concerned about the Church's relations with the Arabs and was therefore wary of any contacts with Israel; he was also greatly under the influence of Cardinal Tardini[2] who is a staunch advocate of the internationalization of Jerusalem. This confirms a report from a reliable source to the effect that the Vatican would prefer an imposed compromise solution and was therefore not interested in negotiations. Cantoni's inquiry about Cardinal Montini[3] elicited Tisserant's reply that Montini was less obdurate than Tardini, but that no great expectations could be harboured owing to the Pope's stand.

Ginossar requests instructions on whether to contact Montini, though he personally thinks that a precondition for talks with the Vatican are detailed proposals relating to the queries put to him by the Papal Nuncio at their last meeting.[4]

Notes

1. Sharett had cabled: "The Foreign Ministry feels strongly that talks with the Vatican should be probed on the eve of the Jerusalem debate at the Assembly, for the following reasons: (a) it is best to demonstrate goodwill and a readiness to reach an agreement before the fighting starts; (b) assuming there are two schools of opinion at the Vatican, with influential Catholic circles in Israel backing the more moderate one, our offer to satisfy the Vatican's wishes in the area under Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem would buttress the moderates and improve the chances of the Pope coming to a compromise..." (OR25, 17 September 1949, 130.09/2356/1).
2. Domenico Tardini, the Vatican's Acting Secretary of State for Special Affairs.
3. Giovanni Battista Montini, head of the General Branch of the Vatican's Secretariat of State.
4. See No. 173 and n. 6 *ibid.*

297. A. Eban (New York) to T. Lie (New York). 20 September 1949

Notes

1. See cable from T. Lie to the Israeli delegation in New York, 14 September 1949, 93.03/3055/11.
2. Alberto Gonzalez-Fernandez, a diplomat in Colombia's foreign service. During 1947–1949 he served as Colombia's alternate Representative at the Security Council. Gonzalez-Fernandez ultimately resigned the Jerusalem assignment for personal reasons, and it was temporarily filled by P. de Azcárate.
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.

298. S. Eliashiv (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 20 September 1949

Coded Tel. 245; Recd: 21 September; Outg.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Further to a previous telegram,[1] Eliashiv reports that at a brief meeting with Gromyko he spelled out Israel's opposition to the Jerusalem plan.[2] Gromyko inquired since when Israel had discarded the 29 November plan and stated that the Soviet Union adhered in principle to a certain position within the limits of which its delegation to the U.N. could act. He did not elaborate on the nature of that position. Namir again brought up the subject of commercial credit,[3] stressing the economic and political importance of Soviet participation in Israel's development, to which Gromyko replied that the discussions were still under way and no decision had yet been taken.

[. . . . .][4]

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above, and Nos. 284 and 293.
3. See No. 170, n. 3.
4. One sentence omitted here.

299. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 21 September 1949

Notes

1. Carl A. Berendsen, New Zealand's Representative at the U.N.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.

300. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 21 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
2. One paragraph omitted here.

301. M. Keren [Washington] to M. Comay. 21 September 1949

Notes

1. See No. 277, n. 4.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above, and No. 293.
3. Stabler was presumably referring to reports from Israel of a Tel Aviv political rally held by Herut on 16 September, at which the speakers had sharply criticized the Government's policy on Jerusalem and even hinted at the possibility of renewed underground activity in the city.

   At two press conferences called by Herut Knesset Members several days later they reiterated their opposition to the internationalization of Jerusalem but stated that the party would act within parliamentary limits and would not reactivate the I.Z.L. (See the *Palestine Post*, 19 September 1949, 21 September 1949; *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1392, n. 1.)

302. J. Tsur (Buenos Aires) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 21 September 1949

Report: 130.02/2383/3

Summary

Tsur reports on his visit to the Spanish Ambassador in Argentina, who wanted his opinion on the prospects of a *rapprochement* between Spain and Israel, stating that Spain had been greatly upset by Israel's vote at the U.N. on the resumption of diplomatic relations with Franco's Government.[1] He explained that forging closer ties with Israel had for Spain not only a political but also a moral connotation – the desire to renew relations with a culture that had greatly influenced Spanish culture. Tsur replied that the Jewish people had difficulty forgetting that Spain had been an ally of the Nazi regime which bore responsibility for the slaughter of a third of their people. In any case, said Tsur, *rapprochement* should begin in the sphere of culture, and commercial relations were also a possibility.

Tsur inquired about King Abdallah's visit to Spain and about the nature of relations between Franco and the Hashemites. The Ambassador assured him that the visit was unrelated to Middle Eastern affairs and its main object was to strengthen Spain's position in Spanish Morocco. He kept reiterating that Franco did not intend to intervene in Middle Eastern conflicts or support the Arabs against Israel.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 19–20 above.

303. *Note Verbale* by the British Government. 22 September 1949

Notes

1. Alexander Knox Helm, the British Minister in Israel, read out the note at hand to Sharett on 22 September, and then handed him the written text (see Sharett to Sasson, 26 September 1949, 130.02/2412/26).
2. On 18 September the British Government had announced the devaluation of the sterling from $ 4.03 to $ 2.80 per pound, and on the following day Israel proportionately devalued the lira.
3. No. 140.
4. Reference is to discussions on the future of British assets and liabilities in Palestine subsequent to the termination of the Mandate (for material on this subject see file 130.02/2457/7).
5. See No. 363 and n. 4 *ibid.*

304. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 22 September 1949

Coded Tel. RI174; Recd: 23 September; Inc.: 130.09/2296/9

Summary

Rubin reports that the Rumanian authorities have stopped issuing new identity cards to natives of Bessarabia and northern Bukovina and have even revoked identity cards so far issued. The Jews have been seized with panic, fearing repatriation to the Soviet Union. 30 to 40 thousand Jews are affected by this policy. Rubin suggests sounding out the Soviets on the possibility of allowing the emigration of these Jews to Israel in the event they are declared Soviet citizens. These Jews had left the Soviet Union legally in 1945–1946 as repatriates to Rumania in the hope of being allowed to emigrate to Israel.

305. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 23 September 1949

Coded Tel. RI175; Recd: 24 September; Inc.: 130.09/2296/9

Summary

Earlier that day Rubin and Agami met the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.[1] Rubin demanded a reply on the matter of emigration as discussed with Ana Pauker,[2] and the Deputy Minister replied that he had nothing to add to Ana Pauker's statement, except that if the Rumanian Government had been negatively disposed to emigration, it would have said so from the beginning. He recommended patience. Rubin had actually requested an interview with Pauker but was received by her Deputy who claimed she was otherwise engaged.[3]

Notes

1. Grigore Preoteasa; for full report of the conversation see Agami to Eliashiv, 29 September 1949, 130.11/2493/12.
2. No. 256.
3. In reply Eytan instructed Rubin to refrain until further notice from requesting interviews with A. Pauker and to desist from further efforts at persuasion regarding emigration (telegram IR100, 28 September 1949, 130.09/2296/8).

Editorial Note

Eban's speech at the U.N. General Assembly Session

Eban addressed the General Assembly on 26 September, at the conclusion of the first part of the general debate. He dwelt mainly on Israel's policy rêgarding the refugees and Jerusalem. He disclosed Israel's decision to contribute to the U.N. Relief Fund for refugees, repeated previous statements on the reunification of refugee families and announced Israel's readiness to admit a certain number of refugees – once a peace settlement was achieved – as part of a regional plan for their rehabilitation.

Regarding Jerusalem, Eban differentiated between the U.N.'s responsibility for protection and supervision of the Holy Places and the need to safeguard the full political rights of the city's Jewish population. He maintained that the protection of the Holy Places and religious rights was the only justification for any resort to international supervision, and when this problem was settled a political *modus vivendi* in Jerusalem had to be arranged according to the principle of self-determination.

Eban dwelt on the cultural and religious ties between the Jews of Jerusalem and the State of Israel and severely criticized the Conciliation Commission's internationalization plan which barred settlement of Jews from outside Jerusalem in the city.

In conclusion, Eban announced that Israel's delegation "will propose that the General Assembly should limit the commitment of the United Nations to the safeguarding of Holy Places and initiate such formal agreements as may be necessary between the United Nations and the State of Israel for the implementation of these safeguards. My government aspires to full international recognition of the political status of the Government of Israel in Jerusalem". (See *GAOR, 4th Sess., Plenary*, 229th Meeting, pp. 92–95; for full text of Eban's speech see also file 93.03/3037/13.)

306. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 26 September 1949

Orig.: 93.03/64/2

Summary

In a telegram dictated earlier that morning,[1] which Sharett hopes reached

Eban before he addressed the Assembly,[2] Sharett had warned him *inter alia* not to speak in favour of the creation of a new mediatory body, but to recommend that the Assembly call on the parties to reach a compromise. Sharett thinks there is no alternative but to dissolve the Conciliation Commission and to let the parties face each other on their own. The experience with Bernadotte, Bunche and the Conciliation Commission had led Sharett to conclude that the mediators had never been satisfied with just bringing the parties together but had instead come up with solutions of their own, invariably to Israel's disadvantage. In his opinion, the Conciliation Commission has become a serious obstacle to Israel and to the cause of peace owing both to its procedural methods and to its actual positions. He adds that the gap between the Arabs and Israel regarding refugees and territory is so large that any mediator would be constrained to find a compromise which would ultimately be to Israel's disadvantage. In conclusion, Sharett reiterates his objection to any form and manner of mediation, explaining that he prefers the longer and safer route to a shorter but more hazardous one.

Notes

1. Y275, 26 September 1949, 93.01/2202/2.
2. Eban addressed the U.N. General Assembly on 26 September; see Editorial Note above.

307. M. Eliash (London) to M. Comay. 27 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
2. International supervision to be limited to the Holy Places.
3. At the U.N. General Assembly, on 23 September (see *GAOR, 4th Sess., Plenary*, 225th Meeting, pp. 29–32.
4. See Nos. 278 and 320.

308. E. Sasson (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 27 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2403/12

Summary

Sasson replies to Sharett's letter of 26 September,[1] expressing pleasure that his views have been sought in drafting the reply to the British Minister.[2] Sasson proceeds to analyse developments and attitudes in the Arab world as regards both Israel and Britain, suggesting this analysis be employed in drafting the reply.

(a) According to Sasson there are three different Arab approaches to Israel: (1) Israel should be attacked and destroyed as quickly as possible

before she can consolidate and grow strong. (2) Victory would be better assured if the Arab world waited a number of years during which it settled its internal conflicts, organized its military power, strengthened its ties with the West and Britain in particular, and extended Arab unity to include Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. (3) Efforts should be directed at preventing Israel from enlarging her territory and her population and from consolidating her strength, in the hope that she will disintegrate from within; however, if in the course of time Israel becomes an established fact in the Middle East, then she should be come to terms with.

Sasson cannot say which attitude predominates in each Arab state, and surmises that all three have exponents everywhere and no uniform approach has yet crystallized, this being a subject of discussion among Arab leaders themselves and with Western statesmen.

(b) Regarding Britain's status in the Middle East, Sasson estimates that the Arabs would rather have Britain withdraw from the region, preferring a partnership with the U.S. instead of the various pacts with Britain which they would like to rescind. If they are not presently calling for Britain's immediate withdrawal it is not out of friendship for Britain but for fear that Britain's place might be taken by the Soviet Union, an eventuality that ruling Arab circles dread.

(c) Sasson dismisses the notion of Arab unity given the rift between the Hashemites and the Egyptian camp. Owing to this state of affairs it is highly unlikely that the Western states will succeed in maintaining stable relations with the Arabs unless the following preconditions materialize: (1) settlement of the Arab–Israeli conflict; (2) economic and social development of the Arab East triggered by the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries; (3) abandonment of all "Fertile Crescent", "Greater Syria" and similar schemes, and assurance of the independence and sovereignty of the existing Arab states.

(d) Sasson sees no proof that Britain has finally abandoned her claims on the Negev either in her Government's statement to the U.S.[3] or in the British Minister's silence on that subject in his talk with Sharett. He suspects this is a British ploy to leave the solution of the territorial problem in general and of the Negev in particular to the Americans, and in the event the latter fail – to obtain from Israel pledges for free use of military bases in southern Israel. There are two advantages for Britain in this ploy: (1) it obviates the need for a choice between Egypt's claim for an independent Arab state that includes the Negev, and Jordan's claim for the annexation of the Arab parts of Palestine; (2) it will promote good British relations with Israel and with the Arabs at one and the same time.

Sasson hopes this analysis proves useful in drafting a reply to the British Minister. He takes the opportunity of informing Sharett about a dinner with Bergman[4] and Azcárate scheduled for that very night.

Notes

1. In file 130.02/2412/26.
2. See No. 303.
3. See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1342–6.
4. Avraham Biran (Bergman), Jerusalem District Commissioner, Ministry of the Interior, and Representative in Jerusalem of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

309. S. Divon (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett. 27 September 1949

Memorandum: 130.02/2403/12

Summary

Divon comments on the "myth of Arab unity" and the "myth of British influence in the Middle East".

(1) Divon argues that the concept of the Arab League failed because it was not grounded on an Arab national movement with a solid and unifying political, economic and social content. Failing to create positive unifying values, the Arab national movement chose the path of rejection – a struggle against foreign influences which became its main rallying point; but this common denominator could not withstand the conflicting interests of the Arab states and blocs. The rivalry between Baghdad and Cairo, the conflicting economic interests of the different states and other divisive factors disrupted the apparent unity of the Arab world. The tension and agitation pervading the Arab countries, fed by a national movement that rallies round the flag of fictional unity, compel the Arab governments to bow to "public opinion", and prevent them from adopting a realistic and rational policy.

Everyone rejoiced at the signing of the armistice agreements, but it should be recalled that these came through direct negotiations with the Arab states, and at a time when the Arab League was in disarray and the dictates of illusory unity could not obstruct negotiations. The experience of the Lausanne Conference, which convened when the Arab League was being reactivated, proves that the concept of a unified front to which the Arab states must pay lip service gives rise to artificially unanimous, radical demands.

(2) Britain's influence in the Middle East has waned in the last few years, partly as a result of her excessive reliance on the traditional regimes and undue tolerance of "negativist" trends in the Arab national movement. The effect has been inimical to British vital interests, as demonstrated by repudiation of the Egyptian and Iraqi treaties; nevertheless Britain is still the strongest power in the Middle East.

The notion of "British influence" encompasses a number of elements: (a) Britain holds the key to rearmament of the Arab states. (b) British economic influence derives from the fact that Iraq and Jordan are in the sterling area and that vast amounts of Egyptian sterling are frozen in Britain. The operations of British oil companies and a well-developed network of other competing

business concerns provide great leverage on the Arab states. (c) Britain has a ramified and well-organized machinery for the promotion of her interests in the Middle East. (d) Direct influence on the balance of power in the Arab world can be exerted by Britain through manipulation of the measure of support given to the Hashemite bloc. (e) The Arab governments are in need of Western, frequently British, support.

Divon therefore concludes that Britain still has the power to persuade and to pressure the Arab states towards moderation and a realistic approach to their problems, including their conflict with Israel.

Whether Britain's decline continues or is arrested depends on the lessons she derives from her past experience.

310. E. Sasson (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 28 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

The Conciliation Commission is due to reconvene on 19 October, and Sasson argues for the need to have the Commission dissolved.

From the Commission's report to the Assembly[1] it is evident that the Commission intends to refer the Palestine issue to the Assembly and to characterize Israel there as extremist and as guilty of contributing to instability in the Middle East. Sasson assumes that the Commission will propose to the Assembly that Israel give up territory in the north to Syria and in the south to Egypt and Jordan, and that the Assembly ratify the annexation of the Arab parts of Palestine to Jordan.

In essence, Sasson suggests that the Commission's summons to the Israeli delegation to come to New York be rejected and that a memorandum be sent to the Commission's Principal Secretary justifying Israel's absence, in order to forestall charges of obstruction and defiance of the U.N. It should be convincingly argued that the Commission itself had made cooperation impossible and unproductive and that the Commission had overstepped its mandate in adopting positions and procedural methods inadmissible to a mediating body. Israel's letter should be termed a reply to the Commission's last communication to Israel in Lausanne in which it declared explicitly that if Israel did not change her position and come to New York with new territorial proposals, it would make the work of the Commission extremely difficult.[2]

Sasson lists the advantages inherent in his proposal: (a) it will enable Israel to denounce the Commission at the Assembly if the Palestine issue is indeed put on the agenda; (b) it may prevent the Assembly from adopting new positions and compel it to seek new ways of achieving peace; (c) it may open the way for dissolution of the Commission, which represents not the U.N. but the Foreign Offices of the U.S., France and Turkey; (d) it may enable Israel to discredit once and for all the concept of conciliation and mediation.

The Lausanne experience has taught Sasson that even the best possible outside instrument of mediation, seeking simultaneous solutions to the refugee, territorial and peace issues, would of necessity be inimical to Israel's interests: Israel would be required to make concessions unacceptable to her, the Arabs would harden their positions and the path to permanent peace would become still longer and more tortuous.

Sasson acknowledges that the ensuing vacuum would leave Israel to face the Arabs all by herself, but he is not apprehensive of this confrontation, believing that it would promote the progress to peace.

Notes

1. See: United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Fourth Progress Report, 22 September 1949; *GAOR, 4th Sess., AHPC, Annex II*, pp. 9, 14; U.N. Document A/992.
2. See No. 281, Part II, Para. 3.

311. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 28 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above, and No. 293.
2. Rusk was referring to his conversation with Sharett of 9 April 1948. See *Documents, December 1947 – May 1948*, No. 366, and cf. report on the present meeting in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1409–12.
3. Cf. No. 307.
4. For Bevin's speech of 26 September see *GAOR, 4th Sess., Plenary*, 229th Meeting, pp. 76–81.
5. See No. 301, n. 3.

312. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 29 September 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to the first part of the general debate at the U.N. Session held between 21 and 26 September (see *GAOR, 4th Sess., Plenary*, 222–229 Meetings, pp. 3–95). The proposal for placing the Jerusalem issue on the agenda was endorsed at a 22 September meeting (see *ibid.*, p. 21).
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
3. See No. 169.
4. See No. 311.

313. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv): Information to Israeli Missions Abroad. 29 September 1949

Circular: 130.02/2404/9

Summary

This memorandum deals with Israel's position at the Fourth Session[1] of the U.N. General Assembly.

A. *The Italian colonies*

The main considerations have been summarized as follows:

(a) Support in principle for the independence of subject peoples motivated, *inter alia*, by Israel's concern for her position in Asia; in this context India's appreciation of Israel's policy is particularly important.

(b) On the other hand, speedy creation of independent Arab states which would merely increase the ranks of the enemy alignment against Israel is undesirable.

(c) The Arabs should not receive the impression that Israel would never dare to vote against independence for an Arab country, lest they feel they can provoke Israel with impunity.

(d) Italy's amity to Israel and her past effective aid in the spheres of "illegal" immigration and supply of vital munitions demands serious consideration of her vital interests. Her alignment with Israel against the Vatican on the Jerusalem issue might be enlisted in exchange for Israel's support of Italy on the colonies. With its colonization background, Israel must defend the interests of the Italian colonists in Libya and even support the settlement of some of Italy's surplus population in that country.

(e) Unconditional support of Libya's independence might antagonize France, who is worried about her status in North Africa in view of the imminent disappearance of the buffer between her colonies and the Arab League zone.

(f) Israel's relations with the Soviet Union dictate support for the extension of membership by representatives of the Eastern European bloc on any commission set up to supervise Libya's progress to independence.

(g) Israel's relations with the U.S. constrain her to be circumspect and avoid creating the impression that she is facilitating communist infiltration into the Middle East.

(h) Britain's friendly overtures bar any Israeli manifestation of hostility towards her.

(i) Traditional friendship towards Ethiopia requires that Israel support her claim for an outlet to the sea; conversely, Ethiopia's identification with the Arab bloc demands the opposite. In the long run, it would be advantageous to Israel if the solidly Arab perimeter of the Red Sea were broken by a strip of coast in Ethiopia's possession.

In view of the above considerations, the following lines of policy have been set out:

Libya. (1) Support independence on principle.

(2) Oppose immediate independence and advocate several years' interim administration.

(3) Resist any Assembly resolution for Libya's unification and urge continued existence of Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan during the interim period, leaving the final decision to a plebiscite.

(4) Support trusteeship during the interim period if proposed by a country outside the Soviet bloc, as: (a) the Soviet bloc might prefer trusteeship to any other arrangement because the Soviet Union sits on the Trusteeship Council; (b) it would be unadvisable for Israel to be the sole supporter of trusteeship outside the Soviet bloc. If no such proposal by a western or neutral country eventuates, Israel will not oppose continued British rule in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania and French rule in the Fezzan, supervised by a special commission to be appointed by the Assembly. If Israel's abstention should jeopardize the proposal the vote should be changed to the affirmative.

(5) Support a broadly based trusteeship or supervisory commission, to include all the large regional blocs.

(6) Israel will not vote for a broadened commission if she is its sole supporter outside the Soviet bloc; in that event, Israel will back any procedure authorizing the five great powers to decide on the Commission's composition.

(7) Support Italy's membership in the trusteeship council or the supervisory commission.

(8) Oppose Pakistan's representation on these two bodies.

(9) Support Turkey's candidacy over Egypt's for the supervisory council; if Turkey's candidacy is not raised, Israel to abstain on Egypt.

(10) Demand a clause guaranteeing equal rights to all citizens, including free emigration, bearing in mind the Jewish minority.

(11) Advocate protection of the economic, cultural and communal interests of the Italian colonists.

(12) Refrain from censuring British imposition of the Senussi regime in Cyrenaica.

(13) Eschew responsibility for the rejection of any plan designed to solve the Libyan issue; if by abstaining Israel obstructs adoption of such a plan, an affirmative vote should be cast even if the plan is not wholly desirable from the Israeli point of view.

Eritrea. (1) Oppose Eritrea's partition and annexation of its northern part to the Sudan and its southern part to Ethiopia.

(2) Register opposition to a sea outlet for Ethiopia in Eritrea but abstain in the voting.

(3) Support a broadly based international trusteeship as a transitional stage towards independence.

Somalia. (1) Support trusteeship as a transitional stage towards independence.

(2) Abstain on the vote for the grant of trusteeship to Italy.

(3) In the event Israel's vote is decisive, an affirmative vote should be cast.

B. *Indonesia*

Holland's unflagging support of Israel through all the stages of the debate and the voting at the U.N. and the need to woo her vote on the question of Jerusalem, as well as Israel's aversion to the establishment of another large Muslim state, would call for an Israeli vote favourable to Holland. On the other hand, Indonesia's future independence being a foregone conclusion, it would be pointless to hinder it. Should the issue be brought before the U.N., Israel's policy would be:

(1) Support independence for Indonesia.

(2) Advocate protection of Holland's economic and cultural interests.

(3) Take a middle road in the controversy on the transition stages to full independence.

C. *Southwest Africa*

The main considerations are: (a) as a former mandatory ward, Israel must demand that the mandatory power be answerable to the U.N.; (b) considering Israel's own likely dilemma regarding international compliance with U.N. directives when the question of Jerusalem is raised, it would be unadvisable to overemphasize the duty to obey the U.N.; (c) the U.S. proposal to refer the issue to the International Court of Justice is not in Israel's interest, as it would create a precedent on which the Arabs would avidly seize; (d) Israel has no sympathy for South Africa's arbitrary seizure of her ward's territory, and still less for her racist policies; (e) Israel does not wish to jeopardize relations with South Africa because of her responsibility towards the Jewish community there; (f) the feelings of the Asian states and the Soviet bloc as well as those of the Commonwealth countries and the Western bloc, should be taken heed of.

In view of the above, the following course of action is recommended:

(1) Support any resolution enjoining a mandatory power to comply with U.N. directives.

(2) Support any resolution calling on South Africa to comply with U.N. resolutions.

(3) Abstain on any resolution censuring South Africa for past disregard of U.N. resolutions.

(4) Abstain on any resolution recommending disciplinary action against South Africa for defiance of the U.N.

(5) Abstain on any resolution referring the issue to the International Court of Justice.

D. *Greece*

The main consideration in this issue and the subsequent ones, all four of them both an outcome and a component of the East–West conflict, is to avoid siding with any of the contending blocs. The following is the recommended course of action:

(1) Abstain on any proposal calling for the prolongation of UNSCOB's mandate, unless the Soviet bloc changes its mind and agrees to this proposal.

(2) Abstain on any proposal authorizing the Interim Committee, on which the Soviet Union is not represented, to instruct the existing commission.

(3) Support the establishment of a new conciliatory or mediating body or any other instrument of mediation, provided the Eastern bloc consents to it.

(4) Refrain from supporting a vote of censure against any of the contending parties.

E. *Korea*

(1) Support any endeavour to bring about an understanding or a compromise between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

(2) Abstain on any motion favouring one side.

(3) Refrain from supporting any vote of censure.

(4) Support the establishment of a conciliatory or mediating body if the Soviet bloc agrees to it.

F. *Atomic power and disarmament*

(1) Abstain on any resolution aiming to decide the issue by majority vote.

(2) Support any proposal to bring the parties to an agreement.

(3) Support any proposal for limitations on armament unless it becomes a bone of contention between East and West.

G. *Protection of human rights*

Relevant to Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania, the following line should be adopted:

(1) Avoid taking positions and abstain on any vote in committee or in the plenum.

(2) The Eastern delegates should be privately told that Israel has serious grievances against Rumania and Hungary for violating human rights on emigration, and that her silence denotes the hope that a satisfactory arrangement can be achieved through direct negotiations.

Notes

1. The present document was drafted pursuant to an extensive debate in the Cabinet on 13 September 1949. It was then circulated among members of the Cabinet who endorsed most of its points. Several Ministers voiced reservations regarding two of Sharett's recommendations: co-option of the Soviet Union to the trusteeship council and Italian trusteeship for Somalia. A further discussion took place on 4 October and despite these reservations Sharett's recommendation on the first matter was adopted; concerning the second issue the Cabinet even went farther and resolved to vote directly and openly for Italian trusteeship in Somalia. (See Eytan to Eban, telegrams Y304, Y305, 5 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14.) See also Nos. 254 and 295 and cf. No. 318.

314. J. Herzog [Tel Aviv] to A. Eban (New York). 29 September 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 231, n. 1.
2. See No. 273.
3. See No. 179 and n. 1 *ibid.*
4. See No. 211, n. 3.
5. See Vol. 2, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 180–1.
6. Sir Hugh Dow, British Consul-General in Jerusalem.
7. See No. 293 and n. 1 *ibid.*
8. Proskauer responded with reservation to Eban's appeal (see No. 179, n. 2) and expressed criticism of Israel's policy on Jerusalem, particularly the recent steps regarding transfer of government offices to the capital (22 August 1949, 93.03/3037/13).
9. Herbert H. Lehman, formerly Governor of the State of New York; Senator (New York) from November 1949.
10. The memorandum is in file 130.02/2451/4.
11. See draft of Agreement between Israel and the U.N. on Protection of the Holy Places in Jerusalem (11 September 1949, 93.03/3037/13).
12. See No. 16 and n. 4 *ibid.*
13. Rosenne prepared four drafts on the supervision of the Holy Places: (a) text of a declaration by Israel not referring to a U.N. representative; (b) text of a declaration specifying a U.N. representative with authority limited to the Jerusalem area; (c) text of a declaration specifying a U.N. representative with authority throughout Israel; (d) a solemn agreement between Israel and the U.N. on supervision of the Holy Places. (See drafts enclosed with Rosenne's memorandum to Sharett, 29 September 1949, 130.02/2451/4.)
14. See Editorial Note, p. 195 above.

315. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett. 29 September 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
2. Avner replied to Fischer in Sharett's stead, explaining that Israel had not modified her opposition to the basic principles of the Conciliation Commission's plan, and instructing Fischer to concentrate on these basic points in his discussions in Paris. Only if the French agree "to yield on the fundamental points (sovereignty, demilitarization, immigration, non-democratic municipal council)... will it become possible to discuss the details". (3 November 1949, 93.02/175/10.)

316. E. Sasson (Jerusalem) to M. Sharett. 30 September 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2447/13

Summary

Following perusal of Sharett's letter to Eban,[1] Sasson is pleased that his views and Sharett's coincide on several of the points raised in his letter of 28 September.[2] He reiterates his opinion that the way to bring about the Conciliation Commission's dissolution is for Israel to absent herself from New

York and to send an explanatory letter. As to what would ensue if Israel succeeds in dissolving the Commission and preventing the establishment of another mediating body, Sasson does not think that the U.S. would ease up pressure on Israel or that the Department of State would abandon Jessup's policy of territorial compensation.[3] This line was a major obstacle throughout the Lausanne talks and consistently influenced the Commission's attitudes and actions. Egypt's claim to the Negev and France's encouragement of Syrian demands for border rectification up to the Jordan River were both rooted in the American policy. Sasson points out that the difficulties under which the Lausanne Conference laboured had originated with the Americans, who had come with a preconceived policy which they insisted on implementing. They had been the decisive factor in the Commission and Sasson is somewhat apprehensive of the expected confrontation with the U.S. should the Commission be indeed dissolved.

Sasson then proceeds to criticize the Survey Group's plan to give temporary employment to Arab refugees on public works in the Arab countries, for the following reasons:

(a) Such a temporary measure would prevent a permanent solution of the refugee problem and of the Israeli–Arab conflict because by strengthening the refugees economically and physically, it would buoy up their morale and sustain them in their demand for repatriation to Palestine, whether by peaceful or forceful means.

(b) The plan would ease the refugee burden on the Arab states as well as fill their treasuries and improve their relations with the refugees, and would facilitate exploitation of the refugee problem as a pretext for renewed hostilities against Israel.

(c) The refugee problem would remain unresolved and permanently linked to the peace and territorial issues.

(d) The plan, not providing a permanent solution to the refugee problem, would not break the united Arab front against Israel nor encourage the Arab states to negotiate individually with Israel.

(e) The plan is not conducive to Israel's cooperation with the Survey Group as long as it does not deal with a permanent solution to the refugee problem or as long as Israel does not renounce her two preconditions for the admission of a certain number of refugees, i.e. general peace and a comprehensive solution of the refugee problem.

Sasson is concerned about Sharett's statement in his letter to Eban regarding imminent unofficial talks with Jordan and Lebanon on indirect trade with Israel, which he opposes in principle. He feels that no undue benefits should accrue to the Arab merchant, who instead should be pressured to urge his government to make peace with Israel. A similar policy should be pursued with respect to the Arab governments – their international commercial and financial affairs should, if possible, be obstructed, so that they come to realize that Israel cannot be ignored and must be made peace with. Moreover, an economic crisis in the Arab countries would slow down their rearmament,

which Israel certainly has no reason to facilitate. Attempts by Israel to initiate indirect trade might also be construed as confirmation of the rumours about her critical economic situation, and encourage the Arabs in their intransigence.

In conclusion, Sasson submits a number of recommendations for further discussion:

(a) Mediation in all its forms should be shunned.

(b) Attempts should be made to discuss with the U.S., Britain and France all the issues that the Conciliation Commision had dealt with and to win them over to Israel's point of view.

(c) During his stay at Lake Success Sharett should hold discussions with the Americans; Sasson himself begs leave to go to London and Paris [. . . . .][4] to see the people in charge of the Middle East desks.

(d) The Paris bureau[5] should be reopened for direct contacts with the Arabs, and Arabs from Israel and from Arab countries should be included in its staff.

Sasson concludes by proposing an early consultation on Israel's policy for the near future.

Notes

1. No. 306.
2. No. 310.
3. See No. 63, n. 1.
4. Part of the sentence omitted here.
5. Reference is to the Liaison Bureau set up in Paris by Sasson in Summer 1948 to facilitate direct contacts with Arab representatives; T. Arazi and Z. Divon were on its staff. The Bureau actually ceased operating early in 1949, with the launching of the armistice talks with the Arab states. (For a summary of the Bureau's activities see Vol. 2, No. 362.)

317. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 30 September 1949

Notes

1. See No. 342.

318. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 2 October 1949

Notes

1. Sharett had cabled to Eban the gist of the memorandum published under No. 313 (29 September 1949, 130.09/2329/13), instructing him in the concluding sentence of the cable to vote for Italian trusteeship in Somalia in the event Israel's vote proved decisive (see above, pp. 202–3).
2. See No. 295.

No. 318 – Notes (continued)

3. Sharett was not persuaded by Eban's arguments and thought his vehement reaction out of proportion with the issue involved. He explained again that Israel's relationship with Italy was of a complex nature, involving present practical considerations as well as past moral obligations (Italian supply of munitions, aid in "illegal" immigration); casting her vote with Italy would place Israel in the company of many other countries. Sharett favoured the Australian approach and decided to endorse it. (Telegram Y317, 7 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14.)
4. Ginossar categorically opposed Eban's approach, refuting his arguments one by one (his letter to Avner, 14 October 1949, 93.03/3054/25; see also "Information for Members of the Cabinet", No. 60, 30 November 1949, I.M.D.E.A. 230.72/896). He rejected the moral principle of prevention of bloodshed invoked by Eban to defend Somalia's independence, and argued that "in this world of ours – woe to the nation whose leaders are deterred from measures beneficial to it by their fear of indirectly causing bloodshed". He cited Nehru's decision to annex Hyderabad despite the violence involved, and compared proponents of a particular solution to the Somalian issue for reasons of prevention of bloodshed to followers of Magnes's line (for a bi-national state in Palestine) which had been rejected by the Jewish community in Palestine. Ginossar concluded by warning that whoever was against imposed trusteeship would be hard-pressed to defend Israel's policy regarding the Arab refugees. (For Eban's reply see No. 400, n. 3.)

319. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to S. Eliashiv. 3 October 1949

Coded Tel. RI207; Inc.: 130.09/2296/9

Summary

The S.S. *Transylvania* is due in Israel with six to seven hundred immigrants on board. Rubin cautions that these are mostly elderly people and parents and thus the ship's arrival should not be heralded as the opening of Rumania's borders to emigration. The press should be warned against misinterpreting the event, particularly given Rumania's interest in favourable press reports as proof of large-scale Jewish emigration.

320. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to M. Eliash (London). 4 October 1949

Notes

1. For full text of the note see file 93.03/64/2.
2. See No. 221, n. 3.
3. For Israel's reply to the note see No. 343.

321. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 4 October 1949

Coded Tel. IP227; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Pursuant to Eliashiv's telegram PI251,[1] Sharett instructs Namir to ask for an audience with Bakulin and to inform him as follows:

(a) The notion that the I.D.F. was to be organized on the American model was inconceivable at G.H.Q., especially given the enormous differences in size and defence problems. (b) The I.D.F. does not copy other armies but develops according to its needs and resources, and the originality of its approach is shown in the combination of agricultural work with military training, and of centrally based striking forces with a peripheral belt of defensive settlements. (c) Israel wishes to benefit from the experience of veteran and advanced armies and she has therefore approached the Soviet Union requesting that I.D.F. officers in certain branches be allowed to study the organization of the Red Army. (d) Israel has thus far enjoyed the help of Jewish volunteers from various countries, most of them coming as immigrants. (e) In the I.D.F. ranks there are Jewish volunteers from numerous countries, including experts and professionals, such as pilots from South Africa, naval personnel and staff officers from Britain and America, tank experts from Czechoslovakia and staff officers from Poland. All these volunteers have come to Israel from purely patriotic motives. (f) If the Soviets obtained their information from an item in *Kol Ha'am* about an American general reputedly heading the I.D.F. General Staff, then Sharett leaves it to Namir's judgment whether to tell the Russians the true facts: no such general ever existed; there was Colonel Marcus, who came to Israel as a Jew, on his own initiative; after Marcus's death, a friend of his, a reserve officer with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, offered his services and is presently employed as adviser to one of the departments; his appointment was not negotiated with U.S. military authorities. Subsequent to publication of this tale in *Kol Ha'am*,[2] the U.S. Embassy officially approached the Israeli Government asking for clarification and was informed of the true facts as above.

Notes

1. Eliashiv informed Sharett that the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister and the Czechoslovak Representative at Moscow had asked him whether there was any truth in the report that Israel was about to invite American experts to train the army and organize it on the American model (telegram PI251, 23 September 1949, 130.09/2325/4). In decoding Eliashiv's telegram, the word "Poland" was erroneously transcribed as "Bakulin", who was Director of the Near East Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The error was discovered by Sharett only later, after he had discussed the incorrect version with the Soviet Minister in Tel Aviv (Sharett to Namir, telegram IP239, 26 October 1949, 130.09/2325/3).
2. See *Kol Ha'am*, 16 and 18 August 1949, and cf. the sequence of events as described by T. Segev in *1949 – The First Israelis* [Hebrew], pp. 251–257.

322. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 5 October 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to Sharett's proposal to the Cabinet for a treaty between Israel and the U.N. on protection of the Holy Places in lieu of unilateral supervision by the U.N. This was modelled on the treaty between the U.S. Government and the U.N. concerning the establishment of the U.N. Headquarters in New York.
2. Eban cabled in response that the proposal would "appear fantastic" unless Israel could also clearly suggest what should be done with the evacuated inhabitants (T642, 7 October 1949, 93.01/2202/3). Sharett disagreed with Eban's scepticism and pointed to the proposal's considerable propaganda value (telegram Y314, 7 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14). For further discussions between Sharett and Eban on this subject see Nos. 326, 329, 332, 333, 347 and 349.

323. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 5 October 1949

Notes

1. See No. 294 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. See No. 375.

324. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 5 October 1949

Coded Tel. PI262; Recd: 6 October; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Namir reports on the warm reception accorded the Legation staff during the High Holidays at the Moscow Synagogue, which was filled to capacity; but, unlike the preceding year, nobody ventured to talk with them. Police guards were stationed at the entrance to the building and in the street. A prayer for the fallen in the War of Independence was recited on Yom Kippur. Namir requests that this be kept confidential in order to protect the Synagogue's director.

A local Jew informed Namir that many Jews were being dismissed from their jobs in Moscow and in provincial towns in the Ukraine to increase artificially emigration to Birobidjan. Forcible deportations were being reported only from Moldavia, and the ostensible official reason was that the deportees belonged to anti-social elements. This had previously been reported by another Jew and Namir had already communicated this information in his telegram 258.[1] Antagonism and discrimination against Jews are generally on the rise, and there is fear of impending deportations from Moscow, where there is a large remnant of Russian Jewry. Further information will follow.[2]

Notes

1. Dated 2 October 1949, 130.09/2325/4.
2. In two subsequent telegrams Namir gave additional details, including the names of several Jews who had been arrested. In a third cable he relayed information given by a Jewish refugee from Rumania about arrests, deportations and persecution of the Jews there. Though Namir had found the account exaggerated, he thought it was grounded on actual facts and undertook to obtain confirmation from other sources. (Telegrams 263, 264 and 265, 5 October 1949, 130.09/2325/4.)

325. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 7 October 1949

Notes

1. 22 September 1949, 130.02/2540/11.
2. See No. 315.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
4. Edouard Félix Guyon, the French Minister to Israel.
5. One paragraph omitted here.

326. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 10 October 1949

Notes

1. Thus erroneously in original; reference is to Eban's telegram T642 quoted in No. 322, n. 2.

327. W. Eytan [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett. 10 October 1949

Copy: 130.02/2451/4

Summary

On 9 October Ford handed Eytan a communication from the U.S. Government based on Elath's talk with Rusk of 28 September.[1] Ford had been instructed to deliver this message to Sharett, but as he had not managed to obtain an interview with him in a week, he had decided to approach Eytan. The gist of the communication is as follows:

The U.S. Government views with concern the campaign, conducted in the press and through public statements, against the Conciliation Commission's plan for Jerusalem.[2] While agreeable to the introduction of changes into the plan, the U.S. nevertheless endorses it as a whole. The U.S. hopes that a solution is reached by "calm and constructive means" and that the parties concerned approach the problem unemotionally. The Conciliation Commission's plan bears resemblance to the concept of trusteeship, to which Sharett was favourably disposed in 1948.[3]

The U.S. Government is also troubled by the possibility of renewed terrorist activity in Jerusalem.[4]

Notes

1. See No. 311.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
3. No. 311, n. 2.
4. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1412, n. 2.

328. J. Herzog (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 10 October 1949

Notes

1. Original erroneously has: "Antigoras"; corrected in accordance with incoming version.
2. See No. 322.

329. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 10 October 1949

Notes

1. See No. 322 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. On both these occasions (see No. 3, n. 2, and Editorial Note, p. 195 above) Eban had declared that Israel favoured international supervision to be limited to the Holy Places and called for international recognition of Israel's sovereignty over Jerusalem.
3. See Nos. 332 and 349 for the Cabinet's opinion and No. 345 for Sharett's reply.

330. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 11 October 1949

Notes

1. Maurice Couve de Murville, Director-General of Political Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs; member of the French delegation to the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. Presumably Gabriel Bonneau, Director of the Africa-Levant Department in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs till Spring 1949.
3. On the eve of the elections to Syria's Constituent Assembly scheduled for mid-November, Nuri Said's plan for an Iraqi–Syrian federation had reached an advanced stage. The plan called, *inter alia*, for political and cultural cooperation and for joint military planning and army coordination. The plan enjoyed Britain's support but aroused grave concern in Israel and in France. (See Eytan to Fischer, 12 October 1949, 130.02/2382/12.)
4. See No. 313 (para. 12).
5. See No. 345.

331. S. Ginossar (Rome) to W. Eytan. 11 October 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2396/15

Summary

Further to their meeting of 8 October,[1] Ginossar and McDonald had a

telephone conversation on 11 October, before the latter's departure for Tel Aviv,[2] about McDonald's meeting with the Pope.

In line with his briefing by Ginossar, McDonald told the Pope that it was possible to bridge over differences between Israel and the Vatican, as their needs were "not irreconcilable". The Pope evinced great interest in this, and repeatedly inquired whether Israel was indeed in earnest about reaching an agreement. McDonald intimated that direct contacts between Israel and the Vatican were necessary and that Israel was expecting some sign of encouragement, but the Pope did not react. Asked by Ginossar whether the Pope had understood that any compromise or agreement would not involve territorial internationalization but only certain arrangements concerning the religious institutions, McDonald replied that he had not gone into details with the Pope.

Ginossar is not quite sure whether McDonald, through imprecise wording, conveyed to the Pope an exaggerated impression of Israel's willingness to compromise, and he fears that McDonald failed to stress adequately that there was no room for compromise on internationalization. Ginossar suggests that this point be cleared with McDonald when he arrives in Israel.

His conversation with McDonald has confirmed Ginossar's opinion that there is nothing to be done at present: the Pope is aware of Israel's desire for direct contact and negotiation; the next move is up to the Vatican.

Ginossar relates further that the Papal Nuncio in Rome approached him at a Chinese Embassy reception and promised to pay him a return visit. Ginossar did not approach the Nuncio first because the latter had not replied to his detailed communication regarding acts of vandalism perpetrated in a number of churches,[3] and Ginossar therefore assumed that the Nuncio wished to avoid contact with him. The fact that the Nuncio took the initiative and promised to return his visit leads Ginossar to believe that this approach holds some significance, perhaps an inkling that relations between them will soon be renewed but, as the Nuncio himself had expressed, "pas encore".[4]

[. . . . .][5]

Notes

1. Ginossar had briefed McDonald on the subject of Jerusalem prior to his meeting with the Pope (10 October 1949, 130.02/2396/15).
2. Prior to dispatch Ginossar inserted the following in the margin: "I learn in the meantime that he is due to leave tomorrow and will arrive [in Israel] the day-after-tomorrow".
3. See memorandum from Ginossar to Burgongini Duca, the Papal Nuncio in Rome, 1 September 1949, 130.10/2523/17.
4. See No. 353.
5. A sentence added in the margin has been omitted here.

332. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 12 October 1949

Notes

1. No. 329.
2. See No. 349.
3. See No. 329, n. 2.

333. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 12 October 1949

Notes

1. No. 332.
2. See No. 330.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 195 above.
4. Reference is to Eban's memorandum on the future of the Old City (Eban to Sharett, 12 October 1949, 93.03/3037/14); its main conclusions are given in No. 337.
5. Sharett endorsed Eban's proposed line of action pending further deliberations (telegram Y335, 14 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14). See No. 467 and n. 1 *ibid.*

334. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 12 October 1949

Notes

1. Sharett had asked for a comprehensive analysis of opinions in Washington on the subject of atomic armament, in the wake of President Truman's 23 September announcement about the detonation of an atomic device by the Soviet Union (4 October 1949, 130.09/2308/4). In two earlier cables Elath surveyed the effects of this event on international and on East–West relations (W438, 7 October 1949; W446, 12 October 1949, 93.01/2181/7).

335. J. Herzog (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 13 October 1949

Notes

1. No. 314.
2. See Vol. 2, No. 13.
3. Eytan to Eban, telegram IW231, 11 October 1949, 130.09/2308/4.
4. See No. 297, n. 2.
5. See No. 231, n. 1.
6. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
7. See No. 314.
8. See No. 328.

336. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 13 October 1949

Notes

1. See No. 313 and n. 1 *ibid.*

337. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 13 October 1949

Notes

1. 12 October 1949, 93.01/2202/3.
2. See No. 333, n. 4.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
4. Reference is to Rosenne's drafts mentioned in No. 314 (n. 13) and to G. Meron's memorandum on the economic background of the Jerusalem Plan, 22 September 1949, 93.03/3037/13.
5. See No. 322 and n. 1 *ibid.*
6. Carl Voss, Protestant clergyman; Chairman of the Executive Council, American Christian Palestine Committee.

338. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 13 October 1949

Notes

1. Jean Benard, First Secretary at the French Embassy in Washington.
2. See No. 330, n. 3.
3. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister in Washington and Representative at the U.N.
4. For Sharett's reply, see No. 345.
5. Telegram WP60, 13 October 1949, 93.01/2181/7.

339. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 13 October 1949

Coded Tel. PI272; Recd: 14 October; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Further to his telegram No. 858,[1] Namir reports on two subjects:

(a) On Yershov's leave-taking visit the latter did not raise any political issues. Namir told him about Israel's stand on Jerusalem and Yershov asked for details, betraying a negative attitude to the Conciliation Commission's plan,[2] though just as Gromyko and Bakulin, he did not quite disclose the Soviet position. He tried to question Namir on Israel's position on the U.N. controversy relating to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary,[3] but Namir was noncommittal. Yershov hoped to be able to meet Sharett before the latter's departure for the U.N. Assembly.

(b) During his trip to the Caucasus, Namir tried to contact Jews there. On a visit to the synagogue at Tbilisi he met three religious officials who told him that there had been a large attendance during the High Holidays. The conversation was inhibited by the presence of a government official. In spite of his efforts Namir failed to find out what befell the local Jewish ethnographic museum; he presumes that it was closed down.

Notes

1. 12 October 1949, 130.11/2513/17.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
3. See Nos. 254, 295 and 313.

340. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 14 October 1949

Notes

1. Eban was to dine that evening with Vyshinsky. Sharett is replying here to Eban's request for instructions in anticipation of that evening's meeting. (Eban to Sharett, telegram X670, 13 October 1949, 93.01/2202/3.) See also No. 348.

341. A. Eban (New York) to W. Austin (New York). 14 October 1949

Notes

1. An identical letter was sent to all the Permanent Members of the Security Council.
2. For the formulation of Israel's position on this subject see exchange of telegrams between Eban and Sharett, X650, 11 October 1949; X657, 12 October 1949, 93.01/2202/3; Y333, 14 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14.
3. See Vol. 3, Appendices C and H.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 above.

342. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 14/15 October 1949

343. The Government of Israel (Tel Aviv) to the Government of the United Kingdom (London). 14 October 1949

Notes

1. See No. 320.

344. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 15 October 1949

Coded Tel. IP233; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Sharett has been shocked by the revelations of Namir's survey No. 7[1] and he thinks conclusions should be drawn regarding future lines of action. He thinks that the recent development of an atomic device in the Soviet Union will act as a deterrent to actual hostilities but will tend to intensify the cold war, reducing chances of East–West *rapprochement* in the near future. He will seek a meeting with Vyshinsky in New York, not to go over ground covered in Paris[2] but to move on and raise the issue of Soviet Jewry in relation to Israel. He does not intend to press demands but to express his views verbally. In Sharett's opinion, the Soviets are also troubled by this issue and every effort should be made to steer them in the right direction. He intends telling Vyshinsky that the best guarantee for continued Israeli friendship and neutrality is a lively rapport between Soviet Jews and Israel.

[. . . . .][3]

Notes

1. The survey dealt with the Soviet campaign against Jewish writers and scientists in the Soviet Union and with the awakening of Jewish national sentiment there (130.11/2514/15).
2. Of 12 December 1948. See Vol. 2, No. 249.
3. The second part of this telegram, enumerating ways to rally world Jewish public opinion, has been omitted here.

345. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington) and A. Eban (New York). 16 October 1949

Notes

1. See Nos. 330 and 338.
2. For details of the talk with McDonald, see No. 346. Meeting with Helm, Sharett expressed Israel's views as summarized in the telegram at hand; Israel's Minister in London was instructed to convey them to the British Foreign Office and to assess Britain's reaction to Israel's position. (See Comay to Eliash, telegram IL195, 18 October 1949, 130.09/2318/2.)

346. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 17 October 1949

Notes

1. For details on the persecution of Jews in Iraq see Eytan to Eban, telegram YA332, 13 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14; and Pearlman to the Israeli delegation to the U.N., telegram IW233, 16 October 1949, 130.09/2308/4.

347. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 17 October 1949

Notes

1. See No. 333 and n. 5 *ibid.*

348. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 17 October 1949

Notes

1. Vladimir Clementis, Czechoslovakia's Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of its delegation to the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. Dmitry Z. Manuilsky, Ukrainian Representative at the U.N.
3. Lester B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs and head of its delegation to the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
4. Carlos García Bauer, Guatemalan Permanent Representative at the U.N.
5. Homero Viteri Lafronte, Ecuador's Representative at the U.N.
6. Fernand van Langenhove, Belgian Permanent Representative at the U.N.
7. Paragraph 8 of this telegram has been omitted.

349. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 18 October 1949

Notes

1. Sharett laid before the Cabinet his exchange of telegrams with Eban (see No. 322 and n. 2 *ibid.*, and also Nos. 329, 332, 333, 337 and 347), supporting Eban's arguments and proposed line of action. A majority of the Cabinet members concurred.

350. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 18 October 1949

Notes

1. Hector McNeil, Minister of State at the British Foreign Office; member of Britain's delegation to the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. See No. 346 and n. 1 *ibid.*
3. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
4. Telegram U2, 18 October 1949, 93.01/2202/3. See also No. 363, para. 2.

351. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 18 October 1949

352. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 18 October 1949

Notes

1. The French Cabinet had resigned on 5 October in the wake of wage increase demands by the Trade Unions.
2. See No. 307, n. 3.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
4. Eirik Labonne, the French Representative on the U.N. Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East.
5. Reference is to an American plan for aid to backward countries, first outlined in point four of President Truman's second term inaugural swearing-in speech on 20 January 1949. The plan's objectives and implementation methods were formulated during 1949, and in September the allocation schedule for the first year was submitted to Congress.

353. S. Ginossar (Rome) to W. Eytan. 18 October 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2396/15

Summary

Further to his previous communication,[1] Ginossar reports on the visit paid to him by the Papal Nuncio in Rome. The Nuncio began by discoursing on modern versus biblical Hebrew and on his own researches. Ginossar told him that Prof. Cassuto[2] was staying in Rome and suggested contacting him through Rabbi Prato.[3]

The Nuncio acknowledged receipt of the memorandum on the incidents at the churches sent to him by Ginossar at the end of August[4] and said he would transmit it to the Church authorities. Concerning Jerusalem, Ginossar gave him a text of Eban's speech at the U.N. Assembly[5] with an additional explanation of Israel's position on the subject of international supervision of the Holy Places and religious institutions. The Nuncio hinted at a certain similarity between Israel's proposal and the guarantees given to the Church in the past (before the Lateran Treaty)[6] which, he claimed, had not been satisfactory.

Ginossar presumes this was not a routine visit and was meant to renew personal contacts and to lay the groundwork for direct contacts in due time.

Notes

1. No. 331.
2. Umberto (Moshe David) Cassuto, Professor of Bible Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
3. David Prato, Rome's Chief Rabbi.
4. See No. 331, n. 3.
5. See Editorial Note, p. 195 above.
6. The 1929 treaty between Mussolini and the Pope, regularizing the Vatican's legal status in Rome and relations between the Church and the Italian Government.

354. J. Herzog (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 19 October 1949

Notes

1. No. 314.
2. Sharett to Elath, telegram IW215, 93.01/2202/2.
3. See Elath to Sharett, telegram W459, 17 October 1949, 93.01/2181/7.

355. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 19 October 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.

356. R. Shiloah (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 19 October 1949

357. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 19 October 1949

Notes

1. See No. 346 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. No. 346.
3. See No. 311.

358. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 19 October 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2397/19

Summary

Consequent on the new arrangement for emigration to Israel,[1] Barzilai re-emphasizes the importance of successfully absorbing the first immigrant groups. He reports on the Legation's activity during the last few weeks in preparation for large-scale emigration and also mentions his conversation with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on matters relevant to Israel at the U.N. He undertook to relay this to the Polish delegation at the U.N. Barzilai refers to his previous letter[2] reporting his impressions of Poland's attitude towards Israel and promises to send an additional and more detailed analysis in the near future.

Barzilai reverts to the problem of settling Jewish immigrants from Poland in Israel. He points out that the majority of the immigrants – having hitherto enjoyed a middle-class standard of living – might suddenly find themselves destitute. Prospective immigrants are very apprehensive and many of them are waiting to hear how the first groups fared. Barzilai requests permission to come to Israel and see things for himself. He suggests enlisting the help of

various institutions in Israel to absorb these immigrants, and he thinks his presence in Israel would help put across the importance of this cause. He would like Dagan[3] to join him and asks that they be allowed to leave before the first group of immigrants departs.

[. . . . .][4]

Notes

1. See No. 197.
2. 20 September 1949, 130.02/2397/19. See No. 286.
3. Pinhas Dagan, Attaché at the Israeli Legation in Warsaw.
4. Two sentences omitted here.

359. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 20 October 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 337, paras. 3, 4 and 6, and No. 364.

360. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 20/21 October 1949

Coded Tel. PI283, PI284; Recd: 21/22 October; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

In reply to Sharett's cable,[1] Namir comments:

(a) He is very much in favour of Sharett's going to New York, if only to meet Vyshinsky.

(b) The international situation appears gloomier to Namir following the Soviet development of an atomic device.[2] The fear of war might increase suspicion of undependable ethnic minorities in the Soviet Union and prompt a curtailment of the last remaining links with the outside. Namir doubts that the Soviets would view with favour Israel's attempt to urge Jewish emigration at this particular junction, and cites to this effect his conversation with Ehrenburg last December.[3]

(c) Nevertheless, Namir recommends probing the possibilities of emigration from Russia and also asking Vyshinsky why the Soviets have not accepted Israel's reiterated invitation to establish an economic and cultural foothold in the country. Furthermore, there has been no reply to the invitation extended to Gromyko[4] nor have the Soviets interceded on behalf of Jewish emigration from Rumania and Hungary. Namir recommends that the focus of the conversation be Israel's needs and not the fate of Soviet Jewry. He also suggests that influential non Russians, such as Henry Wallace,[5] Paul Robeson[6] and the writer Howard Fast be enlisted in the cause of emigration.

[. . . . .][7]

Notes

1. No. 344.
2. See No. 334, n. 1.
3. See Vol. 2, No. 216.
4. See Nos. 109 and 112.
5. Henry A. Wallace, formerly (1941–1945) Vice-President of the U.S.A.; presidential candidate, 1948.
6. Paul Robeson, American singer and actor, winner of the Stalin Prize for Peace, 1952.
7. Last paragraph omitted here.

361. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington) and A. Eban (New York). 21 October 1949

Notes

1. See Nos. 365, 380 and 382.

362. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 21 October 1949

Notes

1. No. 306.
2. No. 372.

363. M. Eliash (London) to M. Comay. 22 October 1949

Notes

1. Comay had communicated to Eliash the gist of Sharett's talk with Helm (18 October 1949, 130.09/2318/2). See No. 345 and n. 2 *ibid.*
2. See No. 350 and n. 4 *ibid.*
3. Reference is to the Archbishop of Canterbury, Geoffrey Francis Fisher, who met Eliash on 20 October 1949. For a report of the meeting, see letter to Comay, 20 October 1949, 93.03/3037/14.
4. Reference is to Israeli proposals for the conclusion of financial negotiations with the British (see No. 303, para. 6 and n. 4 *ibid.*). For the main points of the Israeli proposals, which had been endorsed by the Cabinet on 11 October 1949, see telegram to the Israeli Legation in London, IL198, 19 October 1949, 130.09/2318/2.
5. Comay communicated to Eliash the gist of Eban's talk with Pearson (see No. 351) and the positions taken by New Zealand and Australia on the Jerusalem question. He inquired whether Eliash concurred with Fischer, who reported that hostile Catholic propaganda against Israel had abated. (20 October 1949, 130.09/2318/2.)

364. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 23 October 1949

Notes

1. Eban had informed Sharett in advance that he intended sending the telegram at hand (20 October 1949, 130.09/2329/16).
2. See No. 314, n. 10.
3. Conciliation Commission Document of 29 August 1949, titled "Draft Declaration Concerning the Holy Places, Religious Buildings and Sites in Palestine outside the Area of Jerusalem" (see 130.02/2451/4).
4. Cf. No. 384.

365. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 24 October 1949

Notes

1. For Elath's previous meeting with McGhee, see No. 357.
2. The annual United Palestine Appeal conference closed in Washington on 24 October. Addressing the conference, Elath denounced the persecution of Jews in Iraq.

366. S. Eliashiv (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 25 October 1949

Coded Tel. IP237; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

Eliashiv reports that Sharett discussed with Moukhine the envisaged Iraqi–Syrian union,[1] and informed him of his talks on that subject with the American, British and French[2] diplomatic representatives. Regarding the Jerusalem issue, Moukhine remarked that the Soviet delegation had opposed setting up the Conciliation Commission and had favoured direct negotiations between the parties without mediators. He preferred that the issue not be raised at the present Assembly, and be given the chance to work itself out. Sharett explained to Moukhine the matter of the American military instructors on the lines of his cable to Namir.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 330, n. 3.
2. See No. 345, n. 2, and No. 346. No report on Sharett's conversation with the French Minister has been traced.
3. No. 321.

367. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 25 October 1949

Coded Tel. IP238; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

There are indications of the likelihood of Australia becoming a bridgehead for Israeli ties with South Asia. In a conversation Levin had at the Australian Department of External Affairs the Australians expressed readiness to aid in obtaining Pakistan's recognition of Israel.[1] Simultaneously, Eban reported that the Pakistani representative at the U.N. was scheming to embarrass India by bringing his Government to recognize Israel before India did. From Elath's conversation with Nehru[2] it appears that India is still sensitive to Muslim susceptibilities, thus Pakistani recognition could tip the balance. If Pakistan is in any way subject to Soviet influence, Sharett thinks it worth while to have Bakulin intimate to the Pakistani Head of State, shortly to visit Moscow, that the Soviet Union regards as unseemly Pakistan's failure to recognize Israel. Bakulin should be impressed with the importance to Israel of *rapprochement* with distant Asian neighbours that would tend to isolate her closer neighbours and ultimately lead to peace. Sharett instructs Namir not to act on the above line should he feel it might represent Israel as a Soviet client in Pakistan's eyes. He thinks it logical that Australian and Soviet concerted pressure would prove that East and West were competing for Israel's friendship, would enhance Israel's importance and hasten recognition.

Notes

1. See No. 275.
2. See No. 342.

368. B. Niv (Warsaw) to East European Division. 25 October 1949

Orig.: 130.11/2502/10

Niv, who recently joined the Legation's staff, taking over the functions of Carmel and Gal,[1] reports on the progress of emigration from Poland. So far about 2,000 persons have been summoned to pick up exit permits, about 800 have already received theirs, and a few have already left Poland. An additional group of 200–250 persons is preparing to leave in mid-November. The department in the Polish Ministry of the Interior dealing with exit permits has acted liberally, but the other offices involved keep raising obstacles and creating difficulties, particularly regarding permission to transfer emigrants' property to Israel. In addition to that, the members of the Communist Party's Jewish section, who control the Jewish committees, create obstacles for Jews applying for certificates of Jewish identity. They also disparage emigration and spread false information about Israel. Following their lead, the police has

also begun acting against the Zionist organizations for the propaganda they have allegedly been making in favour of emigration. Despite all this, the general impression from conversations with Jews in various localities is that they all want to emigrate to Israel and are making the necessary preparations.

Niv adds that greatly exaggerated reports, being spread in Poland by the anti-Zionist and also by the Zionist opposition press, may prejudice future emigration, which will be mainly determined by the success or failure of the absorption of the first groups of immigrants in Israel.

Niv rejects the notion that a selection can be made which would limit the number of the old, the sick and the crippled as immigrants. The main argument against this is political: if the Polish Government allows indiscriminate Jewish emigration to Israel, it is inconceivable that Israel itself deny that right to the handicapped. Niv hopes that these will not be many and that they will not constitute too heavy a burden.

Notes

1. Baruch Niv was appointed First Secretary, Consul and Immigration Officer, replacing Israel Carmel; he also took over Shlomo Gal's functions as Second Secretary at the Legation.

369. A. Katznelson[1] (New York) to M. Sharett. 26 October 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2384/21

Summary

Katznelson elaborates on certain basic points:

(1) *Jerusalem.* Katznelson infers that U.N. circles do not take the Conciliation Commission's plan very seriously,[2] both because it is unviable and because both sides oppose it. There is so far no alternative plan which would satisfy both the interests of the Holy Places and Arab demands. Katznelson suggests two possible lines of action: either to try to postpone or even to prevent a debate on Jerusalem at the current Assembly, or to submit an alternative plan. As the first possibility seems to him remote, he thinks it best to draw up an alternative plan, if possible by agreement with Jordan. The Security Council would be only too happy to be rid of the entire issue, as demonstrated the day before when the Egyptian representative raised the question of demilitarization.[3]

(2) *Events in Iraq.*[4] Katznelson suggests using the persecution of Iraq's Jews as an argument against the conditional admission of 100,000 Arab refugees. Israel could claim that events in Iraq conclusively demonstrate the necessity of ingathering the Jewish population from the Arab Diaspora in place of the Arabs who fled from Israel.

(3) *Relations with Jewish political bodies.* Katznelson criticizes Rabbi Perlzweig's appearance before the U.N. Political Committee during the

debate on the Italian colonies. Perlzweig introduced himself as representing Tripolitanian Jewry and demanded that their rights be safeguarded. His appearance did not help and might even have been detrimental from Israel's standpoint. Katznelson argues that intervention by the World Jewish Congress is undesirable in such cases; Israel should assume responsibility and come to an agreement over this with the Chairman of the Executive of the World Jewish Congress, Nahum Goldmann. Katznelson likewise criticizes the activities of Dr. Senator,[5] who had met and discussed with British and American politicians the subject of Mount Scopus, which constitutes an integral part of the whole complex of problems at issue with the Arabs. Katznelson wonders why official Israeli representatives saw fit to accompany Senator in his lobbying, which was unbecoming conduct for a well-ordered State. He suggests that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs move to prevent such undignified activities in future.

Katznelson hopes to meet Sharett in New York and discuss with him the above subjects.[6]

In a postscript Katznelson draws Sharett's attention to an item in the *New York Times* on Esther Herlitz.[7]

Notes

1. Avraham Katznelson, member of the Israeli delegation to the Fourth Session of the U.N. General Assembly.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
3. On a motion by Warren Austin, President of the Security Council, the Council rejected Fawzi's proposal to debate demilitarization of Jerusalem, since it was scheduled for debate at the Assembly. The Council decided to retain the subject on its agenda (see *SCOR, 4th Year*, 453rd Meeting, 25 October 1949, pp. 1–4).
4. See No. 346, n. 1.
5. David Werner Senator, Administrator and Executive Vice-President of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
6. For Sharett's reply, see No. 387.
7. Reference is to a complimentary report on Esther Herlitz's work at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs published in the *New York Times* on 16 October 1949.

370. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 26 October 1949

Notes

1. Elath was sceptical about the optimistic report conveyed in Sharett's telegram, writing to Sharett that he thought nothing had changed in the Vatican's hostile attitude regarding Jerusalem and that the new line was nothing but a smoke-screen to forestall accusations by Israel prior to the Assembly debate (telegram W492,. 28 October 1949, 93.01/2181/7). Sharett agreed with Elath, but pointed to the undeniable advantage of the Vatican finding it expedient to desist from hostile press propaganda owing to pressure from its representatives in Israel. This benefited masses of Jews the world over whose relations with their Catholic neighbours were affected by the press and not by secret diplomacy (telegram IW274, 31 October 1949, 130.09/2308/4).

371. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 26 October 1949

Notes

1. Ely Palmer was appointed to the post on 4 November.
2. The plan for an inter-Arab collective security pact was first raised by Egypt at the 11th session of the Arab League in Cairo in October 1949, and accepted in principle. A committee was appointed to draw up an appropriate plan. This committee met throughout November 1949 but failed to reconcile differences of opinion, particularly regarding definition of military and economic cooperation. More successful discussions were held during the 12th session of the League, in March–April 1950, and the agreement was initialled on 13 April by representatives of all the member states. Nevertheless, final formulation and ratification of the pact took several more years. (See A. Goren, *The Arab League* [Hebrew], pp. 281–301.)
3. McDonald reported to President Truman that from his meeting with the Pope he had carried away the impression that the lower clerical echelons in the Vatican and in New York were more uncompromising than the Pope and Cardinal Spellman (Elath to Sharett, telegram W459, 17 October 1949, 93.01/2181/7).
4. See No. 363, n. 4.

372. A. Eban (New York) to H. Yalçin (New York). 27 October 1949

Notes

1. No. 281.
2. Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
4. The letter is in file 130.02/2441/1.
5. See Vol. 3, Appendix C.
6. This paragraph deals with the assurance of peaceful conduct by states not members of the U.N.

373. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett. 28 October 1949

Notes

1. Sharett to Eban, 26 October 1949, 130.09/2328/14. Sharett dwelt on the importance of meeting Vyshinsky in New York and asked for Eban's advice on the optimal date for his visit (see also Eban's replies, telegrams X727, X728, 28 October 1949, 93.01/2202/3).
2. Part of this sentence has been omitted.

374. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 28 October 1949

Notes

1. Sharett had asked for Eban's opinion regarding Israeli recognition of Communist China and inquired: (1) Whether Israel should take the initiative or await China's approach. (2) Whether recognition by Western states was expected. (3) What was India's attitude? (4) What was the U.S. position? (5) What would be China's status as a permanent member of the Security Council? (27 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14.)

375. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 30 October 1949

Orig.: 93.03/69/20

Summary

There have been reports from Teheran about a more propitious atmosphere than hitherto for the recognition of Israel by Iran and the exchange of diplomatic representatives. Eytan suggests that Eban persuade both the Iranian Ambassador in Washington and the Iranian Representative at the U.N. to urge their Government to follow through. Eban should cite the good will shown by Israel towards Iranian nationals resident in the country, and Eytan gives him a few examples to substantiate this:

(1) About 100 Iranian nationals who had fled to Lebanon on the outbreak of hostilities were permitted to return to Israel on 15 July 1949, as an exception to the Government's declared policy against repatriation of refugees until peace is attained. A subsequent application to allow the return of 62 additional Iranian nationals is at present under consideration.

(2) A decision to release absentee property belonging to the re-admitted Iranian nationals was taken on 20 October 1949, this also being the first case of its sort.

(3) A representative of the Iranian Government arrived in Israel at the end of March to look after the interests of Iranian citizens. The Government of Israel allowed him to reoccupy the Iranian Consulate premises in Jerusalem and accorded him nearly all the prerogatives of an official representative of a state having diplomatic relations with Israel. Israeli officials apprised him of Israel's wish to dispatch an Israeli representative to Iran on a reciprocal basis.[1] The same subject had been broached with the Iranian Minister in Beirut on his visit to Israel in July. Israel has also applied for entry visas to Iran for two Jewish Agency officials who are to deal with Jewish emigration to Israel, but no reply has so far been received.

Eytan suggests indicating to Iranian representatives in the U.S. that Turkey, whose position in the Arab world barely differs from Iran's, has recognized Israel and is about to exchange diplomatic representatives. Commercial considerations, similar to those that swayed Turkey, may also influence the Iranians. It may be pointed out that Israel will remain an importing country for many years and Iranian goods would find a ready market in Israel.

Notes

1. See communication from Sharett to the Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 2 November 1949, 93.03/71/16.

376. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 30 October 1949

Notes

1. The telegram at hand was not dispatched.

No. 376 – Notes (continued)

2. Ragheb Nashashibi, then Governor-General of Jordanian occupied parts of Palestine; from December 1949 – Minister for Refugee Affairs in the Jordanian Government.
3. For further attempts at direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan. see Editorial Note, p. 250 below.
4. No. 362.

377. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to Israeli Missions Abroad. 30 October 1949

Coded Tel. IC199; Outg.: 130.09/2342/12

Summary

On 10 October Eban had dispatched excerpts pertinent to Jerusalem from his speech of 26 September[1] to heads of U.N. delegations, asking them to reconsider their views on this problem in the light of his remarks.[2] Many of the delegations have relayed Eban's communication to their governments, asking for instructions. Eban wants diplomatic activity launched in countries having expressed themselves for the Conciliation Commission's plan, as well as in countries which have not accepted Israel's viewpoint. Eytan instructs the heads of missions abroad to act accordingly. The subject of the Old City should not be raised, but in the event this is queried, the reply to be given is that the ideal solution would be to clear the Old City of all secular elements and confine it to religious activity, while guaranteeing free access to all. The State of Israel would then provide all services while the international community would have to compensate the present inhabitants. The Old City would thus become a kind of museum and pilgrimage centre.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 195 above.
2. For the text of the communications see file 93.03/3037/14.

378. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 30 October 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2397/19

Summary

Further to his previous letters[1] and to his conversation with the Polish Deputy Minister of Public Administration,[2] Barzilai reports on the progress of the emigration process. Two thousand exit permits have so far been issued and the Legation has received the first thousand passports. The first group will leave in late November.

Recent experience has shown that previous estimates of the number of immigrants requiring financial assistance had been greatly underestimated, and adequate provisions must be made.

Barzilai is concerned for the future of the Zionist parties, press and Funds, which he thinks will cease to exist by 1950. The general trend in the East European states is to abolish all institutions with links to the West; the Rajk[3] trial is regarded not as an isolated incident but as a danger warning. Polish officials emphasize that they desire a steady and high rate of emigration of Zionists, so that the dissolution of Zionist bodies is seen as a natural process and not as ordained from above. They claim to be ready to adjust the rate of Zionist emigration to the gradual dissolution of Zionist bodies so that their total liquidation is achieved when the majority of Zionists have emigrated or received their exit permits. Barzilai concludes that the majority of emigrants should be got out of the country before the middle of 1950.

Barzilai subsequently touches on the deliberated assignment of a Polish Minister to Israel, saying that the fate of Loc[4] has not yet been decided. He asks that the contents of the letter be kept confidential as so much of it is of a speculative nature.

Notes

1. See No. 358 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. The content of this conversation has not been brought here.
3. Laszlo Rajk, the Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and two other high officials were dismissed from their posts in June 1949 and tried and convicted for espionage and high treason. In mid-October, following rejection of their appeal, they were executed in Budapest.
4. Rafael Loc, who served as Polish Consul-General in Tel Aviv, left for Warsaw in mid-October.

379. R. Shiloah (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 1 November 1949

380. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 1 November 1949

381. M. Eliash (London) to M. Comay. 1 November 1949

Notes

1. Telegram LI180, 31 October 1949, 130.09/2318/5.
2. See Eytan to Eban, telegram YA384, 28 October 1949, 130.09/2329/14.
3. See No. 330, n. 3.
4. Thus in the original; "Political Committee" is presumably intended.

382. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 2 November 1949

Notes

1. No. 380.

Editorial Note

The debate in the Fourth U.N. Session on the admission of new members to the U.N.

At its final meeting on 4 November, the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the General Assembly was to decide on the admission of fourteen new members to the U.N. (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Ceylon, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Mongolian People's Republic, Nepal, Portugal, Korea and Rumania). Australia submitted nine draft resolutions – one for each state, excluding Mongolia and the East European countries – recommending that the Security Council reconsider favourably the candidacy of these states. Against this there was a Soviet draft resolution calling on the Security Council to approve *en bloc* the candidacy of all the states, excluding Korea. The Soviet proposal was defeated by 30 to 9, with 16 abstentions, including Israel, who supported the admission of seven out of the nine states proposed by Australia and abstained on Korea and Jordan. The candidacy of the nine states obtained the necessary majority in the Committee.

(See *GAOR, 4th Sess., AHPC,* Meetings 25–29, 31 October–4 November 1949, pp. 119–161; see also "Information for Israeli Missions Abroad", No. 40, 14 November 1949, 130.02/4364/1.)

383. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 3 November 1949

Notes

1. In reply to Eban's telegram X738 (1 November 1949, 93.01/2202/4) Sharett requested him to ascertain whether the Australian draft proposal was more likely to be adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Assembly than the Soviet one (2 November 1949, 130.09/2329/14). See Editorial Note above.
2. Viz., Jordan.
3. On the strength of the telegram at hand, Sharett instructed Eban to vote in favour of the Soviet proposal while announcing that Israel reserved her freedom of action regarding Jordan's admission to the U.N. in the forthcoming voting at the plenum. At the last moment, the Israeli representatives reported that Sweden intended to abstain, and it was then resolved also to abstain in the fear of Israel's being isolated in the voting together with the Soviet bloc (see Editorial Note above). As it turned out, Sweden, Mexico and Iraq voted with the Communist bloc. Sharett felt let down by his delegation for not having foreseen this development and complained that they had ignored the certainty of Iraq's supporting the Soviet proposal, which would have sufficed for Israel's affirmative vote (for Eban's reaction, see No. 394). Sharett instructed the delegation to vote for the Soviet proposal in the plenary, with a reservation in respect of Jordan, and to abstain on the admission of Korea, Jordan and Austria. (See Sharett's cables – to Eban, Y411, 6 November 1949; to Lourie, Y416, 6 November 1949; to the Israeli Mission in New York, Y419, 7 November 1949, 130.09/2329/14; Lourie to Sharett, telegram X748, 6 November 1949, 93.01/2702/4.)

384. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 3 November 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 337, paragraphs 3, 4 and 6, and also No. 364.
2. See draft resolution on Jerusalem and draft of agreement between Israel and the U.N. on the Holy Places. Both documents were enclosed with Eban's letter to Hood (3 November 1949, 130.02/2443/4) and were also sent with a short explanatory note to some of the Scandinavian, British Commonwealth, Central American and South American countries. For the final versions of these documents, see Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.

Editorial Note

The debate in the Fourth U.N. Session on the future of the Italian colonies in Africa

The First Committee of the General Assembly debated the future of the Italian colonies in Africa during two periods of time – from 30 September to 18 October and from 4 to 12 November. The first period was devoted to a general debate, in which the Israeli representative also took part; at its conclusion, a sub-committee was set up to formulate draft resolutions on the basis of the proposals put forward during the debate.

In November the sub-committee submitted a report containing three principal recommendations: (a) *Libya* – to attain independence not later than 1 January 1952. During the interim period a U.N. commissioner will assist the local authorities in their preparations for the transfer of authority. He will be aided by a 10-member advisory council comprising the three Western powers, Egypt, Italy, Pakistan, three representatives of the three regions of Libya, and a representative of the minorities. (b) *Somalia* – Italian trusteeship for a period of ten years. (c) *Eritrea* – a fact-finding commission to be set up to determine the wishes of the population and to submit its report not later than mid-June 1950. The sub-committee decided on the incorporation of the three proposals in one resolution.

The Soviet Union rejected the sub-committee's recommendations and submitted her own draft proposals, in which she demanded immediate independence for Libya and independence within five years for Eritrea and Somalia. After consultations and deliberations (see Nos. 385 and 400), Israel abstained on the Soviet proposal for immediate independence for Libya and supported the sub-committee's proposal, which was adopted by a majority of votes. Israel supported the clause on appointing a U.N. Commissioner in Libya, but abstained on the composition of the advisory council (the entire section was adopted by a majority of votes); supported the appointment of a fact-finding commission for Eritrea (adopted by a majority), but abstained on the proposal that the commission's report be referred to the Interim Committee; supported the proposal on Italian trusteeship for Somalia (adopted).

(See "Information for Israeli Missions Abroad", No. 40, 14 November 1949, 130.02/4364/1; *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1948–9, pp. 265–277; *GAOR, 4th Sess., First Committee*, Meetings 278–293, 30 September – 18 October 1949, pp. 19–90; Meetings 311–324, 4–12 November 1949, pp. 190–262.)

385. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 3 November 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. See Avner to Ginossar, telegram of 6 November 1949, 130.09/2356/1.

386. A. Eban (New York) to J. Hood (New York). 3 November 1949

Notes

1. A similar communication was sent to the heads of several other U.N. delegations; the list of these delegations, printed at the head of the document, has been omitted here.
2. The document, not appended here, contains a brief explanation of Israel's proposal for an agreement with the U.N. on the Holy Places in Jerusalem and the first draft of that agreement. A revised draft was sent to the same delegations on 16 November (see file). For the final version, see Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.

387. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Katznelson (New York). 4 November 1949

Copy: 93.03/87/11

Summary

Replying to Katznelson's letter,[1] Sharett agrees with the latter's arguments on the Jerusalem issue but is highly doubtful of the practicability of his conclusions. He does not think it feasible to detach the question of Jerusalem from all the other points at issue with Jordan and to reach an agreement on that problem only. In view of the scope of the issues no agreement with Jordan could be expected before the adjournment of the current Assembly even should negotiations commence immediately. In light of the unlikelihood of bringing before the Assembly a finalized agreement between Israel and Jordan on the Jerusalem issue, it seems best to leave the field to any possible agreement. Should the Assembly take up the Jerusalem issue, it would be desirable that any resolutions it may adopt do not prejudice Israel's negotiations with Abdallah. Had the Assembly not already passed the resolution of December 1948,[2] it would have been preferable if it did not adopt any new resolution on Jerusalem. As it is, some would contend that the internationalization resolution is still valid in the absence of a newer one. If this is the case, it might be preferable if present Assembly adopted a resolution

on Jerusalem which would supersede the previous one, substituting the principle of supervision of the Holy Places for that of internationalization. It may also prove useful to Israel if one of the delegations were to attempt to bring about a reendorsement of the principle of internationalization – and fail. Should the debate be postponed, however, Israel must take care not to be held responsible.

As to Katznelson's conclusions regarding events in Iraq, Sharett doubts whether it would be feasible to connect them with the Arab refugee problem. Sharett was indeed trying to find a way of retreat from Israel's proposal to admit conditionally 100,000 Arab refugees, but gave up after a grave warning on the part of the Israeli delegation at the U.N. It is highly unlikely that the problem of Iraq's Jews could serve as a pretext in this matter, and Sharett cautions against drawing analogies between the Iraqi Jews and the Arab refugees.

Nevertheless, despite the warning by the U.N. delegation, Sharett refrained, in formulating Israel's reply to the Conciliation Commission,[3] from giving renewed endorsement to the Israeli proposal on the refugees and even made an attempt to weaken the commitment somewhat.

Regarding the problem of the World Jewish Congress, Sharett agrees with Katznelson that its representatives should be prevented from appearing before bodies on which Israel itself is represented. However, the Congress should not be excluded, as a matter of general policy, from intervening in favour of Eastern Jewry, for its activity might prove effective to some extent.

As for Katznelson's remarks on Senator, Sharett writes that the latter had apparently made superfluous and entirely unwise moves such as his conversations with Mrs. Roosevelt[4] and Ben Cohen.[5] However, in general, Sharett thinks that the participation of representatives of the Hebrew University in the political offensive on behalf of the Jerusalem issue should not be opposed. Sharett also feels that while Katznelson's criticism of this kind of lobbying is justified, he may be overreacting, for in certain circumstances even a well-ordered state may require the use of such unconventional methods.

Notes

1. No. 369.
2. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
3. No. 372.
4. Eleanor Roosevelt, member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N.
5. Benjamin V. Cohen, member of the U.S. delegation to the U.N.

388. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 4 November 1949

Notes

1. See No. 402.

389. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 4 November 1949

Notes

1. Of the armistice agreement with Jordan. See Vol. 3, Appendix H.
2. Cf. No. 369, para. 3, and No. 387.
3. One sentence has been omitted here.

390. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 4 November 1949

391. M. Amir (Brussels) to W. Eytan. 4 November 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2382/13

Summary

Amir requests some elucidation of Eytan's last telegram,[1] and comments upon the proposal to internationalize the Old City. In his view,

(1) Israel's consent to internationalize the Old City weakens her stand against possible similar action with respect to the New City.

(2) The principle advocated by Israel of international supervision of the Holy Places may just as well be extended to the Old City.

(3) Opposition to the principle of the internationalization of Jerusalem and submission of a formula for international supervision may bring Abdallah closer to Israel, thereby promoting the formation of a united front against the sub-committee's proposal.

(4) Abdallah's opposition to internationalization may undermine the unity of the Arab front on this issue.

(5) Israeli consent to the internationalization of the Old City may drive Abdallah into the arms of the other Arab states. At the same time, his continued control of the Old City will arouse the antagonism of the other Arab rulers.

Israel's argument on the impracticability of the international regime, involving the presence in the City of foreign armed forces including those of the Soviet Union, would be undermined by her consent to the internationalization of the Old City. In conclusion, Amir argues that the entire proposal is quite unfeasible in view of the effective occupation of the Old City by the Arabs.

[. . . . .][2]

Amir adds that he has been informed that the Soviets would view with satisfaction Israel's consent to the internationalization of the Old City, as this would accord with their aim of pushing the British out of the Middle East. However, he doubts whether Russian approval of Israel's stand would outweigh the damage caused.[3]

Notes

1. See No. 377. The last sentence in the telegram to Amir reads: "Act also in Holland as well as in Luxembourg, if possible". (130.09/2300/10.)
2. The first part of para. 6 has been omitted here.
3. In his reply, Eytan expressed his agreement with Amir's comments but added that Israel intended to avoid any reference to the Old City in the draft proposal to be submitted to the Assembly "and even if the U.N. does adopt a resolution concerning the Old City we shall not have been a party to it and will not be obliged to give it our explicit agreement" (14 November 1949, 130.02/2382/13). For Israel's draft proposal, see Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.

392. D. Goitein (Johannesburg) to M. Comay. 4 November 1949

Notes

1. David Goitein, Israel's Consul-General in South Africa.
2. Douglas D. Forsyth, Secretary to the Prime Minister and Secretary for External Affairs, South Africa.
3. Of 26 September, at the U.N. General Assembly. See Editorial Note, p. 195 above.
4. Comay had reported on Eban's suggestion to submit an alternative plan to the Conciliation Commission's Plan for Jerusalem (20 October 1949, 130.09/2316/1). See No. 384 and n. 2 *ibid.*

393. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to M. Sharett. 5 November 1949

Coded Tel. RI211; Recd: 6 November; Inc.: 130.09/2296/9

Summary

Rubin reports that the Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister handed him his government's official protest concerning Ben-Gurion's accusations against Rumanian ministers and officials in his last speech.[1] The Deputy Minister also mentioned the demonstration in front of the Rumanian Legation in Tel Aviv[2] and the incident aboard the SS *Transylvania*.[3] He informed Rubin that this development is leading to a cooling-off of relations between the two countries, and took the opportunity to state in no uncertain terms that the emigration of Rumanian Jews was a purely internal matter on which there would be no further negotiations with Israel. He refused to hear Rubin's explanations and requested an official reply from the Israeli Government.[4]

Rubin acknowledges receipt of telegrams Nos. 6520 and 115[5] and asks to be provided with the full text of the reply.[6]

Notes

1. In his 29 October speech at a rally of Mapai activists in Tel Aviv, Ben-Gurion came out with a scathing attack on Ana Pauker and her policy concerning the Jews. He said, *inter alia*: " . . . a Jewish rabbi's daughter, whose relatives are in Israel, is suppressing and forcibly crushing any manifestation of free Jewish expression, any show of Zionist aspirations, of longing for a homeland, any attempt to emigrate to Israel . . . she puts them in jail, liquidates the *He-Halutz* [Pioneer Youth movement] training farms, forbids Jewish children to join their parents in Israel and parents to go to their children in the homeland, forces Jewish rabbis to slander the State of Israel and its Government at the synagogues during the sacred festivals so as to eradicate from the Jewish masses any spark of the will or the hope to come to their homeland in Israel. These are acts typical of the 'Communist *Yevsektsiya*', as such misdeeds are not an inevitable by-product of Gentile Communism. Gentile Communists in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia do not indulge in such sadistic actions – and it is a fact that emigration from these countries is at present permitted, though of course it is not out of the question that the Jewish *Yevsekists* may induce their Gentile comrades to emulate them!" (Cf. reports on the liquidation of the Zionist movement in Rumania in file 130.11/2514/8.)
2. For details on the demonstration, see letter from Eliashiv to Rubin, 31 October 1949, 130.11/2514/8.
3. Several months previously, the Haifa police took off board the SS *Transylvania* an immigrant who was not in possession of an exit permit from Rumania. The Rumanian authorities protested, and Israel explained that the man was defendant in a legal action opened against him in Israel. (See Eliashiv to Rubin, telegram 71, 2 August 1949, 130.09/2296/8.)
4. The full report on the conversation, which lasted only ten minutes, is in file 130.11/2493/12.
5. The first telegram has not been traced. In the second telegram Eliashiv instructed Rubin to explain to the Rumanians that Ben-Gurion's speech had been aimed at the anti-Zionist and anti-emigration activities of Jewish Communists, that Ana Pauker had not been mentioned by name and that "there had been no intention of offending her personally". Rubin was to apologize to the Rumanians, but also to point out that Israel had been exercising restraint for many months in the face of "unbridled propaganda" against the Zionist enterprise and slanderous reports on members of the Israeli Government in the Rumanian press. (4 November 1949, 130.09/2296/8.)
6. For Israel's reply, see No. 439; see also No. 456.

394. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 6 November 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 231 above, and also No. 383 and n. 3 *ibid.*
2. *Ibid.*

395. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 6 November 1949

Notes

1. Attaché at the Israeli Embassy in Washington. Sharett is replying here to Elath's cable requesting instructions on how to respond to an invitation extended through Shalit by Abd al-Mun'im Rifa'i, Counselor at the Jordanian Legation in Washington, and by Fawzi al-Mulqi to arrange an informal meeting with "a high-ranking Israeli diplomat" (W506, [2 November 1949], 93.01/2181/7).

No. 395 – Notes (continued)

2. No further information on the proposed meeting is available; possibly the Jordanian move in Washington was part of King Abdallah's attempt to sound out the possibility of direct talks with Israel (see Editorial Note, p. 250 above).

396. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 6 November 1949

Notes

1. See No. 460, n. 4.
2. See No. 352, n. 5.

397. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 6 November 1949

Coded Tel. PI309; Recd: 7 November; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

(a) The Ethiopian Minister in Moscow, back from a home visit, says he was not able to ascertain the Emperor's intentions regarding Israel.[1] However, Namir suspects that the Minister tried, though unsuccessfully, to persuade the Emperor to change his stance. When Namir apprised the Minister of Sharett's message as contained in telegram 218,[2] the Minister expounded at length on the arguments for the annexation of Eritrea to his country.

(b) The new Rumanian Ambassador met Namir and enquired about the problem of emigration. Namir informed him, *inter alia*, about his talks in Rumania and about the agreement with Ana Pauker.[3] The Ambassador showed interest in the details but did not comment.

(c) Namir suggests that Israel's representatives at the U.N. raise the subject of Albanian Jewry's emigration to Israel with the Albanian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs during his stay in New York.

Notes

1. See No. 276 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. Sharett had requested that the Ethiopian diplomat be made to understand that, in view of his country's identification with the Arab bloc, Israel "has considerably cooled" towards Ethiopia's claim for an outlet to the sea in Eritrea and it was highly doubtful whether she would continue supporting it unless there was a substantial change in his country's attitude (20 September 1949, 130.09/2325/3).
3. The agreement, of July 1948, had allowed for the emigration from Rumania of 5,000 Jews per month. See Vol. I, No. 374 and n. 1 *ibid.*, and also No. 549 *ibid.*

398. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 6 November 1949

Coded Tel. PI310; Recd: 7 November; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

(a) At his meeting with the Afghan Ambassador, Namir raised the question of recognition of Israel, saying that Afghanistan, a Moslem state remote from the Israeli–Arab conflict, should help the Arab states to abandon their ostrich-like policy of ignoring Israel's existence. One way of doing this would be for Afghanistan to hasten its recognition of Israel, as Turkey had done. The Ambassador replied that his government had nothing against Israel, but that fanatical public opinion, with all its religious solidarity with the Arabs, was not yet favourable to this step. To effect this change, more time was needed, or some new positive development in the relations between the Arab states and Israel, over and above the present armistice agreements.

(b) At a meeting with the new Hungarian Ambassador, Namir raised the question of emigration from Hungary. The Ambassador quoted numerous arguments in justification of his country's policy: (1) the situation of Hungary's Jews was good; (2) there was no anti-Jewish discrimination involved since no Hungarians were allowed to emigrate; (3) his country needed the better element among the Jews; (4) the inferior element would be of no use to Israel either; (5) there had been cases of families which had emigrated to Israel in order to prevent the nationalization of their property in Hungary only to lose their money in Israel; when they returned to Hungary, they vilified Israel; (6) the Rajk trial[1] revealed great internal dangers, necessitating extensive purges and the closing off of contacts with the outside; (7) intensive purges had not yet commenced in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria, but once they had, there too the gates would be closed; (8) emigration from a people's democratic paradise to a less progressive country goes against nature; (9) nonetheless, when the purges end and the regime has stabilized, opportunity to emigrate to Israel may be given to those Jews whose presence in Hungary is not vital. Namir countered each argument. He stresses the fact that the Hungarian Ambassador was the only diplomat in Moscow of proletarian origin, [. . . . .][2] uninformed on Israel's problems. [. . . . .][3] Presumably, his remarks were not of his own formulation, but had been dictated from above. Namir has informed Avriel accordingly.

Notes

1. See No. 378, n. 3.
2. Five words have been omitted here.
3. One sentence has been omitted here.

399. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to M. Namir (Moscow). 7 November 1949

Coded Tel. IP256; Outg.: 130.09/2325/3

Summary

In reply to Namir's cable,[1] Sharett instructs him to avoid for the time being any contact with the German representative. If necessary, Namir should explain that the feelings of the Jewish people towards the German nation preclude such contacts. He may add that this attitude does not detract from Israel's appreciation of the anti-Hitlerite character of the East German Government. It may also be hinted that even the circles that set up the present East German Government had not after all created an underground movement during the War.

Notes

1. Namir had urgently asked for instructions on what should be the nature of his relations with the newly-arrived Minister from East Germany, both on the formal diplomatic level and on the unofficial personal level (6 November 1949, 130.09/2325/4).

400. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 7 November 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 232–3 above, and No. 385.
2. Arne Sunde, Norway's Permanent Representative at the U.N.
3. See No. 318 and n. 4 *ibid.* For Eban's caustic reaction to Ginossar's attitude, see document entitled: The Somalia issue – some concluding comments; 14 November 1949, 130.02/2454/15.

401. A. Lourie (New York) to C. de Boisanger (New York). 8 November 1949

Notes

1. U.N. Document A/AC.25/2, in file 130.02/2451/4.

402. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 8 November 1949

Notes

1. Abbas Aram.
2. Abd al-Ilah, the Iraqi Regent, King Abdallah's nephew.
3. No. 375.

No. 402 – Notes (continued)

4. Reference is persumably to Ziya-ul-Din Tabatabai, one of the leaders of the 1921 coup in Iran, who had retired from active politics in the late 40's.
5. No. 388.
6. Cf. No. 418.

403. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to P. Fraser (Wellington). 8 November 1949

Notes

1. Peter Fraser, New Zealand's Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs. A similar communication was sent by Sharett on 6 November to the Australian Minister of External Affairs.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.

404. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 9 November 1949

Notes

1. Cf. record of the conversation which had taken place at the Department of State on 3 November 1949 in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1465–8.

405. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 9 November 1949

Notes

1. Telegram to Eytan, FIR17, 130.09/2344/5.
2. The Foreign Ministers of the three Western powers held talks in Paris, on 9–10 November, on the question of Germany.
3. See No. 377.

406. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to S. Ginossar (Rome). 9 November 1949

Copy: 130.02/2381/18

Summary

In reply to Ginossar's letter of 1 November dealing with Kadury's conversation with Count Roberti,[1] Eytan advises Ginossar that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs does in principle favour contacts between high-ranking Israeli diplomats and their Arab counterparts; these should, however, be subject to the following limitations:

(a) In establishing such contacts, Israel should not appear as seeking favours or pursuing the Arabs; the contact should be established in a natural way.

(b) In conversations with Arab diplomats, one should not overemphasize Israel's desire for peace. The policy is to create the impression that Israel wants peace but with no particular urgency about it. Israel's numerous declarations on the subject have only reinforced the Arabs' impression that she is in urgent need of a peace settlement and that her economic difficulties will force her to accept their conditions.

(c) Contact between Israeli and Arab diplomats must not assume the nature of negotiations. The Arabs should not have the impression that any particular Israeli representative has been entrusted with the task of ascertaining how much can be achieved through direct negotiations.

(d) As for the possibility of establishing direct contact with the Lebanese Legation in Rome, Eytan warns against involving Italy as a third party. Israel does not desire that Italy or any other country should serve as mediator between herself and the Arabs.

Notes

1. Count Guerino Roberti, Director of the British Commonwealth and Middle East Division in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had suggested to Benzion Kadury, Counselor at the Israeli Legation in Rome, that use be made of the connections of Count Zoppi, the Director of the Ministry, to establish direct contact between the Israeli and Lebanese Ministers in Rome. He had also offered his own services to introduce Ginossar to the representative of the Sovereign Order of the Knights of Malta in the Vatican. Ginossar was in favour of accepting both offers and asked Eytan for clear instructions. (130.02/2381/8.)

407. M. Namir (Moscow) to M. Sharett. 9 November 1949

Coded Tel. PI312; Recd: 10 November; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

(a) Malenkov's speech[1] created a deep impression among Western diplomats that the Soviet Union sincerely wished to avoid war and accepted that the two rival social systems should compete with each other by peaceful means.

(b) Namir points to a paragraph in Malenkov's speech in which he said that the present wave of emigration of workers from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary was about to be halted, and that people who had in the past been forced to abandon their homelands were now returning and "integrating into the ranks of the builders of socialism".

(c) During the military parade, Namir was approached by Gromyko and Mrs. Gromyko, who were conspicuously friendly.

(d) On the same occasion, the Czechoslovak Ambassador introduced to Namir the German representative, who mentioned his acquaintance with Livneh[2] and Burschweidt[3] from Israel, as well as with Julius Meyer, the head of the Jewish community in Berlin. The German representative took the

initiative in the conversation; Namir avoided further contact with him as instructed in Sharett's telegram 304.[4]

Notes

1. Gheorghy Malenkov, one of the Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet Council of Ministers and Member of the Politburo of the Communist Party. Malenkov was the principal speaker at the October Revolution celebrations on 7 November.
2. Eliahu K. Livneh, Israeli Consul and Immigration Officer in Munich.
3. Presumably A. Burstein, then Israeli Immigration Officer in Berlin.
4. See No. 399, n. 1.

408. S. Eliashiv (Tel Aviv) to R. Rubin (Bucharest). 9 November 1949

Coded Tel. IR117; Outg.: 130.09/2296/8

Summary

In a conversation with the Rumanian Minister in Israel, Sharett raised all major issues between the two countries:[1] the importance of immigration, the broken promises to Namir and Agami,[2] the importance of Rumania's Jews for Israel and Zionism, the absence of a reply to Sharett's letter to Pauker,[3] and vilification in the Rumanian press.

The Minister said nothing new. He stressed that he was speaking in his personal capacity and that the only official pronouncement was the Deputy Foreign Minister's statement to Rubin.[4] Rumania wished all her citizens to participate in the upbuilding of the country and she alone had the authority to decide who should be allowed to leave. He remarked on the unfriendly attitude to Rumania as manifested in the Israeli press and in the *Transylvania* incident, and also referred to the demonstration and the speech.[5]

Sharett replied that when a conflict develops, it is not easy to determine its exact source, but the principal issue here was the Rumanian stand on immigration. The Minister promised to report the content of the conversation to his government but Sharett's impression was that their talk had done nothing to further matters.

Notes

1. For record of the conversation, see file 130.11/2514/8.
2. See No. 397, n. 3.
3. See No. 43, n. 4.
4. See No. 393.
5. *Ibid.*, nn. 1, 2 and 3.

409. I. Barzilai (Warsaw) to M. Sharett. 11 November 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2381/12

Summary

In reply to Sharett's letter of 12 October,[1] Barzilai expresses his regret at what he considers the Israeli Government's mistaken decision not to accord special treatment to immigration from Poland.[2] He admits that the moral aspect of discriminating in favour of the remnant of Polish Jewry may be open to discussion, but he stresses that its practical importance should not be ignored. He is happy to learn that Sharett had supported his proposal, and would like to know the essence of the arguments against it at the Cabinet meeting.

Further to his previous letter Barzilai[3] now reports on the process of liquidation of the Zionist Organization in Poland. Almost all the Jewish and non-Jewish relief organizations with headquarters in the West have recently been closed down. The resultant loss of many tens of thousands of dollars annually was outweighed by the overriding political importance of extirpating every organization with its roots in the West. The government refused to delay the disbanding of the Zionist Organization until emigration of Polish Jewry had been accomplished, claiming that the Organization could not be an exception to overall policy and general instructions. Thus the Zionist press has in effect ceased to appear and the various funds have stopped their activities. The agricultural training farms will soon close down and the Zionist parties will presumably suffer the same fate by the end of the year. The Polish authorities assure the Israelis that their actions are not directed specifically at Zionism. On the contrary, this very year the Zionist dream of free immigration has materialized for Poland's Jews.

Further on, Barzilai analyses some of the internal developments in Poland. [. . . . .][4]

Barzilai reminds Sharett of his request for a short visit in Israel,[5] asking for a reply.

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. The Cabinet debated emigration from Poland on 20 September 1949. Sharett reported to the Cabinet that, though restrictions on Jewish emigration had eased, there was no great thrust to leave for Israel owing to absorption difficulties. He dwelt on the seriousness of this development, stressing its possible effect on future emigration from Rumania and Hungary. Sharett advocated action to change the atmosphere in the Jewish communities in Poland, "even if it involved a policy of discrimination in favour of Poland's Jews", and proposed that the Legation in Warsaw be permitted to issue a statement promising special treatment for immigrants from Poland. All other members of the Cabinet objected to this proposal and warned against any idea of discrimination; it was resolved that "no favoured treatment in respect of any Jewish community whatsoever should be promised or announced".

No. 409 – Notes (continued)

3. No. 378.
4. One section has been omitted here.
5. See No. 358.

410. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 14 November 1949

Notes

1. No. 396.
2. See No. 411 and n. 2 *ibid.*

411. E. Elath (Washington) to M. Sharett. 14 November 1949

Notes

1. Burton Berry, Director of the Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs in the U.S. Department of State.
2. The Ambassadors of the Arab states met Webb on 14 November 1949, and delivered to him a joint memorandum urging the U.S. Government to exert pressure on Israel to implement the partition resolution as agreed in the Lausanne Protocol of 12 May 1949 (see Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above). Webb promised to give the memorandum his attention, but made it clear to the Arabs that the U.S. Government could not impose any particular solution on any of the parties and suggested that the Arabs agree to direct talks with Israel (see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1486–90). After the meeting the Egyptian Ambassador, Rahim, made a statement to the press. He refused to disclose the content of the Arab memorandum, rejecting the suggestion of direct talks with Israel as long as the latter keeps violating U.N. resolutions by refusing to cooperate with the Conciliation Commission and by her latest steps for the transfer of government offices to Jerusalem and for the annexation of Jaffa to Tel Aviv. Elath issued a counterstatement, categorically rejecting Rahim's accusations. (See *The New York Times*, 15 November 1949, p. 1.)

412. Meeting: M. Sharett and S. Eliashiv – P. Yershov. (Tel Aviv, 15 November 1949)

Report: 130.11/2513/14

Summary

Sharett informed the Soviet Minister of Israel's opposition to the inter-Arab collective security pact,[1] pointing out that such a pact would be aimed against the Soviet Union, a state friendly to Israel, and this was in itself sufficient reason for Israel to oppose it. Moreover, the pact might also be aimed at Israel. Sharett told the Minister that he had stressed these two arguments in his talk with the American Ambassador prior to the latter's departure for the conference of the American representatives in the East, and had cautioned him against extending support to the pact.

Concerning Newman's articles in the *Herald Tribune*,[2] Sharett said that Newman's relations with the Israeli Legation in Moscow had been bad and that he was the only foreign journalist to have been banned from attending the Legation's receptions. On being questioned more closely, Sharett declared that the Israeli press was free to print anything it chose, whereupon the Minister asked whether it was also free to print reports derogatory to foreign representatives, referring in particular to items which had appeared in *Ma'ariv* and *Yedi'ot Aharonot*[3] following the Seventh of November reception at the Soviet Legation. Both Sharett and Eliashiv assured the Minister that they, too, had been incensed by these news items, but Sharett emphasized that there were no legal means to prevent such reports from appearing in print. At any rate, he promised to have the matter looked into.

At this point, Sharett complained about meetings of the Israel–U.S.S.R. Friendship League held in various localities, in the course of which the Government of Israel was violently attacked in the presence of representatives of the Soviet Legation. The Minister agreed that speeches on internal matters were out of place at meetings aimed at fostering friendship.

Notes

1. See No. 371, n. 2.
2. Joseph Newman, *N.Y. Herald Tribune* correspondent in Moscow. Newman had at the time been dispatching a series of reports critical of life in the Soviet Union.
3. In protest against their representatives not having been invited to the 7th November reception at the Soviet Legation, the two newspapers published reports criticizing the Soviet Minister's behaviour in that matter (see *Ma'ariv* and *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 11 November 1949).

413. Memorandum by E. Sasson. 15 November 1949

93.02/172/9

Summary

Proposed Basic Points for Talks with France[1]

To be required of France

(a) To retreat from her present position on the Jerusalem issue and to support Israel's plan in every international and religious forum.

(b) To recognize Israel's present boundaries in the north, east, and south.

(c) To refrain from supporting, directly or indirectly, any Arab or Western plan aimed at reducing Israel's present territory.

(d) To aid Israel in achieving a genuine peace settlement with her neighbours through direct negotiations.

(e) To refrain from supporting any Arab aggression directed at Israel, whether in the form of propaganda or training facilities, armaments, loans, commerce, etc.

(f) Not to build up France's political, economic and cultural relations with the Arab states at the expense of Israeli interests.

(g) Not to agree to any coordination of Middle Eastern policy with any Western power in a way that might eventually, directly or indirectly, harm Israel's political and economic interests.

(h) To exert all her influence with the countries concerned in the East and West for the resumption of Iraqi oil flow to Haifa.

(i) To instruct all the French ambassadors, ministers and other representatives in the East, the West and the U.N. and other international bodies to maintain close contacts with the Israeli representatives in all matters pertaining to the Middle East in order to exchange information and opinions and to coordinate their positions as far as possible.

(j) To fight antisemitism within her borders, in her colonies and elsewhere.

To be offered in return

(a) Should the U.N. decide to appoint a commissioner (or commissioners) for the Holy Places in Israel and in the Arab parts of Palestine, Israel will support France's candidacy.

(b) Israel will undertake not to violate the present borders of Syria and Lebanon unless they themselves commence hostilities, whether separately or in concert with one or more of the Arab states, or permit free transit through their territory to hostile forces.

(c) Israel will undertake not to support – and will even oppose – any Arab or Western scheme aimed against the regimes, the independence or the boundaries of Syria and Lebanon, or aiming to alter the Arab balance of power in the Middle East.

(d) Israel will undertake to oppose the Arab League should it attempt to involve the Arab world or the North African countries in any political or military adventure which could harm French interests.

(e) Israel will not oppose the establishment of French military bases in one of the Levant countries should this prove necessary, and, conversely, will strongly oppose the inclusion of the Levant countries in the British military, financial, economic, etc. sphere of influence.

(f) Israel will aid France to the best of her ability in consolidating her position in the Levant countries and in North Africa. Should genuine peace be achieved with the Arab countries, Israel will not enter into any political or commercial agreements with them which might prejudice French privileges or harm French interests.

(g) Israel will exchange information with France on the situation in the Arab countries.

(h) The dissemination of French culture in Israel will be intensified.

(i) The Jewish people in the Diaspora and in the United States in particular will be mobilized in support of French political, economic, etc. interests.

(j) Commercial ties with France will be strengthened as far as possible and Israel will refrain from competing with her in world markets, especially the Arab ones.

(k) Israel will be prepared to enter upon talks on French ecclesiastical and other property in Israel as soon as possible.

(l) Israel will use her broadcasting services in Arabic for France's benefit whenever asked to do so, and will be prepared to dispatch an adviser on Eastern affairs to the Arabic radio programme in Paris.

Notes

1. For the background of this memorandum and its objective, see No. 440.

414. H. Yalçin (New York) to A. Eban (New York). 15 November 1949

Notes

1. No. 372.
2. No. 281.
3. See Appendix A, Main Volume, pp. 777–9.
4. No. 255.
5. See Editorial Note, pp. 20–21 above.
6. See No. 372, para. 3, and n. 4 *ibid.*
7. For the texts of the Armistice Agreements, see Vol. 3, Appendices F–I.
8. *GAOR, 4th Sess., AHPC,* Annex II, pp. 9–14.
9. Israel postponed formulation of her reply to the Commission's communication until after the termination of the U.N. Session. A reply was finally drafted on 25 January 1950, but it was decided not to dispatch it. It was read out by Rafael at the opening session of the Conciliation Commission in Geneva in late January 1950. (See "Information for Israeli Missions Abroad", No. 59, 30 January 1950, 130.02/2447/1.)

415. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 17 November 1949

Coded Tel. YA453; Outg.: 130.09/2329/14

Summary

(1) On 15 November the Government decided as follows: The Israeli delegation to the U.N. Assembly will endeavour to prevent any resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem at this Session. Should these efforts fail, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is authorized to submit to the U.N. Assembly Israel's proposal to empower the Secretary-General to sign an agreement on the Holy Places with Israel.[1]

(2) By a majority of 5 to 2, it was resolved that the proposal, if submitted, will not include any reference to the Old City.

Notes

1. See No. 384, n. 2.

416. A. Lourie (New York) to W. Eytan. 17 November 1949

Notes

1. See No. 414 and n. 9 *ibid.*
2. U.N. Document AR/23, in file 130.02/2441/10.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.

417. E. Elath and A. Eban (Washington) to W. Eytan. 17 November 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to the Conciliation Commission's plan; see Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
2. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1495–8.

418. E. Elath (Washington) to W. Eytan. 17 November 1949

Notes

1. See No. 402.

419. J. Tsur (Buenos Aires) to W. Eytan. 18 November 1949

Coded Tel. RA11; Recd: 19 November; Inc.: 130.09/2294/3

Summary

In a conversation with Uruguay's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the latter informed Tsur that their U.N. delegation had received explicit instructions to act in support of supervision of the Holy Places in Jerusalem and against internationalization. Tsur was also told that the appointment of a Uruguayan minister to Israel was conditional on the ratification of a new diplomatic working plan which also included Israel. Tsur advises against exerting any pressure at this time to hasten the appointment of the representative.

420. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to Israeli Delegation to U.N. (New York). 20 November 1949

Notes

1. Eban had apprised Comay of Australia's intention to submit to the Ad Hoc Political Committee a draft resolution for an international regime in Jerusalem, asking for urgent intervention with Evatt to have this plan abandoned (18 November 1949, 93.01/2202/4). See also Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 below.

No. 420 – Notes (continued)

2. The general elections in Australia were to take place on 10 December 1949.
3. Eban's estimate was that the Australian proposal would strengthen the supporters of internationalization and weaken the protagonists of the Conciliation Commission's plan. He thought it advantageous if several draft resolutions were submitted and none were to obtain the necessary majority. (Telegram to Comay, X798, 21 November 1949, 93.01/2202/4.)

421. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 20 November 1949

Editorial Note

Preliminary contacts in preparation for Israeli–Jordanian peace talks

At the end of October and beginning of November 1949 King Abdallah made overtures to Israel through various agents preliminary to initiating direct peace talks (see Nos. 376 and 395, and cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1460–1, 1468–9, 1483–4).

One of the go-betweens was Moshe Novomeysky, Managing Director of the Palestine Potash Company, whom King Abdallah had already met in London on 31 August. At that meeting, held with the object of obtaining Jordan's agreement to the resumption of potash production at the southern Dead Sea works, the possibility of Israeli–Jordanian talks was raised, but the King advanced far-reaching territorial claims: he demanded the return of Lydda, Ramle, Beersheba and Aqaba, maintaining that he had to show the Arab states Israeli concessions in order to justify his contacts with Israel. When Novemeysky met Rifa'i, the King's confidant, the following day, the latter attempted to moderate Abdallah's claims and to put them on a more realistic basis, but he, too, demanded that Israel show her good will by offering concessions. (See record of the conversation, 2 September 1949, enclosed with Eliash's letter to Comay, 5 September 1949, 130.13/2599/12.)

In mid-November a further meeting between King Abdallah and Novomeysky took place, at which the King requested that the Israel government be informed of his willingness to conduct talks "on principles of peace". At the meeting the King made it clear that he would not demand the return of Jaffa, Lydda and Ramle, but would stand firm on "an outlet to the sea and passage to the sea". Ben-Gurion gave an account of that meeting at a Cabinet meeting on 5 December. On 21 November Israel accepted the King's initiative and the talks opened at Shuneh on 27 November (see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1509–10, and also Nos. 424, 426, 431 and 441).

422. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 20 November 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, above.
2. Eytan informed Sharett by cable (Y479, 24 November 1949, 130.09/2329/14) of the date of the scheduled meeting. See No. 441.

423. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 21 November 1949

424. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 21 November 1949

Notes

1. The meeting was held at General Riley's initiative and with his participation. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1483–6.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 250 above.
3. See No. 426.

Editorial Note

The debate on the Jerusalem issue at the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the U.N. Assembly

Following a brief debate on the Palestine issue during the first stage of the Fourth U.N. Session, the General Assembly referred the issue to the Ad Hoc Political Committee. There were three subjects on the agenda: (a) proposals for an international regime in Jerusalem; (b) protection of the Holy Places; (c) relief for the Arab refugees. The Committee held its sessions on 24–29 November and 5–7 December, devoting most of the time to the Jerusalem issue. The Committee had before it the Conciliation Commission plan for the solution of this problem (see Editorial Note, p. 181). At its first meeting Australia submitted a draft resolution for the internationalization of Jerusalem on the basis of the 1947 Partition Plan (see Appendix C), and Israel submitted its own draft resolution for an agreement between Israel and the U.N. for supervision and protection of the Holy Places (see Appendix D). Various amendments to the Australian motion and the Conciliation Commission plan were put forward during the debate, while the Israeli proposal elicited almost no reaction.

The Committee's first session concluded with a resolution to form a sub-committee to deal with the various proposals put forward during the debate and to submit its recommendations to the Committee. The U.S. delegation in concert with the Israeli delegation attempted unsuccessfully to

include in the sub-committee representatives of states which had not supported the internationalization plan. The sub-committee's composition (see No. 435, n. 2) in effect decided the outcome of the debate, for on 1 December the sub-committee adopted the Australian proposal, with an amendment submitted by the Soviet Union to the effect that the internationalization plan be implemented by the Trusteeship Council instead of the Conciliation Commission. The voting was 9 to 6 with 2 abstentions (see No. 458).

The debate in the Ad Hoc Committee resumed on 5 December. The Swedish and Dutch representatives submitted an additional draft resolution (see Appendix E) aimed at a compromise between the Australian and the Conciliation Commission plans. The Israeli delegation had numerous reservations with respect to this proposal, nevertheless Israel was prepared to explore possibilities for its amendment (see No. 457, n. 1). The proposal, however, never came to the vote since the internationalization plan was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on 7 December by a vote of 35 to 13 with 11 abstentions.

(See *GAOR, 4th Sess., AHPC,* Meetings 43–50, 24–29 November, Meetings 57–61, 5–7 December 1949, pp. 246–306, 339–368; *AHPC, Annex I,* pp. 57–60.)

425. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 21 November 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note above.
2. See No. 420, n. 2.

426. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 21 November 1949

Notes

1. No. 424.
2. See No. 432, n. 3.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 250 above.
4. See No. 441.
5. No. 372.
6. Owing to McDonald's departure for Istanbul to attend the conference of U.S. diplomatic representatives in the Middle East, Eytan met Counselor Ford on 23 November and informed him of the latest contacts with King Abdallah (see *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1509–10).

427. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 21 November 1949

Notes

1. Eytan had asked Eban for a brief assessment of the Soviet bloc's position on the Jerusalem issue (20 November 1949, 93.01/2202/4).
2. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above, and also No. 425.

428. M. Sharett (New York) to M. Eliash (London). 21 November 1949

Copy: 130.02/2389/12

Summary

Sharett wishes to explain to Eliash the various considerations regarding his visit to Britain on behalf of the United Jewish Appeal. It was originally suggested that Sharett go to Britain specially for the UJA campaign in February; he rejected the proposal, as it would have involved prior agreement with the British government. The directors of the Appeal requested Ben-Gurion's intervention but the latter agreed with Sharett; he suggested, instead, that Sharett make a brief unofficial visit on his way back from New York. Eliash having opposed this idea, Sharett now asks him to reconsider his attitude.

Sharett dwells on the special character of Israel's foreign relations, influenced by the unique relationship between Israel and the Jewish people. He adds that in the spring of 1949 he went to the U.S. with the special purpose of participating in the United Jewish Appeal, thus creating the precedent of a foreign minister undertaking a mission to the Jewish people. However, he admits that in each case one must take into account the differing conditions in each country. The information he had received from the heads of the UJA had convinced him that the drive in Britain might fail utterly without a special and unusual effort, whereas Sharett's visit might contribute to a record-breaking success.

In light of Israel's urgent financial needs, Sharett seriously doubts whether an effort which might aid in relieving these needs should be abandoned for reasons of diplomatic convenience or even political consistence. Sharett therefore requests Eliash to reconsider the matter, suggesting that he consult Gestetner[1] on the prospects of the scheduled drive.

Notes

1. Sigmund Gestetner, British Jewish business executive, a director of the Jewish Foundation Fund in Britain.

429. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 23 November 1949

Notes

1. See No. 420, n. 3.
2. Cf. Levin to Eban, telegram S1, 22 November 1949, 93.03/69/12.
3. Abram Landa, Adviser to the Australian delegation at the U.N.

430. M. Amir (Brussels) to G. Avner. 23 November 1949

Orig.: 130.11/2533/1

Summary

Amir reports on his visit to Pavlov, the Soviet Ambassador in Brussels. Amir spoke of the communal settlements, the cooperative settlements and cooperation in Israel in general, the Ambassador showing great interest in the subject. Further on, the refugee problem was raised. Amir explained Israel's position on the issue, stressing that the problem had hitherto been dealt with not with a view towards mitigating human suffering, but out of political considerations, namely, the Arab states' desire to make things difficult for Israel and weaken her internally. The Ambassador stated that he was in favour of resettling the refugees in the Arab countries. He himself had made a speech in the Third Committee of the U.N. during the last Assembly, pointing to shared responsibility of the Arab states and Britain for the plight of the refugees. Pavlov mentioned a conversation he had had with Yershov in the recent summer in the course of which the latter had expressed himself very favourably on the subject of Israel. The talk with Pavlov was conducted in a very friendly spirit.

431. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 24 November 1949

Notes

1. See No. 439.
2. No. 414.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 250 above.

432. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 24 November 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 250 above, and cf. No. 426.
3. On 22 November Elath had met Hare, who welcomed the direct contacts between Israel and Jordan. (Telegram to Eytan, W559, 22 November 1949, 93.01/2181/7.)

433. E. Elath (Washington) to W. Eytan. 24 November 1949

Notes

1. This word was decoded in the incoming version as "U.S."
2. See Editorial Note, p. 250 above, and cf. No. 426.
3. The second part of the telegram has been omitted here.

434. J. Herzog (Paris) to M. Sharett (New York). 24 November 1949

Notes

1. The outgoing version has not been traced. A number of decoding errors appear in the incoming version, which is printed here verbatim.
2. Untraced.
3. Vittorino Veronese, Italian lawyer and banker; active in Catholic ecclesiastical circles in Rome and served as president of the Catholic association "Azione Cattolica".
4. Untraced.
5. On 10 November 1949 the Pope came out with an appeal to the Christian world to come forth in a "crusade of prayer" for Jerusalem and the Holy Places. He expressed his hopes for a permanent settlement in Palestine, but did not refer explicitly to the internationalization plan.
6. Cf. No. 314, para. 1.
7. On 21 November the Pope had appointed Alberto Gori, Father Custodian of the Holy Land, to the office of Latin Patriarch of Jerusalem.
8. Reference is presumably to a statement issued on 18 November (Friday) by heads of the Catholic Church in the U.S., calling for the establishment of an effective international regime in Jerusalem and criticizing the Jerusalem plan of the Conciliation Commission.

435. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 26 November 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to the general debate at the first stage of the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Political Committee. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above.
2. The sub-committee ultimately included representatives of seventeen states; Denmark, Bolivia and Poland were not represented. States represented on the sub-committee but not mentioned in the telegram were Cuba, Egypt, El Salvador, Greece, Mexico, Peru, Sweden, the Soviet Union and Ukraine.
3. 28 November; actually Eban appeared before the Committee on 29 November. For the text of Eban's speech see file 130.02/2443/4 and also *GAOR, 4th Sess., AHPC*, 49th meeting, pp. 293–300.

436. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 27 November 1949

Notes

1. A conference of U.S. diplomatic representatives in the Middle East was then being held in Istanbul – see No. 460.

437. G. Avner (Tel Aviv) to D. Lewin[1] (Vienna). 27 November 1949

Copy: 130.02/2411/10

Summary

Avner is replying to Lewin's letter of 24 October[2] on the subject of Israeli–Austrian relations.

In all the discussions on this subject, the same conclusion had been reached, namely, that Israel's relations with Austria will be different from those with Germany on the one hand and from those with other countries on the other hand. With regard to Germany, it was decided to continue with the absence of diplomatic or consular relations. The consulate in Munich is to be closed down but the immigration officer in Berlin, who is instrumental in the transfer of Jews through the Eastern Zone, will remain there for the time being. Financial and commercial relations, i.e. negotiations on reparations, will be maintained, though not with the Government of Israel but with a body of former German Jews supported by Jewish international organizations, as well as indirectly by the Israeli government. The Government of Israel will not enter into any legal or economic negotiations with any German body whatsoever. When the stage of the transfer of goods or money is reached, this will be dealt with by the Jewish Agency.

The situation is different as regards Austria, though here, too, friendly relations should be avoided and a cool and distant attitude should be maintained [. . . . .].[3] Avner disagrees with Lewin's contention in his letter of 5 October[4] that Austria is a liberated country like Czechoslovakia or Poland. He reminds Lewin that Nazism in Austria was a local phenomenon, not an offspring of foreign influence; one must not forget that it reared its head there with perfect freedom. True, in day-to-day affairs one should not adopt a hostile manner towards the Austrian officials and good personal relations may be fostered, but without violating the general directive on maintaining cool and distant official relations.

As in the case of Germany, commercial and financial affairs may compel Israel to enter into negotiations with the Austrian government, as has happened with the commercial agreement on essential machinery and goods. Avner hopes, however, that there, too, the required distance was kept.

As to the issuance of Israeli visas to prospective Austrian visitors, such visits should not be encouraged. At this stage Israel is not interested in furthering political and cultural relations with Austria; accordingly, the applicants should be informed of the unfavourable public opinion in Israel on that score. The same applies to the Austria–Israel Friendship League: Lewin should neither encourage them nor take part in their activities for the reasons enumerated above.

As for the status of the Israeli mission in Vienna, Avner defines Lewin's functions as vice-consul as dealing with everyday practical matters affecting the two countries. In many cases it will be Lewin's task to curb the progress

of relations, in keeping with the general policy. It was officially reported from Rome that a request has been made to enable the Italian legation in Tel Aviv to host an official whose function will be to deal with Austrian affairs in Israel, and the government has acceded to that request. Thus there will be an authorized official taking care of Austrian affairs in Israel without having to open an Austrian consulate for that purpose. Avner considers this arrangement satisfactory, as[5] the time for official representation has not yet come. Avner hopes that the above constitutes a reply to Lewin's letter of 14 November 1949.[6]

Notes

1. Daniel (Kurt) Lewin, Israeli Vice-Consul and immigration officer in Vienna.
2. The letter is in file 130.10/2533/22.
3. The second part of the sentence has been omitted here.
4. The letter is in file 93.06/486/4.
5. Hebrew original has in error "but" for "as".
6. Lewin had reported on the Austrian government's intention to approach Israel officially regarding the opening of a consulate in Tel Aviv on 1 January 1950 (130.10/2533/22).

438. M. Sharett [New York] to A. Moissis (Athens). 28 November 1949

Notes

1. Acher Moissis, Israeli Honorary Consul in Athens.
2. At the debates of the Ad Hoc Political Committee (see Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above).

439. Bureau of the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tel Aviv): Information for Members of the Cabinet. 29 November 1949

130.02/2411/7

Relations between Israel and Rumania

In reply to the protest against Ben-Gurion's speech in Tel Aviv,[1] delivered by the Rumanian Deputy Foreign Minister to Rubin, the Government of Israel has dispatched the following communication through the Israeli Minister in Bucharest:[2]

> The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Israel has taken note of the communication delivered by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Rumanian People's Republic to the Israeli Minister in Bucharest on 5 November 1949 and begs to reply as follows:
>
> (1) In the speech made by the Prime Minister of Israel against which the Rumanian Government's protest was lodged, neither the latter Government nor any of its Members was mentioned. There was no intention of offending the Rumanian Government and if this Government believes

that what was said was directed at it, then the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot but express his regret.

(2) As to the accusation that a certain demonstration which took place in front of the Rumanian Legation in Tel Aviv had allegedly been organized by the Israeli authorities, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs must observe that it comes to him as a complete surprise and he rejects it categorically.

From reports in the press he learns that the demonstrators were parents residing in Israel who had not been able to obtain permission from the Rumanian authorities to bring their children over to this country.

The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs takes this opportunity to express his profound satisfaction at the fact that, according to recent reports which have reached him, there has been a certain relaxation of the limitations on the emigration from Rumania of parents and children of residents of Israel. At the same time, he must point out that the majority of the beneficiaries of this relaxation have been elderly people, and that no relief has been given to most of the Jews wishing to come and settle in Israel, and whom this country particularly needs. In other words, the relaxation cannot be considered a satisfactory solution to the problem.

(3) The regrettable incident on board the SS *Transylvania*[3] has already been the subject of an exchange of communications and there is nothing to add in this respect.

(4) On the other hand, the Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs must emphasize that the attitude of the Rumanian Government and press cannot be considered befitting friendly relations or even ordinary courtesy.

A communication dispatched by him to the Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs on 11 March 1949[4] has so far gone unanswered. Explicit promises given by representatives of the Rumanian Government to Israeli representatives in respect of the immigration of Jews to Israel, and in particular in respect of those young people who have undergone training in preparation for settlement in this country, have not been fulfilled.

The Zionist movement, from which the State of Israel draws its very existence, has become the target of official persecution and a campaign of slander.

The Rumanian press – undeniably subject to government supervision – goes out of its way to be hostile in its reports on events in Israel: while concealing from its readers the achievements of the Government of Israel, it intentionally exaggerates the difficulties and complications encountered, completely distorts the picture of Israel's foreign policy, and continuously slanders – in words and in cartoons – this Government's Prime Minister and its Members.

The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs cannot but express his deep concern for the pernicious effects which such practices may have upon Rumanian–Israeli relations.

(5) The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs considers it his duty to express his deep disappointment over the report transmitted by the Israeli Minister in Bucharest on the Rumanian Government's refusal to hold negotiations or any discussions whatsoever with the Government of Israel concerning the immigration of Jews to Israel. It is inconceivable that the Rumanian Government should be unaware of the primacy of Jewish immigration within the sum total of the interests of the State of Israel and of the predominant role which immigration plays in the diplomatic relations between Israel and the other popular democracies. In Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and Sofia all the discussions concerning Jewish emigration have been conducted, and all the relevant arrangements made, by the representatives of Israel.

The want of a satisfactory solution to the problem of Jewish emigration, will keep diplomatic relations between Rumania and Israel devoid of their most vital content. The present attitude of the Government of Rumania cannot be considered by the Israeli Government as befitting the friendship which the latter Government desires to obtain in the relations between the two countries.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs concludes, therefore, by expressing his hopes that the Government of Rumania will reconsider the problem of Jewish emigration as well as its relations with the Government of Israel touching on that subject.

Mr. Fischer's Conversation with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs

Fischer reports[5] on his 15 November meeting with Schuman on the Jerusalem issue. The conversation turned first to the plan submitted by the Conciliation Commission,[6] taking note of the clarifications published by the Commission on 14 November.[7] Fischer criticized a number of points in the plan, including the inordinately extensive powers conferred on the U.N. Commissioner and on the mixed tribunal. Fischer's impression was that Schuman would readily waive these points.

Fischer communicated to Schuman Israel's unqualified opposition to any restrictions on the entry of Jews to Jerusalem and their settlement in that city. Schuman seemed to grasp the intensity of Israel's opposition but said he personally thought that any concentration of population in either part of the city which might revive the conflict should be avoided.

Schuman emphasized that he stood firm on the necessity of finding a practical solution which would not encroach in any way on the sovereignty of the two states in possession of the city. He also said that he was against an imposed solution, and what he thought was needed was an ''*engagement contractuel*'' entered into freely by both parties. The French Government, he

said, had not yet adopted a position on the Conciliation Commission's plan; its decision would be based on the principles set forth in his own speech at Lake Success,[8] which so far was the only official formulation of France's views on this subject.

Fischer brought up the idea of a treaty, to be signed by as many states as possible, to guarantee the interests of the Holy Places.[9] To this Schuman responded favourably, saying, however, that such a treaty should be entered into under the auspices of the U.N.

Subsequently the subject of the Vatican and Catholic interests was raised and Schuman was up-to-date on this topic. He showed interest in Vergani's statement to the correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*[10] and remarked that if the statement had indeed been made, then it must have been inspired by Rome. He well knew what McMahon's feelings were towards France and what was the position of the Orthodox Church.

In conclusion Schuman added that what was needed was a special status for the Holy Places, to be agreed on between the parties concerned.

The question of the status of the Old City was not raised, Fischer avoiding any mention of it in accordance with the instructions received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pursuant to Eban's memorandum.[11]

Schuman requested that Fischer convey to Sharett his most friendly regards.

Notes

1. See No. 393 and n. 1 *ibid.*
2. See No. 456.
3. See No. 393, n. 3.
4. See Vol. 2, Nos. 433 and 450.
5. See Fischer to Avner, 16 November 1949, 130.10/2550/7.
6. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
7. Consequent on the criticism voiced in the General Assembly of the Conciliation Commission's Jerusalem plan, the latter published an explanatory statement, denying that the plan would bring about the political severance of Jerusalem from the governments ruling the other parts of Palestine. The Commission explained that these governments would retain all their ordinary powers except for certain limitations to be imposed for the protection of the interests of the international community in the city.

   The Commission described as a misunderstanding the allegation that its plan violated the principles of democracy in attempting to impose a particular regime on Jerusalem against the will of its inhabitants, explaining that the residents would be free to elect "their municipal governments" in each of the city's quarters.

   (See U.N. Document A/973/Add.1, 12 November 1949, *GAOR, 4th Sess., AHPC*, Annex I, pp. 15–6, and also file 130.02/2443/4.)
8. See *GAOR, 4th Sess., Plenary*, 225th meeting, 23 September 1949, pp. 29–32.
9. Fischer was alluding to the Israeli draft resolution on the subject of Jerusalem – see Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.
10. See No. 314.
11. See No. 337 and n. 1 *ibid.*, and No. 333, n. 4.

440. G. Avner (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 29 November 1949

Orig.: 93.02/172/9

Summary

Avner recapitulates the subject of the proposed talks between France and Israel on mutual cooperation, which had been raised with Fischer during Shiloah's stay in Paris. In the course of the excitement created over the possible union between Syria and Iraq and following on reports from Elath and Fischer concerning talks with the French on the Middle East, the Minister of Foreign Affairs gave instructions for solid groundwork to be done on this subject. Consequently, Avner summoned Sasson, Divon and Arazi and briefed them on French–Israeli relations, following which Sasson formulated his memorandum "Proposed Basic Points for Talks with France".[1] The intention at first was to hold a discussion on the basis of the memorandum, but as Sharett had to leave for New York, he made certain alterations in the document in consultation with Shiloah and passed it on to Fischer. Avner is now awaiting Fischer's reaction to the memorandum. Having heard that Fischer had expressed surprise at the new initiative, Avner explains that it was Sharett's idea to analyse in detail the possibilities of cooperation with France. It was now suggested that Fischer approach the French officially and propose comprehensive talks on the basis of the said document.

The basic concept of the document was that both countries were now contending against three developments: (1) a possible take-over of one Arab country by another, or by a bloc of states, with the consequent disturbance of the political and military *status quo*; (2) the spread of British influence, working in the direction of (1) above through political and military aid; (3) the spread of pan-Islamic influence, having as its object the annihilation of every non-Islamic element in the Middle East. These fundamental common interests present tremendous possibilities for cooperation. The difficulty regarding Jerusalem appears to be a transient one; when the French realize that far-reaching plans were impractical and unfeasible, they will try to salvage whatever they can and then Israel can offer her support for a French U.N. commissioner to supervise the Holy Places.

Despite misgivings over American pressure on France and French inclination to stay on good terms with the Arabs at Israel's expense, Avner is of the opinion that the suggested course should be taken.

Notes

1. See No. 413.

441. Meeting: E. Sasson, R. Shiloah – King Abdallah, Samir Rifa'i[1] (Shuneh, 27 November 1949, Document dated 29 November 1949)

Report: 93.03/64/2

Summary

The King commenced by saying that he wanted peace and had been involved in the war against his will. The Arabs had agitated for war; he himself had saved the day during the war and now he wants to save it in peace. To the King's question as to why he was leaving for Ankara,[2] Sasson replied that he was disappointed with the Arabs now that the prospects for peace were lessened. The King expressed his satisfaction at Israel's consent to hold the meeting, and then he left, leaving Rifa'i to conduct the talk.

Rifa'i gave a realistic outline of the situation in Jordan and in Israel, saying that Israel could not for long remain surrounded by a hostile world. Her vital interests therefore lay in peace. Despite what the Arabs kept saying, Jordan recognized Israel as a *fait accompli*. Peace was also in Jordan's interest, but it must be peace with honour which can be presented as an achievement to the Arab world. The King was prepared to act independently, as long as his honour was not injured thereby. The Jordanians were prepared to enter into negotiations on the basis of peace with honour.

Rifa'i proposed three main subjects for discussion: (1) political issues, including the territorial settlement; (2) economic issues, including those of Naharayim and the Potash Works; (3) issues concerning the Arabs of Palestine. The Israelis also raised the question of Jordan's treaty with Britain and its applicability, to which Rifa'i replied that it would naturally apply to the western part of Jordan once it was annexed to her. The Israeli representatives insisted on including this issue in the subjects for discussion, to which Rifa'i consented.

Rifa'i said that Jordan, hoping for a reasonable settlement, would adopt a realistic approach to the territorial issues and would not advance unrealizable claims such as those hitherto made for Lydda, Ramle and Jaffa. On the other hand, Jordan needs an outlet to the sea, preferably at Gaza, and this involves territorial continuity with Jordan, i.e., the Negev in its entirety. The Negev is devoid of inhabitants and Israel is insisting on retaining it solely for reasons of prestige. Israel should rise above her narrow interests and agree to the proposed arrangement. Jordan is prepared to grant Israel an outlet to the Red Sea and a free zone in the port of Aqaba in exchange for similar facilities at Haifa. In his opinion, the entire Arab world wants revenge against Israel and it would thus be preferable if Israel shared no common border with Egypt. The Arab world feels that Israel has driven a wedge into it, disrupting its territorial continuity which constitutes a serious infringement of its interests. Hence the removal of this wedge could be held up as a notable achievement. If this matter could be settled, the other issues would not prove an obstacle to peace. The problem of Jerusalem can be solved by a bilateral agreement;

internationalization cannot be imposed when both parties are opposed to it. The central issue is that of the Negev. When Novomeysky came to settle the problem of the Potash Works[3] he was told that the central issue had to be solved first and that agreement could not be reached by stages.

The Israeli representatives replied that possession of the Negev was not a matter of prestige for Israel and that the sacrifices made for it proved its importance. Israel was prepared to concede the importance for Jordan of an outlet to the sea and would agree to have Gaza pass into Jordanian ownership, but not on the basis of Israeli concessions in the Negev. Jordanian access to Gaza could be arranged without such territorial concessions.

Rifa'i evaded the question as to whether Egypt had agreed to give up Gaza in Jordan's favour. The Israeli representatives made it clear that with all Israel's friendliness towards Jordan, she could not become involved in a conflict with Egypt should one arise between that country and Jordan over the issue of the Gaza Strip. Rifa'i replied that he considered any arrangement of access to Gaza impracticable without territorial continuity. The Israeli representatives then proposed a formulation saying that "both parties are prepared to enter on negotiations recognizing Jordan's vital interest in having access to the sea; the parties will search for an arrangement which would satisfy Jordan's need without harming Israel's vital interests." Rifa'i agreed to this wording, adding, however, that he could not see any possibility of an arrangement which was not on the basis of territorial continuity.

Rifa'i contended that a peace settlement would confer upon Israel formal recognition by an Arab state of her occupation of territory contrary to the partition plan. The Israeli representatives hinted at the possibility that Egypt was desirous of peace; they also pointed to the considerable sacrifice Israel was making in acceding to the annexation of the Triangle to Jordan.

The conversation was interrupted at this point by dinner, following which the discussion resumed. The Israeli representatives asked for details on the reported proposed union between Syria and Iraq, and also for Jordan's views on the results of the Syrian elections.[4] Rifa'i replied that Syria and Jordan were parts of the same country and thus it sounded very odd to speak of the annexation of one of these parts to a third state. The road to union should encompass Jordan and Syria first, and Iraq later. He thought that the Syrian–Iraqi union would not be effected. As to the elections, they were of no importance nor was the composition of the government as long as the army was in control. He was expecting further "developments" in Syria.

The Israeli representatives expressed their opposition to the proposed union.

The following meeting was set for 1 December.[5]

Rifa'i replied in the affirmative when asked whether the British and the Americans knew about these talks, and added that the initiative for the meetings had come from the King.[6] The latter entered the room at the conclusion of the conversation and expressed his gratification at the scheduling of the next meeting. He said he had no schemes for the unification of the

Arab world and that his intention was to form closer ties with Pakistan, India and Iran. He named Egypt as his main antagonist, with Iraq coming second.

The Israeli representatives had the impression that the emphasis on the territorial issue was not at Jordan's own initiative, and that the British were behind it.[7]

Notes

1. Samir Rifa'i, King Abdallah's Minister of the Court and former Jordanian Prime Minister.
2. Sasson had recently been nominated Israel's Minister in Turkey; he left for Ankara at the end of December 1949.
3. See Editorial Note, p. 250 above.
4. At the elections to the Syrian Constituent Assembly, held on 15 November 1949, no single party attained a majority. The results increased internal turmoil in Syria and abetted the military *coup d'état* which occurred a month later (see No. 519, n. 1).
5. See No. 449.
6. Cf. No. 424.
7. Cf. report on the meeting as relayed by Shiloah to the U.S. chargé d'affaires in Israel on 28 November, in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1516–8.

442. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 30 November 1949

Notes

1. Donald D. MacLean.
2. The Egyptian ambassador in London.

443. D. Horowitz (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 30 November 1949

Notes

1. See No. 455, para. (a).
2. See No. 303, n. 2.

444. A. Moissis (Athens) to G. Avner. 30 November 1949

Notes

1. Orthographic and similar errors appearing in the original have been corrected here with no special indication.
2. Original has in error: "27 November".
3. None of the documents enclosed with the letter have been appended here; they can be found in file 130.10/2550/6.
4. Original has in error: "collaboration".
5. See No. 438.

445. A. Levavi (Moscow) to S. Eliashiv and M. Namir (Tel Aviv). 30 November 1949

Coded Tel. PI336, PI337; Recd: 1 December; Inc.: 130.09/2325/4

Summary

Levavi reports on Lapid's[1] meeting of a Jew from Moscow who told him that large-scale deportations of Jews from the capital were being carried out. The Jews were allowed to state their preference for their new place of residence. Some Christians were also being deported, but their numbers were very small, being in the proportion of one Christian to every 50 Jews. The non-Jews were all single persons and recently settled in Moscow, and presumably their deportation served to camouflage the main objective. The non-Jewish neighbours of the deportees were openly showing their satisfaction. Even Jewish ex-servicemen were not exempted.

The informant thought it impossible that the deportations were being carried out with Stalin's knowledge. He asked Lapid whether this action could be in reaction to Israel's voting at the U.N. In theory, there are no restrictions on the amount of property that the deportees can take with them, but in practice the short notice which they are given creates utter impoverishment. Many Jews have started to liquidate their property and to accumulate ready money.

[. . . . .][2]

Notes

1. Arye Lapid, Second Secretary at the Israeli Legation in Moscow.
2. The second part of this communication, dispatched in a separate telegram, has been omitted here. It contains additional information on the deteriorating condition of the Jews in the Soviet Union. See also M. Namir, *Israeli Mission to Moscow* [Hebrew], pp. 308–10.

446. J. Tsur (New York) to W. Eytan. 30 November 1949

Orig.: 130.02/2383/3

Summary

Tsur reports on his conversation with Brazil's Foreign Minister, which took place on 25 November. The Minister told Tsur that Brazil was acting on the Vatican's instructions in the Jerusalem issue and suggested that Israel approach the Vatican directly. Tsur said he was aware of Brazil's attitude but could not believe that its Government would adopt an inflexible position without taking into account the changed circumstances and the present situation. Tsur clarified Israel's position and pointed out the danger inherent in adopting a resolution which could not be implemented owing to the opposition of both segments of the population. He analysed the internationalization

plan and the grave effects it could have on the national and economic existence of the city should an attempt be made to impose in on Jerusalem.

The Foreign Minister disagreed with Tsur on the economic dangers, explaining that there was no intention of imposing economic boundaries between the Jerusalem enclave and the neighbouring states. Tsur replied that the plan of the Conciliation Commission[1] could bring about economic restrictions and cited as proof the proposal to limit the influx of population to the Jewish part of the city. Tsur handed the Minister Israel's draft resolution on this issue.[2]

The Foreign Minister admitted that the Israeli arguments sounded reasonable, but said he was bound by the Vatican's demands. He dwelt on the influence of the Catholic Church in his country and on the necessity to abide by the Vatican's instructions. Tsur suggested that Brazil take the initiative and acquaint the Vatican with Israel's viewpoint, adding that to the best of his knowledge, opinions in Rome were divided on this issue, as proved by Vergani's statement.[3] He also told the Minister about his conversations with the Archbishop of Buenos Aires which led him to believe that the Church was prepared to reach a compromise.

The Minister promised to raise the subject with the Brazilian Ambassador to the Vatican. Later Tsur spoke with the Secretary-General of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, who was more intractable than his Minister. He opposed the suggestion that Brazil attempt to win the Vatican over and pointed out that Brazil now needed the Vatican's goodwill more than ever in view of her request to appoint a third Brazilian cardinal. He said he was unaware of any division of opinion in the Vatican; on the contrary, when visited by the papal nuncio, the latter demanded that Brazil support the original internationalization plan with no modifications whatsoever. The Brazilian official admitted that this plan was unrealizable, but he knew of no better one. There was, he said, the possibility of internationalizing the Old City alone and turning it into a sort of Vatican with a special regime, on condition that all the religious institutions outside the wall would also come under its authority.

Tsur replied that Israel could not bring up such a proposal inasmuch as the Old City of Jerusalem was not in her possession, but should such a proposal be put forward, the Government would give it favourable consideration.

Tsur concludes by suggesting that Sharett instruct Israel's honorary consul in Brazil to initiate an extensive propaganda campaign in the press against Brazil's attitude in the Jerusalem issue and to instruct Ginossar to maintain contacts with the Brazilian Ambassador at the Vatican.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.
2. See Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.
3. See No. 314.

447. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 1 December 1949

Coded Tel. XA813; Recd: 2 December; Outg.: 93.01/2202/5

Summary

Sharett reports on his talk with Tsarapkin on the subject of Jerusalem. Sharett told Tsarapkin that had Jerusalem been internationalized, the Russians would not have had the property they claimed there transferred to their ownership. Tsarapkin minimized the importance of the transfer, claiming that the property had always been in the hands of the Russian Church. Sharett rejected this argument, emphasizing that, thanks to Israel, Russia had now a foothold in the East and her flag was waving in the heart of Jerusalem. The Russians would not have been accorded such treatment at the hands of a U.N. representative subject to American influence had there been another regime in the city. In reply, Tsarapkin reiterated the U.S.S.R.'s support in principle of the resolution of 29 November and explained that the Russians were not denouncing the present boundaries, nor were they siding against the Jews. Their main objection was rather to Abdallah's rule over Jerusalem, which was in effect British rule. Sharett replied that the internationalization of Jerusalem would mean British, American, and Vatican rule over the entire city, but Tsarapkin asserted that internationalization would be subject to the Trusteeship Council. Sharett rejected this, advising Tsarapkin to pay more attention to realities and exercise foresight rather than insist on abstract principles.

Sharett suggests that Yershov be talked to on the same lines[1] and that Levavi be instructed to present these same arguments in Moscow. Sharett himself has no fears as to the main issue: it would be fine if Israel could manage to keep her status in Jerusalem without Soviet help, but every effort must nevertheless be made to bring about a change in the Russian position in the final vote in the Assembly. He reports that the internationalization front in the Sub-committee[2] was composed of the Arabs and Latin American countries [. . . . .][3] and also Australia, the last an untypical case, for well-known reasons.[4] They were opposed by Holland, Sweden, Canada, and other Latin American countries. Greece and India are still abstaining, but in private talks, India supports Israel.

Notes

1. See No. 462.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above.
3. Two words omitted here.
4. See No. 420 and n. 2 *ibid.*

448. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 1 December 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to the vote on the Australian draft resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem which was held that day in the Sub-committee of the Ad Hoc Political Committee. The resolution received a majority vote. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above.
2. Two draft resolutions, the Swedish and the Dutch, were submitted to the Sub-committee but were never debated because the Australian resolution was approved by a majority. The two draft resolutions were submitted as a joint resolution to the Ad Hoc Political Committee. (See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above and Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–93.) Sharett communicated to Eytan the original text of the draft resolutions in Cable 1874, 2 December 1949, 93.03/69/20.
3. One word omitted here.
4. See No. 447.

449. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 2 December 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 441.

450. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan and S. Eliashiv. 2 December 1949

Coded Tel. XA814; Recd: 3 December; Outg.: 93.01/2202/5

Summary

Sharett confirms the contents of telegram 514,[1] adding that the Soviets abide consistently by the resolution of 29 November as a matter of principle, while clearly realizing that nothing will come of it. The slanderous reports in the press, to the effect that the Russians sided with the Arabs on internationalization as the result of Israel's voting against them on world peace,[2] must be categorically denied. The Russian stand on internationalization has been laid before the Assembly and it remains absolutely unshakeable, as stated by Gromyko in Moscow.[3] It has once again been proved that the Soviets' basic aim is not to help Israel but to oust the British, and that this was the reason they had been in favour of the establishment of the State but were now against giving Jerusalem to Israel. To their mind, any plan against internationalization is an Anglo-American plot. Sharett suggests that this argumentation be publicized in the press.

Notes

1. Eytan and Eliashiv asked if the rumour were true that Tsarapkin had rejected El Salvador's motion to internationalize Nazareth claiming it was included in the Arab State (1 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14).

No. 450 – Notes (continued)

2. Israel's vote in the General Assembly on the Soviet resolution condemning preparations for war and furthering world peace. Israel opposed or abstained from the voting on the main paragraphs in the Soviet resolution while she supported the Anglo-American counter-resolution which was passed by a large majority in the Plenary Session. (See the Israeli delegation's report on the Fourth Session of the U.N. Assembly, 93.03/75/12.) See also No. 484.
3. See No. 298.

451. E. Elath (Washington) to W. Eytan. 2 December 1949

452. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 3 December 1949

Notes

1. See No. 448 and Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above.
2. Error in original ("effect") amended according to the incoming version.
3. No. 449.
4. Ben-Gurion did not support Sharett's suggestion; he even vehemently opposed any compromise on the line of the Swedish draft resolution (see No. 448, n. 2) and suggested that the Knesset issue a statement clarifying Israel's position (see No. 453). Eytan reported on this to Sharett, adding that in the spirit of his proposal, Sasson had sent King Abdallah a special communiqué suggesting that the King instruct Mulqi to cooperate with Sharett (Y526, 4 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14).
5. Eytan requested Sharett's opinion on closing the Mandelbaum Gate for several days as a demonstration of Israel's control over Jerusalem (2 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14).

453. D. Ben-Gurion (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 4 December 1949

Coded Tel. YA524; Outg.: 130.09/2329/14

Summary

Ben-Gurion announces his intention of convening the Cabinet the following day to propose a statement in the Knesset to the effect that the State of Israel will not tolerate any form of foreign rule over Jewish Jerusalem or its detachment from the State. Should Israel find itself faced with the alternatives of abandoning Jerusalem or withdrawing from the U.N., she would leave the U.N.[1]

Notes

1. Sharett opposed the issuance of a statement against the resolution before it was passed. He expressed the fear that such a statement would indicate needless nervousness in Israel and would be interpreted as provocation against the U.N. Sharett objected especially to the last sentence and forcefully demanded that it be omitted if it were nonetheless decided to publish the statement. (Telegram to Ben-Gurion, X819, 4 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5.) See No. 457.

454. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 4 December 1949

Notes

1. Sharett conveyed to Eytan over the telephone his estimation of the imminent discussion in the Ad Hoc Political Committee on the Jerusalem question. In his opinion, the Israeli draft resolution stood no chance to win more than one vote or at the most two, while the prospects of the Dutch and Australian draft resolutions were nil. He suggested support of the Swedish draft resolution, subject to the introduction of certain amendments. The Swedish resolution called for the introduction of United Nations supervision over the Holy Places in Jerusalem and elsewhere in Israel. (See No. 448, n. 2, and Editorial Note, pp. 272–4.)
2. Sharett endorsed Ben-Gurion's position as formulated in the first three paragraphs but took exception to the last three words of the fourth paragraph. To his recollection the consensus of opinion in the Cabinet had been that international supervision should be extended to the whole of Israel and the Israeli delegation to the United Nations was instructed accordingly. He recommended that this line be pursued. (See Sharett to Eytan, X826, 5 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5; see also Ben-Gurion's reaction in Eytan's telegram to Sharett, Y545, 7 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14.)

455. G. Avner (Tel Aviv) to M. Fischer (Paris). 4 December 1949

Orig.: 93.02/164/10

Summary

Avner supplies Fischer with general information on a number of subjects:

A. *Britain* – There have been signs recently of a certain amelioration in Israeli–British relations. Since Strang's visit and the British Minister's assumption of his duties in Israel, the British have used every possible channel to signal to Israel that the past should be forgotten, that they realize that Israel is an accomplished fact, and that from now on they would follow a policy congenial to both the Arab world and Israel. They have also announced that they were not supporting the detachment of the Negev and that they realized that most of the Arab refugees must be settled in the neighbouring countries.[1] The sole reservation was on the military question: the British have stated that they could not sell arms to Israel or train officers of the Israel Defence Force, since there was no military alliance between Israel and Britain.

Relations have grown worse in the financial sphere, following the stalemate in the negotiations on settling the financial affairs of the Mandate. Israel has proposed a solution[2] but no reply has so far been received from London. Britain has exploited this situation and has refused to open talks on the release of the sterling balances which still amount to 28 million pounds.[3] The agreement signed in April expired in October and the British have so far refused to renew talks on this subject until they have seen some progress in the negotiations over the Mandate financial affairs. In recent weeks there has been a cooling in the political sphere. Apparently the line supported by

Wright and Sheringham has prevailed in the Foreign Office. There is again open talk of demanding cession of the Negev by Israel.

B. *Jordan* – There has been a *rapprochement* with the Jordanians in recent weeks.[4] Experts cite the following reasons:

1. Jordan is taking the credit for the failure of the Syrian–Iraqi union;
2. the Jordanians have emerged strengthened from the sessions of the Arab League at which a collective defence pact was discussed[5];
3. Jordan views Israel as an ally in its fight against the internationalization of Jerusalem.

A better atmosphere seems to prevail in the Armistice Commission and the Special Commission, and this new state of affairs may lead to the solution of several problems such as the Latrun Road, the road to Mt. Scopus, and others. However, Avner foresees difficulties when major issues are discussed, in view of Britain's recent stand on the Negev question. Rumours of meetings between representatives of the two countries are false, all contacts being solely through military personnel.

C. *Sweden* – Preparations are in progress for the tree-planting ceremony for the Bernadotte Forest, in the context of improving relations with that country.

D. *Pilgrimages in 1950* – The preparations in this connection are described.

E. *Germany* – The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has recently been deliberating on its line with respect to relations with Germany.[6] The Prime Minister is considering his reply to the West German Prime Minister's offer of a monetary gift to Israel as a gesture of compensation.[7] Avner assumes that both the reply and the policy on relations will be negative.

Notes

1. See No. 140.
2. See No. 363, n. 4.
3. See Nos. 443 and 461.
4. See Nos. 441 and 449.
5. See No. 371, n. 2.
6. Relations with Germany were discussed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shortly after. It was decided, *inter alia*, "to address the Government with the demand that it abide by its resolutions to refrain from any direct government negotiations with German institutions and to arrange the transfer of property through the Jewish Agency." (See the summary of the meeting in file 130.02/2413/2.) In a letter to the Cabinet Secretary, Eytan requested that the contents of the resolution, "which had been violated a number of times", be brought once again to the Government's attention. He noted that "There is the feeling that the tension has lessened in the question on Germany which Israel's honour demands, namely, that which Israel must adopt in practice." (22 December 1949, *ibid.*) See also No. 399.
7. On 24 November the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, a Jewish newspaper in Düsseldorf, published a statement attributed to Chancellor Adenauer on Germany's intention of paying reparations to Israel in the form of 10 million marks' worth of goods.

456. R. Rubin (Bucharest) to S. Eliashiv. 4 December 1949

Coded Tel. RI233; Recd: 5 December; Outg.: 130.09/2296/9

Summary

Rubin reports that he has delivered Israel's reply[1] to the Rumanian Foreign Minister. The latter asserted that Jews were currently leaving for Israel, Rubin replying that the number of those leaving Rumania was not satisfactory and that Israel desired an arrangement with Rumania patterned on that with Poland, along with a law granting an option on Israeli citizenship. Israel was not satisfied with the present composition of immigration, which was largely made up of the infirm and the aged; the promise to allow trained pioneers to immigrate should be implemented. Pauker asked for patience and forbearance from exerting pressure on her. She wished Rubin good luck.[2] Rubin received the impression that Pauker did not wish to make of her own injured feelings an obstacle to Jewish emigration to Israel. He recommends that Israel continue to exert pressure on Rumania and that the fact of the meeting be broadcast by the "Voice of Israel", emphasizing that the talk revolved around matters of immigration: such an announcement would greatly encourage Rumanian Jewry.

Notes

1. See No. 439. The interview was held on 3 December. (Reported in Rubin's letter to Eliashiv, 8 December 1949, 130.02/2457/19.)
2. Rubin was recalled to Israel without the appointment of a successor in Bucharest in protest against Rumania's policy towards Israel. He left Rumania early in December.

Editorial Note

The Government's statement in the Knesset on the Jerusalem question

On 5 December Ben-Gurion convened a cabinet meeting in order to discuss his proposal to deliver a statement in the Knesset on the question of Jerusalem (see No. 453). At the opening of the meeting, Eytan reported on his telephone conversation with Sharett and led a discussion on his proposal to support the Swedish draft resolution (No. 454, n. 1). Despite the criticism levelled at some of the clauses of the Swedish resolution, it was resolved to approve the line proposed by Sharett. (See No. 457, n. 1 and Eytan's cable to Sharett, Y533, 5 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14.) During the discussion, Ben-Gurion presented the main points of his statement in the Knesset and fiercely attacked the idea of internationalizing Jerusalem. Rabbi Maimon raised the question of the transfer of the government offices to Jerusalem, but Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, and others recommended that the debate be postponed until after the recess of the U.N. General Assembly. The Government approved

the text of Ben-Gurion's statement and decided not to require the Knesset to approve the Government statement.

Ben-Gurion delivered the address in the Knesset on 5 December. Following is the text of the statement:

As you know, the General Assembly of the United Nations is now discussing the problem of Jerusalem and its Holy Places.

Israel is a member of the United Nations, not for reasons of political convenience, but because of deep and traditional regard for the ideals of universal peace and the brotherhood of mankind which the prophets of Israel have bequeathed to us, and which the organization of the United Nations has emblazoned on its standard.

The fact that we are members makes it imperative for us to state from here, from the platform of the first Knesset of Israel, to all the nations gathered together in the General Assembly, and to all those to whom peace and justice in the world are close to heart, that which has been dearest to the soul of the people of Israel from the time it first became a nation under the sceptre of King David three thousand years ago, about Jerusalem its Holy City and about its attitude to the Holy Places of all religions.

In our Proclamation of the 14th May 1948, of the reborn State of Israel, we declared and undertook before history and before the world that "the State of Israel will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; will protect the Holy Places of all religions, and will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations". In accordance with this, our delegation to the United Nations has announced that Israel undertakes to respect all existing rights regarding the Holy Places and religious buildings in Jerusalem, promises freedom of worship and free access without discrimination to all the Holy Places and religious buildings under its control, recognizes the right of pilgrims from all nations and religions to visit the Holy Places in the State, as well as freedom of movement to religious priests, and furthermore, that it agrees that there should be established on the part of the United Nations adequate supervision of the Holy Places and of these existing rights in accordance with an agreement which should be reached between the United Nations and Israel.

At the same time we see it our duty to declare that Jewish Jerusalem is an organic and inseparable part of the State of Israel, as it is an inseparable part of the history and religion of Israel and of the soul of our people. Jerusalem is the very heart of the State of Israel. We feel pride in that Jerusalem is sanctified also in the eyes of the adherents of other faiths and we freely and willingly are ready to make all the necessary arrangements to enable the adherents of the other faiths to enjoy their religious needs in Jerusalem. Moreover, we will give to the United Nations all our assistance to assure this.

But we cannot conceive that the United Nations will try to tear Jerusalem from Israel or to impair the sovereignty of Israel in its Eternal Capital.

Twice in our history we have been exiled from Jerusalem – but only after we were defeated in cruel wars by armies more numerous and stronger than

ours, the armies of Babylon and Rome. Our ties to-day with Jerusalem are no less deep than those which existed in the days of Nebuchadnezzar and Titus Flavius; and when Jerusalem was attacked after the 14th May 1948, our fighting youth knew to sacrifice itself for our Holy Capital no less than did our forefathers in the days of the First and Second Temples.

We do not admit for one minute that the United Nations will try to take Jerusalem by force from Israel. We declare that Israel will not give up Jerusalem of its own free will just as throughout thousands of years it has not surrendered its faith, its national identity, and its hope to return to Jerusalem and Zion despite persecutions which have no parallel in history.

The people which has faithfully honoured for two thousand five hundred years the oath sworn by the first exiles by the rivers of Babylon not to forget Jerusalem – this people will never reconcile itself with separation from Jerusalem. Jewish Jerusalem will never accept foreign rule – after thousands of her sons and daughters have freed the historic homeland and spared Jerusalem from complete destruction.

We are not setting ourselves up as judges of the United Nations, which did not lift a finger when other States, members of the United Nations, openly made war on the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on the 29th November 1947 and tried by force of arms to prevent the establishment of the State of Israel, to blot out the Jews living in the Holy Land and to destroy Jerusalem, the Holy City. But for our successful stand against aggressors acting in defiance of the United Nations, Jewish Jerusalem would have been wiped off the face of the earth. The whole Jewish population would have been annihilated and the State of Israel would never have arisen. We cannot to-day regard the resolution of the 29th November 1947 as being possessed of any further moral force since the United Nations did not succeed in implementing its own resolutions. In our view, the resolution of 29th November touching Jerusalem is null and void.

The attempt to exclude Jewish Jerusalem from Israel is not calculated to establish peace in the Near East, and least of all in Jerusalem itself. Jews will sacrifice themselves for Jerusalem no less than Englishmen for London, Russians for Moscow, or Americans for Washington.

This is the first time in the history of this land that the State governing in Jerusalem has voluntarily accepted the principle of international supervision of the Holy Places in the city. It is perhaps no coincidence that this has been done by the very people which made Jerusalem a religious centre for the world and by the very first government ever to have been elected by the inhabitants of Jerusalem.

We hope that those religions which respect the sanctity of Jerusalem and those nations which, like us, believe in the principles of peace and justice will respect the rights of Israel in Jerusalem just as Israel respects the rights of all religions in its holy capital and in its sovereign State. (*Divrei Ha'Knesset*, Vol. III, pp. 221–226)

457. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 5 December 1949

Notes

1. Sharett reported that the delegation was striving to remove from the Swedish draft resolution everything which went beyond mere supervision of the Holy Places. Sharett felt that Israel's proposal of an agreement with the U.N. (see Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8) should not be presented as a non-negotiable condition (4 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5).
2. See Editorial Note above.
3. See Eytan's telegram to Sharett, Y533, 5 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14.

458. A. Eban (New York) to L. Pearson (New York). 5 December 1949

Notes

1. An identical letter was sent to the heads of other delegations at the U.N. (the copies are in file 93.03/3037/15).
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above.

459. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 5 December 1949

Notes

1. See the guidelines for action which Avner sent to Amir (RB13, 7 December 1949, 130.09/2300/9) and cf. No. 475.

460. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to E. Elath (Washington). 5 December 1949

Notes

1. See Ben-Gurion's diary for 5 December 1949, I.M.D.E.A. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1521–2.
2. The reference is to the conference of American Chiefs of Mission in the Near Eastern countries led by G. McGhee, which was held in Istanbul on 26–29 November.
3. The elections in Egypt were held on 3 January 1950.
4. The final report of the Survey Mission was completed and signed in Paris on 28 December. The general conclusions of the report were that peace and stability in the Middle East depended on the improvement of the inhabitants' standard of living and that this would be a protracted process whose initial stages would consist of developing irrigation and soil improvement projects. In the report several agricultural plans were recommended. (See United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, *Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East*, U.N. Document A/AC.25/6.)
5. Cf. No. 4, n. 20.
6. See No. 352, n. 5.
7. See No. 330, n. 3.
8. See the report of 6 December 1949, 130.02/2403/9.

461. M. Comay (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 5 December 1949

Notes

1. See No. 443 and No. 455, para. A.
2. *Ibid.*

462. Meeting: W. Eytan – P. Yershov (Tel Aviv, 6 December 1949)

Report: 130.11/2513/14

Summary

The Soviet Minister was invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for a talk on the subject of Jerusalem. The previous day, he and the other members of the diplomatic corps received a translation of the Prime Minister's statement in the Knesset.[1] In the course of the talk, Eytan told Yershov the following: The Government of Israel was disappointed by the course of the debates at Lake Success. While Israel does not consider herself authorized to tell the U.S.S.R. how to act at the U.N., she does feel obligated to offer some remarks. The loyalty of the Soviet delegation to the 29 November resolution is understandable. At the same time, Israel must point out what the U.N. Assembly intended by that resolution in the paragraph dealing with the status of Jerusalem. By means of the internationalization of the city, the U.N. wanted to secure two objectives:

1. Assurance of free access to all the Holy Places.
2. The safety of the Jewish population of Jerusalem.

These two objectives could be realized just as well by means of the draft resolution tabled by the Israeli delegation.[2]

As for the first objective, the Government of Israel has declared its complete willingness to grant total freedom to all the religions and their practice in the Holy Places, and has also freely consented to international supervision of the Holy Places. It may be noted at this point that no other regime over Jerusalem has ever proposed international supervision of the Holy Places as the Government of Israel is now doing. Concerning the second objective, one should not forget that, at the time, the U.N. Assembly enlarged the area of internationalized Jerusalem, adding to it various localities in the vicinity, such as Motsa, solely out of the desire to protect the residents of these neighbourhoods which remained within the domain of the Arab state, without any link with Israeli forces. It cannot be denied that the present location of these sites within the borders of the State of Israel as well as the link between Jewish Jerusalem and the State of Israel represent the most effective guarantee of the welfare of their population. It may be thus said that although there is a change in the form, the content of the Israeli proposal embodies the main principles and aims of the 29 November resolution on Jerusalem.

The conversation then turned to the second issue, of a more material nature, namely, the problem of Russian property in Jerusalem. The Government of Israel has adopted a definite line with the goal of transferring the Russian property to the Soviet government and the Soviet religious institutions. A certain part of this objective has already been carried out, and the rest will be implemented in due course. The Government of Israel has no intention of modifying this policy, although it does see the need of pointing out a discrepancy in the Russian position. The Soviet government's claim upon the Government of Israel for the return of its property is being made as if Israel were sovereign in Jerusalem, while in the U.N. the Soviet government denies this sovereignty. The aim of the U.S.S.R. to deny Britain control of the Old City of Jerusalem under the cover of the Jordanian regime is quite understandable. Yet Israel cannot ignore the fact that the proposal to internationalize Jerusalem will not solve this problem but may rather extend Anglo-Saxon and Catholic influence over all of Jerusalem: when the supervision of Jerusalem is turned over to the Trusteeship Council, the Soviet bloc will at best be only a small minority within the administration, while the decisive majority will be in the hands of the Western powers. Instead of localizing and reducing Western influence, the U.S.S.R.'s support of the internationalization proposal will only extend this influence.

The Government of Israel assumes that the Soviet Minister knows that the principal forces opposing the transfer of Russian property to the Soviets were the Catholics. Israel's actions in this matter were made in the face of this strong Catholic pressure. One can only marvel at the fact that in the debate on the proposal concerning the future of Jerusalem, the U.S.S.R. collaborated precisely with those South American countries in which Vatican influence is strongest. The internationalization of Jerusalem will lead to the increase not only of Vatican influence, but also of French and perhaps Italian influence as well. Spain's efforts to penetrate in some way into the precincts of Jerusalem are well known. One thing is clear: should a regime of this kind arise in Jerusalem, the Soviet flag will not wave over the buildings of the Pravoslav mission in the heart of Jerusalem. [. . . . .][3]

In conclusion, it was noted that all sides were interested in strengthening the U.N., and one should thus assume that it would not be in anybody's interest if that organization passes resolutions which are unimplementable.

Eytan told Yershov that Sharett had spoken in the same vein with Tsarapkin[4] and requested that Yershov report on the present conversation to his government. Yershov asked whether the question of Russian property had arisen in the course of the Sharett–Tsarapkin talk and was answered in the affirmative. He also requested information on the talks with King Abdallah which had been reported in the press. Eytan replied that Israel had regular meetings with Jordanian representatives in the various committees. Moreover, at Jordan's initiative, feelers were being put out concerning the signing of a peace treaty.[5] Eytan added that it was important for Israel arrive at a permanent arrangement with other countries before it did so with Jordan and

that one of the most serious problems in her relations with Jordan was Israel's desire to eliminate British influence in the area.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 272–4 above.
2. See Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.
3. One sentence omitted here.
4. See No. 447.
5. See Editorial Note, p. 250 above, and Nos. 441 and 449.

463. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 7 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 272–4 above.
3. Cf. the report on the conversation with Acheson in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1524–7. According to this source the two spoke, *inter alia*, about the question of Israel's relations with the Vatican and the talks between Israel's representatives and King Abdallah.

464. M. Sharett (New York) to M. Fischer (Paris). 7 December 1949

Notes

1. Fischer reported on the surprise felt in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the results of the voting in the Sub-committee (see Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above) and on the prevailing mood in the French Ministry. Ministry personnel claimed that Israel's wrongheaded actions, especially public threats and statements, had lent strength to the extremists' position and hurt the Israeli cause. In their opinion, France could not oppose or even abstain from the voting on the internationalization resolution in the Ad Hoc Political Committee, but in the final vote in the Plenary Session of the Assembly, she would cooperate with the U.S. in order to foil the internationalization plan. (5 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5.) See also No. 467.

465. M. Sharett (New York) to U.E. Maung (Rangoon). 7 December 1949

Notes

1. Burma's Foreign Minister. Sharett sent a cable with a similar appeal to the Foreign Minister of Liberia (8 December 1949, 93.03/3037/15).
2. See Appendix C, Main Volume, pp. 781–2.

466. President Weizmann [Rehovoth] to President Auriol (Paris). 8 December 1949

Notes

1. In the voting on the Australian draft resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem in the Ad Hoc Political Committee on 7 December (see No. 464 and n. 1 *ibid.*).

467. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett (New York). 8 December 1949

Notes

1. With the adoption of the resolution on internationalization in the Ad Hoc Political Committee on 7 December. France had voted in favour of the plan. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above, and see also No. 464, n. 1.
2. In another cable, Fischer reported on Schuman's position, namely, that despite his personal stand, Schuman had come to the conclusion that France could not abstain from the voting in the Assembly for fear of the reaction of the Catholic world. Judging that the resolution would not receive the necessary majority, he had instructed his delegation not to address the Assembly in favour of the draft resolution or to solicit support for it. (Cable to Sharett, PN158, 10 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5.)

468. The Israel Delegation at the United Nations (New York) to Y.H. Levin (Sydney). 8 December 1949

Telegram; Outg.: 93.03/69/12

Summary

Sharett reports: ''Representative of your second country[1] is enraged at the first's proposal which was passed by a large majority of the committee[2] and threatens to be passed in the plenum. He must speak out and vote against it but in the absence of explicit instructions from his government, he must abstain in the Assembly as he did in the committee.'' Sharett asks Levin to urge the Government of New Zealand to expedite its instructions to its representative in the U.N. to vote against the resolution. Levin should explain that those who do not vote against this proposal will be held responsible for the failure of the U.N. and the abandonment of the Holy Places, since internationalization is unimplementable inasmuch as the resolution will terminate Israel's authority without setting up anything effective in its place. Sharett requests that Levin cable him immediately about the results of his activities.[3]

Notes

1. New Zealand.
2. The reference is to the voting on 7 December. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above.

3. Levin cabled on his talk with A.D. McIntosh, Director-General of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs. McIntosh showed an inclination to accept Israel's position and tried to solicit support for it among the leaders of his government. However, his efforts met with no success because of the change in governments in New Zealand precisely at that time. (See Levin's telegrams to the Israeli delegation at the U.N., 9 December 1949, 93.03/69/12.)

469. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 9 December 1949

Coded Tel. YA555; Outg.: 130.09/2329/14

Summary

In the course of Sasson and Shiloah's meeting with the Jordanians in Shuneh,[1] they offered Jordan free access to the sea by means of a corridor from Hebron to Gaza, to be under Jordanian jurisdiction. Rifa'i maintained that Jordan would consent only to a corridor under Jordanian "sovereignty"[2] and not under Jordanian "control"[3], and that they were referring to the Beit Jibrin–Faluja–Majdal strip. The Israelis received the impression that Jordan had no agreement with Egypt on Gaza and that she hoped that by annexing the Majdal area, she would attract the refugees there, and would eventually receive the entire strip. The Israeli representatives stated that they could not consent to any territorial concessions, and requested that the discussion turn to other issues. Rifa'i replied that it was possible to settle the question of the Jewish Quarter and of territorial continuity to Mt. Scopus and that Jordan could agree to straighten out the bulge at Latrun in return for another area in the vicinity. He rejected any possibility of ceding Naharayim because this would mean a territorial concession of original Jordanian territory. As for the validity of the Jordanian–British pact over the West Bank, Rifa'i said that the pact did not permit England to establish any bases except in Amman and Mafraq; Jordan refused to permit the British to establish additional bases in her territory. The Jordanians persevered in their demand for access to Gaza under their sovereignty. The Israeli representatives in reply angrily complained that the Jordanians only came with demands, forgetting that they had fought against Israel.

The King told Rifa'i in Turkish that he would consent to the concession proposed by Israel on the corridor to Gaza under Jordanian control, because without results he could not face his people who knew of these contacts. He also said that England, the U.S. and Turkey were pressing for a settlement. Rifa'i would not retreat from his position, saying that the Jews would eventually make concessions, but if there was no alternative and he had to give in, he would rather resign. The King pressed him not to break off the contacts, and it was finally decided that a date for a further meeting would be announced within the next two days.[4] In conclusion, the King apologized for the Jalbun affair[5] and pinned the blame on his Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Notes

1. For a detailed summary of the talk see document dated 13 December 1949, 93.03/64/2.
2. Arabic: "sovereignty".
3. Arabic: "control".
4. The next meeting was held on 13 December. See Editorial Note, p. 293 above.
5. This is a reference to a complaint by the Jordanian Foreign Minister to the Security Council about a border incident which had occurred in early December in Jalbun and had ended, according to the Jordanians, with the expulsion of the Arab inhabitants of the village. Israel denied the accusation.

Editorial Note

The U. N. General Assembly resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem

On 9 December, the U.N. General Assembly debated the report of the Ad Hoc Political Committee on the establishment of an international regime in Jerusalem and adopted the Australian draft resolution which the Committee had submitted by a majority of 38 to 14 with 7 abstentions. The U.S. and Britain voted against the resolution; France voted in favour. To the resolution was added Appendix B of the Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947 which included a sketch-map of the proposed boundaries of internationalized Jerusalem. The text of the resolution was as follows:

The General Assembly,

Having regard to its resolutions 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Having studied the reports of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine set up under the latter resolution,

I. *Decides*

In relation to Jerusalem,

Believing that the principles underlying its previous resolutions concerning this matter, and in particular its resolution of 29 November 1947, represent a just and equitable settlement of the question,

1. To restate, therefore, its intention that Jerusalem should be placed under a permanent international regime, which should envisage appropriate guarantees for the protection of the Holy Places, both within and outside Jerusalem, and to confirm specifically the following provisions of General Assembly resolution 181 (II): (1) the City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations; (2) the Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administrating Authority...; and (3) the City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including

also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern, Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map;

2. To request for this purpose that the Trusteeship Council at its next session, whether special or regular, complete the preparation of the Statute of Jerusalem, omitting the now inapplicable provisions, such as articles 32 and 39, and, without prejudice to the fundamental principles of the international regime for Jerusalem set forth in General Assembly resolution 181 (II), introducing therein amendments in the direction of its greater democratization, approve the Statute, and proceed immediately with its implementation. The Trusteeship Council shall not allow any actions taken by any interested Government or Governments to divert it from adopting and implementing the Statute of Jerusalem;

II. *Calls upon* the States concerned to make formal undertakings, at an early date and in the light of their obligations as Members of the United Nations, that they will approach these matters with good will and be guided by the terms of the present resolution.

(See *GAOR*, 4th Sess., Plenary, 274th–275th Meetings, pp. 572–607; *Resolutions*, p. 25).

470. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 10 December 1949

Notes

1. In response to the General Assembly's resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem. See Editorial Note above.

471. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan[1]. 10 December 1949

Telegram; Outg.: 93.03/69/20

Summary

Sharett cables instructions for Israel's reaction to be published in the press,[2] which should:

(1) emphasize the U.N.'s failure in that it passed an abortive, unimplementable resolution;

(2) note that all the arguments on and demonstrations of the impracticability of the resolution have gone unanswered;

(3) reveal that many delegations and governments have admitted that they do not believe in internationalization but were forced to vote for it out of Christian solidarity and in the name of a mere abstract principle;

(4) expose the combination of conflicting elements which united for a negative purpose without anything constructive in common to make possible assumption of responsibility;

(5) explain that the strength of the 29 November resolution derived not

from its being an international resolution, but from the willingness of one interested party to implement it on its own; this time both parties are against the resolution, so the U.N.'s ability to implement it is nonexistent;

(6) proclaim that nothing can undermine Israel's position in Jerusalem;

(7) announce that Israel has no intention of attacking the authority of the U.N., but that those who supported the resolution bear the responsibility for the failure of the U.N.'s moral authority;

(8) charge the Church with the fact that this resolution frees Israel of all responsibility towards it, though Israel will not take advantage of this, but will continue to safeguard the Holy Places under her control and will continue faithfully to uphold the rights of other religions;

(9) expose the Arabs' plot to provoke Israel to violence thereby bringing back the chaos which had recently prevailed.

Notes

1. This telegram was despatched to all Israeli Missions abroad.
2. On the resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem see Editorial Note, pp. 281–2.

472. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 11 December 1949

Notes

1. For additional details of the debate in the Cabinet and developments up to the issuance of the Knesset's statement see No. 482, n. 2, No. 487, and Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 below.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
3. See No. 476, para. 4.
4. Sharett stated in reply that he agreed with paragraphs 1 and 2 in the Cabinet's statement, but strenuously objected to paragraphs 3 and 4 (telegram to Eytan, 1941, 12 December 1949, 130.09/2328/7). See No. 476.

Editorial Note

State Department's communiqué to Israel

On 11 December McDonald delivered to Eytan a communiqué from the American Secretary of State on the subject of Israel's reaction to the resolution on internationalization. In the communiqué, Israel is requested to refrain from making extreme statements or performing rash acts which would inflame the situation in the Middle East, particularly in view of the Israel–Jordan talks and the prospect of talks with the Vatican. A similar communiqué was sent to Amman. (See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1531–2; Eytan's cable to Sharett, HK1, 130.09/2329/14, 11 December 1949.)

473. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 11 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, above.
2. J.Z. Lurie, a *Palestine Post* correspondent in New York. See also No. 499.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
4. Cf. the report on the talk in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1532–3.

474. M. Fischer (Paris) to M. Sharett (New York). 11 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. See No. 439.
3. Cf. No. 446.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 232–3 above, and No. 385.

475. M. Amir (Brussels) to G. Avner. 11 December 1949

Orig.: 130.10/2550/10

Summary

Despite his failure,[1] Amir summarizes his activity on the subject of Jerusalem during the last few days. He received the cable from Avner telling him to make one final effort,[2] as well as a similar cable from New York.

On 7 December Amir requested an urgent interview with the Belgian Foreign Minister but this was not granted. However, on 8 December, together with Lotan,[3] he met the Secretary-General of the Ministry. Prior to the meeting, Amir contacted Fischer and Yapou,[4] learning from them that the U.S. and Britain opposed internationalization, and reinforced with this information they went to the meeting. It became clear, however, that Belgium's line on internationalization had been decided on at the highest level and that no retreat from it was possible at that stage.

As for Luxembourg, Amir contacted the Director of Political Affairs and reminded him of Bech's well-known remark[5] that he hated international regimes, and of his promise to instruct his U.N. delegation along these lines. The Director of Political Affairs agreed to pass on Amir's protest to Bech and also his request that Bech bring Luxembourg's vote in the plenum in line with his declared position. In addition, Amir sent a cable (appended to his letter[6]) and also spoke with Marx[7] in Luxembourg, requesting that he explain to the Foreign Minister the significance of Russia's support of international rule over Jerusalem and the consequences of the adoption of an unimplementable resolution. Marx brought back Bech's reply that he was under great

pressure and that he was committed to instruct his delegation to vote for internationalization, against his inner conviction. Marx's statement about the tremendous pressure exerted on Luxembourg's Foreign Minister was later confirmed at The Hague.

Amir arrived at The Hague on the night of 7–8 December, the Dutch Parliament then sitting on the agreements between Holland and Indonesia.[8] On 9 December, he requested an urgent interview with the Foreign Minister. The Minister being otherwise engaged, Amir could only meet the Advisor on Diplomatic Affairs and the official in charge of Israeli affairs. Amir's efforts to prevail upon them to oppose internationalization were unsuccessful. The two Dutch officials explained that Holland could not vote against internationalization because that would arouse the opposition of the entire clergy. Church circles had exerted pressure on Holland, as also had France, not to oppose internationalization. Further on, the formulation of the Dutch-Swedish resolution was discussed.[9] In the afternoon the Foreign Minister received Amir for several minutes and then turned him over to the Secretary-General of the Ministry, Mr. Boon, who told Amir that Holland had never stood in greater need of her powers of resistance than at present in order to abstain from voting. Holland was called on to vote for internationalization by various parties, including the Pope – who had appealed directly – and France, which had been very pressing. Boon agreed with Amir that the resolution damaged the prestige of the U.N. and admitted that if he were Prime Minister of Israel, he, too, would have forcefully opposed the resolution.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above. Luxembourg and Belgium supported the motion on internationalization; Holland abstained.
2. RB12, 6 December 1949, 130.09/2300/9.
3. Yosef Lotan, Israel's Consul, First Secretary and Immigration Officer in Brussels.
4. Eliezer Yapou, Press Attaché at the Israeli Legation in London.
5. Joseph Bech, Luxembourg's Foreign Minister.
6. The telegram is not in the file.
7. Edmond Marx, head of the Jewish community of Luxembourg.
8. See No. 231, n. 2.
9. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above, and Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–793.

476. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 12 December 1949

Notes

1. See Eytan's telegram to Sharett, Y558, 10 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14.
2. No. 472.
3. Cf. Nos. 482 and 487.
4. See Nos. 477 and 483.
5. Itzhak Meir Levin, Minister of Social Welfare and Member of Knesset of the Agudat Israel party.

477. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 12 December 1949

Notes

1. See No. 483.

478. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 12 December 1949

Notes

1. See No. 477.
2. See Vol. 2, Companion Volume, Editorial Note, pp. 131–2.
3. *Ibid.*, Editorial Note, p. 143, and Vol. 2, Main Volume, No. 160.

479. B. Kadury (Rome) to G. Avner. 12 December 1949

Orig.: 130.10/2523/17

Summary

Kadury reports on his talks with the Vatican's agent even though the U.N. Assembly's resolution[1] has made his report out-of-date. Herzog had met this person recently during his stay in Rome.[2] On 8 December a cable was received from Herzog asking the Legation to contact the agent through Yehonatan Prato, and to transmit the following message:

> "Many delegations state that they are forced to support internationalization against their convictions and only under intense pressure from the Holy See. This pressure is having deleterious effects. The internationalization resolution will not be implemented because the residents will frustrate it and no power can force them to obey it. On the other hand, the resolution absolves us entirely of all our commitments and responsibility. If they are sincerely concerned over the fundamental issue and interested in tangible results rather than in empty show, they must prevent the resolution from being passed or else they will be responsible for the failure of the U.N. and the loss of their present and potential achievements. It is inconceivable to us that the Pope, who is so profoundly concerned about the welfare of the Holy City and the strengthening of the values dear to him all over the Middle East, should have a hand in so potentially disastrous a stratagem as this. It is difficult for us to comprehend why they are letting slip the opportunity of insuring the welfare of the city and safeguarding the Holy Places under the aegis of the U.N.'s authority and with the consent of both parties in Jerusalem."

Prato conveyed the text of Herzog's message to the Vatican's agent and requested him to deliver it to the Vatican authorities. As a result of Prato's urging the agent agreed to meet the Counsellor of the Israeli Legation in order

to receive additional clarifications, rejecting the suggestion that he meet the Minister himself in order to lend the talk official character. Kadury explained to the Vatican's agent the situation which had arisen in Jerusalem and the stormy mood of several of the political parties in Israel.[3] He noted especially the U.S. and Britain's opposition to internationalization and the possible consequences for the Church should Russia obtain a foothold in internationalized Jerusalem. Kadury also mentioned Jordan's opposition to the resolution and dwelt upon the danger of undermining the safety of Jerusalem, which would mean jeopardizing the safety of the Holy Places. The agent said that he regarded the message he had received as being of the greatest moment, and pointed out that the first paragraph was in his opinion too definite. He promised to transmit the text of the message and the content of the talk to the appropriate persons in the Vatican.

On 9 December, the Vatican's agent informed Kadury that his superiors declined to provide an answer to Israel's message. He asserted that he had delivered the message.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. See No. 434.
3. After the Australian resolution was adopted in the Sub-committee on 1 December (see Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above), the residents of the capital staged a series of protests and demonstrations against the internationalization of Jerusalem. The demonstrations culminated in a mass march to Mt. Herzl on 4 December, headed by the two Chief Rabbis. In a dramatic ceremony, Rabbi Herzog imposed the oath "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem" on the audience.

480. G. Avner (Tel Aviv) to E. Yapou (London). 12 December 1949

Copy: 93.02/179/1

Summary

In reply to Yapou's letter of 2 December[1] concerning his talks with the Director of the Department of Information of the Greek Embassy in London, Avner recommends that the contacts with this official be maintained and that he be acquainted at the earliest opportunity with all the impediments and embitterment which have built up around Greek–Israeli relations, as Avner reviews them in this letter.

Even before the founding of the State there were numerous complications in Israeli–Greek relations. Greece voted against Israel on every resolution in the U.N.O. for the establishment of the State, and from May 1948 to January 1949, Greece voted against Israel in the Assembly. More than any other country, Greece has interfered with travel to Israel, has prevented young persons from crossing through Greece *en route* to Israel, and has not permitted Israeli citizens to leave their planes during stopovers in Athens. Even

now, when France and Britain have recognized Israel and relations between Israel and West European countries have improved, Greece has continued to be hostile to Israel.

In August 1949 Greece sent a diplomatic representative to Israel, but his role was confined to securing practical concessions for the Greek Church and Greek citizens in Israel without improving the Greek attitude towards Israel in the diplomatic sphere. Several hostile acts on the part of the Government of Greece reflect the situation since July 1949:

(1) Greece's refusal to release two Israeli planes which were detained in Greece at the beginning of the year, despite the fact that the Security Council had already repealed the embargo on arms to the Middle East.

(2) Greece's refusal to vote for Israel's admission to international organizations, even those having a technical and not a political nature.

(3) A clear message to the Government of Israel before the opening of the Assembly that Greece had reservations regarding the State of Israel and could not support her on the matters vital to her.

(4) Official Greek propaganda in Athens against Israel because of her abstention in the voting on the dispute between Greece and the Slavic bloc.[2]

(5) The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs gave clear assurances to Rabbi Herzog that Greece would abstain in the vote on Jerusalem,[3] but two days later he stated that he had not been able to keep his promise, and Greece voted for internationalization.

In the meantime, clear assurances have been given to Greece on the gradual return of the property of her citizens who had fled during the war. The representatives of the Greek Church expressed their satisfaction at their treatment by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Thus Israel cannot be held responsible for the deterioration in relations, at which she feels not a little resentment.

Even if a new diplomatic representative is despatched, there is no reason to suppose that he will succeed where his predecessor failed if the policy of the Greek Government does not change. The Greeks say that they have given certain assurances to the Arab countries regarding their opposition to Israel. In this connection, the claim that the Greek community in Egypt must be protected cannot be accepted in light of the fact that France and Italy also have important communities in Egypt, yet their attitude towards Israel is friendly.

Notes

1. In file 130.10/2537/3.
2. The reference is to the U.N. Assembly resolution of 18 November 1949 on the renewal of the activity of the Special Committee on the Balkans, the condemnation of Albania and Bulgaria for their military aid to the guerrilla fighters in Greece, and the demand from these two states and others to cease rendering any assistance or support to the guerrillas. The resolution was adopted by a majority of 50 to 6 with 2 abstentions (Israel and India).
3. Cf. No. 444.

481. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 13 December 1949

Notes

1. See Eytan's telegrams to Sharett HK4, Y570, 13 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14.
2. See No. 472 and cf. Editorial Note below.

Editorial Note

Government statement on the transfer of the Knesset and government offices to Jerusalem

At the Knesset meeting on 13 December, Ben-Gurion read a statement in the Government's name. The first version of the statement was approved at the Cabinet meeting on 11 December (see No. 472) and was debated the following day by the various parties in the coalition (see Nos. 482 and 487). As a result of the opposition aroused in these parties, and after receiving Sharett's response with its vigorous objection to a public statement on the transfer of the government offices and the Knesset to Jerusalem, the Cabinet convened another meeting on the morning of 13 December. Ben-Gurion laid before the Cabinet Sharett's cable (see No. 472, n. 4), but there was no real debate over his reply. Only Kaplan and Rosen made any explicit reference to Sharett's objections. Rosen recommended that the sentence stating that there was no reason to prevent the Knesset from returning to Jerusalem be omitted from the text of the statement, but his proposal was not adopted. Nor did the Cabinet adopt a similar recommendation by Shapira or Shitreet's proposal to submit to the Knesset a bill declaring Jerusalem the capital of Israel. Following is the text of the statement:

One week ago this day, in the name of the Government of Israel, I made a statement on Jerusalem before the Knesset. I need hardly say to you that this statement retains its full force, and that no change in our attitude has occurred or can possibly occur.

As you know, the General Assembly of the United Nations hes in the meantime, by a large majority, decided to place Jerusalem under an international regime as a separate entity. This decision is utterly incapable of implementation – if only for the determined unalterable opposition of the inhabitants of Jerusalem themselves. It is to be hoped that the General Assembly will in the course of time correct this mistake which its majority has made, and will make no attempt whatsoever to impose a regime on the Holy City against the will of its people.

We respect and shall continue to respect the wishes of all those States which are concerned for freedom of worship and free access to the Holy Places, and which seek to safeguard existing rights in the Holy Places and religious buildings in Jerusalem. Our undertaking to preserve these rights

remains in force, and we shall gladly and willingly carry it out, even though we cannot lend ourselves to take part in the enforced separation of Jerusalem, which violates without need or reason the historic and natural right of the people which dwells in Zion.

From the very first days of Provisional Government we made the peace, the security and the economic consolidation of Jerusalem our principal care. In the stress of war, when Jerusalem was under siege, we were compelled to establish the seat of Government in Hakirya by Tel-Aviv. But for the State of Israel there has always been and always will be one capital only – Jerusalem the eternal. So it was three thousand years ago – and so it will be, we believe, until the end of time.

As soon as the fighting stopped, we began transferring government offices to Jerusalem and creating the conditions the capital needed – effective communications, economic and technical arrangements. We are continuing with the transfer of the Government to Jerusalem and hope to complete it as soon as possible.

When the first Knesset was opened in Jerusalem on 14th February 1949, there were no adequate facilities for its normal functioning in the capital, and it was necessary to transfer its sessions temporarily to Tel-Aviv. The required arrangements in Jerusalem are on the verge of completion, and there is nothing now to prevent the Knesset from returning to Jerusalem. We propose that you take a decision to this effect.

In all these arrangements there is, of course, nothing that alters in the slightest degree any of the existing rights in the Holy Places, which the Government of Israel will respect in full, or our consent to effective supervision of these Holy Places by the United Nations, as our delegation to the General Assembly declared.

After the statement was read, the representatives of the opposition parties made statements on behalf of their own parties. The debate on the Government statement was postponed.

At the end of the meeting, the Chairman announced that following the Chanukah recess, Knesset sessions would take place in Jerusalem. (*Divrei Ha'Knesset* [Knesset Reports], 2nd Session of the First Knesset, III, pp. 281–287.)

482. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 13 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.

No. 482 – Notes (continued)

2. 11 December. At the same meeting, there was a debate on Israel's response to the Assembly's resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem; Ben-Gurion's proposed text of a Government statement in the Knesset was also discussed (see No. 472, Editorial Note above, and No. 487). Rabbi Maimon, who had long pressed for a Cabinet resolution on the transfer of the ministries and of the Knesset to Jerusalem, reiterated his demand. He accused Sharett of preventing the Cabinet from adopting an explicit resolution to that effect by means of his political evaluations in recent months. Ben-Gurion came readily to Sharett's defence. He accused Rabbi Maimon of saying "uncomradely" and "incorrect things." He took full responsibility for the Government's foreign policy and expressed decided reservations regarding the attempt to separate the policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs from the Government's policy.
3. Pinhas (Felix) Rosen, Minister of Justice.
4. Moshe Shapira, Minister of Health, Immigration, and the Interior.
5. Eytan informed Sharett that at the meeting of the Mapai (Israel Labour Party) faction in the Knesset, the Government's statement was adopted by a majority of 25 to 6 despite Kaplan's opposition and after Sharett's telegram (No. 472, n. 4) expressing his opposition to the transfer of the government ministries and the Knesset to Jerusalem had been read out (Y569, 13 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14; see also No. 487).
6. See Editorial Note above.

483. A. Eban (Washington) to W. Eytan. 13 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.
3. Cf. the record of the meeting in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1536–8 and see further details in Eban's telegram to Eytan, X852, 14 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5.

484. G. Rafael (New York) to M. Sharett (New York). 13 December 1949

Memorandum: 130.02/2443/5

Summary

On the day of the vote on Jerusalem in the U.N. Assembly,[1] Rafael met Tsarapkin who told him the following:

(1) The partition of Jerusalem between Israel and Jordan is in fact the division of Palestine between the two countries.

(2) Ratification of this partition would mean consent to the consolidation of the British in Jerusalem and eastern Palestine.

(3) British consolidation would mean aid to the U.S. in its aggressive preparations for a third world war.

(4) Israel's consent to the partition of Jerusalem would have in effect furthered these plans and strengthened the Anglo-Americans in the Middle East.

(5) The populations of Jerusalem will oppose the implementation of the U.N. resolution only to the extent that the Anglo-Americans incite them to do so. Just as the Arabs would not have attacked Israel a year ago in the absence of intense incitement on the part of the Anglo-Americans, so now the State of Israel will not rise up against the U.N. of its own free will.

(6) Should Israel nonetheless oppose the U.N. resolution, the Security Council would regretfully use its authority.

(7) The U.S.S.R.'s policy in the Palestine issue has been entirely consistent. The 29 November plan consists of three parts. Part One, the establishment of the Jewish State, has already been implemented; Part Two, the establishment of an international rule in Jerusalem, is about to be implemented; Part Three, the establishment of an independent Arab state, will be implemented after Parts One and Two of the plan are carried out, and the U.S.S.R. will rigorously insist that an independent Arab state be established in eastern Palestine.

(8) Israel's voting in the Assembly proves that she leans appreciably towards the U.S. On no issue has Israel taken a stand entirely opposed to that of the U.S., while at the same time, on issues vital to the U.S.S.R. and the entire U.N., she voted against the U.S.S.R. Tsarapkin cited the example of Israel's voting on the condemnation of British and U.S. preparations for a new war.[2] He emphasized that, from the Soviet standpoint, this resolution was the most important one on the Assembly's agenda. He added that he did not wish to argue about Israel's voting, since she is free to vote and make decisions as she sees fit.

(9) Following all that, Rafael asked Tsarapkin straight from the shoulder whether Israel was not the most independent State in the Middle East. The Russian replied after some thought and hesitation, "By and large".

Notes

1. 9 December. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. See No. 450, n. 2.

485. M. Eliash (London) to M. Comay. 13 December 1949

486. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 13 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Notes, pp. 251–2 and 281–2 above.
2. No. 474.
3. Pierre Gerlier, Archbishop of Lyons.

No. 486 – Notes (continued)

4. The reference is to a letter which Robert M. Louisgrand, representative of the Jesuits in the Near East and Central Africa, sent to Fischer after their meeting in Lyons. Louisgrand mentions Fischer's assurance, which he gave during his visit to Lyons, that he will send him a communiqué on Israel's position on the Holy Places. Louisgrand recommends that Fischer send Gerlier, who is about to leave for Rome, a detailed document on the question. This should include a map of Jerusalem and those parts of it which are held by the Arabs. (See Louisgrand to Fischer, 7 December 1949, 130.10/2550/7.)
5. See No. 439.
6. One word omitted here.
7. One word omitted here.
8. Georges Bidault, French Prime Minister.
9. Pierre Henri Teitgen, Minister without Portfolio in charge of Information in the French Government.
10. The Fighters Party (formerly Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, Lohamei Herut Israel) headed by Nathan Yellin-Mor. See *Herald Tribune*, 13 December 1949.
11. Roger Garreau, President of the Trusteeship Council.

Editorial Note

Agreement between Israel and Jordan

On 13 December another meeeting was held in Shuneh between Sasson, Shiloah, King Abdallah, and Samir al-Rifa'i. At this meeting a draft agreement was concluded between Israel and Jordan. It contained the following clauses:

(a) Partition of Jerusalem between Jordan and Israel; guarantee of Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter to the Western Wall, and agreement on free access to Mt. Scopus; guarantee of territorial continuity under Jordanian sovereignty from the eastern city to the Bethlehem road.

(b) Israeli sovereignty over the west bank of the Dead Sea to the potash works at the northern end of the Dead Sea, including the works themselves.

(c) Agreement in principle to reciprocal border changes, including the Latrun area, in accordance with the military and agricultural needs of both parties.

(d) Israeli agreement to Jordanian sovereignty over a corridor from Hebron to Gaza through Beit Jibrin, on three conditions:

(1) Free passage for Israel at several points; (2) prohibition of maintenance of an army or establishment of a military infrastructure in the corridor; (3) exclusion of the corridor from the content of the Anglo–Jordanian Treaty.

Already during this talk Rifa'i retreated from the agreement. He continued to demand the southern Negev and objected to the location of the corridor. He proposed a Jordanian corridor from Hebron to Majdal through Beit Jibrin and Faluja and pointed out the difficulty of taking Gaza away from the Egyptians.

Rifa'i reported on the meeting to the American chargé d'affaires in Amman and Shiloah did the same to the American ambassador in Israel. (See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1545–7. See also No. 520 and nn. 2–4 *ibid.*)

487. D. Ben-Gurion: Diary Note [Tel Aviv]. 14 December 1949

I.M.D.E.A.

Summary

Ben-Gurion writes in his diary that in the morning he went to Jerusalem to set up the Prime Minister's Office in the capital, thereby effecting the transfer of the Government to Jerusalem.

The decision on Jerusalem had been among the bitterest and most difficult ones he had been called upon to make. He does not know whether he has ever been faced with a decision as difficult as this one, of disobeying the command of the U.N. and resisting the whole Catholic, Soviet and Arab world. Only after having pondered the question at great length did he decide that Israel must take the risk and resist the U.N. by actions and not only by statements. He admits that the import of the transfer of the Government and the Knesset to Jerusalem is contravention of the U.N. resolution.

Ben-Gurion relates the course of events leading up to his decision. On 11 December the Cabinet adopted his position that the government offices and the Knesset must be transferred to Jerusalem, and to inform the Knesset accordingly on 12 December.[1] Kaplan and Shapira opposed the decision, while Remez supported it. On the morning of 12 December, Ben-Gurion prepared a statement which he intended to read that afternoon before the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee and before the Knesset, but meanwhile opposition had grown in the Religious Front and also in Mapai, the members demanding that a discussion be held. The Knesset session was postponed for a whole day. Ben-Gurion's proposal was adopted by a large majority of the Mapai faction in the Knesset, Sprinzak, Kaplan, Harzfeld, Lavi, and two or three other members opposing it. In the meantime, Moshe Sharett's objection[2] was also received and Ben-Gurion informed his party of it. On 13 December the matter was once again debated by the Cabinet in light of consultations within the parties. Ultimately, Ben-Gurion's statement[3] was adopted with minor amendments by Rosen.

That same afternoon the statement was laid before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Mapam opposed it but agreed to stand by the Government. The General Zionists, wishing to compete with Herut, demanded legislation on Jerusalem as the capital of the State. They evaded the question as to whether they approved of the transfer of the Government and the Knesset. Begin[4] demanded a debate on the Government's policy and a motion of non-confidence.

Ben-Gurion opposed an immediate debate on his statement, proposing instead that the debate be held after the return of the delegation. If the parties should then table a motion of non-confidence, there would be a vote.[5] Until then, he suggested that the various parties issue their own statements, and this was accepted. Begin, however, did not keep his word; instead of a statement, he made a "despicable" speech, as did Saphir.[6] Ben-Aharon[7] was in fine

form. At the end of his statement, Sprinzak delivered a summation formulated for him by Ben-Gurion.[8]

Ben-Gurion writes that, as he said at the inaugural ceremony at the industrial zone,[9] this time Israel was facing a battle against the whole world. The U.N. resolution had been adopted by a strange alliance of three world powers: the Soviet bloc, the Vatican and the Catholic world, and the Arabs and the Muslims (excepting the Turks). This affair revealed the might of the Vatican and world Catholicism. Mexico changed her mind on the last day and voted for internationalization; the Arab states demanded internationalization because of their hatred for Israel and their opposition to Abdallah. But Israel stood her ground not only against these three blocs but also against the U.N. Ben-Gurion says that he does not expect military sanctions, though obviously Israel could not resist the Russian or the American army. What he does fear is economic sanctions, especially on the part of America. He also raises the moral-political question of Israel's contravention of a U.N. resolution when she herself is so interested in strengthening the power of the U.N. and the rule of law all over the world.

Despite all these considerations, Ben-Gurion had no alternative but to take the step which he had determined on, because of the decisive arguments in its favour: the internationalization of Jerusalem would deprive the State of Israel of 100,000 Jews and tear out the heart of the Jewish people. It would also give rise to international intrigues in the city which would in turn affect the political and social bodies there. Russia is interested not only in Jerusalem but also in the partition plan. She would like to detach Jaffa, Lydda, Ramle, Migdal Gad,[10] Nazareth, and western Galilee from Israel – in other words, to destroy the Jewish state. The Vatican also supported the partition plan.

Ben-Gurion contends that had Israel agreed to internationalization, she would later have been required to give in on the refugee question and thus the State would have been destroyed as well as humiliated. He surmises that the solution of the problem of Jerusalem will also solve the problems of the boundaries and the refugees.

Ben-Gurion hopes that Israel's policy on the Jerusalem question succeeds and he lists Israel's potential allies in this issue: Jordan, Britain and the U.S. He is confident that if America takes no steps against Israel in this matter, there is no reason to fear the U.N., the Arab states, the Soviet bloc, or even the Vatican. At the same time, Ben-Gurion notes that the position of the U.S. has not yet crystallized, so if Israel is dilatory in taking any steps, the supporters of formal loyalty to the U.N. will gain strength in the U.S. Of course, there is the danger of committing some act which might force on the Americans a decision to take hostile steps against Israel; however, the U.S. would presumably not be in any hurry to do so, and she might then find ways to amend the U.N. resolution. Ben-Gurion mentions Abdallah's aid and, in that context, his talks with Israel.[11]

Notes

1. See No. 472.
2. *Ibid.*, n. 4. See also No. 476.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.
4. Menachem Begin, leader of the Herut Party.
5. Erroneously *hatsava* (the Army) in the original.
6. Joseph Saphir, Member of Knesset of the General Zionists Party.
7. Itzhak Ben-Aharon, Member of Knesset of the Mapam Party.
8. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.
9. Reference to a ceremony which was held that day to mark the opening of the industrial zone on Agrippas St. in Jerusalem.
10. Majdal, present-day Ashqelon.
11. See Nos. 441 and 449 and Editorial Note above.

488. Meeting: G. Avner – F. Guyon (Tel Aviv, 14 December 1949)

Report: 130.10/2550/7

Summary

The French Minister requested this talk with Avner following the Prime Minister's statement in the Knesset on the transfer of the Government to Jerusalem.[1] Avner maintained that Ben-Gurion's statement represented a continuation of the policy on Jerusalem as adopted by the Government since its formation. The Minister said that already on 9 December he had requested that Israel refrain from any hasty actions. True, his approach had not been made on explicit instructions from his Government, as was the case with the American Ambassador's representations,[2] however he had expressed the spirit of the French Government's attitude. Neither was he in possession of instructions on the matter at the present moment, but he had to express his strong feeling (and he was certain that this was also his Government's opinion) that an error had been committed. It was clear to him that the first statement in the Knesset[3] had increased the majority against Israel and he was certain that the second statement would only reinforce the hostile attitude towards Israel in the U.N. and in the Catholic countries. France was one of the nations which had been forced to join the majority, in the absence of any possibility of swimming against the current. He was certain that his country did not believe in the practicability of the resolution, although Israel's most recent step had pushed France into the camp of the resolution's supporters. This was not because the resolution had become more practical, but because France realized that the society of nations must expose Israel's ambitions. He said that he would not be surprised if America should use Ben-Gurion's statement as a pretext for refusing to support Israel on this issue. He expressed the hope that Israel had weigh her actions carefully and that she had an agreement with Jordan on the tactics in this issue. In the French Minister's view, it was dangerous for Israel to adopt the line of creating *faits accomplis* which would necessarily lead to her isolation in the international arena. In his

opinion, Israel could have adopted the Dutch-Swedish proposal[4] as a basis for discussion as well as the proposal of the Conciliation Commission.[5] He felt that Israel did not realize that the latter proposal was for her own good and now, because she had rejected it, a worse one had been submitted. He was certain that Israel adopted wrongheaded tactics which would create difficulties in her relations with the Catholic countries over other political affairs as well. Finally, he was convinced that the latest statement in the Knesset would create a negative attitude towards Israel at the Quai d'Orsay.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.
2. See No. 473.
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 272–4 above.
4. See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–793.
5. See Editorial Note, p. 181 above.

489. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 14 December 1949

Notes

1. See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–793.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 293 above.

490. M. Sharett (New York) to W. Eytan. 14 December 1949

Coded Tel. X849; Recd: 15 December; Outg.: C.Z.A. A245/183

Summary

Sharett notifies the Prime Minister that "a combination of grave circumstances" forces him to tender his resignation from his post as Foreign Minister and from his membership in the Cabinet; he requests that his resignation be accepted. He lists the reasons for his decision: (1) he had not foreseen the serious international reversal which had taken place on the Jerusalem question; (2) the Government and his party rejected his recommended policy after the decision in the Assembly;[1] (3) he feared that he could not "effectively and wholeheartedly" defend the line laid down by the Government. He adds that he duly appreciates the damage which his resignation may cause the Government and its position, but in the situation which has arisen it was his duty to turn in his portfolio to the Prime Minister.[2]

Notes

1. See Nos. 482 and 487.

No. 490 – Notes (continued)

2. For Ben-Gurion's reply see No. 498. That same day, Sharett telephoned Tel Aviv to announce his intention of resigning. His decision stunned his friends who tried urgently to prevent him from carrying it out. On 14 December, Shiloah cabled the following message: "I am most profoundly stunned and I object strenuously. There are no personal or political grounds for thinking this way and you can not estimate the internal and external damage. I've just come back from the Old Man [Ben-Gurion]. He, too, is stunned. It never occurred to him that you felt this way . . . devotedly and faithfully I implore you – change your mind." In a cable dated 15 December, S. Avigur wrote that he "concurs completely" with Shiloah, and "emphatically" entreats Sharett "not to come to a decision" before meeting with his friends in Israel. Eytan also sent his own cable (Y581) in which he expressed his vigorous opposition to Sharett's action. (All cables are in C.Z.A. A245/183.)

491. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Eliash (London). 14 December 1949

Notes

1. See No. 493.

492. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 14 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. Reference is to Garreau's position concerning the opening date of the debate on implementing the Assembly's internationalization resolution. Garreau supported the Iraqi and Soviet representatives' position in favour of opening the debate immediately and opposed the U.S. and Britain's inclination to postpone it until after January 1st. At the same session it was resolved, by a majority of 6 to 1 with 5 abstentions, to continue immediately with the Council's debates on the implementation of the Assembly's resolution. (See *TCOR, 2nd Sp. Sess.*, 4th Meeting, 13 December 1949, pp. 36–42.)
3. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.

493. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 15 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 293 above.
3. The British reaction to the Israeli proposal was unfavourable. On 28 December Ben-Gurion wrote in his diary that a "tough reply" had been received from the British and he copied the text of the reply into his diary. The letter stated that the question which Israel had raised could be decided only by the governments of Britain and Jordan inasmuch as Israel had nothing to fear from Britain as long as the former did not direct any aggression at her neighbours. Furthermore, Britain had no intention of establishing bases or stationing troops in the western part of Palestine during a time of peace, but joint Anglo-Jordanian action in the event of war or the threat of war was another matter. Ben-Gurion stated that "there is an obvious threat here to the effect that we shall have to deal with Britain if we provoke Transjordan or another Arab nation, and that they will be able to establish bases as they see fit" (I.M.D.E.A.).

494. M. Sharett (Washington) to W. Eytan. 15 December 1949

Coded Tel. WIA38; Recd: 16 December; Inc.: 130.09/2308/16

Summary

In the cable, addressed to Eytan, Shiloah, and Sharef,[1] Sharett asks them to "protect the dignity of the Prime Minister from self-inflicted damage". [. . . . .][2] Ben-Gurion's statement about Israel's war against the whole world[3] was groundless and decidedly harmful, and his words about the three enemies only widened the breach between Israel and the U.S.S.R., where they have already commented that Ben-Gurion's wording was "most infelicitous". The Soviets have repeatedly emphasized that their opposition to Israel should not be considered a reversal of policy, and that their friendship still stood unchanged. Sharett thinks that, following the recent three statements, only one of which had been necessary, it would be better if Ben-Gurion exercised some self-restraint for a while. Sharett feels that the whole method of "creating *faits accomplis* in our foreign policy through direct statements by the Prime Minister" was contrary to his own style and was making his own position intolerable He requests his friends' help in preventing worsening of the situation.

Notes

1. Zeev Sharef, Government Secretary and Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office.
2. One sentence omitted here.
3. See No. 487.

495. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 15 December 1949

Notes

1. See Nos. 482 and 487.
2. See Ben-Gurion's speech at the ceremony marking the opening of Jerusalem's industrial zone (No. 487).

496. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 15 December 1949

Notes

1. No. 489.
2. See Editorial Note, p. 293 above.

497. Meeting: M. Sharett – F. Frankfurter[1] (Washington, 15 December 1949)

Report: 130.02/2414/26

Summary

Sharett laid several ideas before Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter, requesting that he communicate them to Acheson in the form and at the moment he considers appropriate:

(1) Israel was facing two main obstacles in the U.S.: the first was the suspicion that Israel might one day join the Communist bloc; the second was the problem of the ''dual loyalty'' of American Jewry. Though these two problems seem to have no connection, they are in fact closely bound up with each other. American Jews were afraid that their ties with Israel made the U.S. Government question their loyalty as long as American officials suspected that Israel might veer towards the Eastern bloc. In so thinking, these officials are ignoring or failing to realize the importance which Israeli policy attaches to strengthening ties with U.S. Jewry. When the Government of the United States realizes that it has itself a stake in closer relations between Israel and American Jewry and that this constitutes the best guarantee against Israel's joining the Eastern bloc – only then will these two obstacles be removed.

(2) For understandable reasons, Israel cannot give the U.S. any tangible guarantees, as military bases, etc. But the very existence of U.S. Jewry affords such a guarantee, for Israel would never imperil her ties with the five million American Jews. U.S. Jewry draws inspiration and encouragement from the existence of the State of Israel. Emigration of American Jews to Israel and their investments in that country will not diminish the wealth of U.S. Jewry but will strengthen the ties between it and the Jewish people and between the U.S. and Israel. Only the Government of the United States had the prestige to remove the doubts of American Jews concerning dual loyalty. Sharett proposed, for example, that Acheson make a public statement that his Government viewed favourably capital investment by American Jews in Israel and the strengthening of relations with the State of Israel. Such a statement coming from a senior American figure would do away with the dual loyalty problem once and for all.

Justice Frankfurter received Sharett's ideas favourably, even adding he felt that President Truman should be the one to make this statement since the Jews trusted him even more than they did Acheson. He agreed to handle the matter, but requested that no one else be involved in it.

Notes

1. Felix Frankfurter, U.S. Supreme Court Justice.

498. D. Ben-Gurion [Tel Aviv] to M. Sharett (New York). 16 December 1949

Telegram;[1] Outg.: C.Z.A. A245/183

Summary

Ben-Gurion unhesitatingly rejects Sharett's resignation,[2] saying that "it is impossible from my own personal standpoint and that of all the other comrades. Those who brought about the 14th of May must not part." He adds that "aside from the grave internal and external damage" which Sharett's resignation would cause, it is not justified because: (a) Sharett could not have foreseen what happened at the U.N.; (b) since the founding of the State, there have been many instances when the Government and the Party did not accept Ben-Gurion's opinion, sometimes even on serious and fundamental issues, and he had to relinquish his own stand because of a contrary majority stand; (c) the leadership must stand together in a crisis; even Mapam, whose position is like Sharett's, is standing behind the Government. These were the considerations which have led Ben-Gurion not to show Sharett's cable either to the Cabinet or to the Party.[3]

Notes

1. Draft in Shiloah's handwriting. Most probably the text of the cable was communicated in a telephone conversation between Ben-Gurion and Sharett. (See M. Sharett, *Diary*, [Hebrew], Vol. VI, pp. 1534–35.)
2. See No. 490 and nn. 1 and 2 *ibid.*
3. On 16 December, Ben-Gurion copied into his diary the texts of the cables exchanged between Sharett and himself. In the entry for that day he also wrote: "There is as yet no strong reaction on Jerusalem on the part of any of the parties. This morning Weizmann telephoned to say that he had come to the conclusion that he has been wrong and I have been right about Jerusalem."

499. Y. Bezner[1] [Tel Aviv] to D. Horowitz and E. Kaplan. 16 December 1949

Copy: 130.20/2481/3

Summary

Bezner reports on his talk with the American Ambassador to Israel. The talk initially revolved around economic topics connected with Bezner's recent appointment, but after a time the Ambassador turned the discussion to political matters. He criticized the *Palestine Post* for its anti-American position not only on Israeli affairs but also on such general issues as that of Germany, it taking a pro-Soviet position on this matter. The Ambassador cited in this connection the articles by David Courtney,[2] Poulos,[3] and others.

McDonald had several comments on Israel's policy versus the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. According to him, Israel's economic situation was very difficult and only the U.S. with its 6 million Jews could help her out. The U.S.S.R. had not evinced any interest in Israel during the worst of the fighting during the War of Independence, nor does her attitude towards Russian Jewry signify any good intentions. McDonald feels that Israel's declarations of neutrality are understandable but, in actuality, it would be better for Israel to join the Western powers openly and to participate in the Marshall Plan which would bring about economic prosperity in Israel. McDonald noted the inconsistency in Israel's official position. On the one hand, there were attacks on A. Pauker,[4] and on the other, there are the Foreign Minister's statements on the principle of neutrality. He angrily complained that the Government tolerated the hostile tone of the *Palestine Post,* and advised it to exert its influence to persuade the newspaper to change its style.

As for the transfer of the government offices and the Knesset to Jerusalem,[5] McDonald said that the U.S. and Britain were not foremost among those demanding that the U.N. set up the machinery for implementing the Assembly's resolution, and if such machinery were set up, these countries would not appoint representatives to it; however, for at least the next few months America and Britain would not be able to act in defiance of the U.N. nor to damage its prestige. For this reason, the U.S. could not indirectly recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel by transferring her diplomatic mission there or even by allowing visits to Sharett by its official representatives, should his office be transferred to Jerusalem. McDonald showed particular interest in whether the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be transferred to Jerusalem and warned of the political damage which this step would cause.

Notes

1. Itzhaq Bezner was appointed a member of the Israel Purchasing Mission in the U.S.
2. David Courtney, the pen name of D.R. Elston, author of "Column One" in the *Palestine Post* and formerly a British official in the Mandatory Government.
3. Probably Constantine Poulos, the Overseas News Agency correspondent. Poulos was staying in Israel at that time and published articles in the *Palestine Post.*
4. See No. 393, n. 1.
5. See Editorial Note , pp. 289–290 above.

500. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to M. Sharett (New York). 16 December 1949

Notes

1. For several months, the representatives of Israel and Egypt on the Mixed Armistice Commission had been carrying on negotiations over Israel's proposal to divide the no-man's-land in the Beit Hanun area. The Egyptian representatives demonstrated a willingness to arrive at an agreement and had given the Israeli representatives some cause for believing that the agreement would be signed on 21 December. The agreement was not signed as planned, largely because of opposition on Egyptian political and military levels to the signing of an agreement which would fix a change in the armistice lines and would enable the establishment of settlements in the territory which would be turned over to Israel. Following concessions by both parties, the agreement was signed on 22 February 1950. (See the correspondence in file 130.02/2436/5 and the text of the agreement in file 130.16/2951/7.)
2. Sharett had his doubts about Eytan's proposal, and was unconvinced by his arguments. He advised him to wait at least until the agreement was ratified by Jordan. Sharett also pointed out the drawbacks of a premature appeal to the U.S. (X864, 19 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5.)

501. M. Keren (Washington) to W. Eytan. 16 December 1949

Notes

1. Reference is to a draft resolution submitted by the French representative on the Trusteeship Council, censuring Israel for her most recent steps in Jerusalem which were a breach of the Assembly's resolution. In the end, the draft resolution was dropped and France and Belgium submitted a more moderate one instead (see Editorial Note, p. 309 above).
2. See Editorial Notes, pp. 272–4, 289–290 above, and Nos. 482 and 487.
3. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1543–4.

502. S. Kaddar[1] (Paris) to M. Fischer (Paris). 16 December 1949

Report: 130.10/2520/4

Summary

At his meeting with Kaddar, the question of the Israeli Minister's participation in Jewish and Zionist gatherings in France was brought up. Kaddar explained that this question had arisen as a result of the conflict between the Legation's desire to establish friendly and loyal relations with the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and public opinion in Israel which considers it a duty to create opportunities for immigration to Israel for every Jew who so wishes. In France itself there are two kinds of Jews: French Jews (Israelites) and Jews in France (Israelis). The latter view France as a way station *en route* to Israel. M. Binoche said that as far as diplomatic protocol was concerned, the representative of a foreign nation could not take part in the meetings of

citizens of the host country. It was obvious to him that there could not be separate laws for Israeli representatives, for if there were, then representatives of Arab states might wish to appear at meetings of Muslim citizens of France. Although there is nothing to prevent a foreign representative from participating in meetings of a private nature and with a cultural or educational content, such as within the framework of the Jewish Agency or similar organizations, great caution must be exercised in respect of public meetings to which the diplomatic corps has not been invited and in which only the Israeli representative is participating. Kaddar explained that the Israeli representative made a practice of insuring in advance that nothing should occur at the meeting to place him in an uncomfortable situation. Binoche replied that Fischer's tact was well known to him. In conclusion it was agreed that protocol and the representative's own good sense would guide him in his decision whether or not to attend any particular public meeting.

Notes

1. Shlomo Kaddar, First Secretary at the Israeli Legation in Paris.

503. A. Moissis (Athens) to G. Avner. 16 December 1949

Notes

1. Cf. No. 480, para. 3, and see *ibid.*, n. 2.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
3. The original reads ''serait''.
4. See No. 444.
5. See No. 480.

504. D. Ben-Gurion: Diary Note [Tel Aviv]. 18 December 1949

I.M.D.E.A.

Summary

Eytan informed Ben-Gurion that the Italian Minister had told him confidentially that highly placed circles in the Italian government wished to mediate between Israel and the Vatican. The Minister wanted to find out whether Israel would consent to extraterritorial status for the Holy Places, such as that enjoyed by certain buildings in Rome and Italy into which the police are not authorized to enter. Eytan's only reply was that first the term ''Holy Place'' must be defined. Ben-Gurion told Eytan that extraterritorial status could be a basis for an agreement although he feared that Italian mediation might anger France, and hence it would be better to discuss this directly with the Vatican. Eytan reported that the next day he would meet Neuville[1] who was also likely to raise the subject.

Notes

1. See No. 506.

505. M. Amir (Brussels) to G. Avner. 18 December 1949

Copy: 130.02/2382/13

Summary

Further to his letter of 15 December,[1] Amir reports on his talk with the Secretary-General of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 15 December. The interview had been originally arranged to discuss the refugee problem, but in light of the situation which had arisen in the wake of the U.N. resolution[2] Boon requested a talk on the latter subject. He criticized the U.N. for not voting on the Swedish-Dutch resolution[3] that with certain amendments could have been adopted by most states. As for Israel, he quite understood her forceful reaction, but he thought that it was not good to be in open conflict with and rebellion against the U.N. and that a compromise should be worked out. He advised Israel to assist the U.N. without sacrificing her own interests. Boon said that, in his opinion, the U.N. resolution had been adopted because of heavy pressure on the part of the Church. Many governments which had voted for internationalization now felt that the resolution was worthless and that a real, implementable solution must be found.

Boon referred to Amir's reply at a press conference at The Hague when the latter said that Israel considered herself no longer committed to her previous proposal of an agreement with the U.N. on international supervision of the Holy Places.[4] He asked whether Israel would, despite Amir's statement, agree to reopen the discussion on that proposal. Amir replied that he would communicate Boon's suggestion to his Government but that he was not authorized to commit himself on anything.

Throughout the meeting Boon was very cautious, emphasizing that he was expressing his private ideas which had not been cleared with his superiors. Amir's opinion, however, was that the idea of mediation had been broached in the State Department or the British Foreign Office and that the talk with Boon was not the result of sudden inspiration but had been carefully considered and planned in advance.

Further on, Boon raised the subject of the memorandum of 25 November[5] and told him that *de jure* recognition of Israel was on Holland's agenda and that she intended to consult with the Indonesians on this matter once the latter had been granted independence.

Notes

1. In file 130.10/2550/10.
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.

No. 505 – Notes (continued)

3. See Editorial Note, pp. 251–2 above, and Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–793.
4. See Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–788.
5. In file 130.10/2550/10.

506. Meeting: W. Eytan – R. Neuville (Jerusalem, 19 December 1949)

Report: 130.02/2413/9

Summary

Neuville initiated the meeting with Eytan in the wake of the Assembly's resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem.[1] He said that at the time he had told the members of the French government that an international regime was unimplementable and added that he was not proud of France's part in the debates on the future of Jerusalem in the Assembly and in the Conciliation Commission.

In his opinion, Israel had erred in submitting her proposal to the Assembly[2] because it created the impression that the Holy Places were all under Israeli control whereas most of them were actually in the Jordanian part of Jerusalem, while the Holy Places within Israel were of less importance.

Neuville stated that the Christian world would never be reconciled to Jewish rule or supervision of the Holy Places; he attempted to explain this phenomenon on the basis of superstitions originating in history and myth.

Neuville, who totally ruled out the idea of internationalization, proposed that Jewish Jerusalem be included in the area under Israeli control and that it become the home of the State's governmental authorities. As for the Arab part, he proposed a plan for U.N. aid in safeguarding the Holy Places by means of a military unit whose soldiers would be recruited from the local residents and whose officers would be from other nations. According to Neuville, King Abdallah would not object to the formation of such a unit. He dismissed Eytan's fear that the proposed military unit would pose a threat to Israel, for, according to Neuville, its sole purpose would be to safeguard the Holy Places. He reassured Eytan that there was no likelihood of a demand to set up a similar unit on the Israeli side since Israel had no Holy Places requiring protection.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. See Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.

507. Memorandum by J. Tekoah [Tel Aviv]. 19 December 1949

Notes

1. Yosef Tekoah, Assistant to the Legal Adviser in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. Actually 9 December. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
3. See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–793.

508. G. Rafael (New York) to W. Eytan. 19 December 1949

Notes

1. Eytan had asked Rafael to sound out Riley about the resolution on the internationalization of Jerusalem (16 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5).

509. M. Eliash (London) to M. Comay. 19 December 1949

Notes

1. Eliezer Felix Shinnar, Commercial Attaché at the Israeli Legation in London.

510. G. Avner (Tel Aviv) to W. Eytan. 20 December 1949

Report: 130.10/2550/10

Summary

The Dutch representative in Israel, J. Nederbragt, requested this meeting with Avner in order to discuss various matters pertaining to Jerusalem. Although he had not been directly requested to do so by his Government, his words reflected the Netherlands' position.

He expressed vigorous support of Israel's latest practical steps, but advised her leaders to refrain from making speeches which would stir up public opinion in Israel and which were "based on heroics against the U.N. and the Catholic world". He expressed confidence that the present dispute would not lead to a real clash between Israel and the Catholic world and certainly not with the Protestant world. He supported Israel's stand on principle, saying that he, too, felt that the attempt to impose an international regime on Jerusalem would only create disaster in the city and undermine the safety of the Holy Places. He was certain that the partition of the city and the undertakings of the two sides to safeguard the Holy Places constituted the best guarantees of their safety. He advised Israel to continue on the course on which she had embarked during the past week so that the process which she had begun could reach its conclusion gradually, without disturbance.

The Dutch representative noted that, in his address in the Assembly,[1] Sharett had announced that Israel accepted the Swedish-Dutch proposal[2] as a basis for discussion and stated that the Netherlands have remained committed to this proposal. He announced officially to Avner that he was willing to begin detailed discussions on modifying the proposal in ways acceptable to Israel. As for *de jure* recognition, there was no reason to expect a favourable move on this matter in the near future since it depended mainly on the Belgians who were more extreme than the Dutch in their attitude towards Israel in general and towards the Jerusalem issue in particular.[3]

Notes

1. Sharett spoke on 9 December (see *GAOR, 4th Sess., Plenary*, 275th Meeting, pp. 598–602, and file 130.02/2443/5).
2. See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–793.
3. Cf. No. 505.

511. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 20 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.
2. See No. 492, n. 2.

512. Note by M. Keren (Washington). 21 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. See No. 460, n. 4.
3. 21 December 1949, 93.01/2181/7.
4. A Jewish anti-Zionist organization violently opposed to the establishment of the State of Israel. Lessing Rosenwald headed the organization at that time.
5. See No. 460.

513. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 21 December 1949

Notes

1. See Editorial Notes, pp. 251–252, 281–282 above.

514. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to the Embassy of Israel in Washington. 22 December 1949

Notes

1. Cf. *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1555.

Editorial Note

The U.N. Trusteeship Council resolution on the question of Jerusalem

On 20 December the Trusteeship Council passed a Franco-Belgian draft resolution on Jerusalem. It was adopted by a majority of 5, with no votes against and 7 abstentions. For details of the voting and Israel's response see Nos. 515 and 526. Following is the text of the resolution:

The Trusteeship Council,

Concerned at the removal to Jerusalem of certain ministries and central departments of the Government of Israel,

Considering that such action ignores and is incompatible with the provisions of paragraph II of General Assembly resolution 303 (IV) of 9 December 1949,

1. *Is of the opinion* that the action of the Government of Israel is likely to render more difficult the implementation of the statute of Jerusalem with which the Council is entrusted by the General Assembly resolution of 9 December 1949;

2. *Requests* the President of the Trusteeship Council:

   (a) To invite the Government of Israel to submit a written statement on the matters covered by this resolution, to revoke these measures, and to abstain from any action liable to hinder the implementation of the General Assembly resolution of 9 December 1949;

   (b) To keep closely in touch with the developments in Jerusalem while the Council is not in session;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to communicate this resolution promptly to all Member States of the United Nations.

(See *TCOR, 2nd Sp. Sess., Resolutions,* Supplement No. 1, pp. 2–3).

515. Memorandum by W. Eytan (Tel Aviv, 24 December 1949)

93.02/175/10

Summary

Eytan analyses possible developments in the Jerusalem issue in the coming

months in light of the Assembly's resolution,[1] and attempts to map out the practical steps which Israel must take in order to foil the plan and persuade the world that it cannot consider the U.N. resolution as the final word on Jerusalem. He recommends that the transfer of government offices continue and that stress be laid on creating facts rather than on making public statements; above all, one must avoid offending foreign representatives. At the same time, he recommends that a diplomatic campaign be waged on four fronts;

(a) U.N. personnel. Such activity should be carried out primarily by the Israeli delegation at the U.N.

(b) The member states in the Trusteeship Council. Eytan thinks that the voting of the Council members on the transfer of government offices to Jerusalem[2] is encouraging, at least for Israel's future policy-making. He analyses the votes of the states one by one and the prospects of exerting influence on them: (1) Iraq – hopeless. (2) Mexico – will be replaced by Argentina in early 1950. Although, as a Catholic state, Argentina cannot refuse to obey the Vatican, Eytan thinks it possible that she may be led to exert a moderating influence. The diplomatic machinery required for this task already exists and Eytan recommends that it be directed at President Perón and his wife and Cardinal Copello, and not necessarily at their Minister of Foreign Affairs. He suggests that Tsur be brought into action in Buenos Aires and Manguel in Israel, and expresses the certainty that the latter will be glad to do this [. . . . .].[3] (3) The Philippines. This is also a Catholic state, but, like Argentina, is amenable to persuasion. Without going into detail about General Romulo's views,[4] Eytan recommends that close personal ties be established in Manila. He proposes that President Weizmann write to President Quirino and that he himself write the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felino Neri [. . . . .].[5] (4) Belgium – her anti-Israeli position on this and other issues is well known. Eytan does not see any prospect of persuading Belgium, and suggests a special consultation to discuss how to try and change her position. One possibility which Eytan raises is activity through the Netherlands or the Belgian ambassadors in Washington, London, and Rome. (5) France – Eytan is certain that despite France's position favouring internationalization, it is possible to bring her back to the way of reason. He recommends diplomatic activity not only through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but also, and primarily, within political circles in which Israel has some influence, including President Weizmann's circle of friends such as Denivelle;[6] a group of influential Jews such as Blum,[7] Moch,[8] Daniel Mayer,[9] and Réné Mayer,[10] and others. The planning of the campaign should be entrusted to Avner.

On the other hand, seven states abstained in the voting and at least some of these must surely entertain doubts as to the very idea of internationalization: (1) Australia – we may hope that the new government there will wish to align itself with the British position. Australia's membership in the Trusteeship Council obliges Israel to appoint a Minister to Canberra as soon as possible.

Israel can explain her case to the Australian Minister in Tel Aviv [. . . . .].[11] (2) New Zealand is even likelier than Australia to align herself with British and American policy. It should be possible for Israel to exert influence through New Zealand's Ambassador in Washington and her High Commissioner in London. (3) China – it is possible to attempt to exert some influence on this country through the Chinese delegation at the U.N. and the Chinese representative on the Trusteeship Council. Eytan recommends that Israel operate only through Eban in New York, and that no action be taken from Israel or through indirect diplomatic channels except for Washington. (4) The Dominican Republic – in Eytan's opinion, this state may join the American camp, but the main activity on this score will be in the hands of the Americans since Israel has only the most tenuous links with the Dominican Republic. The only possible channels are Elath's ties with the Dominican Ambassador in Washington and Drapkin's ties with the head of the Dominican delegation at the U.N. (5) The U.S.S.R. – there is not much hope of influencing her, but nonetheless Eytan suggests that, for the time being, Israel postpone the transfer of Russian property in Jerusalem to the Soviets. (6–7) Britain and the U.S. – theirs is the key position and Israel must discuss separately the lines of action to take with these states.

(c) Action *vis-à-vis* all the members of the U.N. who are not members of the Trusteeship Council, to prepare for the possibility that the subject may be raised again at the next session of the Assembly. Israel must begin diplomatic activities among the states with the greatest influence and those which have demonstrated their ability to adopt an independent stand in Assembly debates. Eytan enumerates these states.

(d) The Vatican – Eytan recommends that a well-thought-out plan be laid for studying the problem and recommending a course of action. He thinks that Israel's relations with the Vatican should not be viewed as a marginal affair which can be handled by the Ministry of Religious Affairs.

Notes

1. See Editorial Note, pp. 281–2 above.
2. See Editorial Note, above.
3. Five words omitted here.
4. Carlos P. Romulo, head of the Philippine delegation at the U.N. and President of the Fourth Assembly.
5. Five words omitted here.
6. Léon Denivelle, French chemist and industrialist.
7. Léon Blum, President of the French Socialist Party, formerly French Prime Minister.
8. Jules Moch, French Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior.
9. Daniel Mayer, formerly French Minister of Labour.
10. René Mayer, French Minister of Justice.
11. One part of the sentence is omitted here. The Australian Minister, O.C.W. Fuhrman, arrived in Israel on 19 December 1949.

516. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 25 December 1949

Notes

1. Untraced.
2. Henri M. Laurentie, alternate representative of France on the Trusteeship Council.

517. W. Eytan (Tel Aviv) to J. Tsur (Buenos Aires). 25 December 1949

Coded Tel. AR17; Outg.: 130.09/2294/1

Summary

In reply to Cable RO21[1] Eytan instructs Tsur to stress the following points in his talk: (1) The Assembly had entrusted the Trusteeship Council with an impossible task and it was the duty of them all to help extricate the Council from its distress with the slightest possible injury to the dignity of the U.N. (2) Israel was anxious to avoid conflicts with the U.N., but she could not deviate from the path which her past history and her practical welfare dictated. (3) The solution to the Jerusalem problem would be found in the realm of facts and not in the hopeless pursuit of the ideal. (4) The fact that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel does not bode ill for the Holy Places since (a) the most important ones are on the Arab side; (b) the Assembly's resolution does not involve a retreat from Israel's commitments to safeguard the Holy Places under her control. (5) It should be made clear to Argentina and other countries that it was the irrevocable decision of the Jewish people to have Jerusalem for its capital and that Israel will continue to transfer her government offices to that city. (6) Tsur should overtly imply that Israel would soon sign a peace treaty with Jordan according to which the partition of Jerusalem between the two states would be accepted and endorsed by both governments. (7) Doubt should be cast on the legality and good sense of the Assembly's instructions to the Trusteeship Council to upset the state of affairs which the Security Council had explicitly confirmed as recently as 11 August of the current year.[2] (8) The President and the Minister are to be assured that, should Argentina adopt in the Council a line whose goal was safeguarding the Holy Places without infringing upon Israel's and Jordan's sovereignty over Jerusalem, she could rely on the support of Britain and America who were seeking a solution along these lines. (9) Continuous contacts with both officials as the issue developed should be proposed.

Notes

1. In advance of the expected invitation to an interview with the Argentine President and the Foreign Minister, Tsur requested clear instructions on the Jerusalem issue (23 December 1949, 130.09/2294/3).
2. See Editorial Note, pp. 133–5 above.

518. A. Eban (New York) to W. Eytan. 28 December 1949

Notes

1. Eytan told Sharett about Ben-Gurion's enthusiastic response to President Weizmann's proposal to send a letter to President Truman on the subject of Jerusalem, and requested Eban to submit a draft (20 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5).
2. President Weizmann's letter was sent to President Truman on 3 January 1950 (file 130.02/2443/5). See also *FRUS*, 1950, V, pp. 658–61.

519. A. Katznelson [New York] to M. Sharett. 28 December 1949

Copy: 130.02/2384/21

Summary

Katznelson reports on his talk with Tsarapkin, who said that the Jerusalem question was a matter of principle which the U.S.S.R. could not disavow and that she could not consent to the return of the British to this part of Palestine.

Tsarapkin asked for details on the negotiations with Abdallah and questioned whether Israel was not strengthening British influence through her negotiations with the King. Katznelson replied that it was precisely an agreement with Abdallah which would weaken the King's dependence upon the British, and that Israel was interested in friendly relations with Abdallah because he was the only element amenable to negotiations in this part of Palestine.

Tsarapkin inquired who was the Husseini who was appearing in New York on behalf of the Arab Higher Committee, and asked for an analysis of the recent revolution in Syria.[1] Katznelson gave a detailed account of the Mufti's leadership in Palestine and maintained that the only stable element among the Arabs was Abdallah.

As for Israeli–Russian relations, Katznelson said that Israel's friendship was based upon their common hatred of war and Fascism. Tsarapkin confirmed this, saying that the Jewish people and the U.S.S.R., who had been the victims of Hitler's campaign of annihilation, were friends and would remain friends.

Notes

1. On 19 December there was a military *coup* in Syria in the setting of opposition to union with Iraq, headed by Lt.-Colonel Adib Shishakli. The Syrian Chief of Staff, Sami al-Hinawi, was deposed along with several army and government heads. The Army Council appointed a new Chief of Staff and Shishakli was appointed his deputy. The *coup* did not affect the civilian government, and at the end of December, a new government was set up. (See *Information to Israel Missions Abroad*, No. 50, 28 December 1949, 130.02/4364/1.)

520. M. Sharett (Tel Aviv) to A. Eban (New York). 29 December 1949

Notes

1. Eban requested information on the progress of the talks with Abdallah (27 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5).
2. The meeting with the King was held on 23 December. In consultations with Shiloah the previous day, Ben-Gurion suggested that during the meeting, the discussion on the following subjects be concluded: "(a) The Jewish Quarter as far as the Western Wall for us; (b) free access to Mt. Scopus for us, to Bethlehem for them; (c) free access to the sea; (d) the west bank of the Dead Sea for us; (e) an arrangement on Latrun; (f) agreement on reciprocal adjustment of the lines; (g) discussion of economic questions (compensation and Naharayim). Should they agree, they will initial it and publish a joint announcement that there had been talks and that they had come to the decision to initiate official peace negotiations." (Ben-Gurion's Diary, 24 December 1949, I.M.D.E.A.)
3. Untraced. Cf. the report on the meeting in *FRUS*, 1949, VI, pp. 1558–62.
4. See *FRUS*, 1949, VI, p. 1565.

521. Memorandum by S. Rosenne (Tel Aviv, 29 December 1949)

Summary

Further to his memorandum of 18 December 1949[1] and with reference to Eytan's memorandum,[2] Rosenne suggests that the final decision on the Jerusalem question in the international arena be deferred as long as possible. The delay would permit Israel to create numerous *faits accomplis* in Jerusalem and to plan a diplomatic campaign. Rosenne proposes the following guidelines for action:

(1) The dispute over Jerusalem should not be presented openly as a dispute between Israel and the U.N. He notes that the majority which supported internationalization included states which were friendly to Israel and might support her if she played her cards right. He proposes that the difficulty be presented as a dispute between the heart and the mind, and to that end Israel should demonstrate the illogical and heterogeneous combination of states which made up the internationalization majority in the U.N.

(2) Israel must oppose the convening of a special session of the Assembly in the spring, for the problem of Palestine might arise there in all its seriousness.

(3) Israel must do her utmost to prevent the Jerusalem problem from being referred to the Security Council.

(4) The Trusteeship Council resolution of 19 December 1949[3] on the working procedures of the Council was favourable to Israel but it was desirable to apprise the members of the Council from time to time of the true situation in Jerusalem. The possibility of sending official communiqués to the Trusteeship Council should not be dismissed in view of the fact that

Israel is not formally represented on the Council. Rosenne does not recommend that a forceful reply be sent at this stage to the Council's latest communication to Israel.[4] He especially recommends that Israel not disclose to the Council all the legal, factual and moral arguments at her disposal.

(5) The general objective must be to draw out the debates in the Trusteeship Council for a period of not less than six months in order to prevent the convening of a special session of the Assembly in the spring. Should peace prevail in Jerusalem, it will be possible to prevent the subject from being raised in the Security Council.

(6) Israel must decide upon her ultimate goal. In the last part of his address in the Assembly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed Israel's willingness to accept the Swedish-Dutch resolution[5] as a basis for settling the problem. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there is a version of this address[6] in which the minister intended to criticize this resolution in order to bring it into line with Israel's aspirations. In Rosenne's opinion, there is no reason to change Israel's position, but if the matter can be concluded with an agreement between the U.N. and Israel based upon Israel's first proposal,[7] so much the better.

(7) It is essential that Israel's diplomatic machinery be put into operation forthwith in selected countries in order to persuade them to send to the Trusteeship Council proposals favourable to Israel.

(8) It is essential to achieve a settlement with the Vatican and to formulate the proposed settlement with the U.N. in the spirit of the accord with the Vatican.

Notes

1. In file 130.02/2451/4.
2. No. 515.
3. The resolution entrusted the President of the Trusteeship Council with the preparation of a draft statute for Jerusalem to be submitted to the January 1950 session of the Council. (See *TCOR, 2nd Sp. Sess., Resolutions,* Supplement No. 1, p. 2.)
4. See No. 526 and n. 1 *ibid.*
5. See Appendix E, Main Volume, pp. 789–793.
6. Dated 9 December 1949, in file 130.02/2443/5.
7. See Appendix D, Main Volume, pp. 783–8.

522. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 29 December 1949

Notes

1. In another cable (X882, 29 December 1949, 93.01/2202/5) Eban gave his initial reaction to Garreau's plan. He noted with approval the fact that this plan might help undo the internationalization resolution, although he advised that it be rejected because it proposed demilitarization and an enclave. He suggested that they try to persuade Garreau to confine the proposed enclave to part of the Old City and Mt. Zion only. Sharett approved of Eban's proposal but queried its effect on the talks being conducted with Abdallah. He asked for Eban's reaction to the idea that Israel should confront Abdallah with two possibilities regarding Jerusalem, namely, that the King either forms a joint front with Israel against the Trusteeship Council or Israel will reserve the right to reach an agreement with Garreau. (Cable Y613, 30 December 1949, 130.09/2329/14.) See also No. 525.

523. G. Rafael [New York] to M. Sharett. 29 December 1949

Copy: 93.03/89/22

Summary

Rafael reports on his talks with Rothman[1] and Hillman.[2] The latter told him that the President grew very angry when he heard about Ben-Gurion's statement that "the whole world is against us",[3] asking whether the U.S. was not part of this world and whether her support was of so little consequence to Israel. The President advised Israel to base her claims regarding Jerusalem on the justice of her case and especially on the Jewish people's traditional ties with Jerusalem. He suggested quoting the Prophets instead of making ridiculous threats on the use of force. Rafael feels that the President's response shows how closely Washington follows the Prime Minister's statements.

Rothman told Rafael that Australia's new government would significantly reduce its activities in the U.N. as a result of the lesson it had learned from the numerous times it had intervened in the U.N. and had only succeeded in getting into trouble with Britain, the Dominions, and the U.S. From now on, Australia would bring her foreign policy into line with that of Britain and the U.S.

According to Plimsoll, a member of the Australian delegation at the U.N., his country would try to extricate herself from her former support of the internationalization plan. He also mentioned that he had been told that the Vatican was willing to come to a compromise which would not only safeguard its practical interests in Jerusalem but would also enable the states which had supported internationalization to retreat honourably from their position.

Rafael suggests that, in possible talks with Vatican emissaries, we should mention the argument that the Arabs' motive for supporting internationalization did not spring from their concern for Christianity, but rather from the

opportunity to undermine once again the very existence of Israel, and that the Vatican must bear in mind that if war should break out between Israel and the Arab states, all of Jerusalem and Palestine might fall into Israel's hands.

Rafael proposes that, in talks with the Soviets on a possible agreement with Abdallah, Israeli diplomats should utilize the argument that, without Jordan's consent, Israel could not implement some extensive development plans and thus her economic dependence upon the West would increase.

Finally, Rafael congratulates Sharett in advance on his upcoming address in the Knesset.[4]

Notes

1. Probably A. D. Rothman, *Sydney Morning Herald* reporter in the U.S.
2. William (Bill) Hillman, member of the editorial board of *Collier's Magazine* and manager of its Washington office.
3. See No. 487.
4. The debate on Jerusalem in the Knesset was held on 2 January 1950.

524. M. Fischer (Paris) to G. Avner. 29 December 1949

Notes

1. See No. 519, n. 1.
2. Christian Pineau, Minister of Transport, Tourism and Public Works in the Bidault Government.
3. René Pleven, Minister of Defence in the Bidault Government.
4. The letter to F. Lichtenstein, director of the European Office of the Department of Youth Aliyah, was found in the file. The correspondence on this subject was also found in file 93.02/168/5.

525. A. Eban (New York) to M. Sharett. 30 December 1949

Notes

1. No. 522.

526. A. Eban [New York] to R. Garreau (New York). 30 December 1949

Notes

1. The letter and the appendix are in file 93.03/3037/14. See the resolution of the Trusteeship Council in Editorial Note, p. 309 above.
2. See *TCOR, 2nd Sp. Sess.*, 8th Meeting, 20 December 1949, pp. 76–84.
3. Error in the original. The date should be 13 December. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.
4. See Editorial Note, pp. 289–290 above.

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TO MAIN VOLUME AND COMPANION VOLUME

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References to the principal addressees in this volume – Ben-Gurion, Eban, Eytan and Sharett – are brought only when they are the authors of documents or when they are mentioned in them.

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* *Abbreviations*

b. – born

n – note

edn – editorial note

CV – Companion Volume

IDF – Israel Defence Forces

Geneva, Conciliation Commission session in 632n 645 722 727 755 760; *CV* 248